Using the data available on the site “iraqbodycount.org”, the Wikileaks data are confirmed, but more importantly it confirmed the period 2012-2017 for which there was no data available from the US military. Materialization/visualization is credible: a disturbing coincidence. These data collected by the actors of Iraqbodycount.org are the only ones existing over such a long period (2 complete periods of the “War Cycle”) and which are so credible.

Iraq: What can we conclude about the visualization/materialization of the “War Cycle”?

The principle of the Materialization/Visualization of the “War Cycle” seems credible, first with the data of the US army via Wikileaks, then from the data of Iraqbodycount.org.

• Hundreds of thousands of reports have been used to draw these curves,
• We have 2 documented sources that converge on the first period (2003-2011), then only one on the period 2011-2022,

• What is there to dispute in this visualization of the “War Cycle”? At this stage it is a beginning of proof, insofar as it will take other cases to be able to convince that it is not a simple coincidence,
• We observe a similar time lag (6 months to one year) on the 2 successive data amplification peaks (Iraq). The “observed template” is therefore a few months behind the “theoretical template”. This is not surprising, given that the cyclical phenomenon is not a perfect sinusoid, but probably an imperfect sinusoid that shifts a little at each peak, in one direction or another. We would need to know the origin of the phenomenon in order to make the necessary corrections. In 2014, there is a sharp peak that seems to correspond to the shift in the peak observed in both the outbreak of wars and the Syria graph that you can look at the following page.

Syria: Visualization of a period of the “War Cycle”

(The following text and table were taken from Wikipedia)

The following figures were all compiled by the SOHR, which is considered as an authoritative source on the subject. The figures are for documented deaths only, while SOHR estimates that another 100,000 undocumented deaths occurred in addition. The data includes not only civilians, but also all combatants on both sides.

Because the war was not as long as in Iraq, the data covers only one period of the “War Cycle,” but there are similar data:

• The attenuation peaks correspond well to the minimum dead periods
• There is a lag between the “Theoretical Amplification Peak” and the “Actual Amplification Peak” which is more in 2014. This lag was seen for all the wars that broke out in 2014. In the first half of 2014 you had an Israeli-Palestinian war, the war in Ukraine, the war against the Islamic State.

What do these Iraq & Syria data bring us for the demonstration of the “War Cycle”?

The data available on the Syrian war is a little less precise, but it does confirm what is found on the Iraq war that started in 2003. This is very important, since if one were to rely solely on the dates of the wars’ outbreak, these two wars (Iraq and Syria) broke out near a mitigation peak. Showing that amplification phases have an effect on the course of the war is very difficult by CONTEXTS alone. But by curves based on tens or hundreds of thousands of reports, it gives these curious coincidences, as if the “War Cycle” had an effect on the course of the war and its victims. While in the case of the dates of the outbreak of wars alone, one can imagine that only the leaders are sensitive to this phenomenon, with such curves one can see an effect on all the combatants and armed forces involved. The materialization is consistent with the modeling.

 It is recommended that you reread in “Modeling the outbreak of wars to understand the war cycle” the section ” Case 3: the accumulation of causes is well above the threshold of war triggering, even before the amplification phase” . The two wars in Iraq and Syria are two examples of this case. The visualization/materialization of the “War Cycle” helps to better understand this “Case 3“.

The data and graphs available on the UCDP project confirm the materialization of the War Cycle

The graph “Fatalities in state-based conflicts by Region (1989-2022)”, produced by UCDP (Uppsala Conflict Data Program) and published in 2023, completes the demonstration outlined for the materialization section. This graph confirms the demonstration of 5 phases of amplification.

These data take the materialization of the “Recurrent War Cycle” from a validated hypothesis to a virtual certainty. There will still be those who see it as a mere coincidence, but there is no more convincing evidence to date for the “Recurrent War Cycle”.

UCDP has its own definitions of war, intra-state conflicts, unilateral conflicts and deaths in armed conflicts. Here we take only the part on deaths in armed conflicts (inter- or intra-state) “Fatalities in state-based conflicts by Region”.

The graph published by UCDP is as follows:

If we add the peaks and amplification phases of the “Recurrent War Cycle”, we get this other graph:

(Areas colored red or blue have been added to the UCDP chart)

What’s striking is that each phase of amplification contains peaks of fatalities, as if there were a direct and systematic correlation between the “Recurrent War Cycle” and the number of deaths due to war.

This raises many questions:

• While the 1990 and 1999 peaks are almost perfect, the 2015 & 2024 peaks are shifted. It is accepted that the current value of 3085 days for the “War Cycle” is an approximate, average value, which varies from peak to peak. Some cycles may be shorter, and amplification peaks may be shifted. To date, there has been no recalibration since the T0 of the outbreak of the First World War. This will probably have to be done soon. This research awaits a global resumption by a new multidisciplinary team to recalculate this mean value and make the necessary adjustments.
• In the amplification phase around 2007, the Middle East death toll is close to 0. This is not consistent with the fatalities of the Iraq war from 2003 onwards, as confirmed by Wikileaks and Iraqbodycount. The data, as presented by Wikileaks and Iraqbodycount, presents the UCDP team with a methodological problem, due to the fact that the categorization of the data is not the same as that of UCDP. The result is that, in the absence of a methodology equivalent to their own, all Wikileaks and Iraqbodycount data seems to have been ignored. UCDP’s data revision could reinforce this amplification phase around the 2007 amplification peak, which appears, with UCDP version 23.1, to be underestimated for Middle East data.
• The theoretical peak in December 2015 has been shifted to 2014. In fact, several wars started within a few weeks of each other in 2014 (2014 Gaza War, war in Ukraine, war against the Islamic State).
• The Ukraine-Russia war began just before the amplification phase. Should we shift the amplification peak from the 2002-2006 period?
  Probably, but we don’t know where the actual amplification peak of the “War Cycle” is over the period 2022-2026. There was the Ukraine-Russia war starting in February 2022, but there’s also the Hamas-Israel war starting on October 7, 2023. In 2026, we’ll know where the real peak is, but today the worst may be yet to come. The violence of these 2 wars seems characteristic of this amplification phase. We can legitimately wonder whether certain phases of amplification have characteristics that can lead to more violent wars, and which could explain, in part, the 2 world wars we’ve had, as well as the extremely violent wars of the 2022-2026 period.
• We might be able to identify the peak of the 2022-2026 period, if we had reliable data enabling us to know the evolution, in real time or with a time lag of a few months, of deaths due to wars. UCDP could probably do this, but has its own constraints and priorities, which are not those of the “War Cycle”.
• It is reasonable to say that all 5 phases of amplification covered by UCDP since 1989 are significant, taking into account possible future recalibrations and the possible future revision of UCDP on Iraqi data.
• No region systematically has a large number of deaths in each successive amplification phase. The phenomenon is true for each region, but at different times. It is the sum of the regions that is significant, since there is always one region, or even several at the same time, for each phase of amplification.
• Of course, this observation explains nothing. How can we imagine that a cyclical phenomenon could have such an influence on wars and collective human behavior? Our current knowledge doesn’t allow us to answer that question. Just because we can’t explain it doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist.

Conclusion of the Materialization of the “War Cycle”

This relationship between the amplification phases of the “War Cycle” and the available UCDP data is the most convincing evidence for the existence of the “War Cycle”. Without knowing it, UCDP could become a stake, in spite of themselves, in the credibility of the existence of the “War Cycle”.

This confirmed materialization raises questions that can only be answered by further research. In particular, it will be necessary to analyze the period from 1900 to 1989 to see whether this materialization can be confirmed over such a long period, and by what method.

The subject of “materialization” is a hotly debated topic. Some claim it’s a mere coincidence, while others put forward bizarre arguments. Some claim that it doesn’t make sense until we can explain it, whereas it would be more prudent to confirm the observation that has been made, knowing that the full explanation will not be known for many years. Nothing we know today in all the sciences (human, biological, neuropsychological and others…) allows us to explain how an “unidentified” phenomenon can have such an influence on humans as to engage in war and cause deaths in greater numbers than during attenuation phases. A simple coincidence? This is a flimsy argument for ignoring the facts.

Every leader on our planet should bear this reality in mind before committing themselves further to the wars of 2023 and beyond. But indifference on this subject and the absence of an official relay have prevented us from informing all those who might be concerned.

updated on November 10, 2023

References :

• Davies, Shawn, Therese Pettersson & Magnus Öberg (2023). Organized violence 1989-2022 and the return of conflicts between states. Journal of Peace Research (60-4)