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Does a cyclical phenomenon favor War and Peace?

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Abstract

In another research, a cyclical phenomenon has appeared that has an influence on wars and a possible influence on peace. It is not a deterministic phenomenon that would provoke wars in a certain way, but a cyclic phenomenon that amplifies or attenuates violence to the point of being able to transform it into war or escalation and more rarely into Peace.

This text summarizes and makes available the main existing elements on this subject

Whether you are opposed or convinced by this reality, it is important to know about it in order to integrate it into your understanding of wars and crises. For more than 15 years, the concepts have been used to improve conventional war predictions. Even if this study requires further research to arrive at an indisputable truth, the concepts are already usable by those who accept to know and understand them.

The knowledge provided is more about anticipating future wars by forecasting them than by conducting military operations, which remains unchanged once war has been declared.

Introduction

From the original idea to a cyclical phenomenon

It was a long process that led to the discovery of this cyclical phenomenon. The purpose of the research was not to find a cyclical phenomenon but simply to find a method to improve forecasts, in particular on possible crises that seemed unpredictable.

This process has led to the identification of a cyclical phenomenon that is expressed in various forms:

- Resurgences of the past: a collective event that has left its mark on the unconscious can be relived or implicated in probable periods. This phenomenon is called "Return of the Past". The phenomenon of Return is not described here, but it is by identifying returns from the past that a cyclical phenomenon linked to wars has appeared, which we will call "War Cycle". Wars can be favored or attenuated by a cyclical phenomenon.
- War cycle
- And some other ways not described here ...

Quick description of the observed phenomenon

A cyclical phenomenon has been observed which has an influence either on the outbreak of wars or on their escalation. It has also been seen a partial influence that can favor lulls or peace.

The influence on wars seems to be demonstrable, while the influence on Peace seems hardly demonstrable, in the state of this research.

Why such a difference in treatment between War and Peace?

When a war breaks out, it presents itself as a compelling need that **immediately** triggers a war. The outbreak of war is not generally disputed and there are enough wars to have some statistical evidence.

When Peace finally comes, it is most often a very long process that results in an official peace that may never be implemented and become a reality. Although there are times when there is an easing of the tension that can lead to peace, there is **no immediate and compelling event** like in the case of the outbreak of a war. It can take weeks, months and years for the will for peace to materialize, which makes it difficult to use the dates of peace to arrive at a statistical confirmation of this cyclical phenomenon on peace.

Moreover, there are very few peace events: too few cases to conclude statistically, not to mention the fact that most of the peace agreements negotiated are not implemented.

The main observation is that there is a cyclical phenomenon **that amplifies violence to the point of promoting wars or escalations** at certain times called "amplification phase" and **that attenuates wars and promotes lulls and peace** at other times called "attenuation phase".

How can the "cyclical phenomenon" favor the outbreak of wars?

What follows could be called "modeling the outbreak of wars compatible with the observed cyclical phenomenon." It is an explanation consistent with the evidence that is explained in the remainder of the paper. It is necessary to present both an explanation of what causes wars and the "cyclical phenomenon" that impacts the outbreak and escalation of wars. How can we confirm the impact of a "cyclical phenomenon" if we do not agree on what can trigger a war?

This explanation was built mainly on concepts explained in polemological studies in the 1970s with some contributions from the author.

Those who understand the following few pages have the essentials as well as the main thread that will be followed to seek and present evidence of this "cyclical phenomenon" also called "War Cycle".

To understand how the "cyclical phenomenon" works, we must keep in mind 2 phenomena:

Phenomenon A - a "cyclical phenomenon" that amplifies or attenuates tensions


Phenomenon B - the outbreak of war

And finally, the combination of these 2 phenomena

"Cyclical phenomenon" and the outbreak of wars

Phenomenon A - a sinusoidal phenomenon that amplifies or attenuates tensions

There are times when violence is amplified and times when it is attenuated. The transition from one to the other is gradual.



"Cyclical phenomenon" and the outbreak of wars

Phenomenon B - The outbreak of war


A war is caused by a combination of causes and not by a single cause.

Polemology (in the journals of the Institute of Polemology¹ in the 1970s) distinguished mainly 3 levels of causes:

- Structural causes which correspond to permanent causes (religious, cultural, institutional differences)
- The "conjunctural" causes which correspond to the succession of events which precede the war without being the immediate cause.
- The immediate cause, i.e. the event that is at the origin of the outbreak of the war

Causes accumulate and can become greater than a **war triggering threshold**². A war will only be triggered if the accumulation of causes exceeds a threshold called the "War Triggering Threshold". This notion of a war triggering threshold is considered fundamental.

Beyond this threshold, war begins. The accumulation of tensions leads to an incident or action that will mark the beginning of the war.



Combination of phenomena A and B on an amplification peak

¹ At that time, the Institute of Polemology was located in the "Musée de la Guerre" in Paris.

² If the different causes of war (structural, conjunctural, immediate) are derived from polemology, the notion of a "threshold for the outbreak of war" is specific to the author. There may be other authors who have described the equivalent of a threshold, but they have not been identified to date. If they are ever identified, they will be referenced.


"Cyclical phenomenon" and the outbreak of wars

Case 1: Case where the accumulation of causes is slightly lower than the threshold for war before the amplification phase

In this case, the "cyclical phenomenon", during a peak of amplification, acts as an additional cause that will make the threshold for the outbreak of war be exceeded and will thus transform the permanent tension into war.

This explains the choice of the contexts selected (*see part Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars* page 24 and following pages) and why they allow us to make some forecasts.

By looking at recurrent conflicts (e.g. the Arab-Israeli conflict) which always give the impression of being on the brink of war without entering it, we can predict the probable wars in the next periods of amplification.




"Cyclical phenomenon" and the outbreak of wars

Case 2: Cases where the combination of conjunctural and structural causes are much lower than the threshold before the amplification phase.

In this case, the "cyclical phenomenon", during a peak of war amplification, acts as an additional cause, but there is no war because the threshold of war initiation is not reached.

This also allows us to imagine means of action, i.e. to act on the identified causes to avoid crossing the threshold of war. Not knowing the origin of the cyclic phenomenon, we cannot act on this cause. Only the known causes can be mitigated. Classic and vigorous negotiations should reduce tensions and the causes of war. If they are carried out before the next period of amplification, we can hope to avoid a war that is considered probable, since even with the amplification caused by the "cyclical phenomenon" the threshold for the outbreak of war will not be reached.




"Cyclical phenomenon" and the outbreak of wars

Case 3: Case where the accumulation of causes is well above the threshold of war triggering, even before the amplification phase.

In this case, there is already a war before the amplification phase. There is no new war since it has already begun. The amplification phase can lead to visible "over-violence" through military escalation (local, regional, international) or new violence. Several examples illustrate this case:

- In early 1964, the bombings in Vietnam marked a military escalation at the peak of the amplification. The war had officially been going on for some time, but the real escalation occurred at this peak.
- The war in Iraq began in 2003, at the time of a mitigation peak, the American victory was followed by an Iraqi civil war which coincides well with the amplification phase. See the "**Visualization/materialization of the "War Cycle**" pages 15 and following. This internal Iraqi violence increased up to the amplification peak and then steadily decreased, until it gradually resumed with the arrival of the next amplification phase and the war against the Islamic State.
- The Syrian war began in 2011, at a mitigation peak, thus apparently contradicting the "War Cycle." But knowing this case 3, I predicted in 2012 that there would be a regional escalation of the Syrian war at the amplification peak expected in late 2015. This expansion of the war began in 2014 and continued into 2015 and 2016 before the Islamic State's pushback began.



Characterization of the "Cyclic Phenomenon"

Origin of the discovery

This cycle was not discovered by a statistical study, but fortuitously in another research that did not have as its main subject the study of wars, but the study of "returns of the past". These "Returns of the Past" were used to make predictions (of wars or crises) based on past events. At the end of 1998, the periodicity of these "returns of the past" was a multiple of 25 years. Applying the concepts of the time, I expected for 1998, 1999, a major event such as a war which would be the return of past events in 1948 and 1973. This approach was a bit complicated since it was necessary to identify at least two past events that could cause a resurgence in order to make a forecast, which explains why there were very few possible forecasts because of the constraints applied. About the Kosovo war in 1999, I realized that 3 different cycles of the Return were simply shifted by a little more than 8 years and that it would be enough to determine a single Cycle with a periodicity of a third of 25 years (i.e. 8 years and a few months) to group together all that was observed about the Wars. Because this discovery was linked to the "Returns of the past", the cyclical phenomenon was called "Cycle of Return". The "Cycle of Return" was later renamed "War Cycle", which is more meaningful. These elements explaining the origin of the discovery are not evidence and are not developed here. They have been developed in 2 books³.

Calculation of the periodicity of the "War Cycle"

The periodicity was calculated in 2001, based on the dates of the outbreak of the major wars⁴ of the 20th century.

The periodicity of the cyclic phenomenon from this calculation is 3085 days, or 8 years and 5 ½ months.

The outbreak of the First World War is the T0 of the "War Cycle". The other peaks are calculated from the periodicity of 3085 days.

It is better to speak of an **average periodicity of 3085 days**. There is no perfect sinusoid in nature. There are certainly variations of this phenomenon which probably oscillates between 6 and 10 years. There would be a lot of studies to do before changing the current value by another more accurate one.

The value retained and used is approximate. It would be necessary to find the origin of this phenomenon to be able to recalibrate it with precision. Other values between 3070 and

³ Book 1 : " L'Horloge de l'Inconscient " published by Publibook - 2003

Book 2 : " L'Horloge de l'Inconscient déclenche-t-elle des guerres " published by Le Glaive d'argent - 2012

⁴ The wars and dates used for this calculation are presented in " L'Horloge de l'Inconscient " published by Publibook - 2003

Characterization of the cyclic phenomenon

3100 can be as relevant and will have little impact on what is observed and on the forecasts that can be made.

The current imprecision of the periodicity value has little influence. In the present stage of this study, we are interested in the amplification phases as a whole. Even if the amplification peak is calculated, the accuracy of the predicted events has an uncertainty that is rather of the order of six months or one year, which justifies continuing to work with an approximate value that is certainly inaccurate.

The demonstration of the phenomenon also seems possible, despite these recognized approximations.

Predictions of future wars have been made regularly since the 2005's. They are based on periods of time (such as amplification phases) and not on precise dates to the day.

Some dates (Peaks and periods of amplification and attenuation)

Amplification peaks	Mitigation peaks
February 1906	May 1910
July 1914	October 1918
January 1923	April 1927
June 1931	September 1935
December 1939	February 1944
May 1948	August 1952
October 1956	January 1961
April 1965	June 1969
September 1973	December 1977
February 1982	May 1986
August 1990	October 1994
January 1999	April 2003
June 2007	September 2011
December 2015	February 2020
May 2024	August 2028
October 2032	January 2037
April 2041	June 2045
September 2049	December 2053

Amplification time	
Start	End
January 1904	March 1908
June 1912	September 1916
November 1920	February 1925
May 1929	August 1933
October 1937	January 1942
April 1946	June 1950

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
Characterization of the cyclic phenomenon

September 1954	December 1958
February 1963	May 1967
August 1971	October 1975
January 1980	April 1984
June 1988	September 1992
December 1996	February 2001
May 2005	August 2009
October 2013	January 2018
April 2022	June 2026
September 2030	December 2034
February 2039	May 2043
August 2047	October 2051

Mitigation time	
Start	End
March 1908	June 1912
September 1916	November 1920
February 1925	May 1929
August 1933	October 1937
January 1942	April 1946
June 1950	September 1954
December 1958	February 1963
May 1967	August 1971
October 1975	January 1980
April 1984	June 1988
September 1992	December 1996
February 2001	May 2005
August 2009	October 2013
January 2018	April 2022
June 2026	September 2030
December 2034	February 2039
May 2043	August 2047

Characterization of the cyclic phenomenon

This graphic representation is equivalent to the dates on the previous pages



How to demonstrate the reality of the "War Cycle"

What argumentation and demonstration?

At first, I naively thought that it would be enough to present some rational elements to interest and convince of the reality of a "War Cycle". But then I realized that most of those who read it start off reacting to the subject, without reading either the proposed explanation or the evidence presented. They react to their idea of a "War Cycle" and not to what is presented, without much thought as to whether what they put in the phrase "War Cycle" is what the author wants to explain.

In other words, the expression "War Cycle" naturally generates misunderstandings, and there is no more accurate and sufficiently short expression to express this phenomenon. One could always say **"The cycle that amplifies violence to the point of triggering war or escalation and mitigates it to the point of de-escalation or a step towards peace"**. This expression is a bit cumbersome, although accurate: it is therefore preferable to speak of the "War Cycle", a shorter expression, although a source of misunderstandings.

What are the main reactions and misunderstandings?

- If one or more wars were started outside the periods of amplification, this would prove that the "War Cycle" is false.
Answer: it is a phenomenon that amplifies or attenuates but does not determine all wars. Moreover, it is a statistical reality. There are wars that start at the most improbable moment and that allow, despite everything, to demonstrate the "War Cycle".
- Some authors have demonstrated that there can be no periodicity of wars
Answer: there are also some authors who have considered the periodicity of wars as credible. For example, the father of polemology, Gaston Bouthoul, was explicit on this subject in his "Traité de polémologie"⁵. He is not the only one, since several Anglo-Saxon authors have also considered that there can be a periodicity of wars. Why give more weight to those who say that this would not be possible, without even arguing their position?
- Cyclical phenomena allow to demonstrate anything and everything, which discredits the "cyclical phenomena" and therefore the "War Cycle".
Answer: this reaction is due to the fact that from occasionally authors present a "cycle" which is based on many different types of events (e.g.: birth and death of a great man, revolution, war, discovery...). By mixing all types of events one could demonstrate almost any periodicity. In the present case, only a few events of a similar nature are used: outbreak of war, escalation, lull, peace). Proponents of cyclical phenomena sometimes add unrelated events to

⁵ Traité de polémologie by Gaston Bouthoul published by Payot " Bibliothèque scientifique Payot ", 1991 edition, following the 1970 update

Demonstrate the « War Cycle »

demonstrate their cycle. The consequence is that this discredits any demonstration of a cyclical phenomenon

Moreover, the cause of wars is a sensitive subject on which there is no unanimity or shared scientific truth. Everyone has his own model of the causes of wars and their outbreak, which complicates the subject. To accept a shared demonstration of the influence of the cyclical phenomenon on wars, it would be necessary to share a common model of the causes of wars and to take into account events compatible with this model.

The demonstration of the "War Cycle" is therefore difficult, mainly because of the lack of shared certainties about the phenomenon of War and Peace. However, we propose an approach to get there. In the section **How can the "cyclical phenomenon" favor the outbreak of wars?** page 3 we explained:

- there is a sinusoidal phenomenon of amplification and attenuation
- and there are outbreaks of war in case 1 and escalations in case 3 (*see for cases 1 and 3 " How can the "cyclical phenomenon" favor the outbreak of wars?"* page 3 and following

We will therefore present some elements that will facilitate the understanding and the demonstration

- Visualization (materialization) of the "War Cycle"
- Presentation of different contexts as well as their statistical elements verifying that major wars occur more often during periods of amplification based on the dates of outbreak of wars or dates of escalation.

To speak of demonstration is a bit premature and even, for some, presumptuous. These are tracks of elements of proof to be developed in order to hope to arrive one day at a demonstrated and shared truth. For such a truth to emerge, it will be necessary for other authors and researchers to study the subject and make their contribution, which is not yet the case.

Visualization/materialization of the "War Cycle"

Why did you present this cyclical phenomenon in the form of a "sinusoid"? Because we see periods of amplification and attenuation that seem credible (See "**Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars**" page 24 and following pages).

But if someone were to say that it is not a sinusoid, there is no other argument than to show something resembling a sinusoid and constructed from real data

One could imagine many ways:

- Use statistics of violent incidents and see if you see anything that resembles this cyclical phenomenon
- Using war data to try to visualize and materialize the "War Cycle"
- ... or other ways not proposed here but imaginable


By chance, I was able to gather some data that allowed me to begin to materialize this "War Cycle". This chance is called Wikileaks and without it I probably would not have had the idea to visualize and materialize this cyclical phenomenon.

Iraq: the precious data of Wikileaks

The U.S. military has done a remarkable job internally of recording all incidents and deaths and injuries during the war in Iraq that began in 2003.

In 2010, following the publication of the U.S. military reports by WikiLeaks, the newspaper "Le Monde" dated Sunday 24-Monday 25 October 2010 published a graph clearly showing a peak in violence in late 2006. Prior to the publication of this graph, it was accepted that the peak of violence in Iraq was in 2007, and the figures given were extremely variable depending on the source. Careful analysis of the reports revealed by Wikileaks has made it possible to measure the actual violence in Iraq from 2004 to 2009. The measure is the number of casualties. The source of the original graph published in the newspaper "Le Monde" is "THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM" According to the U.S. military reports published by Wikileaks, there were 110,000 deaths from 2004 to 2009. The following graph (*the form of which has been slightly modified for insertion in this document*), shows the distribution of these casualties over time (dead and wounded). This is the only reliable measure of violence in Iraq known to date during this period that is based on reports, unlike many other estimates that were based on a few polls extrapolated by statistical methods under very different assumptions from one source to another.


Visualization of the "War Cycle"



Curve showing the number of dead and wounded (vertical axis) versus time (horizontal axis) based on US military reports obtained by Wikileaks

This curve is based on 400,000 military reports provided by Wikileaks and exploited by the media.

Knowing that the peak of amplification was in mid-2007 and that the next one is at the end of 2015, someone who knows the "War Cycle" can place on this graph the peaks of amplification of 2007 and 2015



Was the "War Cycle" materialized?


Not really. We see a half-period of the "War Cycle" and a peak that is about 6 months out of sync with the theoretical peak in 2007. This is a good coincidence which gives an apparent materialization of the amplification peak, but it is insufficient to visualize the "War Cycle". At least one complete cycle (8 and a half years) is needed. 2 cycles (17 years) would give weight to the subject. This is a good start but we need something else to claim to have visualized/materialized the "War Cycle".

Visualization of the "War Cycle"

What can anyone who knows about the "War Cycle" conclude before 2014?

It can be concluded that the departure of the Americans in 2011 from Iraq is done in the calmest period. If this materialization is indeed that of the "War Cycle", in the period of amplification that will follow (2014 to 2017), we will see a component of internal violence/civil war in Iraq increase until 2015 and then a new decline in this violence/civil war. The Americans left Iraq believing that the job was done and over. If they had known about this phenomenon they could have come to these conclusions and anticipated the period that followed. Everything that happened afterwards confirmed this.


Iraq : 2014 and 2015



What we see in 2014 and 2015: Since 2012 there has been a rise in violence (dotted line), confirming that the cycle identified by Wikileaks is indeed the materialization of the "War Cycle". The media gradually spoke of a resumption of attacks, then at the end of 2013 spoke of a level of violence similar to that of 2008/2007 and then this new war in Iraq against ISIS explodes all the counters. Unfortunately, the trends are not measurable as accurately as with the US military reports. We have the impression that there is such a trend, based on all the information that comes in, but without being able to demonstrate it with a curve calculated from facts.

Visualization of the "War Cycle"

Iraq : 2016




What we see in 2016: The conflict in Iraq is losing its intensity. The Islamic State's retreat is resulting in a gradual recapture of the territories initially conquered in 2014. Their action will likely continue in the classic forms of attacks but with what appears to be less intensity. A reliable measure or estimates have yet to be found to supplement these elements. This is the first time the cycle could be materialized in thousands of measurement points over a period of more than 10 years. Half of the work is based on hundreds of thousands of US Army reports. However, there is a small flaw: since Wikileaks, there is no more data available through the Americans, and the Americans would rather hide this reality than contribute to confirming this materialization of the "War Cycle". If the first part of the curve from 2004 to 2009 is not questionable, the extrapolation from 2014 to 2016 is not demonstrated. If someone were to say, "the author has mistaken his desires for realities," I would not have a convincing argument to counter without finding data to demonstrate it. Good point, but not convincing at this point

Visualization of the "War Cycle"

Iraq: Iraqbodycount.org has data allowing a materialization of the "War Cycle" over 17 years, i.e. 2 complete periods.

In March 2017, I came across the site "Iraqbodycount.org". This site provides data on the number of civilian deaths in Iraq. A group of British and American opponents of the 2003 Iraq war have documented and recorded the violent deaths from 2003 to 2022, just so everyone remembers the consequences of this war. What do more than 100,000 civilian deaths weigh against about 4,000 deaths of American soldiers from 2003 to 2011?

The following graph is a copy of the graph available at Iraqbodycount.org (<https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/>) as of January 20, 2022 with the amplification and mitigation peaks of the "War Cycle" added



Using the data available on the site "iraqbodycount.org", the phenomenon observed from the WikiLeaks data is confirmed, but more importantly it has confirmed the period 2012- 2017 for which there was no data available from the US military. Credible visualization/materialization? YES. These data collected by the actors of Iraqbodycount.org are the only existing data on such a long period (2 complete periods of the "War Cycle") and which are indisputable. Even without the deaths of US, Iraqi and other combatants and soldiers, it allows to materialize the "War Cycle".

Visualization of the "War Cycle"

Iraq: What can we conclude about the visualization/materialization of the "War Cycle"?

The principle of the visualization/materialization of the "War Cycle" is confirmed, first with data from the US Army via Wikileaks, and then with data from Iraqbodycount.org. Even if it took a little more than 7 years to gather some convincing elements, at random from the news and from reading newspapers, it is an unexpected result for which we have to thank the US army, Wikileaks and Iraqbodycount.org

- It is not a few scattered data that were used but hundreds of thousands of reports. The result seems difficult to contest, without being in total bad faith.
- If skeptics speak out about the US military data, they still have to obtain everything that has not been made public by Wikileaks and is still in the hands of the US military to complete the data made available in 2010
- What can be challenged in this visualization of the "War Cycle"? Probably the form, but when there is a scientific team determined to evaluate this data, it will probably be necessary to go back and verify all the data in order to obtain an indisputable report based on the data coming from the US army and Iraqbodycount.org. Will it be useful to redo the work already done by tens and hundreds of anonymous people? It will probably save time for those who are bothered by it and who will try to find arguments against this reality.
- We observe a similar time lag (6 months to one year) on the 2 successive data amplification peaks (Iraq). The "observed template" is therefore shifted by a few months compared to the "theoretical template". This is not surprising, given that the cyclical phenomenon is not a perfect sinusoid, but probably an imperfect sinusoid that shifts a little at each peak, in one direction or another. It would be necessary to know the origin of the phenomenon in order to make the necessary corrections.

Visualization of the "War Cycle"


Syria: Visualization of a period of the "War Cycle"

(The following text and table were taken from Wikipedia)

The following figures were all compiled by the SOHR, which is considered an authoritative source on the subject. The figures are for documented deaths only, while SOHR estimates that another 100,000 undocumented deaths occurred in addition. The data includes not only civilians, but also all combatants on both sides.

Time period	Pro-government forces	Anti-government forces	Civilians	Grand total (inc. unidentified)
2011	3 138	619	3 968	7 841
2012	18 928	9 746	19 924	49 361
2013	30 269	18 914	22 806	73 929
2014	25 106	32 803	18 038	76 268
2015	17 668	23 601	13 021	54 574
2016	14 771	23 431	141	52 589
2017	10 771	14 064	13 369	347
2018	4 522	8 663	6 776	2 013
2019	2 968	4 727	3 488	11 244
2020	2 585	2 693	1 528	6 817
2021	1 069	1 238	1 558	3 882
Total	131 795	140 499	118 576	391 335

The following graph was created by the author based on the figures of the annual Grand Total and adding information related to the "War Cycle"



Visualization of the "War Cycle"

Because the war was not as long as in Iraq, the data period does not cover 2 complete "War Cycle" periods, but similar data are found:

- The mitigation peaks correspond well to the minimum dead periods
- There is a lag between the "Theoretical Amplification Peak" and the "Actual Amplification Peak" which is more in late 2013-2014. **This lag was seen for all the wars that broke out in 2014. In the first half of 2014 you had an Israeli-Palestinian war, the war in Ukraine, the war against the Islamic State.** So, this shift on this graph is perfectly consistent with everything that was seen over the 2013-2017 period for the other wars.

The data available on the Syrian war are a little less precise, but they confirm what is observed on the Iraq war that began in 2003. This is very important, since if one were to rely solely on the dates of the wars' outbreak, both of these wars (Iraq and Syria) broke out near a peak of attenuation. Contradictors like to use these two wars based on the date of outbreak to demonstrate that the "War Cycle" is meaningless, since it is contradicted by the outbreak of the wars during a mitigation peak. It is recommended that you re-read the "**Case 3: Case where the accumulation of causes is well above the threshold of war triggering, even before the amplification phase.**" Page 8. The two wars in Iraq and Syria are two examples of this case. The visualization/materialization of the "War Cycle" helps to better understand this "Case 3".

Are there other examples?

It is likely that if we did the same exercise for the first and second world wars, we would find similar data. The difficulty is to get hold of reliable data, if possible with a monthly statement of the dead and wounded.

However, the likely limitations of this exercise must be considered:

- It is certain that we cannot visualize this phenomenon on all the wars, in particular if they are too short and of too low intensity
- It does not appear that the accumulation of all the dead and wounded over all the wars is significant, based on the examples of data available on such a subject.
- The war in Ukraine that broke out in 2014 is not significant when taking the deaths and injuries of the war. On the **other hand, data on the number of violations and explosions collected by the OSCE through the SMM show that the quietest period (in terms of number of violations and explosions) from 2014 to the end of 2021 is the period after the ceasefire in July 2020. The quietest period of the ceasefire in Ukraine coincides well with the year of peak mitigation.** This case shows that the measures from one war to another are not necessarily the same, to lead to meaningful interpretations.
- Presumably, it will be necessary to accumulate small successive pieces of visualization/materialization of the "War Cycle". It will probably not be possible to have a credible visualization over one or more centuries

Visualization of the "War Cycle"

- All of this must be considered as a beginning of proof, since there is no complete and indisputable proof over a long period of time.

Conclusion visualization/materialization of the "War Cycle"

The case of the war in Iraq has allowed us to materialize the "War Cycle" by using the data available from the US military via Wikileaks and Iraqbodycount.org.

The case of the war in Syria allows us to confirm some of these elements from the data available from the SOHR.

It is obvious that there is a lot of other research to be done on this subject alone, but the problem is not, today, to do all this additional research alone but to present this beginning of evidence (or research opportunity) and hope to get the scientific community going on this subject, in order to do something other than to kick into touch on this contested and disturbing subject.

To demonstrate the existence of this cyclical phenomenon called "War Cycle", this visualization/materialization is important.

The visualization/materialization part alone could represent hundreds of other necessary researches if teams of researchers would invest on this subject. This subject is not finished, it is just beginning, even if the author that I am will not do the other necessary researches.

Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars

Reminder of Gaston Bouthoul's words

What did Gaston Bouthoul say about the periodicity of wars

Some years ago, a diplomat explained to me, with reference to several international authors, that it is not possible for a cyclicity of wars to "arouse the general approval of the scientific world". Since this quotation was presented to me as a definitive judgment of eminent authors who have examined this subject, I can only recall what the founder of Polemology said.

It is honest to admit that the subject of the cyclicity of wars is a controversial one.

It is also honest to be able to quote someone who has legitimized the hypothesis of a periodicity of wars and not to be impressed by a few people who, without taking cognizance of the data presented, try to close the door to any presentation and contradictory debate. I have nothing against Anglo-Saxon authors as long as they are not brandished to demolish ideas without even examining them. In fact, there are excellent Anglo-Saxon authors who have also admitted the legitimacy of the "War Cycle". This "a priori" rejection by using one or another author appears to be a simple way to avoid examining the content.

During his lifetime, Gaston Bouthoul did not demonstrate this periodicity of wars. The "War Cycle" which is presented in this document can be considered as a confirmation of this hypothesis of Gaston Bouthoul on the periodicity of wars.

If Gaston Bouthoul remains little known at the international level, his work on the sociology of war or Polemology still contains research opportunities, as this study demonstrates.

Gaston Bouthoul, in his *Traité de Polémologie*⁶, considered such an approach to the periodicity of wars as legitimate.

He mentions it in two places:

1 - In the first part "Introduction and Methods", when he outlines "the main features of a methodology of war in chapter 2

2 - In the ninth part (out of ten in total) of the "Traité de Polémologie", totally devoted to the periodicity of wars.

Excerpts from the methodology section of the "Traité de Polémologie"

⁶ *Traité de polémologie* by Gaston Bouthoul published by Payot " Bibliothèque scientifique Payot ", 1991 edition, following the 1970 update

Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars

"...the presence of war in all known types of civilizations, the fact that it is inseparable from the most diverse mentalities and institutions, and especially its analogy with certain biological functions, raises the question of its periodicity. **Periodicity that we can consider as admissible**, although it is by no means certain a priori....

However, one analogy deserves to be pointed out: it is that of war and *economic crises*. They both present the same aspect of sudden irruption from a clearly defined and identifiable break point. Both are immediately defined by their destructive or, at least, frenetic character: a halt in the processes of accumulation, the reabsorption or destruction of capital and stocks, a halt or slowing down of the production of men and things; this first process being followed by a slow convalescence leading back to a new equilibrium.

This analogy is likely to confirm the hypothesis of a certain periodicity of wars. Those of the crises are also very elastic since the classic interval between them varies on average **between seven and eleven years**, that is to say approximately from simple to double.... "

It is therefore necessary to remember that such a periodicity of wars seems probable for Gaston Bouthoul and that it is situated, a priori, between 7 and 11 years.

Excerpts from the section Periodicity of Wars of the "Traité de Polémologie"

In this part, Gaston Bouthoul indicates several things

1 - the limitations of the search for a single man: "...

Perhaps wars present one more analogy with economic crises. The analyses made of these by a great number of authors, spread over nearly a century, agree in considering that economic crises do not proceed from a unique cause but are the results of concomitant factors. The same is true of wars.

To have a clearer idea of this periodicity and its causes, or more exactly of its factors, it would be necessary to return to each of them in detail and to make analyses and observations intended to show the role that each of them plays in this periodicity. But **this research exceeds the possibilities of a single researcher...** "

2 - It seemed to Gaston Bouthoul that the rhythms of wars could be those of oblivion, that is to say of a generation (30 years) as well as of a great war every 100 years.

He did not start from a precise analysis of the wars, but from a possible explanation to try to find a periodicity on which he recognized that he did not have the material time to make a complete analysis. He did not find a periodicity confirmed by an analysis, but posed some hypotheses, illustrated by some examples which could not be a demonstration, leaving to other researchers to come the care to make a detailed analysis to find the periodicity or the periodicities of the wars.

3 - For Gaston Bouthoul, the periodicity of wars must be studied from the moment the wars break out.

"... when one wants to determine the rhythm of wars, it is advisable to place oneself not at the end of the conflict but **on the contrary at the precise moment when it breaks out ...**

Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars

It does not matter whether the period of consecutive destruction lasts a few months or years. What is to be considered is the moment of triggering which marks the reversal of the situation **It is thus this point of fracture which constitutes the striking phenomenon and which we will systematically take into consideration in the research on the periodicity of the conflicts...**"

Conclusions on the Periodicity of Wars in the "Traité de Polémologie" and the "War Cycle" presented in this document

- The periodicity of wars is a legitimate hypothesis according to Gaston Bouthoul
- The "War Cycle" was based, at the beginning, on **the date of the outbreak of the wars, as recommended by Gaston Bouthoul**, which also legitimizes the methodology that was used
- Gaston Bouthoul envisaged an economic periodicity **of 7 to 11 years (the periodicity of the "War Cycle" is 8 and a half years)**, as well as periodicity of 30 years and 100 years.

In view of what is written in the "Traité de Polémologie", the research that led to the "War Cycle" is consistent with the methodological approach of the periodicity of wars in the "Traité de Polémologie". *The "War Cycle" is a striking confirmation of the hypotheses of Gaston Bouthoul, whose "Traité de Polémologie" is still worth consulting.*

Gaston Bouthoul opened many relevant avenues in his time, some of which are simply confirmed more than half a century later. Gaston Bouthoul's work was immense and dealt with many different subjects: the periodicity of wars is a very small part of it.

Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars

How can contexts be elements of demonstration consistent with Gaston Bouthoul's statements?

When it appeared in 1999 that there was probably a "War Cycle", the first attempts at demonstration were based on a reasoning similar to that of Gaston Bouthoul, as he expressed it in his "Traité de Polémologie": the dates of outbreak must be a fundamental element of demonstration. The calculation of the periodicity was carried out in 2001 by relying on the trigger dates

To be credible, the demonstration must use war data from different regions. This is what we have called "Contexts".

The contexts selected were initially chosen with recurrent conflicts that have provoked several wars (Arab-Israeli conflict or Indo-Pakistani conflict) or regions or countries with a "structural" weakness that regularly provokes conflicts (Europe, Lebanon) and finally a global vision.

- Arab-Israeli conflict,
- Indo-Pakistani conflict,
- Europe,
- Lebanon,
- World.

There are contexts not presented here that are not significant:

- South America
there are too few wars between Latin American countries to be significant
- Africa
there are too many wars. In order to present an African context, it would be necessary to make a choice among all the wars and present only certain wars. If the author does this, he will be criticized for only including the wars that suit him. The selection of wars should be made according to objective criteria of major wars, criteria that remain to be defined

It would be possible to define and present other contexts. Such a presentation of other contexts by other authors would show that they have understood this approach, whether they agree or disagree with the "War Cycle".

The visual presentation chosen allows both to partially justify the "War Cycle" by showing the past statistical distribution and to extrapolate it into future periods in the form of "forecasts", generally indicated by a "?"

To understand these contexts, it is recommended that you first read the brief presentation on the following pages

Methodology for presenting the contexts of the "War Cycle"


Graph: calculation of amplification and mitigation peaks

The T0 of the graph is July 31, 1914, the date of the outbreak of the First World War. This reference amplification peak is a bit arbitrary. The cyclic phenomenon must be set in time. The other amplification peaks are calculated at a multiple of 3085 days from this initial date.

As previously indicated, this value is an average value. The real peaks are certainly shifted compared to the theoretical calculation, but it would be necessary to know the origin of the phenomenon to be able to recalibrate the amplification peaks.

The mean value of 3085 remains approximate, given the limitations of this study. A recalibration of the average value of the period could be done after a study made on several centuries (*study which remains to be made but which will have only little impact on the current uses of forecast*)

Charts - how to read them?



Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars



Which events are taken into account?

The following are indicated on the graph for each context


- The dates of the outbreak of wars, and some significant escalations
The calculations are made only on these 2 types of events. This is important to make these figures credible. Cyclic phenomena are too often presented with multiple events. In such a case, it is easy to demonstrate a cyclic phenomenon with all types of events. The only statistical figures are derived from these events. These figures are just an indication, since it is admitted that the periodicity is approximate and that it represents an average and not an absolute value. But these figures are a major element to demonstrate and convince. To date, there has never been any comment on the numbers, which probably means that they are not even evaluated.
- Some tensions when the war did not take place but the tensions were very visible,
- A few other events, such as peace treaties or more or less formalized lulls, are also presented for information purposes. The information given by these types of events is rather qualitative: they may give the impression that there would also be a form of "Peace Cycle" similar to the "War Cycle", but they are too few in number to be treated in a meaningful statistical form. These events may provide a trend that other research could confirm in ways not discussed here.

Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars

Some examples and their visual interpretation



Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars




Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars

Table of Deviations in % of the context


To each graph are associated in a specific table the measures of the deviation of the war type events.

The significance on the graph of these discrepancies shown in the table is illustrated in the following graph.



- 0% means that there is no gap and that the war started at the time of the amplification peak,
- 100% means that the war started at the most unlikely moment of the "War Cycle", i.e. on the mitigation peak,
- If wars were completely random, this would mean that they are uniformly distributed with random values, i.e. between 0 and 100,
- If all deviations were less than 50%, this would mean that wars would all start within 50% of the time (instead of being spread over the whole time or 100%).
- If the deviation is a negative value, it means that the event took place before the amplification peak, otherwise after

War Cycle in the Arab-Israeli context



Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars

	Date of the beginning of the event	Deviation in month vs Peak	Deviation (%) vs Peak	Graphical representation of the deviation (from 0 to 100%)
First Arab-Israeli War	15-May-48	0,1	0%	
Suez Crisis/War	29-Oct-56	0,2	0%	
Six-Day War	5-Jun-67	26,0	51%	
Yom Kippur War	6-Oct-73	0,7	1%	
1982 Lebanon War	6-Jun-82	3,4	7%	
First Intifada	9-Dec-87	-31,9	-63%	
Gulf War with Iraqi missiles	16-Jan-91	5,4	11%	
Second Intifada	28-Sep-00	20,4	40%	
2006 Lebanon War	12-Jul-06	-11,5	-23%	
Operation Cast Lead	27-Dec-08	18,0	36%	
Operation Pillar of Defense	14-Nov-12	-36,8	-73%	
Operation Protective Edge	8-Jul-14	-17,0	-34%	

Average absolute value, including tensions

28%

Israeli-Arab Conflict Deviation

If the wars were random, the distribution of the deviations from the amplification peaks of the wars would be between 0 and 100%, in a random way.

90% of the wars (9 out of 10) are in 50% of the time (between 0 and 50%)

1 exception

- the 6-day war, which is 51%,

2 other exceptions presented here as episodes of tension and considered by some authors as wars

- the first intifada which is 63% but which is not considered by all the perpetrators as a war, given its overall peacefulness

- the pillar defense operation considered by some authors as one of the wars

There are many other military operations that are not considered wars, by a very large majority of historians

By adding these two tension episodes as wars,

75% of the triggering dates of wars (9 of 12) are in 50% of the time (between 0 and 50%), which remains statistically significant of a periodic phenomenon influencing this conflict.

Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars

Analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict based on contextual data

Place of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the "War Cycle"

The Arab-Israeli conflict remains the outstanding case of the "War Cycle", both in its war and peace aspects.

Peace initiatives have, until now, always taken place during phases of mitigation, only to be more or less contested during the next phase of amplification. Some agreements remain, others disappear.

During the 2013-2017 amplification phase, this conflict did generate a war, as usual.

In the 2018-2022 mitigation phase, this conflict has generated peace and normalization agreements, as it sometimes does.

The "War Cycle" on the Arab-Israeli conflict is still relevant, even if it seems to be attenuated.

This conflict should lose its recurring reality in the 1930s, when the Arab world will reconfigure itself regionally with Israel being considered a regional state on a par with the other states of the Arab League. This time is approaching but is not yet a reality and will not prevent some jolts during the period 2022-2026.

Possible additional studies

It would be possible to make a more general statistical study by including all incidents, all military operations as well as attacks. This study could shed light on the identification of periods when tensions are forecasted, without the outbreak of war, but such a study would not change the reality of the outbreak of war, which is the main purpose of this study, in order to be able to use these findings to forecast the outbreak of war.

Forecast 2019 to 2022

Theoretically this is the period when there can be a peace initiative, even partial. In the first quarter of 2019, there was no such prospect, but with the Trump-Netanyahu tandem, there was indeed an American peace attempt and the Abraham Accords in 2020, resulting in an agreement between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, and then an agreement in January 2021 with Sudan. The normalization of relations between Israel and Morocco took place in December 2020, following a deal between the United States and Morocco over Western Sahara.

So, there was a partial peace initiative, as expected, although at the beginning of the mitigation period it was not clear where such an initiative would come from.

Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars

The 50-year Return⁷ of the 6-Day War that was supposed to happen in 2017 or 2018 has not been very visible. Apart from Hamas' attempt to demonstrate regularly on the border with Israel, there has been no generalization to the West Bank that could have been interpreted as such a Return. Rather, the 50-year Return was reaffirmed as a reaffirmation of Israeli military victory.

At the beginning of the mitigation period, it was anticipated that the recurrent tensions with Gaza could lead to a new conflict even in the mitigation period of the wars: when tensions are too high and almost permanent, there is still the possibility of a slippage into war. Military operations remain harder and stronger during periods of escalation, but there are incidents during periods of mitigation. The consequence is that the demonstration of the "War Cycle" through the outbreak of wars has become less evident in the period 2013-2022. On the other hand, the various agreements between Israel and Arab states confirm the possible influence during a period of mitigation. Less convincing than in previous years, but still significant and usable to have a thread in the evolution of this conflict.

There have been a few major incidents, but they have not resulted in a full-scale war and have not involved Israeli forces throughout Gaza. The recurring conflict between Gaza and Israel tends to produce more and more incidents that occur in both the amplification and mitigation phases. This is indicative of what appears to be a hopeless conflict to date, with no negotiations other than military power struggles on both sides that only buy a little time without bringing any future or regional balance.

2022-2026 forecast on the 2024 peak

While the Abraham Accords and the normalization with several Arab states may give the impression that the Arab-Israeli conflict is over, this cannot exclude new violence or war events, especially on the Palestinian side. This Arab-Israeli conflict is not over and has not found its point of equilibrium that would make it insensitive to the "War Cycle".

The Arab-Israeli conflict has often produced agreements during the mitigation phase that were challenged during the subsequent amplification phase. What will remain of the Abraham Accords and will they be stronger than the Palestinian conflict? There will be something left of these agreements, but it is an illusion to believe that nothing will happen in the next amplification period.

Will there be a war during this period 2022-2026? Yes, with about a 90% chance. But which one and when? The candidate wars are Iran (indirectly through proxy actors), the Palestinians and Syria, as well as any combination of the three. When? Most likely in the period 2023-2025 at + or - a year from the expected peak, but it may happen (as in 2014) that it is frankly delayed.

Could this war be avoided? Perhaps, if we gave ourselves the means to launch something a little serious that would begin in mid-2022 at the latest and last as long as it takes to start building something and give a perspective to the Palestinian people who no longer have any. You don't build anything by ignoring reality and pretending to be invincible.

⁷ Not explained in this document. Refer to the <https://horlogedelinconscient.fr> web site, in the English part. It is not completely explained but could be enough to understand the "Return from the past", quoted but not explained here.

Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars

Israeli-xxx regional military alliance?

If today the only Israeli military alliance is with the US, possible regional integration should provoke a military alliance with Israel. A regional war like the one in Syria and Iraq could have provoked such an alliance. This is not the case at the moment, but it could be if there is finally a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Prospects for settlement

There are 2 main obstacles to any evolution:

- The two territorial returns that took place in southern Lebanon and Gaza did not ease relations with Lebanon and Gaza. The claim that Israel would get peace for the return of territory was undermined in both cases. This does not encourage Israel to return these territories, on the contrary.
- Israel still lives as if the State of Israel had not yet been definitively created, at least as it would like it to be recognized. Israel has accepted all the opportunities that have presented themselves, but never its content. Neither the 1947 Palestine Partition Plan nor the Oslo Accords have been accepted in substance. Peace according to Israel is first and foremost the consecration of its military victory.


In 2010, in anticipation and to avoid the round of wars of the period 2014-2017, a manuscript "**Will Jerusalem know a lasting Peace?**" was written. It has been updated several times. The latest version is from 2020 but no version of this text has been used to try to find a settlement to this conflict.

The most likely outcome is that the two-state solution will be abandoned and lead to an Apartheid-like stalemate in South Africa. Such a situation will ultimately lead to the opposite of what Israel wants.

The apparent victory for Israel of not recognizing a Palestinian state could lead to the dilution of the State of Israel into a larger whole that would no longer be a Jewish state without being a Palestinian state either: a kind of Israeli-Palestinian state that seems unlikely today, although consistent with current developments

Analysis updated on December 19, 2021

Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars



European Wars Deviation

If wars had a random distribution, the deviation would be between 0% and 100%. If the deviation is less than 30% in the most of the european Wars (exception like Spanish Civil War), it means that is is not a random distribution. It demonstrates, on these wars, that there is an amazing cyclical force that favours wars.

Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars

Analysis of Europe based on context data

Europe place in the "War Cycle"

After the Arab-Israeli conflict, the European context is the second remarkable case. These two geographical areas and their wars are the pillars of the demonstration and use of the "War Cycle".

Europe should be considered as the geographical space that extends from the Atlantic Ocean to the limits of Russia. That is to say, the area covered by the EU, NATO and the candidate countries to these institutions.

Demonstrating the "War Cycle" from the European context is more complicated than in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, for several reasons:

- It is not a single recurrent conflict that is the basis of this context, but the relational complexity between the European actors that can provoke different recurrent conflicts over time. There was the recurrent Franco-German conflict as there is now a recurrent conflict with Russia which is expressed in various forms (Georgia, Ukraine, ...)
- In the current phase where the "War Cycle" remains to be demonstrated, it is necessary to have unquestionable events, that is to say periods where there are very few wars, and if possible one and only one per phase of amplification, and no new war during a phase of attenuation. This has been the case since the 1990s. Before the 1960s, there were many wars between Europeans and the rest of the world. These are the major wars that have been retained for those periods when there were many more wars.

Currently, since 1990, each phase of amplification of the "War Cycle" gives rise to a war (which can be multiple in the case of the disintegration of Yugoslavia), and there has been no new war that starts during the phases of attenuation. The geographical perimeter of these wars is always the same: within the perimeter of the former Socialist Bloc (including the USSR and socialist countries like Yugoslavia).

The last two phases of amplification have an indirect involvement of Russia (Georgia and Ukraine). Russia's attempt to present them, in these two cases, as a simple internal conflict is not very credible. Indeed, there are internal problems in these countries but not only. It is classic in internal wars that internally one tries to demonstrate that the only cause is foreign and that the foreign country involved tries to explain that the only cause is internal. But such an explanation hammered out by Russia shows above all a refusal to step back and an official denial of reality.

The analysis induced by the "War Cycle" only makes sense for understanding the evolution of Europe if it is based on a more classical study of pre-existing conflicts. Such a study is not part of the current scope of the "War Cycle", but participation is possible if it exists. We have not found either in France or in Europe systematic surveys and presentations of pre-existing conflicts in a form that is both synthetic and detailed. Each one presents small pieces that one must try to put together oneself. This presentation of the European context can serve as such a synthesis, for lack of anything better.

Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars

This European context must also be analyzed with the "returns from the past", as described in the [Theory of Return](#). The last important "Return of the past" is the "Return from the end of the USSR". It causes an event opposite to the initial event of the disintegration of the USSR, with a progressive reaffirmation of Russia. This return began to be visible in 2014 and is the thread for understanding Russia's unconscious behavior over the period 2014-2022. This comeback will not result in a superpower of the importance of the USSR, but has allowed Russia to regain an important international position.

Possible additional studies

In the European context, there are many possible complementary studies.

- Relying on a pre-existing forecasting and strategy center would allow to show what the "War Cycle" brings. To date we have not found such a center: there is information available everywhere, on each conflict, but no synthetic global view. We need to find one or recreate one.
- Identifying the main pre-existing conflicts seems to be done at the OSCE level, but not in a directly usable synthetic form. It may exist internally at the OSCE, but is not available and visible at this time. We could perhaps have an idea by this means of the next war during the 2022-2026 amplification phase
- In the case of ongoing conflicts (active or dormant), it would be necessary to monitor them in a form that could be used for this study and to try to identify the causes of ongoing conflicts. The apparent causes are known, but we do not know of any studies on the real causes
- Continuing the study of the "War Cycle" in a European institutional framework
- etc.

Mitigation Phase 2018-2022

Are there elements of the European context that would help to understand the effect of the mitigation phase?

*To date, we see only one element over the 2018-2022 period that could help demonstrate the mitigation phase. In Ukraine, there was a cease-fire in July 2020 that was the only one that was pretty much respected. Since the SMM (OSCE Special Monitoring Mission) was established in 2014, there are daily reports based on the number of violations and explosions. There is an impression that the ceasefire was best observed in 2020 (especially from the end of July). Since the MMS environment is very structured with little change over time, there must be data that would identify by month the number of ceasefire violations and explosions from 2014 to 2022. It should be possible to show that the quietest period is the second half of 2020 after the July 27, 2020 ceasefire (the year of peak mitigation in the "War Cycle") and that the months of 2021 show a gradual deterioration. Once this study is done, we could ask ourselves if the "War Cycle" has an influence on the level of violence in this conflict (see **Visualization/materialization of the "War Cycle" pages 15 and following pages**). Apart from this measurable element in the war in Ukraine, there is nothing visible in this attenuation phase in the European perimeter.*

Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars

2022-2026 forecast on the 2024 peak

It is likely (80-90%) that there will be a war during this period. The most likely period is 2023-2025.

This war will be:

- Either an escalation of an ongoing or dormant conflict (Ukraine, Georgia ... or potential conflict already identified within the OSCE)
- Either a new conflict that would be amplified during this period (as was the case for the Ukrainian conflict that did not pre-exist before 2013 but gives the impression of having been amplified by this phenomenon in 2014)

Most likely :

- It will be in a country of the former socialist bloc (in the broad sense, USSR and Yugoslavia and other socialist countries)
- There will be an indirect or direct Russian component

Could we avoid this war?

Yes, if there was the will to launch an initiative and take the means to make it happen.

The short-term difficulty is that the Europe-Russia relationship is one of mistrust and lying poker. Who really believes that Russia did not intervene indirectly in the Donbass in Ukraine? Russian officials want to believe it, but others do not, even if they politely do not shout it too loud. The Russian military presence and the armaments provided are such that there is little chance that the Ukrainian conflict will evolve. It is voluntarily blocked by a massive military presence, whatever the pretext. Of course, there is a Ukrainian problem, but it is exacerbated. For its part, Ukraine has difficulty in presenting a way out of the crisis that gives a comprehensible future to its Russian-speaking population.

Analysis to launch a reflection, or even an action

What is new since 1990 is that all the internal wars in Europe are in the former space of the "Eastern countries" representing the former Soviet and socialist bloc, and including Yugoslavia and other socialist bloc countries such as Romania and Albania.

This is how we got:

- the wars of the disintegration of Yugoslavia
- the war in Georgia
- the wars in Chechnya
- 1999 - the Kosovo war (involving the countries resulting from the disintegration of Yugoslavia)
- 2008 - again war in Georgia (Russian component)
- 2014 - war in Ukraine (Russian component)

Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars

Since 2008, all European wars have been based on the same relational pattern with respect to Russia. Either a Russian-speaking population or a local community relies on Russia to fuel the war and lead to a de facto secession, when it is not outright encouraged and wanted by Russia (Crimea).

From a geopolitical point of view, the retreat to the East following the collapse of the blocs and the disintegration of the USSR poses problems for Russia. Russia and Europe have not found a point of balance that reassures everyone. Russia is worried about NATO's advance towards the East, including potentially towards Ukraine, and Europe is worried about Russia's awakening.

The emerging NATO line is too close to vital Russian centers (St. Petersburg and Moscow) not to arouse (historically justified) fears. Russia's regional interventions are too frequent not to arouse fears (historically justified) for several countries bordering Russia. These fears, on both sides, fuel reciprocal tensions.

Will there still be a separatist problem in Europe, supported by Russia?

The answer is definitely YES as long as the fears on both sides are not removed, which would require a new regional geopolitical balance involving European countries, Russia and probably also NATO and the OSCE. It is difficult to envisage significant developments in the short term in the context of chaotic European governance.

The conflict in Georgia has not moved an inch in 7 years. It could be the same in Ukraine, whatever the protests of good faith.

Moreover, the current conflicts are not in the process of being resolved, showing that the means officially used in Europe by the OSCE are not successful. They just mitigate the effects but do not solve anything. If there was an effective method of at least maintaining a cease-fire one could hope to anticipate and limit the impacts of local "separatism" in Europe. This is not the case and the existing European organizations will not prevent or stop any war, at least in their existing state in 2021.

Without geopolitical evolution, we can already imagine tensions and wars around 2024, of the same type as those we experienced in 2008 and 2014, probably on a larger scale.

Analysis updated on December 30, 2021

Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars

	Date of the beginning of the event	Deviation in month vs Peak	Deviation (%) vs Peak	Graphical representation of the deviation (from 0 to 100%)
Indo-Pakistano War of 1947	28-Oct-47	-6,5	-13%	
Indo-Pakistani War of 1965	16-Aug-65	4,4	9%	
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971	12-Dec-71	-21,1	-42%	
Kashmir Insurgency	10-Jan-90	-6,8	-13%	
Kargil War	12-May-99	3,8	8%	
Mumbal attacks	26-Nov-08	17,0	34%	
Following the attack on a military base in India, India announced strikes	30-Sep-16	9,8	19%	
Indo-Pakistani Confrontation with numerous military incidents including plane shot down	15-févr.-19	38,3	76%	

Average absolute value

20%


Indo-Pakistani Wars deviation

If the wars were random, the distribution of deviations from the aggravated wars would be between 0 and 100%, randomly.








If the difference is always less than 50%, it means that the triggering of the wars is distributed in half the time. It is therefore significant to show that there is a phenomenon which pushes the outbreak of wars during certain periods.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, there has been no war for 15 years. The peaks of amplification simply give rise to tensions without turning into war. This remains significant and continues to be monitored.

War Cycle in Lebanon context




Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars

	Date of the beginning of the event	Deviation in month vs Peak	Deviation (%) vs Peak	Graphical representation of the deviation (from 0 to 100%)
1958 Lebanon Crisis	May-58	18,7	37%	
2 year War	13-Apr-75	18,9	37%	
1982 Lebanon War	06-Jun-82	3,4	7%	
Mountain War (1983-1984)	Sep-83	18,7	37%	
War of Liberation against Syria	Sep-88	-22,7	-45%	
2006 Lebanon War	Jul-06	-11,5	-23%	
(Short) Lebanon-IS War 17	19-Aug-17	20,4	40%	

Lebanon Wars Deviation

If wars had a random distribution, the deviations would be between 0 and 100%, randomly. For Lebanon by taking the different wars as described under fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Histoire_du_Liban, the deviation is always less than 45%.
It demonstrates, on these wars, that there is an amazing cyclical force that favours wars.

War Cycle in World context



Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars

	Date of the beginning of the event	Deviation in month vs Peak	Deviation (%) vs Peak	Graphical representation of the deviation (from 0 to 100%)
Russo-Japanese War	10-Feb-04	-24,3	-48%	
World War I	30-Jul-14	0,0	0%	
Japanese aggression in Manchuria	13-Sep-31	2,7	5%	
World War II	03-Sep-39	-3,0	-6%	
1947 Indo-Pakistani War	28-Oct-47	-6,5	-13%	
First Arab-Israeli War	15-May-48	0,1	0%	
Korean War	25-Jun-50	25,4	50%	
Crise/Guerre de Suez	29-Oct-56	0,2	0%	
Direct US intervention in Vietnam	01-Dec-64	-4,1	-8%	
Biafran War	30-May-67	25,8	51%	
Six-Day War	05-Jun-67	26,0	51%	
Yom Kippur War	06-Oct-73	0,7	1%	
Lebanon Civil War	13-Apr-75	18,9	37%	
Soviet Afghanistan War (USSR-Moudjahedin)	27-Dec-79	-26,0	-51%	
Iran-Irak War	23-Sep-80	-17,1	-34%	
Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and Gulf War	02-Aug-90	-0,1	0%	
Second Congo War (killed + than 4 millions)	01-Aug-98	-5,5	-11%	
Kosovo War	24-Mar-99	2,2	4%	
Second Afghanistan War (USA - Talibans)	07-Oct-01	32,7	65%	
Second Gulf War	20-Mar-03	50,1	99%	
Russo-Georgian War	07-Aug-08	13,3	26%	
Syrian Civil War	15-Mar-11	44,6	88%	
Donbass War (Ukraine)	06-Apr-14	-20,1	-40%	
Escalation/Internationalization War in Syria	05-Jun-14	-18,1	-36%	
Islamic State (ISIS) War	05-Jun-14	-18,1	-36%	
Second Nagorno-Karabakh War	27-Sep-20	-43,7	-86%	
Ethiopia-Tigray war	04-Nov-20	-42,5	-84%	

Major Wars (World) deviation

If wars had a random distribution, the deviation would be between 0% and 100%, randomly. Throughout the 20th century, the distribution is significant from the War Cycle and most wars are in the amplification zone.

The September 11, 2001 attack put the US into a quasi-permanent war with several wars including those against Afghanistan and Iraq that do not follow the War Cycle.

When the war becomes permanent, the phenomenon induced by the War Cycle may be temporarily hardly visible, as was the case from September 2001 and as it has been since the Arab Spring

The wars in Syria and Libya that began during the Arab Spring did not follow the War Cycle. But Syria has experienced an escalation and internationalization during the amplification phase. This World context is probably typical of what should be observed over the centuries: the outbreak of wars is sometimes significant, but other methods of analyzing the effects of the war cycle must be used.

This shows the difficulty of a convincing objective demonstration.

In the period 2014-2020, it is necessary to note groupings of war onset/escalation:

- April to June 2014: Donbass war in Ukraine, escalation in Syria, Islamic State war and Israeli-Palestinian war
- September and November 2020: 2nd Nagorno-Karabakh war and Ethiopia-Tigray war

These 2 groupings will deserve to be studied again when the real origin is understood. Are wars that start in a short interval, almost simultaneously, indicative of a phenomenon that takes place over a few weeks or months? It is impossible to answer this question for the moment.

Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars

World analysis from context data

Is the chosen method a dead end?

If you go back to the **Methodology for presenting the contexts of the "War Cycle"** and if you look at the graph and what is shown in the rectangle with blue dashes, you will conclude, as indicated in the methodology of presentation of the contexts of the "War Cycle", that over the period from 2001 to 2021 the wars at the World level do not demonstrate the "War Cycle" at all, since there are as many wars that start in the amplification zone as in the mitigation zone.

The strict application of the methodology leads to an apparent dead end since we have just demonstrated that at the world level there is nothing significant over a period of almost 20 years.

The presentation methodology must be complemented by other demonstrations

In fact, there are several findings that need to be considered:

- When war becomes permanent, as was the case after the September 11, 2001 attack, it is difficult to see which wars do or do not verify the "War Cycle". There are periods, such as the Napoleonic Wars at the beginning of the 19th century, where the phenomenon is not visible only by the dates of the outbreak of wars.
- A war may start in the mitigation phase but will likely produce a significant escalation during the amplification phase, as explained in "**Case 3: Case where the accumulation of causes is well above the threshold of war triggering, even before the amplification phase.**" Page 8
The Iraq war started in 2003 and the Syrian war started in 2011 started on a mitigation peak, but it has been demonstrated for these 2 wars, in the **Visualization/materialization of the "War Cycle"** page 15 and following that there is indeed a visible over-violence around the amplification peaks
- The presentation through the dates of the outbreak of wars in a context is useful, but insufficient.

So? We see through this the limits of the demonstration by the "dates of the outbreak of wars". There are many cases where the dates of the outbreak of wars help to demonstrate the "War Cycle", but there are others where it is the escalation during the amplification phase that is significant.

Context studies using the dates of the outbreak of wars

What can we conclude from the different contexts?

To be able to conclude anything, it would be desirable to make some verifications by someone other than the author and to confirm that the data presented and used are consistent:

- Are the wars selected those that are generally cited as wars in this context?
- Are there any wars that have been omitted and whose absence would distort the presentation?
- Are the dates of the wars those recognized by historians?

As long as this is not the case, it is likely that the contexts of the "War Cycle" are not even seriously considered, and the data presented are not even looked at

We can notice that :

- There are wars that do not verify the "War Cycle",
- The proportion of wars that verify the "War Cycle" is statistically troubling: there is probably some unknown phenomenon that amplifies violence and wars and increases the probability of war during periods of war amplification,
- The "War Cycle" is not specific to one region or conflict: it is general.
- At the "World" level, we can see that over the period from October 1, 2001 to the end of 2018, we could consider that there are as many wars in the amplification period as in the attenuation period. This observation is a major argument against the "War Cycle", but it is necessary to take into account the part **Visualization/materialization of the "War Cycle"**

This post-9/11 period has led to a period of permanent wars.

The phenomenon remains visible in recurrent conflicts (such as the Arab-Israeli conflict) but blurs the signals at the global level. When war is permanent, the "War Cycle" is hardly visible. There is another period where nothing is visible: from 1789 to 1814, during the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, there are many successive wars, but one cannot distinguish what could resemble a "War Cycle".

Provisional conclusion

An attempt to demonstrate the "War Cycle" by the dates of their outbreak alone is insufficient. If the result presented is troubling, it must be noted that there are periods such as between October 2001 and the end of 2018 at the global level where one could seriously doubt the reality of the "War Cycle" if one only took the important wars at the global level as shown in the "World" context. The advantage of presenting contexts is that in the case of recurrent conflicts the phenomenon remains visible and usable for predictions. The paradox is that the "War Cycle" is no longer visible at the global level but remains usable for forecasting at the level of a context.

The difficulty of demonstrating the "War Cycle"

What can we conclude from the two types of demonstration?

2 types of demonstration were presented:

- Visualization/materialization of the "War Cycle" through thousands of measurements
- Presentation of contexts based mainly on the outbreak of wars or escalations

Neither of these two methods alone can completely demonstrate the "War Cycle".

Each of these 2 methods provides a beginning of proof.

The 2 methods may yield conflicting results in cases where wars began in the mitigation phase but escalated during the subsequent amplification phase.

This contradictory result was taken into account from the start in **How can the "cyclical phenomenon" favor the outbreak of wars?** presented from the page 3

The "War Cycle" cannot be demonstrated in a binary way by a single method. Each of the 2 methods presented brings elements that confirm it, but can also bring elements that contest it.

In the case of the 2011 Syrian and 2003 Iraqi wars, the method using the dates of the wars' outbreak weakens the demonstration while the visualization/materialization method vividly strengthens it.

Rightly, some opponents will point out that the author takes the demonstrations that suit him to show the "War Cycle" and reject those that disturb him.

Therefore, there is no single demonstration, and it is necessary to present the existing elements so that everyone can have a precise idea of the reality of this phenomenon.

The conclusion is that there is no indisputable proof at the moment, but that the part **How can the "cyclical phenomenon" favor the outbreak of wars?** pages 3 and following is indeed a synthesis of what has been observed, taking into account cases where war started during a period of attenuation but caused a visible and measurable escalation during the subsequent peak of attenuation.

Contradictory debates would help to settle all these issues and could bring complementary elements if other researchers were involved in such a subject.

The difficulty of demonstrating the "War Cycle"

What further research is needed to confirm the "War Cycle"?

They are numerous and show that "Gaston Bouthoul" was right to believe that one man alone would not be able to demonstrate such a reality. All that is presented here must be considered as a few research tracks that have been roughened up and validated as tracks, without being able to demonstrate this "War Cycle" in an incontestable way.

The following list is not exhaustive and is only part of what should be done:

- Study the "War Cycle" over several centuries.
This work has been started but not finalized. To make predictions, it will not bring much, but to give credit to the "War Cycle", it would do a lot. There are 2 difficulties on the subject:
 - * *first to create specific tools to do it, based on what must already exist in astronomy. With the Excel tool we are limited to the beginning of the 20th century.*
 - * *Then to surround oneself with historians capable of giving some elements on each of the wars*
- Determining criteria for major wars. In the case of Africa and in certain periods (such as the Napoleonic Wars), it is not known which major wars would probably be consistent with the "War Cycle". Currently, due to a lack of recognized and shared criteria, certain periods or contexts have not been studied, simply because it will be easy to reproach the author for having chosen the wars that suit him or her in order to demonstrate the "War Cycle".
- Ask astronomers and radio astronomers to identify all the periodic phenomena that would be compatible with what has been observed. The exercise was done on the movement of the planets of the solar system: none of them corresponds to such a cyclical phenomenon. The cycle of the sun has been examined: it does not correspond even if it brings complementary information. To date, it is enough to present this study to an astronomer or radio astronomer to make him run away. They are visibly afraid to approach this subject and to be embarked on research which smells bad and not orthodox and give a feeling of pseudo-sciences like astrology.
- Set up a war forecasting platform to complement what already exists
- Etc.

Forecasts of wars

Forecasting using the War Cycle

Logic dictates that when a "Cycle" is identified, we can predict future events based on knowledge of the "Cycle".

What have we learned that we can use for forecasting?

- Rule A1: The contexts show that in recurrent conflicts, there is a probability of war during the amplification period. Since the duration of an amplification period is slightly more than 4 years, we can say that there is a high probability during the two years surrounding the amplification peak and a slightly lower probability during the other two years.
- Rule A2: The understanding of how this cyclical phenomenon works and the materialization of the "War Cycle" allows to understand that when a war has started before the period of amplification, there can be an escalation (or a new war within the war)
- Rule A3: If a new conflict emerges during the amplification period, it may turn into a new war, even if it does not correspond to an already identified recurring conflict.

Forecasts made for the period 2005-2009 using the "War Cycle"

At that time, we were working with the Israeli-Arab, European and World contexts. We could foresee

- A war in the Arab-Israeli conflict: there have been 2 wars,
- A war in Europe: there was the war in Georgia

This was the first application of the use of the "War Cycle" in forecasting. The results were good but did not convince before the wars in 2005 or 2006, or even after the wars in 2008 or 2009, as if the difficulty of the subject favored a denial of reality: It is reassuring to say that the "War Cycle" does not make sense, especially the forecasts that are derived from it. It is not objective or rational, but it is intellectually relieving to deny the reality of it. The "a priori" raised by this subject seems to provoke a natural rejection. Is this rejection rational and argued? At this stage, I cannot answer for those who were aware of it at the time.

Forecasts made in 2012 for the period 2014-2017 using the "War Cycle"

There will probably be new wars in the existing recurrent conflicts (see graphs):

- One (or more) new round of the Israeli-Arab war (according to rule A1)
- A new European war (according to rule A1)
- An episode of Indo-Pakistani tension (following rule A1)
- A war of international scope

As well as other new wars:

- One or more wars other than the previous ones (according to rule A3)

Page 54 on 62 "Does a cyclical phenomenon favor War and Peace?" Version of 23/01/2022

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Forecasts of wars

And the probable extension of existing wars

- Syria should turn into a regional and/or international war if not resolved in 2012 (according to rule A2)

Result of forecasts made in 2012

Yes, the period of amplification was very marked. A lot of it was in 2014, slightly ahead of schedule, but there were also some marked events in 2015 and 2016.

This gives the impression that the expected peak in late 2015 has shifted to 2014.

New wars in existing recurring conflicts (see graphs) :

In blue, reminder of the forecasts made, in red underlined what happened

- A new round (or rounds) of Arab-Israeli war
Gaza war in July and August 2014
- A new European war
Crimean crisis in March 2014 followed in April 2014 by the war in Donbass in Ukraine
- An episode of Indo-Pakistani tension
from September 2016
- A war of international scope
war against the Islamic State

Other new wars:

- One or more wars other than the previous ones
Revival of the conflict between Turkey and the PKK from July 2015, war in Yemen since 2014

Extension of existing wars

- Syria is expected to turn into a regional or/and international war if not resolved in 2012
Iraq-Syria-Turkey-Hezbollah regional war, Russian intervention from September 2015, Western coalition against Islamic State from August 2014

Forecasts in 2022 for the period 2022-2026 using the "War Cycle

There will probably be new wars in the existing recurrent conflicts (see graphs):

- A new round of the Arab-Israeli war (according to rule A1) or an Iranian-Israeli variant (*see War Cycle in the Arab-Israeli context page 33 Erreur ! Signet non défini.*)

Page 55 on 62 "Does a cyclical phenomenon favor War and Peace?" Version of 23/01/2022

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Forecasts of wars

- A new European war (following rule A1) (*see War Cycle* in the European Context (Europe = from the Atlantic to the Urals) *page 38*)
- An episode of Indo-Pakistani tension (following rule A1) ... or India-China
- The A2 rule could apply to the war in Ethiopia that began during the mitigation phase and could escalate regionally if not resolved by 2023

As well as other new wars:

- One or more wars other than the previous ones (according to rule A3)
- Chinese nationalism could cause some sparks to fly, but not necessarily a new war. US-China arms race?

And the possible extension of existing wars

- Ukraine, Yemen are candidates for further escalation

Conclusion

Conclusion

For some readers the glass is half full and they ask to fill it a little more to really adhere to it. For other readers the glass is half empty and this allows them to quickly dismiss into oblivion and indifference everything that is presented.

The "War Cycle" deserves better than a first-class burial, but fashions remain dominant in the fields concerned with this subject. Neither polemology nor the possibility of cyclical phenomena correspond today to trends affirmed by our intelligentsias.

Official communication is difficult on this subject, especially since the author has not followed an academic path and has not fit into the contemporary mold of communication, which is very compartmentalized. Communicating at once on a subject that concerns War, Peace, leaders and periodic phenomena that could be of radio-astronomical origin is the surest way to provoke rejection.

If this document reaches you, it could be due to chance or to the interest that one of the readers would have found to the point of forwarding it again.

In the meantime, any comments or reviews that would improve the reading and understanding of this document are welcome. An author who has been working on the same subject for a long time has a hard time stepping back to find the right words and the right way to explain it.

The opportunity to discuss and improve the presentation of this topic remains, in the short term, the only way forward.

If a public debate on this topic were to occur, it could change the behavior of actors during the next phase of amplification (2022 to 2026). Today, there is an unknown cause for the amplification and outbreak of wars. To avoid certain wars, it would probably be necessary to be able to question leaders on the reasons that push them to war. Is there really a good reason or is their unconscious itching for this "War Cycle" they have never heard of?

From the point of view of military operations, knowledge of the "War Cycle" does not help. Since we do not know the cause of this cyclical phenomenon, we cannot act on the cause, and when war breaks out, it is the conduct of military operations according to the art of war that is relevant. The knowledge of the "War Cycle" does not change anything, except that if we had known, we might have reacted differently. But since hardly anyone has heard about it, no one has acted or reacted.

The authors who have expressed interest about the periodicity of wars

This subject is recurrent in the study of wars. There are some renowned authors who have expressed themselves on the subject, judging the hypothesis of the periodicity of wars to be credible.

Quincy Wright: he structured the studies on war in the Anglo-Saxon world from his work "A study of War"⁸.

To summarize what he thinks, we can take a simple extract:

"There has been some periodicity in the frequency and intensity of warfare in particular states and state systems, but these fluctuations have not been sufficiently regular to permit accurate prediction" (from the "Periodicity of Crises" section in "A Study of War Volume 2")

Quincy Wright would certainly have appreciated the predictions that were made from the "War Cycle".

Gaston Bouthoul: in France he was the founder of polemology. In his "Traité de Polémologie" "he considered the periodicity of wars as legitimate and gave a periodicity range. We can consider that the "War Cycle" is the confirmation of his hypotheses.

Edward R Dewey: He studied all the cycles that could be imagined, both in the economic world and in war. "Systematic Reconnaissance of Cycles in War"⁹ is the most interesting article to summarize the cycles he foresaw. These cycles are the result of a systematic statistical study over a significant period of time from 1700 to 1913. There is, however, a difference with this study: the events retained are the dates of battles, not wars. In what is considered a war, there may be dozens or even hundreds of battles. He identified the cycles of 11.2, 17.4, 23.8, 53.5 and 125.9. It was not possible to find a correlation between the periodicities of the War Cycle (8.4 or multiple of 8.4) and the periodicities proposed by E R Dewey, except for the multiples 2, 3 and 6 times of 8.4. A comparative analysis of the data and statistical processing would be necessary to understand the differences between the cycles proposed by Dewey and those of the "War Cycle".

Other authors in other countries have also made studies on the periodicity of wars, they could deserve to be quoted.

⁸ Quincy Wright, *A Study of war*, Chicago : University of Chicago Press 1965

⁹ Edward R. Dewey, *Systematic Reconnaissance of Cycles in War*, published in *Cycles* magazine in January 1967

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