2019

The War Cycle

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1.0	05/02/2018	English translation for presentation and review
1.1	06/05/2019	Updating the context graphics

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Introduction to the War Cycle

Is the term « War Cycle » the right one?

The term “War Cycle” imperfectly summarizes the reality of the identified phenomenon. This gives the impression that any War would be determined by this "War Cycle", **whereas it is only a periodic phenomenon of amplification at certain periods and of attenuation at other periods.**

The "War Cycle" has the implicit defect of imagining that all wars would be cyclical. This "a priori" leads some readers to misunderstandings from the start. They work hard to find one or more exceptions, believing that these exceptions will demonstrate that there is no "War Cycle". The good expression would be "The cycle that amplifies conflicts and wars during periods of amplification of the “War Cycle". Too long to communicate. The term "War Cycle" is therefore simplistic, but it is better for communication.

Could we have called it "War and Peace Cycle" ? Perhaps, but as we will see, it is possible to have some statistical elements from the dates of the outbreak of war but it is not possible to have credible statistical elements from the only dates of Peace. We see a trend at some cyclical periods, but it relies on too few cases to be able to speak of a "Peace Cycle", while the "War Cycle" looks credible. Implicitly, the periods of attenuation are used in the forecasts, but the objective demonstration based on data from peace treaties or the end of a fighting is more difficult. Peacebuilding is a long process in which it is difficult to give a Peace Start date, when the beginning of a war is generally unambiguous and there are enough “war outbreak events” for using them statistically. Stop fighting or an armistice or a ceasefire is not the beginning of peace: it just indicates a lull, a decrease or a reduction of the violence that led to the war.

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Thanks

We must begin by thanking those who are here to try to understand this subject. It is both difficult to express new ideas clearly and difficult to understand if it comes out of existing standards, as it is.

It happens that the term "War Cycle" provokes "a priori" reactions without even examining the data presented. We must therefore thank those who will accept to go beyond the "a priori". The expression of these "a priori" is useful and necessary to arrive at an understandable presentation. The author has not yet had the opportunity to confront all his ideas and so has not yet found a clear form of expression for all those who would like to understand the War Cycle

Some examples of "a priori":

- **Determinism, fatalism?**
  This may give the impression that the author is trying to bring events into a deterministic world that has been rejected for many centuries. The observed and projected trends may never happen if we take our destiny into our own hands. There is no fatalism or determinism. When you see a car rushing against a wall, you still have time to steering to avoid going against a wall. To foresee that the car goes into the wall is it deterministic? No.
  This "a priori" is today the biggest obstacle to understanding the "War Cycle". Some people want to see predictions like those that oracles could do in ancient times.
  If forecasts made from the understanding of the "War Cycle", proved to be accurate, it is because they were not used to prevent the wars that were coming. The day the "War Cycle" is recognized, it is possible that most wartime predictions will never happen. Awareness of a possible "war risk" could help to avoid them.
  The day the "War Cycle" forecasts are denied by the facts, it will mean that understanding the "War Cycle" has helped promote peace by avoiding wars. Part of the goal will have been achieved.
  There is no fatalism or determinism, simply the expression of a tendency resulting from the knowledge of the "War Cycle"
- **A "war cycle" cannot exist because there will always be a war that comes in an unlikely time in relation to the "War Cycle"**
  I confirm that there will always be wars that will happen at the most unlikely moment, but there is indeed a "war cycle" that will increase the probability of wars at certain times, while minimizing (without completely avoiding) wars at other times.
  Rather than talking about wars that would all follow the same cycle, without exception, we must speak of a strange statistical distribution that is not random as one might have imagined. An exception can confirm a rule. In the presentation, you will find some wars that contradict the "War Cycle". Yes and so ? it shows that we are not in a 100% and 0% world but rather in a 70% and 30% world
- **Authors of cyclical phenomena demonstrate anything and everything**
  That's right: some authors take a famous birth then another famous event, then a war, a protest, a death and so on ... and in the end they demonstrate any cyclical phenomenon with

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any period. But if the author takes only one type of event, for example war outbreaks, do you think he will really demonstrate any cycle?

- **The data presented was chosen to confirm the cyclical theory**
  There must be an objective evaluation that selects the events according to equivalent criteria of the author in order to confirm or refute the author's hypotheses. But have you checked the data presented? or do you know someone who would agree to do it?

There are other examples of "a priori" but if you are still there after these few "a priori" ready to try to understand what is presented, I can only send you my sincere thanks for accepting 'to try to understand. It is also a difficult exercise for the author to come down from his little intellectual cloud that he has not yet confronted with the reality perceived by others. By agreeing to debate it, we will each take a step in the right direction hoping to talk about the same thing, even if there are different points of view.

These "a priori" are today the biggest obstacle to understanding the "War Cycle". This subject and the term used often gives rise to ideas "a priori". It takes a certain intellectual courage and benevolence to confront its "a priori" to what is actually described in this document on the "War Cycle". This deserves these thanks.

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What use has already been made of the « War Cycle » ?

To demonstrate the interest of the "War Cycle", various forecasts have been made since the 2000s. For the moment we have a feedback of forecasts on 2 periods of amplification: May 2005-August 2009, then October 2013 -January 2018

Forecasts for the period 2005-2009 using the "War Cycle"

At the time we worked with the Arab-Israeli contexts, Europe and World. We could foresee:

- A war in the Israeli-Arab conflict: there were two,
- A war in Europe: there was the war in Georgia

It was the stammering of applications of the use of the "War Cycle" in anticipation. The results were good but did not convince before the wars in 2005 or 2006, or even after the wars in 2008 or 2009, as if the difficulty of the subject promotes a denial of reality: It is reassuring to say that the "War Cycle" does not make sense, especially the forecasts that come from it. It is not objective nor rational, but it is intellectually soothing to deny it. The "a priori" raised by this subject seem to provoke a natural rejection. Is this rejection rational and well-argued? At this stage, I cannot answer for those who have seen it at the time.

Forecasts made in 2012 over the period 2014-2017 using the "War Cycle"

There will probably be new wars in existing recurring conflicts (see charts):

- One (or more) new round of the Arab-Israeli war,
- A new European war,
- An episode of Indo-Pakistani tension;
- A war of international importance

As well as other new wars:

- One or more wars other than the previous ones

And the likely extension of existing wars

- Syria should turn into regional or / and international war if unresolved in 2012

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Introduction to the War Cycle

Result of the forecasts made in 2012

Yes, the amplification period was very marked. A good part took place in 2014, slightly ahead of phase, but there were also some marked events in 2015 and 2016.

(In blue, reminder of the forecasts made, in red underlined what happened)

New wars in existing recurrent conflicts (see graphs):

- One (or more) new Arab-Israeli war round
  Gaza war in July and August 2014
- A new European war
  Crisis of Crimea in March 2014 followed in April 2014 by the Donbass war in Ukraine
- An episode of Indo-Pakistani tension
  from September 2016
- A war of international importance
  war against the Islamic State

Other new wars:

- One or more wars other than the previous ones
  Wake up of the conflict between Turkey and the PKK from July 2015, Yemen war since 2014

Likely extension of existing wars

- Syria should turn into regional or / and international war if unresolved in 2012
  Iraq-Syria-Turkey-Hezbollah regional war, Russian intervention from September 2015, Western coalition against the Islamic State from August 2014

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How to demonstrate the "War Cycle"?

The demonstration is not unique. It is multiple:

- First, based on the **war outbreak dates and their statistics**
  → refer to the different contexts from page 11
- Then trying **to understand the action of the War Cycle** on the outbreak of wars
  → refer to - How does the “War Cycle” work?” - from page 26
- Finally showing **the materialization of a cycle by thousands of measurements**
  → from page 33

These partial demonstrations complement each other. They introduce a certain "technical" complexity by explaining different approaches. It is very important to understand these different views, although some may give the impression of contradicting each other.

Statistics on the War outbreak dates

Initially, I took different contexts like the Arab-Israeli conflict or Europe. In these contexts, I have set war outbreak dates and I made a visual presentation that allows to understand the statistical distribution, accompanied by a more precise measurement of deviations from the amplification peaks. Refer to **The "War Cycle" in different contexts** page 11 to see these contexts.

In these contexts, I also positioned some Peace events, to see if it was significant in relation to the mitigation peaks. Does attenuation period favors peace? Yes in the Arab-Israeli conflict where peace initiatives take place during mitigation period, even if the initiatives have not resulted in a complete solution. Yes also in Europe, but not in some cases like the Indo-Pakistani conflict. If there is a tendency to favor peace during the mitigation period, there are too few "points" to translate it into a reliable statistical measure.

This demonstration by the dates of the outbreak of wars has limits:

- When there are many wars, as in Africa, it is difficult to demonstrate anything
- When it is a period of permanent war, like the one that followed September 11, 2001, it is very questionable: the Iraq war of 2003, of Libya and Syria wars in 2011 start near the peak of attenuation, giving the impression of contradicting the "War Cycle"
- Some wars that seem to contradict the "War Cycle" can lead to over-violence or escalation due to the amplification period. The phenomenon may therefore be visible even when the war started at the most unlikely moment, such as the war against Iraq in 2003, which begins on the mitigation peak of the "War Cycle".

These findings have shown:

- From the outbreak war dates, we can show trends,
- We need to find a model of understanding of wars showing how the "War Cycle" works,
- It is necessary to find other measures than war outbreak dates to fully demonstrate the "War Cycle"

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Understand the action of the War Cycle

This further reflection led to the part - **How does the "War Cycle" work?** - for the outbreak of wars and to amplify a pre-existing war from page 26. This part is very important and 3 cases have been identified

1. **<u>Case in which the cumulative war causes is slightly below the trigger threshold of war.</u>**



→ go to page 30

2. **<u>Case in which the cumulative war causes is much lower than the threshold for triggering war.</u>**



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How to demonstrate the "War Cycle"?

3. **<u>Case where the cumulative causes are well above the threshold of war, even before the period of amplification of war.</u>**



Case 3: The combination of conjectural and structural causes is **well above** the trigger threshold of war before a period of amplification of the "War Cycle". The war started before the amplification period

→ go to page 32

These 3 cases have been recalled here to have it in mind, even if they are described later and may appear a duplication.

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Demonstrate the War Cycle by visualizing the cyclical phenomenon through thousands of measurements

This demonstration comes directly from Case 3 described on the previous page. The war in Iraq (2003) initially appears as a case contradicting the "War Cycle" because it occurs on a mitigation Peak. But the two civil wars that followed and the data that was collected made it possible to materialize a cycle of violence with thousands of measuring points.

If in the first part ‘contexts’ , the 2003 war in Iraq is an element contradicting the "War Cycle", the 2 civil wars that followed the 2003 War make it possible to materialize the "War Cycle" and become a fundamental element of the demonstration of the “War Cycle”.

Refer to **Materialization of the "War Cycle" by thousands of measurements** from the page 33

Temporary conclusion to demonstrate the "War Cycle"

It's a bit like trying to represent a 3-dimensional space on a 2-dimensional plane: it does not reflect reality without using different plans. The reality of this "War Cycle" has partial demonstrations that complement each other. None can claim to be a definitive demonstration, but together they constitute elements of demonstration that will have to be completed as studies are conducted on this subject.

One could add that the forecasts that have been made and confirmed by the facts are another demonstration element, but the problem is that to admit it sometimes disturbs. Is it useful to want to show at all costs that these forecasts were made and confirmed by the facts? Probably no, this reaction is the expression of a malaise compared to a disturbing reality: to my knowledge, only a few people have defended such hypotheses. Many contemporaries do not even remember it and do not seem in the state of mind of a benevolent demonstration, but rather in reassuring denial.

Demonstrating is one thing (there are troubling beginnings of evidence), accepting it is another thing and nothing in our contemporary culture, whether scientific or political, has prepared us to catch a glimpse of this possible reality and has not therefore prepared to accept what, "a priori", may seem irrational.

So thank you to all those who accept a contradictory debate on this difficult but promising subject. The contradiction will allow everyone to move forward from the data that is presented in the following pages to help demonstrate the "War Cycle".

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The "War Cycle" in different contexts

The selected contexts

The selected contexts are chosen contexts. The "War Cycle" works by amplifying pre-existing conflicts and tensions. It has no effect if there are no prior tensions.

The selected contexts were chosen as recurring conflicts which provoked several wars (Arab-Israeli conflict or Indo-Pakistani conflict) or regions or countries with a "structural" weakness provoking regular conflicts (Europe, Lebanon) and also a global vision World.

The contexts selected for this presentation are:

- Arab-Israeli conflict,
- Indo-Pakistani conflict,
- Europe
- Lebanon
- World.

There are contexts not presented here that are not significant:

- South America
  there are too few wars between Latin American countries to make it meaningful
- Africa
  there are too many wars. To present an African context, we must make a choice in all wars and present only a few wars. If the author does it, he will be reproached for retaining only the wars that arrange it. The selection of wars should be made according to objective criteria of the major wars, criteria which remain to be defined

It would be possible to define and present other contexts. For the "War Cycle" to be recognized, other authors will have to come to similar conclusions from different contexts. It is therefore left to other authors free spaces of protest or confirmation by presenting other contexts.

The visual presentation used allows at the same time to partially justify the "War Cycle" by showing the past statistical distribution and to extrapolate it in the coming periods in the form of "forecasts" generally indicated by a "? ".

To understand these contexts, it is recommended, beforehand, to read the short presentation in the pages that follow.

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Methodology for the presentation of the “War Cycle”

How to read Graph?



What events are taken into account?

Are indicated on the Graph of each context

War events

- The dates of the outbreak of wars,
- Some tensions when the war did not take place but tensions were clearly visible,

Peace Events – not systematic, only for information if it looks relevant

- The dates of cessation of fighting
- The dates of dialog and peace treaty.

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The "War Cycle" in different contexts

Some examples and their visual interpretation





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The "War Cycle" in different contexts



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The "War Cycle" in different contexts

Deviation table by Context

The gap between the outbreak of war and the peak of war amplification is measured in % in a deviation table

The significance of these deviations shown in the table is illustrated in the following graph.



- 0% means there is no gap and war started at the peak of amplification,
- 100% means that the war unleashed at the most unlikely moment according to the "War Cycle", that is to say on the peak of mitigation,
- If wars were triggered completely randomly, this would mean that they were uniformly distributed with random values, hence between 0 and 100,
- If all deviations were less than 50%, it would mean that wars are all triggered in 50% of the time (instead of spreading over 100% of the time).
- If the deviation is a negative value, it means that the event occurred before the amplification peak

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Israeli-arab Conflict Context



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The "War Cycle" in different contexts

	Date of the beginning of the event	Deviation in month vs Peak	Deviation (%) vs Peak
First Arab-Israeli War	15-May-48	0,1	0%
Suez Crisis/War	29-Oct-56	0,2	0%
Six-Day War	5-Jun-67	26,0	51%
Yom Kippur War	6-Oct-73	0,7	1%
1982 Lebanon War	6-Jun-82	3,4	7%
First Intifada	9-Dec-87	-31,9	-63%
Gulf War with Iraqi missiles	16-Jan-91	5,4	11%
Second Intifada	28-Sep-00	20,4	40%
2006 Lebanon War	12-Jul-06	-11,5	-23%
Operation Cast Lead	27-Dec-08	18,0	36%
Operation Pillar of Defense	14-Nov-12	-36,8	-73%
Operation Protective Edge	8-Jul-14	-17,0	-34%
Average absolute value, including tensions			28%

Graphical representation of the deviation

(from 0 to 100%)



Israeli-Arab Conflict Deviation

If the wars were random, the distribution of the deviations from the amplification peaks of the wars would be between 0 and 100%, in a random way.

90% of the wars (9 out of 10) are in 50% of the time (between 0 and 50%)

1 exception
- the 6-day war, which is 51%,

2 other exceptions presented here as episodes of tension and considered by some authors as wars
- the first intifada which is 63% but which is not considered by all the perpetrators as a war, given its overall peacefulness
- the pillar defense operation considered by some authors as one of the wars

There are many other military operations that are not considered wars, by a very large majority of historians

By adding these two tension episodes as wars,

75% of the triggering dates of wars (9 of 12) are in 50% of the time (between 0 and 50%), which remains statistically significant of a periodic phenomenon influencing this conflict.

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Europe Context *(Europe area from the Atlantic to the Urals)*



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The "War Cycle" in different contexts

	Date of the beginning of the event	Deviation in month vs Peak	Deviation (%) vs Peak
Worl War I	30-Jul-14	0,0	0%
Ruhr Invasion (French-Belgian Forces)	11-Jan-23	0,0	0%
Spanish Civil War	17-Jul-36	-40,5	-80%
World War II	03-Sep-39	-3,0	-6%
Suez Crisis/War	29-Oct-56	0,2	0%
Falkland War (UK<-->Argentina)	02-Apr-82	1,2	2%
Gulf War following Koweit Invasion	17-Jan-91	5,4	11%
Yougoslavia Disintegration	01-Jun-91	9,8	19%
Kosovo War	24-Mar-99	2,2	4%
Georgian War	07-Aug-08	13,3	26%
Donbass War (Ukraine)	06-Apr-14	-20,1	-40%
Average absolute value			17%

Graphical representation of the deviation

(from 0 to 100%)



European Wars Deviation

If wars had a random distribution, the deviation would be between 0% and 100%. If the deviation is less than 30% in the most of the european Wars (exception like Spanish Civil War), it means that is is not a random distribution. It demonstrates, on these wars, that there is an amazing cyclical force that favours wars.

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India-Pakistan Context



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The "War Cycle" in different contexts

	Date of the beginning of the event	Deviation in month vs Peak	Deviation (%) vs Peak	Graphical representation of the deviation (from 0 to 100%)
Indo-Pakistano War of 1947	28-Oct-47	-6,5	-13%	
Indo-Pakistani War of 1965	16-Aug-65	4,4	9%	
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971	12-Dec-71	-21,1	-42%	
Kashmir Insurgency	10-Jan-90	-6,8	-13%	
Kargil War	12-May-99	3,8	8%	
Mumbai attacks	26-Nov-08	17,0	34%	
Following the attack on a military base in India, India announced strikes	30-Sep-16	9,8	19%	
Indo-Pakistani Confrontation *with numerous military incidents including plane shot down*	15-févr.-19	38,3	76%	
Average absolute value			20%	



Indo-Pakistani Wars deviation

If the wars were random, the distribution of deviations from the aggravated wars would be between 0 and 100%, randomly.
If the difference is always less than 50%, it means that the triggering of the wars is distributed in half the time. It is therefore significant to show that there is a phenomenon which pushes the outbreak of wars during certain periods.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, there has been no war for 15 years. The peaks of amplification simply give rise to tensions without turning into war. This remains significant and continues to be monitored.

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Lebanon Context



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The "War Cycle" in different contexts

	Date of the beginning of the event	Deviation in month vs Peak	Deviation (%) vs Peak	Graphical representation of the deviation (from 0 to 100%)
1958 Lebanon Crisis	May-58	18,7	37%	
2 year War	13-Apr-75	18,9	37%	
1982 Lebanon War	06-Jun-82	3,4	7%	
Mountain War (1983-1984)	Sep-83	18,7	37%	
War of Liberation against Syria	Sep-88	-22,7	-45%	
2006 Lebanon War	Jul-06	-11,5	-23%	
(Short) Lebanon-IS War 17	19-Aug-17	20,4	40%	



Lebanon Wars Deviation

If wars had a random distribution, the deviations would be between 0 and 100%, randomly.
For Lebanon by taking the different wars as described under fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Histoire_du Liban, the deviation is always less than 45%.
It demonstrates, on these wars , that there is an amazing cyclical force that favours wars.

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World Context



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The "War Cycle" in different contexts

	Date of the beginning of the event	Deviation in month vs Peak	Deviation (%) vs Peak
Russo-Japanese War	10-Feb-04	-24,3	-48%
World War I	30-Jul-14	0,0	0%
Japanese afgression in Manchuria	13-Sep-31	2,7	5%
World War II	03-Sep-39	-3,0	-6%
1947 Indo-Pakistani War	28-Oct-47	-6,5	-13%
First Arab-Israeli War	15-May-48	0,1	0%
Korean War	25-Jun-50	25,4	50%
Crise/Guerre de Suez	29-Oct-56	0,2	0%
Direct US intervention in Vietnam	01-Dec-64	-4,1	-8%
Biafran War	30-May-67	25,8	51%
Six-Day War	05-Jun-67	26,0	51%
Yom Kippur War	06-Oct-73	0,7	1%
Lebanon Civil War	13-Apr-75	18,9	37%
Soviet Afghanistan War (USSR-Moudjahedin)	27-Dec-79	-26,0	-51%
Iran-Irak War	23-Sep-80	-17,1	-34%
Invasion of Kuwait by Irak and Gulf War	02-Aug-90	-0,1	0%
Second Congo War (killed + than 4 millions)	01-Aug-98	-5,5	-11%
Kosovo War	24-Mar-99	2,2	4%
Second Afghanistan War (USA - Talibans)	07-Oct-01	32,7	65%
Second Gulf War	20-Mar-03	50,1	99%
Russo-Georgian War	07-Aug-08	13,3	26%
Syrian Civil War	15-Mar-11	44,6	88%
Donbass War (Ukraine)	06-Apr-14	-20,1	-40%
Islamic State (ISIS) War	05-Jun-14	-18,1	-36%

Graphical representation of the deviation

(from 0 to 100%)



Major Wars (World) deviation

If wars had a random distribution, the deviation would be between 0% and 100%, randomly.
Throughout the 20th century, the distribution is significant from the War Cycle and most wars are in the amplification zone.
The September 11, 2001 attack put the US into a quasi-permanent war with several wars including those against Afghanistan and Iraq that do not follow the War Cycle.
When the war becomes permanent, the phenomenon induced by the War Cycle may be temporarily hardly visible, as was the case from September 2001 and as it has been since the Arab Spring

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How does the "War Cycle" work?

The first misunderstanding is to believe that this determines all wars

Experience shows that this first presentation of contexts might suggest that the author tries to show that all wars follow this phenomenon.

This creates a major misunderstanding that does not reflect the view of the author.

To understand how the "War Cycle" works, we must have two phenomena in mind:

Phenomenon A - a sinusoidal phenomenon that amplifies or reduces tension
Phenomenon B - the outbreak of a war

And finally, the combination of these two phenomena

Phenomenon A - a sinusoidal phenomenon that amplifies or attenuates the tensions

There are periods when violence is magnified and others where it is mitigated. The transition from one to the other is progressive.



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Amplification Peaks	Mitigation Peaks
February1906	May 1910
July 1914	October 1918
January 1923	April 1927
June 1931	September 1935
December 1939	February 1944
May 1948	August1952
October 1956	January 1961
April 1965	June 1969
September 1973	December 1977
February 1982	May 1986
August 1990	October 1994
January 1999	April 2003
June 2007	September 2011
December 2015	February 2020
May 2024	August 2028
October 2032	January 2037
April 2041	June 2045
September 2049	December 2053

Amplification periods	
Starting	**Ending**
January 1904	March 1908
June 1912	September 1916
November 1920	February 1925
May 1929	August1933
October 1937	January 1942
April 1946	June 1950
September 1954	December 1958
February 1963	May 1967
August 1971	October 1975
January1980	April 1984
June 1988	September 1992
December 1996	February 2001
May 2005	August2009
October 2013	January 2018
April 2022	June 2026
September 2030	December 2034
February 2039	May 2043
August 2047	October 2051

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Mitigation Periods	
Starting	**Ending**
March 1908	June 1912
September 1916	November 1920
February 1925	May 1929
August1933	October 1937
January 1942	April 1946
June 1950	September 1954
December 1958	February 1963
May 1967	August 1971
October 1975	January1980
April 1984	June 1988
September 1992	December 1996
February 2001	May 2005
August2009	October 2013
January 2018	April 2022
June 2026	September 2030
December 2034	February 2039
May 2043	August 2047

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Phenomenon B - The outbreak of war

A war is caused by the accumulation of a set of causes and not by a single cause.

When some people say that the crisis of 1929 was the cause of the Second World War, it would be more relevant to say that it was a cause that was added to others like the Franco-German antagonism, as well as the treaty marking the end of the First World War, perceived as a vexation to be repaired. These are 3 causes that have accumulated. There are others like Hitler's personality. And to all these causes was added this sinusoidal phenomenon at the origin of the "War Cycle" which appears as a complementary cause.

This last cause does not represent more than 20% of all these causes leading to the war, but added to the others it could be enough to trigger a war.

Polemology (in the journals of the Institute of Polemology in the 70s) distinguished mainly 3 levels of causes:

- structural causes that correspond to permanent causes (religious, cultural, racial, institutional differences)
- Conjectural causes that correspond to the succession of events that precede the war without being the immediate cause.
- the immediate cause, ie the event that caused the outbreak of the war

The causes accumulate and may become greater than **a trigger threshold of war**.
A war will only be triggered if the cumulative causes exceed a threshold called "Trigger Threshold of war". This notion of threshold is considered fundamental.

Beyond this threshold, there will be an incident that will trigger the start of the war. The accumulation of tensions leads anyway to an incident or action that will mark the beginning of the war.



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Combination of phenomena A and B on a peak of war amplification

Case 1: Cases where the cumulative number of causes is slightly lower than the triggering threshold of war.

In this case, the "War Cycle", during a amplification period, acts as an additional cause that will exceed the Trigger threshold of war and will therefore turn the permanent tension into war.

This case explains the choice of contexts selected (see page 11 and following pages) and why they allow to make some forecasts.

By focusing on recurring conflicts (exe: Arab-Israeli conflict) that always give the impression of being on the verge of war without entering, one thus determines the likely wars during the next period of amplification.



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Case 2: Cases in which the combination of conjectural and structural causes is much lower than the trigger threshold of war.

In this case, the "War Cycle", during a period of amplification, acts as an additional cause but there is no war because the war threshold is not reached.

It also allows to imagine means of action. Without knowing the origin of the periodic phenomenon at the origin of the "War Cycle", we cannot act on this cause. Only known causes can be mitigated. Traditional and vigorous negotiations can help reduce tensions and the causes of war. If they are conducted before the next amplification period, we can hope to avoid a future war.



Case 2: cumulative conjectural and structural causes are **very much below** the trigger threshold of war before a period of amplification of the "War Cycle"

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Case 3: Cases where the accumulation of causes is well above the threshold of trigger of war, even before the period of amplification of war.

In this case, there is already a war before the period of war amplification. There is no new war since it has already begun. The period of amplification can favor an "over-violence" visible through a military escalation (local, regional, international) or new violence. Several cases make it possible to reinforce this hypothesis.

- At the beginning of 1964, the bombings in Vietnam marked a military escalation at the peak of amplification. The war has officially begun for some time, but the real escalation occurs on this peak.
- The war in Iraq began in 2003, at the time of a mitigation peak, the US victory was followed by an Iraqi civil war that coincides with the amplification period. See the "Materialization of the War Cycle by Thousands of Measures" section. These internal violence in Iraq increased until the amplification peak and then steadily decreased, until gradually resume with the arrival of the following amplification peak and the war against the Islamic State.
- After the attack of November 13, 2015 in Paris by the Islamic State, the reaction of France provokes an escalation and involves Great Britain in the war, hoping also to gather a military coalition. The war against Islamic State began long before, but November 13, 2015 and the escalation that follows are a typical example of over-violence when the war is already underway.
- The war in Syria began in 2011, during a period of attenuation, apparently contradicting the War Cycle. But knowing this combination 3, I forecasted in 2012 that there would be a regional escalation of the Syrian war during the next amplification period. This extension of the war began in 2014 and continued in 2015 and 2016 before the ebb of the Islamic State begins.



Case 3: The combination of conjectural and structural causes is **well above** the trigger threshold of war before a period of amplification of the "War Cycle". The war started before the amplification period

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Materialization of the "War Cycle" by thousands of measurements

The civil wars in Iraq have allowed the materialization of the "War Cycle"

Let's go back to the 2nd Gulf War against Iraq in 2003. Opponents of the "War Cycle" will find a remarkable case against the "War Cycle". The outbreak of this war takes place on the mitigation Peak, just as if this Cycle did not make sense.

What happens in such a remarkable case?

- In principle, it demonstrates that "the War Cycle" is meaningless, since the outbreak of war takes place at the mitigation peak
- But if we take into account the Combination 3 described in **- How does the "War Cycle" work? -** we should have a visible form of over-violence or escalation at the moment of the amplification peak that follows

Do you remember what happened after the US intervention in Iraq from March 2003?

- First the Americans won this battle,
- Then they occupied Iraq,
- **And an Iraqi civil war accompanied by a US military crackdown followed.**

The valuable data of Wikileaks

The US military did a remarkable internal job listing all the incidents as well as the dead and wounded.

In 2010, following the publication of US Army reports by WikiLeaks, the newspaper "Le Monde" dated Sunday 24 - Monday 25 October 2010 published a graph clearly showing a peak of violence in late 2006. Before the publication of this chart, it was admitted that the peak of violence in Iraq was rather in 2007, and the figures advanced were extremely variable depending on the sources. The careful analysis of the reports revealed by Wikileaks made it possible to measure the actual violence in Iraq from 2004 to 2009. The measure is the number of victims. The source of the original graphic published in the newspaper "Le Monde" is "THE OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM" According to US Army reports published by Wikileaks, there were 110,000 deaths from 2004 to 2009. The following graph (whose shape has been updated to present it), indicates the distribution of these victims over time (dead and wounded). This is the only reliable measure of violence in Iraq known to date during this period and based on reports, unlike many other estimates that relied on some surveys extrapolated by statistical methods following assumptions very different from one source to another.

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Materialization of the « War Cycle » by thousands of measurements



This graph is based on 400,000 military reports provided by Wikileaks and exploited by the media.

Knowing that the peak of amplification was in mid 2007 and that the next one is at the end of 2015, you can imagine what is presented in the following graph.



Is the "War Cycle" materialized?

When we look at this graph, we see a half-period of the sinusoidal phenomenon that is materialized. Rather than having a single point: the outbreak of war, we see an apparent materialization of the amplification peak by thousands of measurements.

What can be concluded before 2014, someone who knows the "War Cycle"?

He can conclude that the departure of the Americans in 2011 from Iraq is in the period + calm. If this materialization is indeed that of the "War Cycle", in the period of amplification that will follow (2014 to 2017), we will see a component of violence / internal civil war in Iraq regain momentum until 2015 and then a further decline in this violence / civil war. The

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Americans left Iraq believing that the work was done and finished. Had they been aware of this phenomenon they could have reached the same conclusions and anticipated the period that followed. Everything that happened later confirmed it.

2014 et 2015



What we see in 2014 and 2015: Since 2012 there is a rise in violence (dashed line), confirming that the cycle identified by Wikileaks is indeed the materialization of the "War Cycle". The media gradually spoke of the resumption of attacks and in late 2013 spoke of a level of violence similar to that of 2008/2007 and then this new war in Iraq against Daech increased sharply the number of victims.

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2016



What we see in 2016: The conflict in Iraq is losing its intensity. The retreat of the Islamic State results in a gradual recovery of the territories initially conquered in 2014. Their action will probably continue in the classic forms of attacks but with an intensity that seems less. It remains to find a measure or reliable estimates to complete these elements. This is the first time that the cycle could be materialized by thousands of measurement points over a period of more than 10 years. Half of the work is based on hundreds of thousands of US Army reports. However there is a small flaw: since Wikileaks, there is no more data available through the US.

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March 2017: new data allowing a materialization of the "War Cycle" over 10 years

After Wikileaks, the data tap stopped. It was no longer a question for Americans to provide other data. It was therefore necessary to look for other sources of data. In March 2017, I came across the site "Iraqbodycount.org". This site provides data on the number of deaths in Iraq. In the following graph (reconstructed from the data available on the site), it is the number of civilian deaths in Iraq that is used as a measure of violence, year by year.

Everything fits in this graph. Whoever understands this graph holds a key element of the objective demonstration of the "War Cycle"



Using the data available on the site "iraqbodycount.org", the phenomenon observed from the data wikileaks was confirmed, but above all it allowed to confirm the period 2012-2016 for which there was no data available.

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What can we conclude?

The materialization of the "War Cycle" is confirmed, first with the data Wikileaks, then from the data of Iraqbodycount.org

- We note on the 2 successive amplification peaks a similar shift (6 months to one year)
- The "observed curve" is therefore offset by a few months compared to the "theoretical curve". If this should be confirmed in other cases, it is possible to have to adjust the amplification peaks
- The war in Iraq in 2003, which was a fundamental element of the "War Cycle" challenge, became a fundamental element of demonstration and confirmation of the "War Cycle" through the successive civil wars for almost 15 years.

What must be done to confirm this materialization of the "War Cycle"?

Finding another example is necessary. The difficulty is to find a war that lasts long enough (ideally 10 years as for the civil wars in Iraq) with enough dead and wounded for the data to be significant.

- the data of the first and second world wars could be candidates for such an analysis even if the duration is a little short
- The war in Syria is a good candidate but it is difficult to find reliable data. It seems unlikely that the 2014 to 2017 curve is not similar to that of Iraq, but there has been no equivalent work for the moment
- wars in Europe or in the Arab-Israeli conflict are too short with too few victims to draw any lesson whatsoever.

Only one example is insufficient, but the research community should be mobilized to find other examples

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Questions/Answers

There are recurring questions from those who are aware of the "War Cycle".

Is this "War Cycle" a reality in all previous centuries?

It seems that yes but to confirm it would require a specific research with relatively important means

- *All this research was conducted using the date calculations built into Excel. The dates in Excel only work from 1900 onwards. Beyond that would be tools for calculating other dates. This must exist in astronomy or it must be developed a specific software to manipulate the differences between dates as with an excel spreadsheet.*
- *On the wars of the 20 ° and 21 ° century we can easily select the major wars. A study through the centuries would require the participation of historians with a good knowledge of these centuries and the main wars lived to select the major wars among all the wars that took place.*
- *One difficulty is that there have been many more wars in previous centuries and we must be sure to select the main wars. When there are too many wars (as is the case in 20th century Africa), the "War Cycle" is difficult to evaluate objectively.*

In any case, this question is relevant but it requires means other than those of an isolated individual to be able to respond credibly

Why has all this not resulted in communication and is it not known?

Simply because the author that I am has not found a way to communicate on this subject. The fact of having conducted these reflections outside academia or research means that the same academic or research communities do not read and even evaluate the content. For them, it does not matter whether it's true or false. In principle, this does not exist because it is not part of their study and research scope.

If someone has a good idea to communicate, the author thanks him in advance.

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