

Which Strategy for a settlement of the Donbass conflict?

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ND202004001-1 of April 21, 2020

ND202004001-2 of April 22, 2020 - ceasefire part added

ND202004001-3 of April 24, 2020 - How to explain the outbreak of war in Ukraine?

ND202004001-4 of 27 April 2020 - From Strategy to Action

ND202004001-5 of April 27, 2020 - Appendix A Ceasefire Formalization + Appendix B Verification

ND202004001-6 of April 28, 2020 - Appendix C - the SMCC (System Monitoring and Control Center)

This text is intended for the Ukrainian authorities in order to reflect on an approach for a settlement of the Donbass conflict and to implement it, as far as possible. It is a document that has been gradually completed and started at index 1, this is the latest version. This text is a variant of ND201707003, adapted to the fact that it was intended to be presented to the Ukrainian authorities. On the substance and the analysis of the causes of the non-respect of the cease-fire, it is the same as ND201707003. Appendices A to C are more precise than the text ND201707003.

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Introduction

The Donbass conflict has been going on since 2014. There have been two attempts of settlement: Minsk 1 and Minsk 2 which remain virtual. None of the points have been fully implemented, neither the ceasefire nor the exchange of prisoners.

In 2020, the good will of the new President Volodymyr Zelensky has translated into a few partial gestures, without really moving forward. Is there a clear strategy? If it exists, it is not very visible and this document tries to ask questions in the hope of having answers that will allow a better understanding of the strategy followed by the Ukrainian authorities.

Internal warfare

An "internal war"¹ in a country generally has 2 components that favor this war:

- A local context expressing a difficulty to feel good in the State
- External actors (most often neighbors) who fuel the conflict and claim to defend the local population.

Depending on whether one is the representative of the state in which the "internal war" is taking place or the neighboring state, the war is presented as having as its cause either a strictly internal or a strictly external cause.

For the Ukrainian authorities, the Donbass conflict is presented as a simple conflict with Russia. For the Russian authorities, this same conflict is presented as simply internal.

This is the case in all wars of this type (e.g. Lebanon, Syria or any other country): the local authority sees it as a foreign war and the neighbor sees it as a civil war. The truth is somewhere in between.

Attacks from the other side

Almost every day, each military side officially presents the attacks of the other side.

If we take the press releases of April 20, 2020, we have :

Press release from the Ukrainian camp on April 20, 2020 (Unian news)

Russia-led forces mount six attacks on Ukrainian positions in Donbas on Orthodox Easter

Russia-led forces mounted six attacks on Ukrainian positions in Donbas, eastern Ukraine, on Orthodox Easter on April 19, despite ceasefire agreements. "The enemy opened fire from 82mm mortars prohibited by the Minsk agreements, as well as from grenade launchers of various systems, sniper rifles, and small arms," the press center

¹ The expression "internal war" is intentional so as not to speak of either civil war or foreign war, even if there is a bit of both.

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of the Joint Forces Operation (JFO) Headquarters said in a statement on Facebook on Monday morning.

Hot spots were the villages of Pisky, Shyrokyne, Luhanske, as well as the town of Maryinka. No Ukrainian army casualties have been reported. "There were no casualties among Ukrainian troops amid shelling by the armed forces of the Russian Federation over the past 24 hours," the JFO HQ said. "The Joint Forces resolutely responded to all the acts of provocation staged by the enemy." According to Ukrainian intelligence reports, two enemy troops were killed and another two were wounded on April 19. From 00:00 to 07:00 Kyiv time on April 20, the Russian occupation forces have been inactive. No losses among Ukrainian troops were reported. No coronavirus cases have been confirmed in Ukraine's Joint Forces.

Press release of the separatist camp on April 20, 2020 (DAN news)

Kiev forces violate ceasefire eight times in 24 hours

Kiev forces violated the ceasefire eight times within 24 hours, the DPR mission to the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) said.

"The number of ceasefire violations recorded in the past 24 hours is eight. The total number of rounds fired is 50."

The rounds under 12.7 mm caliber are excluded from daily reports.

Four townships were targeted with anti-tank guided missiles, 82 mm mortars, grenade launchers and small arms including of large caliber.

Over the previous reporting period, Kiev forces violated the ceasefire four times firing 20 rounds.

What can we conclude from this?

According to the Ukrainians, there were 6 attacks against them and according to the separatists, there were 8 attacks against them.

Of course no one talks about the attacks they might have carried out themselves. It is the others who attack. This is a principle that you will find in any war: it is the **other who attacks and is responsible for everything.**

Is this the truth?

If you read the OSCE SMM report from the evening of April 20, which covers the same day of April 19, the number of violations is several hundred and the number of explosions is about 30 (extremely low figure, since it usually runs between 100 and 200).

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It's hard to compare. For the SMM, every shot is a violation, for the fighters on each side, the term violation is used for an attack of a certain importance. In general, there is no correlation between the SMM figures and the figures presented by the fighters of each camp.

To make matters worse, the JCCC, which represents an entity of military representatives from each camp, has other numbers.

One thing is certain: since 2014 there have never been days without violations and explosions. The ceasefire is largely "virtual".

These different counting systems show above all that there is no common culture or coordination among all the actors present on the field in Donbass.

To summarize what we see in every war: when war breaks out, it is the other side that causes it and provokes attacks every day. If peace returns, it is I and I alone who is the cause and who has allowed peace to take hold.

(This is how it is in all wars and this is what each side says: see press releases of April 20, 2020).

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Why is Ukraine pushing the separatist territories out of Ukraine?

Try to take a step back and rethink what the Ukrainian authorities have been doing for the last 6 years.

- The border of Ukraine was put between Ukraine and the separatist territories on the line of contact.
It is a deliberate choice of Ukraine. The line of contact became the real border
- There is no more direct administrative link between Ukraine and the population of Donbass.
Are pensioners supposed to cross the line of contact to get their pension? It is a voluntary choice of Ukraine not to support the administration set up by the separatists?
- The separatist people of Donbass and Luhansk have good reason to feel rejected
- The "Ukrainian liberators" are still those who regularly destroy houses.
- Is it really appropriate to suggest that the only future interlocutors will be the Ukrainian army?

...

One could take other subjects, but to believe that the hermetic wall and the abandonment of any direct administration will lead this territory and the population to feel Ukrainian and to return to Ukraine seems an illusion.

I believe that the Ukrainian authorities should think about resuming administrative services that the separatists cannot and will not implement.

- One could imagine that the pensions of pensioners in the Donbass and Luhansk territories would be distributed directly by Ukrainian administrative staff who would go to these territories, or through local banks if local branches of Ukrainian banks are authorized. Imagination should be used.
- One could imagine directly taking back control of the health services (civil servants, etc...) which is probably what does not work and badly (in Russia it does not work very well and is unlikely to work properly). Here again, nothing must go through the administration set up by the separatists, but a way must be found to manage directly, either by sending some Ukrainian civil servants on a mission or by reconstituting a delegated administration in Kiev. COVID-19 can help bring together
- One could imagine sending companies to repair the damage caused by the Ukrainian army. One can also envisage reciprocity
- One could imagine many other things ... There are many subjects for which the administration set up by the separatists has neither the will nor the means to do anything serious. It is necessary to identify these subjects and act, without the sources of funding being used to fatten or enrich the administration put in place since 2014.

Do you really think that the local population feels Ukrainian with all the constraints put in place by the Ukrainian administration towards them? Personally, I have a doubt.

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Note dated 24/04/2020 : To date it is not obvious to understand which action of reconquest "administrative policy" is envisaged by the authorities of Kiev. It is important for the future, even if such an action is not obvious to carry out.

Question/Action 001: Last week Russia decreed that DPR and LPR residents who would like to have Russian citizenship will be able to acquire it free of charge. It is known that DPR and LPR want to be integrated into Russia, in contradiction to the Minsk agreements. But all these actions are presented by Russia and DPR/LPR as a result of the neglect of Ukrainian citizens by Ukraine. As far as I am concerned, I have never seen in the media any official action of the Ukrainian authorities valuing the Ukrainian citizenship of the residents in the DPR and LPR territories. Am I misinformed or does this correspond to reality? The Answer is important. So there is a question for Ukrainian authorities, hoping for a clear answer and action. It is true that Russia is gradually favoring the integration of the DPR and LPR territories, but as long as the only image of Ukraine's reconquest is symbolized by its army alone, I am afraid that Ukraine will accelerate this trend rather than thwart it. A few weeks ago, the Prime Minister took the decision not to cut off the water to the Crimea because they are Ukrainians and so that the population does not suffer from this state of affairs. Not having seen an equivalent decision towards the Donbass, I ask the question again.

This point will be followed up in Q/A001 (see end of document).

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The ceasefire, can we improve it and make it permanent?

The current ceasefire remains "fictitious". Every day there are a few hundred violations and a number of explosions ranging from a few dozen to a few hundred. When each military camp speaks of just 6 to 10 violations, there is clearly a problem of consistency of information between all the actors.

Why is there no permanent ceasefire?

This is a complex issue about which I can give you some clues. If we act together, we might be able to achieve a permanent ceasefire. I have only limited real experience but enough virtual experience to know what should work, if I meet someone who is willing to implement it, which has not yet been the case.

The "internal wars" all have a cease-fire problem. Most often these are repeated ceasefires, but frequently the ceasefire remains fictitious. This is a known problem, regardless of the country in which it happens.

The solutions applied are varied and all have disadvantages and advantages.

More often than not, it ends with the victory of one side, which avoids the need to implement a simple ceasefire. Making peace for the military often means winning the war. But in Ukraine, it is unlikely that either side in a conflict will win the war militarily. In the summer and fall of 2014, the Ukrainian army has almost found itself in a dominant position to contemplate victory. But I don't know if you have understood it, but Russia will make sure that there will never be a military victory of Ukraine, without allowing a military victory of the separatists.

Can we, however, achieve a permanent ceasefire? I think so, but we should be able to act with the different actors.

What are the different causes of non-compliance with the ceasefire?

The main causes of the failure to hold the ceasefire are :

- A - No truly accepted basic agreement between the actors,
- B - Non-transmission and poor formalization of the ceasefire order to the armed components,
- C - Undisciplined armed groups deciding what they do,
- D - Inadequate ceasefire monitoring and supervision system

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A - No truly accepted basic agreement between the players

To date, there is no future perspective really shared by the main actors: Ukrainian authority, separatists, Russia.

What is theoretically admitted is that within the Ukraine a relative autonomy is institutionalized for the Donbass.

The Minsk agreements 1 and 2 are too imprecise, badly formalized, leaving it up to each one to interpret the agreements as he wants.

The first task would be to remove these ambiguities, identify them clearly and take the time to build a perspective that takes into account the hard points raised by starting to formalize the consequences.

The main points to be raised and confirmed are :

- There is only one army in Ukraine.
- In a country at peace, the army manages the borders and external threats: it does not carry out the usual police operations.
- Autonomy is not a federation of states that would have their own armies and completely autonomous laws.
- There may be autonomy of the security forces, provided that they are compatible according to common rules to be defined and applicable to the entire State and its autonomous services. This requires common and approved training.
→ Behind this point you have a weakness of the Ukrainian state which has not clearly defined how the police is different from its militia and army, and the mix made between some military units managed by the Ministry of Interior and vice versa (for example, the battalions of volunteers were attached to the Ministry of Interior and not to the army, which explains the lack of coordination between these battalions and the military command). This calls for a fundamental reform of the entire Ukrainian security services, which has been overlooked for the moment.
- It is possible that the interventions of the Ukrainian army will be restricted in Donbas, except the airspace of which it will keep the exclusivity.
- There may be partial legislative autonomy. The scope of this autonomy should be clearly defined
- The local executive must also have a clearly defined perimeter,
- The border of Ukraine will be controlled only by the central state, which means that there will be at least a 10 km zone along the border that will be under the exclusive control of the Ukrainian army.

The removal of these ambiguities should be done through an internal negotiation in Ukraine. Transparency should ensure that the agreements reached make sense and are acceptable to the different parties.

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To my knowledge, this removal of ambiguity has not been attempted. One could try to start it with the Ukrainian authorities, without waiting for the agreement of the other parties and when it will be the case take a sample of the population of Donbass to see if it makes sense and would allow to move forward.

Question/Action 002: Removal of ambiguities in the Minsk Accords

This is an important point. Before knowing whether such or such structure should deal with it and passing the buck between all the actors, one must first agree with the Ukrainian authorities on the ambiguities to be removed before unofficially submitting them to deputies in the opposition who can be considered close to the separatists, until they converge. It will be necessary to add to this lifting of ambiguities the problem of the Russian language in these territories and the special status. I wish to have a direct visibility on the removal of ambiguities and what is proposed. I have not written anything here about the "special status" but it must be given meaning. In the Ukrainian state Donbass and Luhansk are administrative provinces that straddle the territories controlled by the Ukrainian state and the separatists. Will the arrangements concern the complete administrative provinces or a new administrative province corresponding to the occupied territories. This can be discussed because the separatists would like to control all of these 2 provinces and could only be done if this extension is purely administrative. It is in the interest of the Ukrainian state to keep a similar framework for all, although this would have to correspond to developments that are wanted and acceptable by the parties. This is a delicate point and is being pushed to the limit by Russia and its allies in a federal form that does not correspond to anything in the Minsk agreements.

It would be normal that those who defined the Minsk Accords participate in the process of removing ambiguities. Still, there should be an internal engine within the group of 4 that I don't really see. I don't see who feels responsible for what. I rather have the impression that these are postures of circumstances without action, which leads to a fatal immobility.

B - Non-transmission and poor formalization of the ceasefire order

There is a lack of precise data, but the ceasefires in Ukraine give the impression that they are being passed on to only a part of the armed components. Most of the combatants are not informed in detail about the ceasefire and do not even have a written record and clear instructions at their disposal. This would require sample interviews with many combatants to confirm this, but how would one explain so many violations and artillery fire if all combatants had received the ceasefire order?

In the formalization, there is also the fact that, presumably, it is not indicated to the combatants what they should do in case of a blunder. They should be able to call by radio or otherwise a ceasefire supervision and monitoring system that covers their area. I believe there is no such system defined and implemented. It is this system that should go and silence the sources of fire.

Instead, as soon as there is a burr, everyone responds and causes a climb again. The formalization of ceasefire agreements is not designed to involve the combatants in de-escalation. It seems to me that the instructions received by most of the combatants is to respond to attacks and blunders, which contributes to the end of the ceasefire.

Note of 8/09/2017 :

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In the OSCE's Daily and spot reports from the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine between 3 and 7 September 2017 you can find a whole series of elements confirming these assumptions. SMM observers interviewed randomly encountered combatants on their patrols to find out if and which ones they had received orders for the last ceasefire in force. While a few were specifically informed, most received only a few oral reminders and had difficulty clarifying or justifying the content of what was conveyed to them. The first definite area for improvement, in light of these field surveys, is that better formalization and transmission will certainly have beneficial effects, even if they are likely to be short-lived and will not be sustainable without a Ceasefire Monitoring and Maintenance System adapted to the local situation.

To compensate for this bad formalization, we could ask each camp to write a cease-fire order on an A4 page (one side only) and ask each level of the hierarchy to sign it until the last level, which will also sign it. This sounds a bit bureaucratic, but when we are in the field and ask a combatant what he has received as an order, he is not able to say precisely if he has received one and which one (as verified by survey in 2017 by the SMM observers). Even if there is no new official ceasefire, simply reformulating it would have the advantage of ensuring that it has been transmitted to all levels and to everyone. Unfortunately, what has been found is that there are many combatants on both sides who have not received it or are not implementing it. The autonomous groups will never receive it, and it should not be too difficult to ensure this if the observers and inspectors asked each combatant to present his or her ceasefire order. I understand that military orders are never transmitted to everyone in this way, but it is unverifiable by an outside third party when they are transmitted orally.

Question/Action 003: Such formalization can be unilateral at first or initiated by what remains of JCCC, but it does not take 3 days to make the decision and start implementing it. Yes, it is bureaucratic and the military and combatants hate this kind of thing. Do they have another action that allows all their troops to respect a ceasefire rather than accusing others of violating it? I understand that they want to defend all their troops at all costs, but there are many elements on both sides who regularly take the initiative to make mistakes.

In order for this formalization to take effect, there must be authorization from each side to implement inspection patrols that will be composed of former SMM observers and liaison officers from each side. We will do the inspections with a liaison officer from the camp where we will do the inspections. Every blunder, violation, should be inspected as much as possible.

Refer to Appendix A: Formalizing the Ceasefire on page 17

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C - Undisciplined armed groups deciding what they do themselves

In Ukraine, this phenomenon exists on both sides. It is more accentuated on the separatist side than on the side of the Ukrainian armed forces.

On the Ukrainian side :

- Volunteer battalions are reputed to be the most undisciplined. This is reinforced by the fact that these volunteer battalions were initially attached to the Ministry of the Interior and with no clear link to the military command. It seems to me that things have changed a bit, but it is often specific units that are multiplying blunders and escalations.
- The observations of the SMM observers clearly show that the shots were fired from all directions and in all directions, putting into perspective the official statements that only the camp opposite is responsible for the "attacks". But OSCE observers are humanly short-sighted. They clearly identify the cannon shots and explosions, but they never make any connection with the fighting forces on the ground and refrain from acting on the fighting forces, if only by reminding them to stop firing or to evacuate the prohibited weapons.

On the side of the separatists:

- The fighting units appear as a grouping of militias, militiamen, formed troops whose unified command seems theoretical,
- They do what they want when they want and to maintain their faith in a dream (No European country will ever recognize their republic and their leaders will avoid telling them this truth to their face), sending a small blow to the camp opposite is good for morale.

There are ways to get undisciplined armed groups to respect a cease-fire. This requires sectorization (i.e., cutting the entire line of contact and the security zone into sub-sectors. Currently there are 2 sectors, 7 to 10 sub-sectors would be needed), operational centers, liaison officers with these fighting units, observers/inspectors who know the sector and the forces involved.

In Ukraine we are in a situation where many armed groups are undisciplined.

Therefore the only thing that works from time to time is to relaunch a ceasefire at the highest level. This seems to be done on a regular basis, which I call a cover-up for the lack of understanding of what is happening and the lack of a coherent system of supervision and monitoring of the ceasefire.

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D - Inadequate ceasefire monitoring and supervision system

The image of a fire protection system in a very dry forest is this: in order to be able to act quickly, observers are dispersed on observation towers in the forest. As soon as a fire breaks out, the observer informs an operational PC which immediately deploys the fire department necessary to extinguish the beginning of the fire.

In Ukraine, there are SMM observers: they observe but I don't believe they are connected to a local operational center and that there are specialized "firefighters" to go and put out the fire. The firefighters would be specialized teams to search for local military officials and their fighters to ask them to stop and comply with ceasefire orders.

The current system is passive: there are observers who observe, retransmit their information much later, as if it were not important to transmit it, and above all there is no subsystem to go and put out the fire. All the information is retransmitted to the highest level that can do nothing with it. An example can be taken by giving a daily SMM report to the Ukrainian President and the Ukrainian Prime Minister asking them if they are able to stop this or that incident from the table of violations. They will probably say that only a local officer needs to know where it came from and that if this information is not given to him within minutes of the incident he will probably not find the source of the violation.

For a ceasefire to hold, the entire SMM and JCCC system would have to be recast into one, and they would have to work differently.

Each sector/sub-sector should have an operational center running 24 hours a day. This center should be linked to inspector patrols accompanied by liaison officers for their security and be able to facilitate contact. These patrols would go to where violations are occurring to try to understand what is happening and stop it. They would investigate and understand the forces involved. When they encounter prohibited weapons in the security zone, they would not only report it, but also ensure that the prohibited weapons are removed and traced geographically.

Refer to Appendix C - SMCC - System Monitoring and Control Center *page 20*

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Are the Ukrainian authorities interested in :

- *Removing ambiguities in the Minsk Accords*
- *Better formalize a ceasefire,*
- *Improve the ceasefire monitoring system*
- *Agree that inspection teams can come and question their combatants directly to see the reason for incidents and violations.*

If YES, we will have to organize ourselves to move this forward and allow inspection teams to be created.

In the meantime, the Ukrainian army should debrief every morning with an SMM representative on the previous day's violations (not 48 or 72 hours before, it's too late) and confront everyone's information with the observed reality. No offense: there are thousands of combatants who think they have good reasons for what they did, even if it was to the detriment of the ceasefire. We are not going to punish them, but we are going to deal with them and their hierarchy. It will be done on each side.

These questions will be reformulated later until there are satisfactory answers from the Ukrainian authorities that can be shared with any interlocutor.

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How to explain the outbreak of War in Ukraine?

The preliminary question could be: what do you want to hear? A militant discourse that explains that the other is solely responsible for this whole war? If this is the case, it is probably better to skip the part that follows, which will not satisfy anyone: neither you, nor your opponents, nor the learned doctrines of our time, who will find no reference to what they think are the causes of wars.

The following is simply what the author thinks as a result of his research. The author does not pretend to be the truth, but to explain his truth, if you want to hear it. The author assumes that he is speaking to people who are able to understand what is being explained to them. Any contradictory debate is welcome.

The researches that are referenced here should be considered as rough intuitions that would deserve further research to be conducted to be able to confirm them.

The author has used all these concepts to make war predictions that have been confirmed by facts and history. The author does not pretend to expose a recognized scientific truth and regrets not having found a way to communicate more widely on the subject.

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To read the rest, you are asked to have at hand the text "The War Cycle" Version 2.1 of May 21, 2019, which was translated into English in early 2020. Some parts are quoted here, to avoid having to repeat them.

For the rest, we must understand that a war is caused by the accumulation of a set of causes and not by a single cause (see page 22 of version 2.1 in French).

Among these causes we can cite the following:

- The new Russian will-to-power
- The Ukrainian political instability of recent years (Revolution, counter-revolution then new revolution, etc...)
- The historical fragility of Ukraine as a state and territory
(If I met Ukrainian historians, I would ask them to present in the form of a map or drawing all the successive contours of the Ukrainian state borders, limiting them to about fifteen drawings, from the Middle Ages to now. Once done, I would ask someone else to scroll through these successive contours of Ukraine on a slide show. The visual result should be interesting)
- The geographical location that makes Ukraine a sounding board for Europe-Russia conflicts, as well as its role as a possible link between these two worlds
- And a cause that remains unknown to most Ukrainians is "The War Cycle".
*Several years before the Donbass war in 2014, the studies of the "War Cycle" predicted that there would be a war in Europe in the period 2014-2017, as a consequence of the phenomenon underlying the "War Cycle". During this period, there was only one war: that of Ukraine. This war therefore confirms the expected forecast.
Chance? Probably not, but minds are not ripe to understand that the main reason for the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2014 is probably the cyclical phenomenon of the "War Cycle" which has caused several conflicts to degenerate into wars or escalations in a few weeks.*

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Why Ukraine at that time? Because it was in an internal and external conflict that was significant enough to degenerate into war. If at that moment in 2014 there had been other countries in Europe in a state as conflictual as Ukraine, these other conflicts could have degenerated into war or escalation, as was the case in other non-European countries.

Tentative Conclusion :

You certainly have your own opinion, but you probably didn't know that the most likely explanation for your war is that a periodic phenomenon of great influence on our collective unconscious went through there, in accordance with the "Cycle of Wars".

The state of this research is too little advanced for our contemporaries to confirm this explanation, but it seemed important to me to put at your disposal the most advanced research, even if it is disputed and questionable, in an attempt to explain what led to the outbreak of war in Ukraine. Even if you refuse to believe in these hypotheses, for lack of finding in the public space a confirmation of the "War Cycle", if this would allow you to think differently than what you have believed until now, it would be a considerable step forward in trying to build a settlement. It is necessary to know how to create doubt in order to construct a future other than the one that seems to be traced out through the explanation you have made of this conflict. Trust your common sense to try to understand what is explained to you through the "War Cycle".

A contradictory debate would be welcome on the subject of the causes of the Ukrainian war. This debate would have the advantage of being able to present different hypotheses, including those indicated here, and to confront more precisely these different ideas, some of which remain unknown to the general public and to European leaders.

The underlying concepts have been used for many years to predict future wars. In Europe, since the 1990s, all wars on European territory have taken place in the former perimeter of socialist Eastern Europe (USSR, all satellite countries and Tito's former Yugoslavia). The collapse of the socialist system in the East brought to the surface the conflicts repressed by the authoritarian socialist regimes. If one wants to imagine the next European wars, one can start by making an analysis in this former socialist perimeter and identify the most important underlying conflicts. They will all be candidates for a future conflict, especially if they have a Russian dimension (direct or indirect through a Russian-speaking population). Georgia, Ukraine, who will be next ??? For the time being they are degenerating in a manner consistent with the "War Cycle". This may facilitate the understanding of the future (all the more so as the organizations officially in charge of these subjects in Europe make it a point of honor to ignore any new concept referring to such a subject). It is better that you know this, even if you do not agree, rather than burying your head in the sand.

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From Strategy to Action

This part only repeats the actions identified previously in the text in mauve color.

27/4/2020: currently limited to 3 actions. If they don't start, nothing will happen

These actions are summarized in a table

Action	Title (<i>see definition in the body of the text above</i>)	Responsible for monitoring	Comments
Q/A001	What administrative recovery plan? with a short-term flagship action	?? Ukrainian PM	
Q/A002	Removal of ambiguities	?? president ?? + ND ??	Sensitive and complex
Q/A003	Reform at all levels of the ceasefire hierarchy	Chief of Staff ?? with JCCC + ?? to be defined	ASAP

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Appendix A: Formalizing the Ceasefire

It is necessary to describe a little more precisely what is expected on this subject. Some might interpret it as if we had to redefine precise chords, with maps and all the shaking. No, the formalization does not consist in gathering all the formalization documents that have been generated for almost 6 years by the Contact Group. The aim is not to produce an encyclopedia of agreements and give it to every fighter, whether military or militia.

- It should begin by stating that the ceasefire is about the cessation of all shooting, of any weapon, be it a simple pistol or a piece of artillery. There are no exceptions allowed, none. Ceasefire should not be confused with disengagement or disarmament.
- There needs to be a way to ensure that the ceasefire order has been transmitted to all. The proposed means is to make sure that each combatant on the ground has received a document in one page (possibly double-sided if you want to have one side in Ukrainian and the other in Russian), signed by his direct superior (with visible name).
- This one-page formalization must indicate :
 - ➔ The ceasefire applies to all types of weapons, without exception.
 - ➔ It is permanent
 - ➔ No preventive action or return to firing is allowed: the hierarchy and local officials must be informed of the cease-fire maintenance system.
 - ➔ A VHF frequency will be communicated at a later date and will depend on the geographical areas in which the combatants are located. There will be a maximum of 10 frequencies corresponding to geographical areas. These frequencies will be open, unencrypted. These will be the listening frequencies on which you will have to transmit any violations found. On each of these frequencies there will be a permanent listening 24/7 on the part of the teams in charge of monitoring and maintaining the ceasefire (the entire line of contact and the security zone will be divided into 10 zones). These zones are sub-sectors. Not all zones are active at any given time. The geographical description of these zones will have to be defined between the two camps on local maps. This definition is more of a detail. The JCCC could do this. A SMM presence is desirable, so that at least they act of this reality)
 - ➔ Inspection teams may be brought in to interview each fighter. These inspection teams will always be accompanied by a liaison officer from your camp. You must answer questions and participate in the checks that will be conducted by these teams.
- The page can be completed with other elements, but it must remain simple
- Why formalize it on a page of A4 paper? Because we have noticed at all levels that some orders were broken as if they were retransmitted truncated or incomplete. In addition, we need to be able to check by inspection teams what happens when there are violations. These inspection teams do not always have a good knowledge of the language. These teams know how to check on presentation of a sheet of paper that an order has been transmitted by their superior, but they do not know, by simple oral questioning, how to be sure that an order has been transmitted and which one it is.
- Of course, each copy held by a combatant must be signed by him/her and his/her direct superior. It is not necessary to report all intermediate signatures.

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- Whether the A4 paper is the same for everyone in a camp or customized locally is irrelevant. The advantage of personalization is that it is probably better accepted locally and does not seem like an impersonal order that does not concern them. Either solution is not imposed at my level. We just need a way to verify that certain orders are transmitted to all levels of the hierarchy.

Appendix B: Verification by Inspection Teams

In most existing industries and countries, there are quality systems in place that ensure the quality of what is produced. They not only observe what is being done, but they check what has actually been done and, if necessary, initiate corrective action. Inspection teams are much the same thing, except that these teams have no other way of launching corrective actions than to do it with the combatants and their hierarchy.

Not all violations are necessarily voluntary. There may be misunderstanding, irrational fears, or other circumstances. But we must try to understand why these violations occur and find ways with each side to stop them.

Although some people think that there is no audit and inspection to be done, I am one of those who believe only what they see and what can be verified. The inspection teams will therefore have to come and interview combatants. They will generally be accompanied by a liaison officer from your camp.

These inspection teams are bound by professional secrecy: they have no written report to make on what they have seen and understood. They are only required to confirm violations and only if they find the source of the violation do they confirm that the source has been resolved. It is not their role to throw an accusing finger at anyone without the person having been directly informed by them. All they want is for the source of the violations to be understood and for each side to resolve its problems, which may be simple misunderstandings.

The inspection teams will work in mirror image on each side of the contact line. It is important that the violations observed by each camp are traced back (for example, by zone frequencies), so that the inspection teams can be launched in the camp opposite to try to understand the source of the violations.

It may happen that the source of the violations is not found, but the principle is that we will try to understand and that the goal is to help each side control the violations that still remain.

Inspection teams are not strictly SMM observers. Let's call them SMM-I. They have a different role and missions from simple SMM observation teams. Each inspection team is in contact with a liaison officer from each side. He is not necessarily physically present with the inspection team at all times. If he is not physically present with the inspection team, each fighter can ask to speak to him and the inspection team must contact him by radio and possibly make him move to confirm himself the mission of the inspection teams to the fighters of his camp.

Inspection teams have the right and duty to conduct their own investigations when they deem it necessary.

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Appendix C - SMCC - System Monitoring and Control Center

The SMCC is a project of New Ceasefire Supervision and Control System in Ukraine.

Its name is no coincidence, being a combination of the first two letters of SMM and the last two letters of JCCC, as if the best of each was being used.

The aim of this system is not only to provide an overview of the situation on the ground, but also to set up operational centers that will act in a sub-sector (or zone) when there are incidents, violations or other incidents.

Information indicating violations is only useful if it is used early enough to help stop violations or avoid future ones. Today there is information about ceasefire violations and explosions, but it does not seem to be used in real time by other teams that would be responsible for seeing with the combatants what is happening: these are inspection teams.

To summarize, we could say that an inspection team has a civilian leader from the SMM observers but works as a team with liaison officers from each side to better understand and act. The liaison officers are dedicated to one inspection team and one inspection team only. They can go into the field together or synchronize through any means of communication.

Liaison officers and inspection teams choose to work together on an individual basis. Inspection teams are most often composed of former European diplomats or various government officials. They generally do not have the local military culture and often do not have the practice of local languages that would allow them to have the best understanding of local combatants. On the other hand, liaison officers do have this local knowledge and can help to better understand the situation. Without them, inspection teams are somewhat short-sighted and may be unable, under certain circumstances, to have local influence.

Inspection teams are unarmed and have only their understanding and persuasion to move things forward.

These inspection teams are one of the links in the SMCC.

A sub-sector (or zone) is a limited geographical area (a few tens of kilometers and always less than 50) in which interact :

- Fighters and their hierarchy in each camp,
- Inspection teams with their liaison officers,
- An operational PC that works 24 hours a day. The latter is considered as a coordination center. It has visibility on possible incidents. It has radio contact with each camp. It also has a fixed radio listening frequency accessible to all. It also has contact with some inspection teams dedicated to the area.

Normally, this operational PC is a dedicated place (under canvas or hardened), at a sufficient distance from the contact line to be safe, but it can also simply be a coordination center in a vehicle.

Ideally, in an operational PC you have a sector map on a wall or a table where you can materialize the different incidents in progress.

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When a violation occurs in a sub-sector, the operational Center should be made aware of it, make a note of it in a logbook, and check with the camp where the incident originated to see if there is an explanation and a way to stop it.

If there is insufficient information to conclude, the operational Center may delegate inspection teams who, with the help of their liaison officers, will try to stop it by persuasion. On this occasion, they will check with those concerned the ceasefire orders received, or the attack orders received and, if they deem it necessary, contact local hierarchies to better understand the reasons for these violations.

It is clear that the goal is to understand and stop the incidents.

There may also be occasions when the operational Center and the teams may come to recommend a local reorganization of local forces to avoid the recurrence of these types of incidents. The operational CP must also be able to identify the risks in the area and the means to limit them (demining, etc.).

An area that would be more than 50 km wide on the line of contact is probably unmanageable by these means alone. Between 20 and 30 km wide, there must be a small chance that this arrangement will make it possible to mitigate incidents and to ensure that local orders are consistent with the ceasefire, the principle of which has been accepted by all, even if it is slow to be implemented.

If necessary, the operational Center can call back the ceasefire in this area and request to be able to verify that each combatant has received the ceasefire standing orders they should respect.

The operational Center and inspection teams are not empowered to sanction anyone, but they must be in contact with local hierarchies to resolve situations.

On the exact security rules and prohibitions related to each zone, it will be necessary to define rules consistent with what has already been officially accepted. However, there has been a proliferation of too many rules for it to be pointless to claim to enforce them all. It will be necessary to take a subset of the rules and agreements between the parties. For example, all of the arms prohibitions defined for the security zone must be recalled and enforced.

What will the SMCC change?

Today there is information gathered by observers that is not immediately processed. Some of the information in the daily reports does not allow a detailed understanding of the problem. Some information is relayed to combatant leaders on each side, but without ensuring that the information is processed. It also happens that this information is relayed at a very high level, but not to those who could process it locally.

The SMCC presents itself as an improvement of the existing by trying to take the best of each one. It is hoped that it will see the light of day in the field between all the actors concerned.

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