

Jean-Baptiste RENARD

A cyclical phenomenon that
favors war?

To all those who hope to avoid wars by understanding why they break out.

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Foreword

This book is for anyone who likes to think and understand, as well as for researchers. For researchers, everything may be important, including the appendices, which may provide further details. For everyone else, try to skim-read to retain the essential points.

- The CALCULATION part is not easy to digest: remember that 60% of wars start 50% of the time, during the amplification phases, for a period of 3,095 days (just under 8 and a half years). By taking only the most important wars, known as Major Wars, we have better potential results. What's important to remember from the CALCULATION part is that not all wars are determined by this phenomenon, but some wars are favored by it.

- The CONTEXT section is the most accessible: 7 contexts are presented. These contexts show that wars most often break out during phases of amplification, but not exclusively. There are remarkable cases, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, where 90% of wars break out during phases of amplification. There are more worrying cases, such as the Russian Federation and Putin, which show exacerbated behavior in relation to wars, which are more numerous on average in the Putin context. This reflects the fact that Russia is a country that intends to play on its balance of power in relation to others. The end of the war in Ukraine will do nothing to change this, and could even accentuate this behavior if Russia believes itself to be victorious.

- The MATERIALIZATION part is very interesting, showing that the number of war victims is apparently linked to this same periodic phenomenon. Although the materialization is also based on UCDP (Uppsala Conflict Data Program) data considered reliable, it's a part that could shock and provoke a form of intellectual denial. It may seem very unlikely that the number of war casualties could be linked to such a cyclical phenomenon.

- The MODELING section explains how this cyclical phenomenon interacts with wars. This part alone could require special communication and lively debate in the War and Peace community.

- The FORECASTING part is the most frustrating. Since 2006, we've been able to predict periods of war in contexts such as the Arab-

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Israeli conflict and the context of wars on European soil. Despite this, no one has been willing to take these forecasts into account to avoid future wars. For the time being, no one has been interested in confirmed forecasts, as if the players didn't want to face up to the future they are building. The most likely periods for future war risks are presented. These risks of war are not indicated to determine future wars, but to avoid them. The fatalist is not the one who foresees that there could be wars, but the one who refuses to see these coming risks and does not seek to avoid them, preferring to bury his head in the sand rather than take his future in hand.

- Everyone can draw their own CONCLUSION. This subject will remain controversial, because nobody likes to think about future wars, and most people prefer to avoid this disturbing topic. But those with sound common sense may be able to understand the phenomenal stakes involved in this discovery, which could shake our societies as deeply as the eccentricities of the dictators and autocrats who want to govern us by plunging us into repeated crises, supposedly for our own good. Simply imagining that rulers provoke conflicts and wars because a periodic phenomenon tickles their unconscious is a crime of lèse-majesté that they will not fail to combat by ignoring this disturbing new reality as much as possible. Use your reason and common sense. Express yourself freely. What kills an idea is indifference, not polemics.

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Introduction

Origins and development

More than 25 years ago, it all began with an observation, during research into resurgences from the past, called "Return of the Past": I noticed that some wars seem to occur on a predictable cycle of 1/3 of 25 years, equivalent to about 8 years and 4 months.

There were only about ten wars, which is not enough to draw any substantial conclusions. Is this cycle simply a coincidence between these few wars, or is it perhaps the start of a real discovery? This is the question that began the study of this cycle, which I have named the "Quesako^I Cycle".

The first step in confirming the existence of such a cycle is to take one or more lists of wars and to find, by CALCULATION, the periodicity of this cycle from the dates on which the wars began. Once this first step has been taken, we have a periodicity and an idea of the importance of this phenomenon, which becomes the starting point for the rest of the study.

How does this impact today's major wars? To get an idea, we've defined several CONTEXTS representative of contemporary wars. Examples: context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, context of Europe, context of the Russian Federation, etc. These contexts have been studied, taking as the main event the date on which the war began, as recognized by historians. Contexts speak louder than a few statistics on a list of wars.

But there is one case, such as the 2003 Iraq war, which seems to completely contradict the "Quesako Cycle". The 2003 Iraq war came at the most unlikely of times. This led to the MATERIALIZATION of the "Quesako Cycle". This materialization process took almost 14 years to evolve into something credible: WikiLeaks^{II}, Iraqbodycount^{III}, UCDP^{IV} were the main stages in the construction of this surprising

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reflection. At the start of the study, the materialization section and its conclusion were unexpected.

And how do we explain the effect of the "Quesako Cycle" on wars? By taking a few key ideas from polemology^V and adding a few others, this has led to MODELIZATION, which proposes an explanation of the influence of the "Quesako Cycle" in triggering or escalating wars.

Throughout this study, the partial results obtained (calculation, contexts, materialization, modeling) were used to make war risk forecasts. At the end of 2021 and the beginning of 2022, it was foreseeable that over the period of 2022-2026, there would be a war in Europe and a war in the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the intensity and savagery of these two wars were not imagined or predicted.

Predicting the risk of war is a matter of course for those who understand the "Quesako Cycle", but it is also a source of great frustration for those who know of and understand this Cycle but who themselves cannot act upon the events that lead to war.

This study cannot be considered fully complete until the source of the "Quesako Cycle" has been identified, but the basics of the understanding are already in place.

The "Quesako Cycle" is not magic. It does not correspond to any known astronomical cycle, and would require an effort on everyone's part to find its true origin.

This book should only be a starting point and a stepping stone for those who want to see a little further than the current turmoil of our times and better understand the possible predictability of contemporary wars.

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Reference authors

The subject of the periodicity of wars is a recurrent one in the study of wars. A number of renowned authors have expressed their views on the subject, giving credibility to the hypothesis of the periodicity of wars by making their own contributions. These authors are considered the reference authors of this study. We would like to thank them for their initial reflections, which were useful in finalizing this study.

Quincy Wright: He structured war studies in the Anglo-Saxon world from his work *A Study of War*.^{VI}

To sum up what he thinks, we can take a simple excerpt:

"There has been some periodicity in the frequency and intensity of warfare in particular states and state systems, but these fluctuations have not been sufficiently regular to permit accurate prediction" (from "Periodicity of Crises in *A Study of War*, Volume 2").

In other words, Quincy Wright tried to forecast wars based on observed periodicities but failed to produce accurate predictions. Had he been successful, he would have considered these forecasts as confirmation of the "cyclical phenomenon". This explains the importance given to various factually confirmed forecasts in this study.

Gaston Bouthoul: In France, he was the founder of polemology. In his *Traité de Polémologie*^{VII}, he considered the periodicity of wars to be legitimate and gave a periodicity range. He considered the start of a war to be an important event to consider when studying the periodicity of wars. Gaston Bouthoul's slogan was, "If you want Peace, know War". Polemology has remained essentially French and has been supplanted internationally by other currents of thought.

This study is in line with the idea of Peace through Knowledge of War. In the case of disease, it seems natural to try to find a cure by analyzing the causes. The same applies to wars: to avoid or even stop them, we need to understand why certain wars break out in the first place.

Edward R. Dewey: He studied every cycle imaginable, both in the economic world and in war. "Systematic Reconnaissance of Cycles in War"^{VIII} is the most interesting article to summarize the cycles he

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foresaw. These cycles were derived from a systematic statistical study covering the period from 1700 to 1913. There is, however, one difference from the present study: the events used are the dates of battles, not wars. In what is considered a war, there can be dozens of battles. Dewey identified cycles in years of 11.2, 17.4, 23.8, 53.5 and 125.9. By analyzing Dewey's results, we might consider also including the values around 8.4 and 8.5 years in the same amplification phase, which would then make these cycles consistent with the present study. More on this later. He has charted cycles between 8 and 10 years, when these may only be one or two cycles instead of 5 or 6. His work shows that, implicitly, he had discovered a cycle equivalent to the "Quesako Cycle", but the mathematical method he followed didn't allow him to see it.

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Definitions & acronyms

Basic definitions

State armed conflict

Armed struggle between two parties, at least one of which is dependent on the government of a state. This armed conflict results in **at least 25** fighting-related deaths in the course of a year.

Non-state armed conflict

Armed struggle between two organized armed groups, neither of which is dependent on a state government. This armed conflict results in **at least 25** fighting-related **deaths** per year.

War

State-based armed conflict resulting in **at least 1,000** battle-related **deaths** per year.

Unilateral violence or one-sided violence

Deliberate use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians, resulting in **the** death of **at least 25 people** in the course of a year.

Comment: extrajudicial executions on government premises are excluded. The genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda is an example of unilateral violence.

These different categories and thresholds (25 and 1,000) are taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).

Operational (military) personnel and people who have lived through (and suffered from) wars sometimes express surprise at these definitions. For them, everything is expressed differently, and such definitions seem far removed from the reality they have experienced. Their reaction is legitimate, but to be able to study wars and be sure we are talking about the same thing, we need a precise definition of what a war is. Practical experience shows that setting a threshold of 1,000 war deaths is a very useful way of defining war. This avoids confusing events of limited violence (a demonstration, an attack, or a limited

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armed conflict) with that of a war. The present study cannot be generalized to all forms of violence. Further study is needed to see whether the “Quesako Cycle” could be applied to forms of violence other than war.

Acronyms

Some acronyms are used throughout the document. Their meaning is indicated on first appearance but is not repeated in the rest of the document.

COW: Correlate of Wars

The following text is an extract from the COW website^{IX}:

"The Correlates of War Project was founded in 1963 by J. David Singer, a political scientist at the University of Michigan. The original and continuing goal of the project has been the systematic accumulation of scientific knowledge about war. Joined by historian Melvin Small, the project began its work by assembling a more accurate dataset on the incidence and extent of inter-state and extra-systemic war in the post-Napoleonic period. To do this scientifically, Singer and Small found they needed to operationally resolve a number of difficult issues such as what is a “state” and what precisely is a “war.” Building upon the work of other pioneers such as Pitirim Sorokin, Lewis Frye Richardson, and Quincy Wright, Singer and Small published *The Wages of War* in 1972, a work that established a standard definition of war that has guided the research of hundreds of scholars since its publication.

...COW seeks to facilitate the collection, dissemination, and use of accurate and reliable quantitative data in international relations. Key principles of the project include a commitment to standard scientific principles of replication, data reliability, documentation, review, and the transparency of data collection procedures. More specifically, we are committed to the free public release of data sets to the research community, to release data in a timely manner after data collection is completed, to provide version numbers for data set and replication tracking, to provide appropriate dataset documentation, and to attempt to

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update, document, and distribute follow-on versions of datasets where possible."

Note: The COW project appears to be dormant, and the available data has not been updated to include wars after 2007. However, it remains a valuable source for the period from 1816 to 2007.

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

UCDP: Uppsala Conflict Data Program

The following text is an extract from the UCDP website^X:

"The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) is the world's main provider of data on organized violence and the oldest ongoing data collection project for civil war, with a history of more than 40 years. Its definition of armed conflict has become the global standard of how conflicts are systematically defined and studied."

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Calculation and readjustment

How to demonstrate a cyclical phenomenon linked to wars?



The most common way of thinking about war is to assume that any war can break out at any time. There would be no predictable time for war to break out. To say that a cyclical phenomenon has an influence on wars means that we believe that wars most often break out at certain times, in connection with a cyclical phenomenon. This doesn't mean that wars can only occur at certain times, but rather that they are more common or severe at certain points within a recurring cycle, here referred to as the "Quesako Cycle".

The three figures that follow represent the methodological approach to the cyclical phenomenon we wish to study, and the conventions that will be used during the study. If wars are shown to be more frequent in certain periods, we can consider that there is an amplification phenomenon which favors the outbreak of wars. Conversely, periods with fewer wars can be considered as attenuation phases of war. There are possible shifts in the amplification peaks. A helpful analogy is the well documented "Solar Cycle", which has an average periodicity of 11.2 years, but can vary from 8 to 15 years from one cycle to the next. The "Quesako Cycle" is not directly related to the solar cycle but shares the characteristic of periodic variability.

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
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To demonstrate that there is the existence of a cyclical phenomenon of about 1/3 of 25 years (8 years and 4 months) which may influence the outbreak of wars, we have calculated the number of wars which broke out during phases of amplification. From this, we derived the percentage of wars occurring during phases of amplification in relation to the total number of wars. We used the highest percentage values to determine the value of the periodicity of the "Quesako Cycle". A value of 50% would indicate no influence as wars would be equally likely to break out during phases of amplification and phases of attenuation. A result below 55% is considered as not indicative of a periodic amplification phenomenon.

An initial calculation showed a peak between 3,080 and 3,100 days, the calculations were made between 3,000 and 3,200 days, with a 5-day increment. This is not a systematic calculation of all the cycle values that could exist, but a calculation around 8 years and 4 months, following the initial observation of this study.

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Calculations based on two different lists

Naturally, the list of wars used for the calculations can determine or bias the results. Since no single, universally accepted reference list of wars exists, and given the methodological and political variation across sources, we chose to use two separate lists. This gives us an idea of what will happen when other researchers use lists other than those used here.

Since 2001, two lists have been used:

- **A list of major wars since 1900, used in 2001 and 2024:** *This list was drawn up as part of this study, in 2001. This list has no ambition other than to provide information on what was done initially, on the assumption that the phenomenon should be visible in the most important wars. These are the most important so-called "major" wars. This list and the calculations based on it are provided for information purposes only. This list was updated in 2024 to ensure that the original list still made sense. This list is available in "Appendix 1: List of major wars from 1900 to 2024", page 107.*

- **A list of interstate wars with more than 5,000 deaths, based on the COW (Correlates Of Wars) V4 list^{XI}.** This list has the advantage of being the result of research work linking other information to each war, such as the number of war dead. V4 was published in 2010, covering wars from 1816 to 2007. For this study, it had to be completed with the main wars up to 2024. This second, completed list was used for calculations up to 2024.

This list is not the author's own. Given that the V4 ends in 2007, it had to be completed, which has been done in this study. This is shown in "Appendix 2: List of COW V4 wars completed from 2007 to 2024", page.110

Calculated from the list of major wars since 1900

The first calculation made in 2001 was based on a list of major wars defined by taking the main wars cited in the *Encyclopedia Universalis*. To have a minimum of credibility, it was necessary to start from an external source. At the time, there was no known reference list of wars.

The value of 3,085 was adopted in 2001 and will be used until 2024.

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In 2024, the list was completed with the major wars since 2001, and the calculation was made by calculating the number of wars that break out during amplification phases.

The table below shows the number and percentage of wars that break out during the amplification phases for periods of 3,000 to 3,200 days (i.e. 8.21 to 8.76 years), in 5-day increments.

Period in days	in years	Amplification	Attenuation	% amplification
3 000	8,21	22	15	59 %
3 005	8,23	23	14	62 %
3 010	8,24	24	13	65 %
3 015	8,25	23	14	62 %
3 020	8,27	24	13	65 %
3 025	8,28	25	12	68 %
3 030	8,30	25	12	68 %
3 035	8,31	25	12	68 %
3 040	8,32	26	11	70 %
3 045	8,34	24	13	65 %
3 050	8,35	24	13	65 %
3 055	8,36	25	12	68 %
3 060	8,38	26	11	70 %
3 065	8,39	26	11	70 %
3 070	8,41	27	10	73 %
3 075	8,42	28	9	76 %
3 080	8,43	28	9	76 %
3 085	8,45	26	11	70 %
3 090	8,46	29	8	78 %
3 095	8,47	29	8	78 %
3 100	8,49	28	9	76 %
3 105	8,50	27	10	73 %
3 110	8,51	27	10	73 %
3 115	8,53	27	10	73 %
3 120	8,54	26	11	70 %
3 125	8,56	25	12	68 %
3 130	8,57	24	13	65 %
3 135	8,58	24	13	65 %

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Period in days	in years	Amplification	Attenuation	% amplification
3 140	8,60	25	12	68 %
3 145	8,61	25	12	68 %
3 150	8,62	24	13	65 %
3 155	8,64	24	13	65 %
3 160	8,65	25	12	68 %
3 165	8,67	25	12	68 %
3 170	8,68	27	10	73 %
3 175	8,69	24	13	65 %
3 180	8,71	23	14	62 %
3 185	8,72	23	14	62 %
3 190	8,73	22	15	59 %
3 195	8,75	22	15	59 %
3 200	8,76	20	17	54 %

In the table, lines 3,090 d and 3,095 d have the highest percentage of wars breaking out during amplification phases: **78%**.

Calculation based on COW V4 interstate wars with more than 5,000 deaths completed up to 2024

To reinforce the credibility of the result, a second calculation from a list of wars compiled by other researchers, COW (Correlate Of Wars) V4, was performed. This covers the period of 1816-2007 and constitutes a well-established and defined data set.

Only interstate wars with more than 5,000 deaths were taken into account. Why 5,000 deaths? This was in order to take into account wars that were more important than the UCDP criterion of 1,000 (*this does not mean that the criterion for a major war is one of + 5,000 deaths*). The calculation was made in 2024-2025 from this COW V4 list, supplemented by the major wars up to 2024. The calculation followed the same principle and formulas as for the list of major wars since 1900. The table below shows the number and percentage of wars that break out during the amplification phases for periods of 3,000 to 3,200 days (i.e. 8.21 to 8.76 years), from 5 to 5 days.

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Period in days	in years	Amplification	Attenuation	% amplification
3 000	8,21	41	36	53 %
3 005	8,23	41	36	53 %
3 010	8,24	42	35	55 %
3 015	8,25	40	37	52 %
3 020	8,27	40	37	52 %
3 025	8,28	42	35	55 %
3 030	8,30	41	36	53 %
3 035	8,31	41	36	53 %
3 040	8,32	41	36	53 %
3 045	8,34	38	39	49 %
3 050	8,35	38	39	49 %
3 055	8,36	39	38	51 %
3 060	8,38	39	38	51 %
3 065	8,39	41	36	53 %
3 070	8,41	43	34	56 %
3 075	8,42	44	33	57 %
3 080	8,43	44	33	57 %
3 085	8,45	44	33	57 %
3 090	8,46	46	31	60 %
3 095	8,47	46	31	60 %
3 100	8,49	45	32	58 %
3 105	8,50	44	33	57 %
3 110	8,51	44	33	57 %
3 115	8,53	44	33	57 %
3 120	8,54	43	34	56 %
3 125	8,56	41	36	53 %
3 130	8,57	39	38	51 %
3 135	8,58	39	38	51 %
3 140	8,60	39	38	51 %
3 145	8,61	39	38	51 %
3 150	8,62	39	38	51 %
3 155	8,64	39	38	51 %
3 160	8,65	39	38	51 %
3 165	8,67	39	38	51 %
3 170	8,68	41	36	53 %

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Period in days	in years	Amplification	Attenuation	% amplification
3 175	8,69	40	37	52 %
3 180	8,71	40	37	52 %
3 185	8,72	41	36	53 %
3 190	8,73	40	37	52 %
3 195	8,75	40	37	52 %
3 200	8,76	40	37	52 %

In the table of calculations between 3,000 and 3,200 days from the completed COW V4 list, the 3,090-day and 3,095-day lines show the highest percentage of wars breaking out during amplification phases: **60%**.

Why does the COW list give such a low result of 60%?

Let's take the wars surrounding the First World War, from 1911 to the end of 1919. The calculation shows that over this nine-year period (a complete "Quesako Cycle"), three wars broke out during the amplification phase and six wars broke out during the attenuation phase. In other words, 33% of wars broke out during the amplification phase. This result, followed to the letter, indicates that the "Quesako cycle" has no visible effect on this period. This makes no sense, since the First World War alone confirms that the "Quesako Cycle" does have an influence on this period. So why this apparent contradiction? Because the World War counts as a single war, and there are small wars both before and after the First World War, which give the impression that there are more of them during the mitigation phases. If we were to associate an importance factor with each war (e.g. 15 for the First World War and 1 for all other small wars, then the weight of those that break out during the amplification phase would be greater than that of wars that break out during the mitigation phases). But to define such a factor of importance (or major war) is an enormous task that has not been carried out in the present study.^{XII}

In conclusion, yes, the results are reduced in the COW list because the COW list is complete and contains minor wars that were not initially included in this study in the list of major wars.

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Conclusion calculations

From 2 different lists, the periodicity of 3,090 and 3,095 days gives the best results in both lists.

However, only the list drawn up using COW V4 is considered objective, and we have taken the percentage of wars breaking out during the amplification phases as 60% of the total number of wars for 3,090 or 3,095 days.

The value of 3,095 days is used for the periodicity of the "Quesako Cycle".

The list of major wars defined in this study is for information only. We have not defined a "major war" criterion, but simply the wars considered to be the most important. If someone were to define a criterion of major war recognized by all players in the field, they could redefine a list of major wars. The fact that we have given here the results of a non-objective list of "major wars" therefore lets others know that, potentially, the results could be better than 60%. There could be a great deal of work to be done to define what a major war is, and to draw up an objective, recognized list corresponding to these criteria.

For the "Quesako Cycle" to be recognized, other researchers will have to redo their calculations using credible war lists and specifying their selection criteria for the wars selected. Of course, researchers making equivalent calculations will not find exactly the same figures as a result, if they use completely or slightly different lists of wars. However, they should have "similar" results.

In the current phase of presenting and demonstrating the "Quesako Cycle", it is important to have a periodicity value recognized on several lists (this is the case with the two lists). It is also important to have a credible percentage value for wars breaking out during amplification phases. The value of 60% is credible and reflects the fact that the phenomenon observed favours wars, without this being a determining factor for all wars.

It is recognized that putting all wars on the same level, without indicating a corrective factor due to the importance of the war, undermines the result found.

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Readjustment

Readjustment based on the theoretical peak of 2016, revised in 2014

Perfect sinusoids don't exist in nature. Just as the solar activity cycle is irregular, there are certainly amplification peaks in the "Quesako Cycle" that are shifted and deserve to be "readjusted": from one cycle to the next, the period of the cycle may vary.

We know, for example, that 1967 and 1968 were years of war and violence, which means that this cycle was "lengthened" and is probably much longer than 3,095 days. The "recalibration" was not done for this period, but this could have made sense.

In 2014, several wars broke out within a few weeks of each other: the Donbass war in Ukraine, a new Hamas-Israel episode in Gaza, and the war against the Islamic State. This episode was interpreted as a shift in the amplification peak. This interpretation was only possible a few years later, to confirm that there was no comparable cluster during the rest of this amplification phase.

It was therefore decided in 2024 to shift the theoretical 2016 amplification peak, by measuring the offset between these three wars and the theoretical 2016 peak and averaging the 3 offset. This yielded a 679-day offset from the 2016 peak, resulting in a shifted peak in 2014. This shift remains applicable for future amplification phases.

To date, this is the only readjustment carried out for the period 1816-2025, but there are certainly others for other periods prior to 1816. Possibly, other minor readjustments could be identified during the period 1816-2025, but the data and justifications are lacking to do so more systematically. Perhaps this will be easier once the "Quesako Cycle" is better understood.

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Effect of readjustment on calculations

What is the impact of readjustment on the calculations previously made?

For the list of major wars since 1900, the probability of wars breaking out during amplification phases rises from 78% to 86%.

For the COW list, the probability of wars breaking out during amplification phases rises from 60% to 64%.

Possibility of other cycles (3,095 days)?

Rapid sampling to verify the existence of other Cycles but with a period of less than 20 years

By sampling every 100 days, calculations were made from 2,700 days to 7,000 days with both lists.

With both lists, there is a cycle around 11 years and another around 17 years.

The calculation method used is considered unreliable for such exercise and for large periodicity values. Checking only the number of wars that break out during the amplification phase means that very few war occurrences are considered. The resulting information is purely informative and will need to be verified using more robust techniques.

How do these Cycles relate to those discovered by Edward R. Dewey?

In the study "Systematic Reconnaissance of Cycles in War^{XIII}", there is a table that summarizes all the Cycles identified by Edward R. Dewey. (See Appendix 3: Table of Cycles from Edward R. Dewey's "Systematic Period Reconnaissance")

Cycle length 8.47 years:

It is not identified by Edward R. Dewey, but four distinct cycles are identified with a value of 8, xx. If they were grouped into one, this would represent a significant amplitude, and such a value would have been retained and indicated. Edward R. Dewey's method of calculation means that he doesn't group cycles around a single value; with the method of calculation followed here, all the wars of an amplification phase are

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grouped together. In other words, all values from 8 to 10 are part of the same cycle. In his table, Edward R. Dewey implicitly has a cycle around 8.4, but his calculation method didn't allow him to assert it.

Cycle of 11, xy :

Edward R. Dewey identifies a cycle of 11,204 (amplitude .110, which is significant), whereas there is a cycle of just under 11 with the COW list and the list of major wars since 1900.

Cycle of 17, xy :

Edward R. Dewey identifies a cycle of 17.398 (amplitude .181), while there are several values between 17 and 17.5 identified with the COW list and the Major Wars list since 1900.

Conclusion:

For values between 7 and 19 years, three methods (calculation or different list) and two authors identify the existence of cycles around close values. Further work needs to be carried out by repeating the calculations on other bases and using other methods. This additional work has not been carried out as part of this study.

Presumably the value around 11 years is linked to the "Solar Cycle", which could introduce a complementary influence to that of the "Quesako Cycle". The value of 11.204 in Edward R. Dewey's study is linked to a peak in 1971 (1971.29), which is consistent (i.e. relatively close) with a peak in solar activity. This would be another avenue to explore^{XIV}. Previous studies on the "Quesako Cycle" have already identified a potential complementary influence of the solar cycle on warfare.

➔ This is a lead for further study in the "Quesako cycle"^{XV}.

This link has not yet been demonstrated.

For the value around 17 years, we can consider that this is indirectly covered by the "Quesako Cycle" study. It's not exactly double the value of the "Quesako Cycle", but as the amplification phases cover half of the time, we can consider, for the moment, that this study indirectly covers this point.

As mentioned, this part of two complementary cycles of around 11 and 17 years is purely informative and will not be defended without further work to confirm it. It is an avenue left open to other researchers.^{XVI}

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Table of peak dates and amplification phases of the "Quesako Cycle" since 1900

With a periodicity of 3,095 days, a T0 of July 30, 1914 (outbreak of the First World War) and a readjustment, the values are:

Amplification phase			
Start	Peak amplification	End	Peak amplification readjustment
	February 7, 1906	March 21, 1908	
June 16, 1912	July 30, 1914	September 10, 1916	
December 6, 1920	January 19, 1923	March 2, 1925	
May 28, 1929	July 11, 1931	August 22, 1933	
November 17, 1937	December 31, 1939	February 11, 1942	
May 9, 1946	June 21, 1948	August 3, 1950	
October 29, 1954	December 11, 1956	January 23, 1959	
April 20, 1963	June 2, 1965	July 15, 1967	
October 10, 1971	November 22, 1973	January 4, 1976	
March 31, 1980	May 14, 1982	June 25, 1984	
September 20, 1988	November 3, 1990	December 15, 1992	
March 12, 1997	April 25, 1999	June 6, 2001	
September 1 ^(st) , 2005	October 15, 2007	June 10, 2009	
September 30, 2012	May 27, 2014	July 8, 2016	-679
October 3, 2020	November 16, 2022	December 28, 2024	
March 25, 2029	May 8, 2031	June 19, 2033	
September 14, 2037	October 28, 2039	December 9, 2041	
March 6, 2046	April 18, 2048	May 31, 2050	
August 26, 2054	October 8, 2056	November 20, 2058	
February 15, 2063	March 30, 2065	May 12, 2067	
	September 19, 2073		

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Attenuation
Attenuation peak
May 4, 1910
October 24, 1918
April 15, 1927
October 5, 1935
March 26, 1944
September 15, 1952
March 7, 1961
August 27, 1969
February 16, 1978
August 8, 1986
January 28, 1995
July 20, 2003
February 4, 2011
August 21, 2018
February 10, 2027
August 2, 2035
January 22, 2044
July 13, 2052
January 2, 2061
June 24, 2069

Attenuation phase start dates are amplification phase end dates, and attenuation phase end dates are amplification start dates. These dates are defined in the amplification phase table.

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Contexts

Introduction to contexts

What is a context?

In the framework of this study, a context is the study of the link between wars and the "Quesako Cycle" within a chosen limited perimeter, grouped together under the name CONTEXT.

A context can be:

- Geographic (country, region).
- Linked to a figure (especially a leader).
- Or whatever.

The context is:

- Visual, represented in a graph based on an identical framework for all contexts.
- A table of deviations from amplification peaks quantifies the link between the "Quesako Cycle" and contextual events.

A context allows us both to show, in a visual and quantified way, the relationship between the "Quesako Cycle" and the outbreak of war, and to predict future risks in future phases of amplification. A context usually has one foot in the past and another in the future. To produce sufficiently detailed and relevant forecasts, it is advisable to link them to a classical and appropriate classic geopolitical assessments.

The first two contexts were produced in early 2006, on Europe and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since then, each amplification phase has given rise to at least one war in these two contexts. We therefore have almost 20 years' hindsight on the context and their use.

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In recent years, it's not so much the context principle that has evolved, but everything around it: definition of wars (in particular the 1,000-death threshold, borrowed from UCDP, which clarified ambiguities about the wars taken into account), adjustment of periodicity from 3,085 to 3,095 at the start of 2025, readjustment applied for the first time in 2025, addition of a few significant contexts (Russia and Sudan), associated geopolitical analysis.

Everyone can define their own contexts, depending on how they intend to use knowledge of this "Quesako cycle".

Certain contexts may show that there is no link between the "Quesako Cycle" and wars. For example, the wars in Afghanistan did not start during the amplification phases in the current definition of the "Quesako Cycle". When this is the case, the context cannot identify the risks of war to come from this context.

The contexts were created for the contemporary period of the 20th and 21st centuries, because they are also a projection into the future. To date, there is no "historical" context defined for the centuries prior to the 20th century.

Events considered in contexts

The word "war" is used in many different senses: economic warfare, cyberwarfare, asymmetrical warfare, and so on. CONTEXT refers to inter- or intra-state wars that have resulted in at least 1,000 deaths per year in total. (*See Definitions page 9*)

The events considered in the contexts are:

- Start of the war: this is when the war begins.
- Escalation: an existing war suddenly takes on a new dimension.
- Tension or incident.
- Ceasefire or stop fighting.
- Peace treaty.

Only the dates of the outbreak of war are considered when calculating the deviation of the start of the war from the amplification peak. The deviation of the start of the war from the amplification peak is measured. If the war breaks out right on the amplification peak, the deviation is 0%. If the war breaks out on an attenuation peak, the deviation is 100%.

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War start deviation from amplification peak = (War start date - Amplification peak date)/(3095/2)

Events other than the outbreak of war are presented in the context for information purposes, without any "calculated measure".

What's the point of context?

The conclusion of the "calculation and readjustment" part is that 60% of wars outbreak during the amplification phases of the "Quesako Cycle". An amplification phase lasts just over 4 years, and forecasting wars based on this statement simply means that more wars are likely to break out during the half-time amplification phase, without knowing which war. However, with context, we can get some more precise information on which wars will break out, especially if we couple context with geopolitical analysis.

Defining a few contexts corresponding to known geopolitical realities allows us to be more precise. What we're interested in is knowing roughly when and where the next major wars will take place.

What contexts are presented here?

List of contexts presented:

- **Arab-Israeli conflict:** this context considers all the wars of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is a remarkable case.
- **Context of wars in Europe:** this context limits the wars selected to those taking place in Europe. Why such a limitation? There have been so many wars waged by Europeans since the beginning of the 20th century that to consider all the wars would be to make a selection that might not be objective. By limiting European wars to those fought on European soil, we can "filter" wars out of the European context. Europeans will not be able to build a common political future without understanding this context and its consequences.

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- **Putin (or Russian Federation) context:** this context encompasses all Russia's wars since the creation of the Russian Federation. This context is very important, particularly for understanding the "sensitivity" of Russia and its leaders to this phenomenon, which is probably unknown to them. This deserves a "special study".
- **World context:** this context considers the most important wars on earth.
- **India-Pakistan context:** there has been no major war in the last 25 years, but it remains a conflict to watch.
- **Lebanon context**
- **Sudan context:** in Africa, there are many wars. Some are significant, others not, in terms of the "Quesako Cycle". Sudan is a case in point.
- **Other contexts to come:** it's up to everyone to suggest and use other contexts. In view of the future risk of conflict in Asia, it would be worthwhile to study a few that will be incorporated into future editions. The day that other contexts are defined and used by others, it means that there is a beginning of appropriation of this subject.

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Methodology for presenting contexts

Context: representation of the “Quesako Cycle”

The starting point T0 of the "Quesako Cycle" is July 30, 1914, the date of the outbreak of the First World War. This reference amplification peak is used to set the cyclical phenomenon in time. The other amplification peaks are calculated at a multiple of 3,095 days, or 8.47 years, from this initial date.

This value is an average value. The actual peaks are probably offset from the calculated amplification peaks, but it would be necessary to know the origin of the phenomenon to be able to systematically readjust the amplification peaks, given that from one cycle to the next, the period is not exactly 3,095 days and can vary in one direction or another.


A readjustment was made to the theoretical peak of 2016, resulting in a peak readjusted to 2014. As the main wars of the amplification phase broke out within a few weeks of each other, the average offset of these wars from the amplification peak was calculated and applied. The fact that the main wars broke out in 2014 within a few weeks of each other was interpreted as a sign that the amplification peak was offset at that time (Donbass war, Hamas-Israel conflict, war against the Islamic State). The average time offset for these 3 wars was 679 days. The shift was therefore -679 days. All the following peaks are calculated from multiples of 3,095 days. New offset can be introduced later. This readjustment has been tested since the beginning of 2025 and is included in this document.

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Context diagram - how to read it?





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
A few examples and their visual interpretation



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
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Table of context deviations in % from amplification peak

Each graph is associated, in a specific table, with measurements of the deviation of outbreak-type events from the amplification peak.

The significance on the graph of the discrepancies shown in the table is illustrated in the following chart.



- 0% means that there is no gap and that the war started at the moment of peak amplification.
- 100% means that the war broke out at the most unlikely moment according to the "Quesako Cycle", i.e. at peak attenuation.
- If wars were completely random, this would mean that they are uniformly distributed with random values, i.e. between 0 and 100.
- If all deviations were less than 50%, this would mean that all wars would start within 50% of the time (instead of being spread out over the whole time).

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- If the deviation is a negative value, this means that the event took place before the amplification peak.

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Context of the Arab-Israeli conflict

Defining the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict

This context includes all wars between Israel and other countries or the Palestinians.

Are there any events that have been omitted?

In the definition and methodological presentation of contexts, it is explained that at least 1,000 deaths in total per year are required to be considered a war.

There are four events that could be considered war by those who don't apply the 1,000-death limit:

- **The first intifada:** there were 2,239 deaths in over 5 years, which works out at around 450 a year. That's not 1,000 deaths a year.
- **1991 Gulf War:** Iraq launched missiles into Israeli territory, hoping to widen the conflict. Apparently, there were no fatalities and virtually no material damage. It was a war incident, but not a war.
- **Operation Pillar of Defense:** this operation began on November 14, 2012, and claimed 170 lives in 7 days. It's a somewhat serious incident, but not yet a war.
- **The Israel-Palestine crisis of 2021:** this crisis began on April 13, 2021, and left around 270 people dead.

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Deviation Table for Israeli-Arab Conflict					
Event	Fatalities if < 1000	Evt Date	Peak Date	Deviation months	Deviation %
First Arab-Israeli War		May 15,1948	Jun-48	-1,2	-2%
Suez Crisis/War		Oct 29,1956	Dec-56	-1,4	-3%
Six-Day War		Jun 5,1967	Jun-65	24,1	47%
Yom Kippur War		Oct 6,1973	Nov-73	-1,5	-3%
1982 Lebanon War		Jun 6,1982	May-82	0,8	1%
First Intifada	2,239 deaths in over 5 years	Dec 9,1987	Nov-90		
Gulf War with Iraqi missiles	0	Jan 16,1991	Nov-90		
Second Intifada		Sep 28,2000	Apr-99	17,2	34%
2006 Lebanon War		Jul 12,2006	Oct-07	-15,1	-30%
Operation Cast Lead		Dec 27,2008	Oct-07	14,4	28%
Operation Pillar of Defense	170 deaths in 7 days	Nov 14,2012	May-14		
Operation Protective Edge		Jul 8,2014	May-14	1,4	3%
2021 Israel-Palestine Crisis	around 270	Apr 13,2021	Nov-22		
2023 Israel-Hamas War		Oct 7,2023	Nov-22	10,7	21%
Twelve-day War		Jun 13,2025	Nov-22	30,9	61%
Average of the absolute deviation values				11	21%

Data

The Arab-Israeli conflict has had short wars, except for 1948 and 2023. Short wars mean that there is little ambiguity about the dates of the wars, and that even if there were discussions about one or another date, this would have little or no impact on the outcome.

The wars of the Arab-Israeli conflict are described in the document "Arab-Israeli War^{XVII}".

Amplification phases

90% of identified wars break out during amplification phases.

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This result may seem inconsistent with the calculation section (see "Conclusion calculations " page 20), which indicates that 60% of wars break out during the amplification phase.

The context method does indeed show that, for certain known conflicts, the probability of war exceeds the results expected from calculations based on all wars. The same observation is made for other contexts, demonstrating the added value of working by context.

The average deviation between the start of the wars in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the amplification peaks is 21%. In other words, the wars start (on average) within + or -11 months of the amplification peak.

Attenuation phases

Almost all peace initiatives in the Arab-Israeli conflict materialize during phases of mitigation. This is the opposite of the phenomenon of wars breaking out during phases of amplification. It is significant for the Arab-Israeli conflict, since there have been at least six peace treaties or agreements formalized during mitigation phases.

After the war that followed on October 7, 2023, it is therefore reasonable to expect that there will be an initiative that should materialize during the subsequent mitigation phase, i.e. between January 2025 and February 2029. For the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict to be lasting, and for there to be no new war during the amplification phase that follows, the main blocking issues would have to be resolved. There is no certainty that such an initiative will materialize into a lasting peace.

This observation for the attenuation phases is specific to the Arab-Israeli conflict and cannot be generalized to all contexts, as you can see by consulting the other contexts.

What can we expect in 2025 for the years 2026 to 2041?

Since 2006, the risk of war in subsequent amplification phases has been confirmed as war: extrapolation to the next amplification phase therefore makes sense. Readers may be unaware that, since 2006, each upcoming amplification phase has been the occasion for a new war, but this is a reality that has already been observed 3 times since 2006. Extrapolation to future phases of amplification is not gratuitous, but the

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application of what has already been observed. Drawing attention to the risk of war in the future is not done out of fatalism, but in the hope that it may motivate a real awareness to take measures to avoid the next war.

The war that began on October 7, 2023, was the longest and hardest that the Palestinians and Israelis had ever fought, not to mention other players such as the Lebanese and Iranians. It's not impossible that the next settlement attempt, which will take place between 2026 and 2029, will be more serious and will succeed in ensuring that the "Quesako Cycle" no longer has any effect.

Should there be no basis for a lasting peace as a result, there are two periods of war risk to watch out for:

- 2029 à 2033
- 2037 à 2041

That's all we know now. Only within 1 to 3 years before these periods could we do an analysis to determine whether there is still a risk of war and the type of war that could result.

The historic Franco-German antagonism that fueled several wars between these two countries has turned into a pillar of European construction. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict could one day become the pillar of their future. Even if this seems impossible today, we must not lose hope, but there will have to be a trigger and a collective will to overcome this situation, which is not the case as this manuscript is being written.

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Context of the wars in Europe

Defining the context of wars in Europe

The context of wars in Europe concerns wars fought on European soil. Europe is Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. More precisely, Europe is that of the EU countries + the EU candidate countries, with a few exceptions. Switzerland is considered part of Europe, and Turkey is not included in this context (Turkey's wars have not been taken into account, except for Cyprus, which is considered part of Europe).

Why such a definition? Initially, the Europe context should consider all wars waged by European countries, wherever they were fought. This included wars of colonization and decolonization, and all European interventions, whether initiated by Europeans or not. With such a broad definition, creating a European context would be a feat or a nightmare. To limit the context to a dozen wars would be arbitrary, and the context presented would be questionable.

By restricting ourselves to the wars that took place in Europe, the context naturally allows us to select the wars concerned.

What's more, in the forecasting aspect that can be deduced from a context, it provides a useful vision of Europe on its territory and with its neighbors.

For example, the Falklands War was interesting because it was triggered during a phase of amplification, but it did not take place in Europe and will therefore not be considered. The Suez crisis, in which the French and British took part, was interesting but did not take place in Europe, and has already been seen in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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Deviation Table for the wars in Europe					
Event	Fatalities if < 1000	Evt Date	Peak Date	Deviation months	Deviation %
World War I		Jul 30, 1914	juil.-14	0,0	0%
Spanish Civil War		Jul 17, 1936	déc.-39	-41,5	-82%
World War II		Sep 3, 1939	déc.-39	-3,9	-8%
1963-1964 Inter-Cypriot conflict	<500				
Invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact	between 200 and 300	Aug 20, 1968			
Turkish invasion of Cyprus	~1000	Jul 20, 1974	nov.-73	7,9	16%
Yougoslavia Disintegration		Jun 1, 1991	nov.-90	6,9	14%
Kosovo War		Mar 24, 1999	avr.-99	-1,1	-2%
Georgian War		Aug 7, 2008	oct.-07	9,8	19%
Donbass War (Ukraine)		Apr 6, 2014	mai-14	-1,7	-3%
Russia-Ukraine War		Feb 24, 2022	nov.-22	-8,7	-17%
Average of the absolute deviation values				9	18%

Data

This context represents the major wars that have taken place in Europe since 1900.

There are 3 parts to consider:

- From 1900 to the end of the Second World War (1945)
two world wars and the Spanish Civil War.
- 1945-1990 - This was a post-war period, with an ongoing Cold War but no major war on European soil. The trauma of the Second World War and the division of Europe probably helped to keep things relatively calm.
- 1990 to present - This is a post-socialist period (post-USSR and post-Yugoslavia) marked by the traumas repressed during the socialist era. The two former blocs remain marked by past power relations between the old centers (i.e. Russia and Serbia) and the

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other countries that have become independent. It's as if these former centers of power were unable to overcome their past and the dominant role they played in it. From 1990 to 2025, this period has seen a war per phase of amplification.

But it's useful to keep these three periods in a single context, to try and find the fundamentals of Europe that mark the Europe of today and tomorrow.

A few selected and non-selected events are worth commenting on:

- The invasion of the Ruhr in 1923 is rather anecdotal, but it's an example that illustrates the "Return Theory". The "Quesako Cycle" applied to wars is an application of the "Return Theory", which states that an event that has left its mark on the collective unconscious can be relived at a multiple of 3,095 days (8 years and just under 6 months) to plus or minus two years. The Ruhr invasion is a return to the past. It's not relevant to war, but it's a good way of recalling the "return of the past" of the Franco-German war, which didn't turn into a war.

- The Berlin blockade was not a war but coincided with a peak in amplification.

- The Irish conflict is not mentioned. This conflict, animated by numerous attacks scattered over time, was not a war in the sense defined for this study. Does the "Quesako Cycle" fit in with the Irish conflict? There has been no study on the subject yet.

- Some of the local wars that followed the First World War are not included. They are considered as the end of the generalized conflict.

- The disintegration of Yugoslavia could be presented as several different, separate wars, but they have been combined into a single event.

Amplification phases

Between 1945 and 1990, amplification phases did not lead to wars in Europe (apart from Cyprus). This observation is important if we are to affirm that there is no such thing as fatalism. The trauma of the Second World War and the balance of terror are the probable causes.

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Since 1990, each amplification phase has given rise to a war, following a similar pattern: a former socialist bloc country (USSR and Yugoslavia), with direct or indirect involvement of the former power centers of the socialist bloc concerned. (i.e. Serbia or Russia).

The average deviation between the start of wars in Europe and amplification peaks is 18%. In other words, wars start (on average) within + or - 9 months of the amplification peak. For forecasting purposes, this is transformed by saying that the most likely risk of war is + or -1 year from the amplification peak. The "9 months" observed are downgraded to one year, in the hope of obtaining a reliable estimate for forecasting purposes.

Attenuation phases

World wars came to an end during attenuation phases. The Dayton Accords also took place during an attenuation phase. Three Armistice or Peace events indicate a tendency towards peace during mitigation phases.

There are not enough events related to the attenuation phase to be able to draw any firm conclusions.

Based on this trend, it can be estimated that the war in Ukraine will end between 2025 and 2027, whoever wins. But likely, this will not change the risk of war in the future. It risks being an imposed and therefore fragile solution. Like a temporary agreement to buy a little time, without solving the real problem of the Russia-Europe relationship (and all its neighbors).

What can we expect in 2025 for the years 2026 to 2041?

Since 2006, the risks of war in subsequent phases of amplification have been confirmed as war, so extrapolation to the next phase of amplification makes sense.

We need to build a new relationship with the Russian Federation, moving away from this imbroglio that claims to build a future on the defeat of the other, without offering anything other than vassalage.

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NATO is a false problem. Even if NATO were to disappear, the Europeans would rebuild a defense system that would bear a striking resemblance to NATO. In such a set-up, Ukraine would have to become a key partner: the one nobody believed would stand up to the Russian army, which has held out for over 3 years and has unrivalled military experience against Russia.

There are 2 risk periods to watch out for:

- 2029 à 2033
- 2037 à 2041

That's all we know now. Only between 1 and 3 years before these periods will we be able to do an analysis to determine the type of war and then we will be able to be more precise.

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Putin Context (and the Russian Federation)

Defining the Putin (and Russian Federation) context

This context includes all the wars since Putin came to power (1999) and since the creation of the Russian Federation in 1991.

Data

Document: "List of Russia's wars^{XVIII} ", as well as all the documents accessible from this list on the "Russian Federation" section.

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Deviation Table for Putin (and the Russian Federation)					
Event	Fatalities if < 1000	Evt Date	Peak Date	Deviation months	Deviation %
First South Ossetian War and Georgian Civil War		Jan 5,1991	Nov-90	2,1	4%
Civil war in Tajikistan		May 3,1992	Nov-90	18,0	35%
Conflict in North Ossetia	~550	Oct 30,1992			
First Chechen War		Dec 11,1994	Nov-90	49,3	97%
Second Chechen war		Aug 26,1999	Apr-99	4,0	8%
Ingushetia conflict (war)	~800 pendant 6 ans de guerre	Jul 21,2007			
Russian-Georgian war (also known as the Second South Ossetian War)		Aug 7,2008	Oct-07	9,8	19%
Guerilla in Ciscaucasie		Apr 16,2009	Oct-07	18,0	35%
Annexation of Crimea + war in Donbass		Feb 26,2014	May-14	-3,0	-6%
Russia's entry into the Syrian conflict		Sep 30,2015	May-14	16,1	32%
War in Ukraine		Feb 24,2022	Nov-22	-8,7	-17%
Average of the absolute deviation values				14	28%
Average of the absolute deviation values - F				10	20%

Amplification phases

Each amplification phase gives rise to at least one war, and on average there is more than one war per amplification phase. The Russian Federation is the country that objectively represents the greatest risk of war, with an average of more than one war per amplification phase.

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Attenuation phases

Nothing to report.

What can we expect in 2025 for the years 2026 to 2041?

If there are no internal developments in Russia, there should be one or two wars in the next phases of amplification, including a European one. The question will also depend on the Putin-Russian Federation relationship.

Thinking on the Putin and Russian Federation context

A "special study" of Russia's behavior and decision-making circuit would be in order. As Russia reacts not to institutions, but to its leaders and a very small circle of power, a special study would be needed to understand how the "Quesako Cycle" can affect its leaders and its country. Other known contexts would require a joint analysis of the behavior of the leaders and the various institutions. In the case of the Putin-Russia context, it's less than a handful of people whose logic and behavior we'd need to understand to get an idea of the possible link between the "Quesako Cycle" and the decision to start and prolong a war.

In other words, the Russian Federation, through its leaders, has a very high apparent sensitivity to this phenomenon: the number of wars is greater during phases of amplification than in other contexts. A "special study" could shed light on the reasons for this sensitivity, which leads to so many wars in this context. This is the absolute record for the 1999-2025 period.

What's needed is a collective organization to take on this "special study". Researchers from all over the world, including Russia, would be very welcome if the study were to be carried out.

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World context

Defining the World Context

These are the major wars, i.e. the most important ones. To date, there is no precise criterion for defining major wars.

Data


It's a well-known fact that putting wars on a world scale means making choices. These choices are bound to be debatable, even if they haven't yet been discussed.

The World context is less significant than others, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is normal: the more wars there are, the more difficult it is to have a meaningful context.

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Deviation Table for the world's major wars 1/2					
Event	Fatalities if < 1000	Evt Date	Peak Date	Deviation months	Deviation %
Russo-Japanese War		Feb 10,1904	Feb-06	-23,9	-47%
World War I		Jul 30,1914	Jul-14	0,0	0%
Japanese agression in Manchuria		Sep 13,1931	Jul-31	2,1	4%
World War II		Sep 3,1939	Dec-39	-3,9	-8%
1947 Indo-Pakistani War		Oct 28,1947	Jun-48	-7,8	-15%
First Arab-Israeli War		May 15,1948	Jun-48	-1,2	-2%
Korean War		Jun 25,1950	Jun-48	24,1	47%
Crisis/Suez War		Oct 29,1956	Dec-56	-1,4	-3%
Direct US intervention and escalation in Vietnam		Dec 1,1964	Jun-65	-6,0	-12%
Biafran War		May 30,1967	Jun-65	23,9	47%
Six-Day War		Jun 5,1967	Jun-65	24,1	47%
Yom Kippur War		Oct 6,1973	Nov-73	-1,5	-3%
Lebanon Civil War		Apr 13,1975	Nov-73	16,7	33%
Soviet Afghanistan War (USSR-Moudjahedin)		Dec 27,1979	May-82	-28,6	-56%

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Deviation Table for the world's major wars 2/2					
Event	Fatalities if < 1000	Evt Date	Peak Date	Deviation months	Deviation %
Iran-Irak War		Sep 23,1980	May-82	-19,7	-39%
Invasion of Kuwait by Irak and Gulf War		Aug 2,1990	Nov-90	-3,1	-6%
Second Congo War (killed + than 4 million)		Aug 1,1998	Apr-99	-8,8	-17%
Kosovo War		Mar 24,1999	Apr-99	-1,1	-2%
Second Afghanistan War (USA - Talibans)		Oct 7,2001	Apr-99	29,5	58%
Second Gulf War		Mar 20,2003	Apr-99	46,8	92%
Russo-Georgian War		Aug 7,2008	Oct-07	9,8	19%
Syrian Civil War		Mar 15,2011	May-14	-38,4	-76%
Donbass War (Ukraine)		Apr 6,2014	May-14	-1,7	-3%
Escalation/Internationalization War in Syria		Jun 5,2014	May-14	0,3	1%
Islamic State (ISIS) War		Jun 5,2014	May-14	0,3	1%
Second Nagorno-Karabakh War		Sep 27,2020	Nov-22	-25,6	-50%
Ethiopia-Tigray war		Nov 4,2020	Nov-22	-24,4	-48%
Russia Ukraine war		Feb 24,2022	Nov-22	-8,7	-17%
Israel-Hamas War		Oct 7,2023	Nov-22	10,7	21%
Average of the absolute deviation values				14	27%

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Amplification phases

The 2 wars in Afghanistan did not start during the amplification phases. It is a characteristic of Afghanistan, both in colonial times and now, to be completely out of the ordinary. Is it due to geography? There is no credible clue as to why the wars in Afghanistan are not affected.

Attenuation phases

No significant attenuation-phase events considered in this context. Several armistices and treaties could have been taken into account, but the number being small, this does not seem significant for a convincing demonstration of the generalized influence of the attenuation phases.

What can we expect in 2025 for the years 2026 to 2041?

Likely, one or more wars will break out during the next phases of amplification.

Thinking on this context

At a world level, it is possible to anticipate the main periods of war risk, especially for the major wars that have marked world history.

From the moment war becomes permanent, as it did after the September 11 attacks in 2001, the multiplication of wars makes the cyclical phenomenon less visible. The same phenomenon was observed during the Napoleonic Wars: permanent warfare makes it impossible to objectively select any one war or battle as indicative of a cyclical phenomenon. It's possible that the cyclical phenomenon can be seen with more precise criteria.

The "World" context will certainly provoke a number of comments calling for it to be revised and probably broken down into several pages. This is one of the least accomplished contexts at present. International bodies such as the UN (and all regional bodies such as the OSCE, the Arab League and ASEAN) should be aware of these contexts and carry out the context exercise in their region.

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India-Pakistan context

Defining the context for the Indo-Pakistani conflict

The context considers all the wars since the creation of India and Pakistan. It is also necessary to add the few periods of tension.

Data

The reference documents taken into account are :

- Indo-Pakistani war^{XIX}
- First Indo-Pakistani War^{XX}
- Second Indo-Pakistani War^{XXI}
- Third Indo-Pakistani War^{XXII}
- Kargil conflict^{XXIII}
- The Indo-Pakistani confrontation of 2001-2002^{XXIV}
- 2019 Indo-Pakistan confrontation.^{XXV}
- The Indo-Pakistan crisis of 2025^{XXVI}

Amplification phase

The absence of war since 2001 does not preclude incidents that appear generally under control. The Crisis of 2025 came very close to a new war.

Attenuation phase

Negotiations in this conflict generally took place in the heat of the moment. Few events indicate the influence of the attenuation phase.

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What can we expect in 2025 for the years 2026 to 2041?

During the next phases of amplification, there could be incidents and tensions, but these are unlikely to lead to a full-scale war.

Thinking on this context

Since Pakistan has had nuclear weapons, there has been virtually no war. Is this a deterrent effect? Or an awareness of conflict?

Given that there has been no major war since 2001, we can consider that the risk of war in the next phases of amplification is reduced and could be limited to periods of tension.

However, the power embodied by India's Modi has very high standards for Hindus and low standards for Muslims. The same applies to Kashmir, which the government would like to see both Indian and Hindu, even though the demographic majority is not Hindu. It was this permanent discrepancy that led to the conclusion, at the end of 2021, that there would be tensions during the amplification phase from 2022 to 2026.

We're going to have to start looking for a real solution for Kashmir. It will be long and complicated, but necessary.

We must continue to monitor this context. It can be used to identify risks of tension and war (with a low to medium probability of war).

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Sudan context

Defining the context for the Sudanese wars

All Sudanese wars are included.


Data

Document: "Sudanese Civil War^{XXVII}", as well as the documents accessible from this document.

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Deviation Table for the Sudanese wars					
Event	Fatalities if < 1000	Evt Date	Peak Date	Deviation months	Deviation %
First Sudanese civil war		Aug 18,1955	Dec-56	-15,8	-31%
Second Sudanese civil war		Jun 15,1983	May-82	13,1	26%
Darfour War or third Sudanese civil war		Feb 28,2003	Apr-99	46,2	91%
Civil War in south Sudan		Dec 15,2013	May-14	-5,4	-11%
Sudanese civil war or fourth Sudanese civil war		Apr 15,2023	Nov-22	4,9	10%
Average of the absolute deviation values				17	34%

Amplification phases

Four wars during amplification phases versus one during attenuation phases.

Attenuation phases

No event considered

What can we expect in 2025 for the years 2026 to 2041?

There is a relatively low probability of war, on the order of 40%.

Thinking on the context of the Sudanese wars

There are so many wars in Africa that it's a little harder to find meaningful contexts. Sudan is a case in point.

Wars are not systematic with every amplification phase: every 2 or 3 amplification phases, there's a war.

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Lebanon context

Defining Lebanon context

It covers all wars in Lebanon. It does not include wars fought by Lebanese militias outside Lebanon (such as Hezbollah in Syria).

Data


Documents used:

- *Lebanon War*^{XXVIII} ;
- *Lebanon War - Larousse*^{XXIX} ;
- *Conflict in Lebanon (2011-2017)*.^{XXX}

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Deviation Table for the wars in Lebanon					
Event	Fatalities if < 1000	Evt Date	Peak Date	Deviation months	Deviation %
1948 Lebanon Crisis		May 15,1958	Dec-56	17,1	34%
2 year War		Apr 13,1975	Nov-73	16,7	33%
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982		Jun 6,1982	May-82	0,8	1%
Mountain War		Sep 3,1983	May-82	15,7	31%
War of liberation against Syria		Sep 15,1988	Nov-90	-25,6	-50%
Israeli-Lebanese war of 2006		Jul 12,2006	Oct-07	-15,1	-30%
Hezbollah-Israel War following Gaza War		Oct 8,2023	Nov-22	10,7	21%
Average of the absolute deviation values				15	29%

Amplification phases

All wars are in the amplification phase, but not all amplification phases lead to war.

Attenuation phases

The main ceasefire or agreement events are represented: no negotiations or agreements during the attenuation phases. In other words, the attenuation phase had no visible impact other than the absence of war, without having fostered the slightest agreement.

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What can we expect in 2025 for the years 2026 to 2041?

The latest wars in Lebanon are directly linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Much will depend on the regional evolution of this conflict.

Thinking on the Lebanon context

This context remains to be seen, even if there is no systematic war.

67% of amplification phases result in wars breaking out during these phases. The periods of war risk are well known, and have been confirmed by recent wars.

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Template for defining a new context


In the model that follows, the "intermediate" dates have been indicated, so that everyone can position the events in the right place. They have not been kept in the contexts presented, to avoid overloading the graph. Only recent or forthcoming intermediate dates have been indicated in the various contexts presented. This gives an idea of upcoming risk periods.

For context to be meaningful, there must be enough wars identified in the context, and there must be a clear difference between amplification and attenuation phases. For example, making a context on wars in the Limited World between 2001 and 2012 would lead to more wars breaking out during the attenuation phases than during the amplification phases, and that's not significant. This is often the case when there are many wars, or when political and security instability leads to a multiplication of incidents (Africa, for example). So, there can be contexts that are not significant. When they are significant, they are an invaluable aid for identifying war risks and making forecasts by adding a geopolitical analysis that has not been included in this version of the contexts presented.

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Summary of all contexts

	Conflict Arab-Israeli	Europe	Russia	World	India-Pakistan	Sudan	Lebanon
First amplification phase	1948	1914	1990	1906	1948	1956	1956
Number of amplification phases up to 2025	10	14	5	15	10	9	9
Number of wars during amplification phases	10	8	8	24	5	4	7
Number of wars during mitigation phases	1	1	1	4	1	1	0
% of wars during amplification phases	91%	89 %	89 %	86 %	83 %	80 %	100 %
% of amplification phases with at least one war	90 %	57 %	100 %	93 %	50 %	44 %	67 %
Is it possible to forecast the risk of war?	YES	YES	YES	partial	partial	partial	partial

The essential information on the contexts examined in this document is summarized in the table above.

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This summary is important for those who think globally and want to have an initial idea of the existing risks of war.

Everyone can define contexts other than those defined here and draw conclusions other than those presented here. This study does not claim to cover all the conflicts on Earth, but we can already identify risks of war in the next phase of amplification, i.e. 2029 to 2033.

Other elements, such as the US/China relationship, should be considered to assess the full risk of war in the future. For the time being, this risk cannot be assessed in context, due to the lack of a history of war between these two players. Today, it seems highly likely that in the next two phases of amplification, there will be a war involving China and the USA.

What can we conclude about the CONTEXT section?

The context provides a clearer picture of the effect of the "Quesako Cycle" on recurring conflicts. They give an initial indication of future periods of war risk.

Contexts are the simple, visual way to understand the effects of the "Quesako cycle".

Context analysis is a prerequisite for any conflict analysis, enabling us to predict the risks of future wars.

Given the contexts presented, can we totally deny this periodic phenomenon? I don't think so, but are we still capable of reacting with reason to such passionate subjects as wars? Experience has shown, during presentations, that some people have immutable ideas about wars, and that they don't read or listen to anything that doesn't fit in with their ideas. Reason and common sense have little hold on passionate reactions to war.

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MATERIALIZATION of the "Quesako Cycle"

If you've understood the "World" context and wanted to find an argument against the effect of the "Quesako Cycle", the 2003 US war against Iraq is one you could use. This war began close to an attenuation peak, and apparently contradicts the assertion that wars are favored by the "Quesako Cycle", if we take the date of war outbreak as the sole criterion. The same applies to the war in Syria, which broke out in 2011, close to an attenuation peak.

The cases of Iraq and Syria will be used in this Materialization section to show that the "Quesako cycle" does indeed influence wars that started during the attenuation phases. This phenomenon is not visible on CONTEXT and requires us to view this cyclical phenomenon from another, complementary angle, which provides other, equally useful information.

Having begun this reflection with the cases of Iraq and Syria, we will turn to the available UCDP data, which supports this disturbing hypothesis.

Iraq: WikiLeaks' precious data


In 2010, following the publication of U.S. military reports by WikiLeaks, the newspaper *Le Monde*, dated Sunday 24-Monday 25 October 2010, published a graph clearly showing a peak in war casualties at the end of 2006. Prior to the publication of this graph, it was accepted that the peak of violence in Iraq was more likely to be in 2007, and the figures put forward were extremely variable depending on the source. Careful analysis of the reports revealed by WikiLeaks has made it possible to measure actual violence in Iraq from 2004 to 2009. The measure is the number of victims (dead and wounded). The

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source of the original graph published in *Le Monde* is "THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM". According to US Army reports published by WikiLeaks, there were 110,000 deaths between 2004 and 2009. The following graph (*the shape of which has been reworked for insertion in this document*) shows the distribution of these casualties over time (dead and wounded). This is a reliable measure of the violence in Iraq during this period, based on reports, unlike many other estimates which were based on a few surveys extrapolated by statistical methods according to very different assumptions from one source to another.



Curve showing the number of dead and wounded (vertical axis) versus time (horizontal axis), based on US army reports obtained by WikiLeaks.


This curve is based on 400,000 military reports provided by WikiLeaks and exploited by the media.

Knowing that the amplification peak of the "Quesako Cycle" is in 2007 and that the next is in 2014, an expert on the cycle can place the amplification peaks of 2007 and 2014 on this graph. We can see that the amplification peak is just a few months after the peak in casualties from the civil war that followed the Iraq war in 2003, as if there were a correlation between the "Quesako Cycle" and the number of victims.

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Has the "Quesako cycle" materialized?

NO. We see a half-period of the "Quesako Cycle" and a peak that is about 9 months behind the theoretical peak of October 2007. It's a simple coincidence that gives an apparent materialization of an amplification peak, but it's not enough to visualize the "Quesako Cycle". At this stage, it's more an intuition than a demonstration, but no research succeeds without a minimum of tenacity, starting from a hypothesis that initially appears dubious. At the very least, a complete cycle (8 and a half years) would be required. Two cycles (17 years) would give weight to what is, at this stage, only a hypothesis. It's a good start, but we'll need something else to visualize/materialize the "Quesako cycle".

What would anyone familiar with the "Quesako Cycle" have concluded before 2014?


They could have concluded that the departure of the Americans from Iraq in 2011 took place in the calmest period. If this materialization is indeed that of the "Quesako Cycle", in the amplification phase that follows (2012 to 2016), we will see a component of internal violence/civil war in Iraq regain momentum until 2014, and then a further decline in this violence/civil war. The Americans left Iraq believing that the job was done and finished. If they had known about this phenomenon, they could have understood what was going to happen.

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Iraq: From 2012 to 2015




What we see from 2012 to 2015: Since 2012, there has indeed been an upturn in violence (dotted line), which may confirm that the cycle identified by WikiLeaks is indeed the materialization of the "Quesako Cycle". The media gradually spoke of a resumption of attacks, then at the end of 2013, spoke of a level of violence similar to that of 2008/2007, and then, this new war in Iraq against Daesh blew up all the counters. Unfortunately, trends can't be measured as accurately as with US military reports. We have the impression that there is such a trend, based on all the information that comes in, but without being able to demonstrate it with a curve calculated from real facts.

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Iraq: 2016



What we're seeing in 2016: The conflict in Iraq is losing its intensity. The Islamic State's retreat is leading to a gradual recapture of the territories initially conquered in 2014. Their action will probably continue in the classic forms of attacks, but with what appears to be less intensity. It remains to find a measure, or reliable estimates, to complete these elements. This is the first time that the cycle could be materialized by thousands of measurement points over a period of more than 10 years. Half of the work is based on hundreds of thousands of US Army reports. However, there is a small loophole: since WikiLeaks, there is no longer any data available through the Americans. If the first part of the curve from 2004 to 2009 is not questionable, the extrapolation from 2014 to 2016 is not demonstrated. We have an impression and a sense of a possible conclusion, but no certainty.

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
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Iraq: "Iraqbodycount.org" discovered

In March 2017, this study discovered the "Iraqbodycount.org" website. This site provides data on the number of civilian deaths in Iraq. A group of British and American opponents of the 2003 Iraq war have documented and recorded violent deaths from 2003 to 2022, so that everyone remembers the consequences of this war.

The following graph is a copy of the graph available on the "Iraqbodycount.org" website (<https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/>) dated January 20, 2022, to which the amplification and attenuation peaks of the "Quesako Cycle" have been added.



Using the data available on the "Iraqbodycount.org" website, the WikiLeaks data is confirmed, but more importantly, it has confirmed the 2012-2017 period for which there was no data available from the US military. Materialization/Credible visualization: a troubling

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coincidence. These data collected by the "Iraqbodycount.org" actors are the only existing and credible ones over such a long **period (two complete periods of the "Quesako Cycle")**.

Iraq: What can we conclude about the visualization/materialization of the "Quesako Cycle"?

The principle of materializing/visualizing the "Quesako Cycle" seems credible, first with US Army data *via* WikiLeaks, then using data from "Iraqbodycount.org".

- Hundreds of thousands of reports were used to draw these curves,
 - We have two documented sources that converge over the first period (2003-2011), then a single one over the period 2011-2022,
 - What's not to like about this "Quesako cycle" visualization? At this stage, it's the beginning of proof, insofar as other cases will be needed to convince us that it's not just a coincidence. The two successive data amplification peaks (Iraq) show a similar time offset (9 months to a year). The "observed template" is therefore a few months behind the "theoretical template". This is not surprising, given that the cyclical phenomenon is not a perfect sinusoid, but probably an imperfect sinusoid that shifts a little at each peak, in one direction or the other. We'd need to know the origin of the phenomenon to be able to make the necessary corrections.

In 2014, there is a sharp spike that seems to correspond to the peak offset observed both in the outbreak of wars and on the Syria graph shown on the following page.

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Syria: Visualization of a period in the "Quesako" cycle

(The following text and table were taken from Wikipedia in French)


"The following figures have all been compiled by SOHR (The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), which is considered an authoritative source on the subject. The figures refer only to documented deaths, while SOHR estimates that a further 100,000 undocumented deaths have occurred in addition. These figures include not only civilians, but all combatants on both sides".

Time period	Pro-government forces	Anti-government forces	Civilians	Grand total (inc. unidentified)
2011	3 138	619	3 968	7 841
2012	18 928	9 746	19 924	49 361
2013	30 269	18 914	22 806	73 929
2014	25 106	32 803	18 038	76 268
2015	17 668	23 601	13 021	54 574
2016	14 771	23 431	141	52 589
2017	10 771	14 064	13 369	34 700
2018	4 522	8 663	6 776	20 130
2019	2 968	4 727	3 488	11 244
2020	2 585	2 693	1 528	6 817
2021	1 069	1 238	1 558	3 882
Total	131 795	140 499	118 576	391 335

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As the war was not as long as the one in Iraq, the data covers only one period of the "Quesako Cycle", but there are similar data.

What do the Iraq & Syria data tell us about the "Quesako cycle"?

The data available on the war in Syria is a little less precise, but it does confirm the findings for the war in Iraq, which began in 2003. This is very important, since if we were to base ourselves solely on the dates on which the wars were launched, these two wars (Iraq and Syria) contradict the "Quesako cycle", since they broke out close to a peak of attenuation. Showing that phases of amplification influence the course of war is very difficult using CONTEXT alone. But curves based on tens or hundreds of thousands of reports give the impression that the "Quesako Cycle" influences the course of the war and its victims. While

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
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in the case of war starting dates alone, we can imagine that only leaders are sensitive to this phenomenon, with such curves, we see an effect on all combatants and armed forces involved.

UCDP data

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) data became available in 2023 (see *Appendix 4: Review of UCDP data*, page 117).

This graph of war fatalities in state-based conflicts is taken from the annual publication by the UCDP team. This team records the number of war deaths and consolidates regional results at global level in this graph, as published in 2024.





Amplification peaks are added to the following graph and to the UCDP graph.

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Of the 5 amplification peaks representing the scope of the UCDP program, 4 are directly linked to periods when the number of war

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fatalities is higher, as if there were a correlation between the "Quesako Cycle" and the number of war casualties. The amplification phases of the cycle coincide with peaks in the number of war casualties.

On the 2007 amplification peak, it's not significant if we stick to the UCDP graph, whereas the idea of materializing the "Quesako Cycle" began on the 2007 peak, with the help of WikiLeaks data. We might therefore expect to see a larger number of deaths due to the war in Iraq on this peak. Why don't they appear on the UCDP graph of state wars? In conversation with some members of the UCDP team, it seems that the team has not found exactly the data expected, according to the UCDP definitions. It's a question of definition. Iraqbodycount recorded all "violent deaths", whereas UCDP only wants to see war-related deaths. "Violent deaths" contain more deaths than those due to war. What's more, WikiLeaks has mixed up the dead and wounded to total up war casualties. Surely, we could come to an arrangement and admit that a corrective factor could be applied. The UCDP team's practice is also to reconsider certain eras, considering all available data. While a review of these data for Iraq was planned, it did not take place, given the workload generated by the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. So, it's not impossible that one day, the UCDP team will rectify the data taken into account for Iraq, which would make the 5th peak of 2007 as significant as the others. The deaths counted by Iraqbodycount should be somewhere and not nowhere, as is the case today in the data that has been published in recent years.

Extrapolation of UCDP data for the period not covered by UCDP work (i.e. before 1989) cannot be made at this time. History has shown, particularly in the case of the Iraq war, that estimates of the number of deaths, when not seriously measured as was the case for Iraqbodycount or UCDP, are imprecise, not to say often wrong. We must therefore be wary of extrapolating too hastily from periods when no measurements have been made. It will have to be done, but we must avoid rushing into things or taking unverified and unreliable estimates at face value. In other words, UCDP data and work are, for the moment, the only known and credible data to confirm the materialization of the "Quesako cycle" other than through a few scattered cases (Iraq, Syria, world wars...). Nor should we forget Iraqbodycount, which has done important fieldwork, even if the definitions used are not those of UCDP.

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In the final version of this book, an appendix is devoted to the UCDP work (see **Appendix 4: Review of UCDP data**, page 117). This is important for an overall understanding of the "Quesako Cycle", as well as the work carried out by UCDP, which is partially reusable for this study.

The UCDP work must be continued and developed:

- Identify the periods of amplification from 1900 to 1989 when the number of deaths is at its highest (for example, the two World Wars, which confirm this phenomenon of Materialization), in order to provide arguments for a generalization of Materialization.
- Ensure that data can be processed by month and not by year, in order to have curves equivalent to those of Iraqbodycount.
- Verify the sustainability and possible restructuring of UCDP activities. MATERIALIZATION will only be confirmed with additional data on other phases of amplification and customized exploitation of existing data.

Conclusion MATERIALIZATION of the "Quesako Cycle"

The case of the Iraq war made it possible to start materializing what looks like the "Quesako cycle" effect, using data available from the US military *via* WikiLeaks. This materialization was confirmed by "Iraqbodycount.org", which showed the effect over 2 successive periods: 2 phases of amplification and 2 phases of attenuation.

The case of the war in Syria has confirmed some of these elements, based on data available from SOHR.

It was the beginning of proof that needed to be confirmed with other cases.

A closer look at the UCDP's work has brought further confirmation of the "Quesako cycle" materialization principle.

The "Quesako Cycle" wasn't discovered thanks to the UCDP work, but the UCDP work gives the "Quesako Cycle" real credibility, if you're willing to take the trouble to do the necessary analysis and contradictory debate to make sure everyone's talking about the same thing.

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There's no better scientific proof to demonstrate a cyclical phenomenon than to rely on existing work, deemed incontrovertible and unavoidable, such as that of the UCDP program.

MATERIALIZATION is a fundamental issue, no matter how difficult it may be to put across.

The conclusion in 2025 is that there is a very strong coincidence allowing us to rely on 4 phases of amplification documented by UCDP and a 5th phase that is documented with WikiLeaks and Iraqbodycount data that have not yet been incorporated into the UCDP data.


Despite these 5 coincidences, it will take a long time to come to terms with this MATERIALIZATION, with its unexpected results compared to current knowledge.

What's more, there's currently no parameter to explain the intensity of the phenomenon. We could imagine the "Quesako Cycle" varying in intensity and resembling the graph below, justifying the reality of the wars of the 2022-2024 period, which were particularly violent in the case of the war in Ukraine by Russia, as well as the war in Gaza on the part of both Hamas and Israel. This is not to legitimize one war over another, but the observation of these wars suggests an unknown intensity factor that might explain the outburst of violence during certain phases of amplification (such as the 2 World Wars and the 2022-2024 amplification phase). This is only an unproven hypothesis for the intensity factor.

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Modeling

Let's take stock of what we've seen so far:

- Statistics of all wars, based on a validated list of wars, provides an initial argument for the existence of the "Quesako Cycle". 60% of wars break out during amplification phases. This is not absolute determinism, but a phenomenon that favors wars at certain periods.

- Contexts selected from recurring conflicts in different geographical areas provide evidence for the existence of an unexplained cyclical phenomenon, based on the dates of the outbreak of war.

- Two cases of wars call into question the existence of a "Quesako Cycle", because the date of their outbreak is close to the attenuation peaks, namely the Iraq war of 2003 and the Syrian war of 2011; these wars become a pillar of the existence of a cyclical phenomenon by materializing in thousands of dots what looks like the "Quesako Cycle" ; as if a war unleashed at the most unlikely moment during a phase of attenuation provoked an escalation measurable by the number of war victims at the time of the next phase of amplification, confirming an "amplification effect".

We have elements that may seem contradictory. Can we bring them together with a coherent explanation?

To understand how the "cyclic phenomenon" works, we need to keep in mind two phenomena:

- Phenomenon A - a "cyclical phenomenon" that amplifies or attenuates tensions.
- Phenomenon B - The outbreak of war.

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- And finally, the combination of these two phenomena.


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Phenomenon A - a cyclic phenomenon that amplifies or attenuates tensions

There are periods when violence is amplified and others when it is attenuated. The transition from one to the other is gradual. This is the "Quesako Cycle".



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Phenomenon B - The outbreak of war

War is caused by a combination of causes, not by a single one.


Polemology (in the journals of the Institute of Polemology^{XXXI} in the 70s) has distinguished mainly 3 levels of causes:

- Structural causes correspond to permanent causes (religious, cultural, institutional differences, etc.).
- Conjunctural causes correspond to the succession of events that precede war without being its immediate cause.
- And the immediate cause, i.e. the event that triggered the outbreak of war.

The causes accumulate and may exceed a **war threshold**^{XXXII}.

War will only break out if the accumulation of causes exceeds a threshold known as the "war triggering threshold". This notion is considered fundamental.

Beyond this threshold, war begins. The accumulation of tensions culminates in an incident or action that marks the beginning of war.



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
Combination of phenomena A and B on an amplification peak

Case 1: Cases where the accumulation of causes is slightly below the war triggering threshold

In this case, the "cyclical phenomenon", during a phase of amplification, acts as an additional cause that will push over the threshold triggering war, transforming permanent tension into war.

This explains the choice of contexts, and why they also allow us to make a few forecasts.

By focusing on recurring conflicts (e.g. the Arab-Israeli conflict), which always give the impression of being on the brink of war without entering it, we can forecast the wars likely to occur in the next phases of amplification.



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
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Case 2: Cases where the combination of cyclical and structural causes is well below the war triggering threshold

In this case, the "cyclical phenomenon", during a phase of amplification, acts as an additional cause, but there is no war because the threshold for triggering war has not been reached.

This also allows us to imagine ways of acting, i.e. to act on the causes identified to avoid crossing the threshold for starting a war. Since we do not know the origin of the cyclical phenomenon, we cannot act on the cyclical phenomenon cause. Only known causes can be mitigated. Classic, vigorous negotiations should reduce tensions and the risks of war. If they are conducted before the next phase of amplification, we can hope to avoid a war considered probable, since even with the amplification caused by the "cyclical phenomenon", the threshold for triggering a war will not be reached.



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Case 3: Cases where the accumulation of causes is well above the threshold triggering war, even before the amplification phase.


In this case, there is already a war before the amplification phase. There is no new war, since it has already begun. The period of amplification can lead to visible "over-violence" through military escalation (local, regional, international) or new violence. Several examples illustrate this point:

- In early 1964, the bombings in Vietnam marked a military escalation in the amplification phase. The war had officially been going on for some time, but the real escalation occurred during this amplification phase.
- The war in Iraq began in 2003, at a time of peak attenuation. The American victory was followed by an Iraqi civil war, which coincides well with the amplification phase. See **MATERIALIZATION of the "Quesako Cycle" "**, pages 73 and following. This internal Iraqi violence increased to approach the amplification peak and then steadily declined, gradually picking up again with the next amplification phase and the war against the Islamic State.
- The war in Syria began in 2011 during an attenuation phase, there was an escalation and internationalization of the war that began in 2014, during the amplification phase, and continued before the Islamic State's ebb began. This escalation of the conflict around 2014 corresponded to an amplification phase of the "Quesako Cycle".

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Is the "Quesako Cycle" a cause of war?

The best way to describe the "Quesako cycle" effect is to speak of a drop of water that breaks the camel's back.

If we think again on the various CONTEXTS presented, we see that the wars of the Arab-Israeli conflict were all triggered during a period of amplification. Only a mere drop? At the very least, a very big drop. But realistically, the "Quesako Cycle" becomes one of the many causes of war.

What difference does it make to consider the "Quesako Cycle" as a cause of war? It's just common sense for those who see a growing body of evidence on the "Quesako Cycle" and simply draw a conclusion: it's a new cause of war to be considered alongside all the other causes.

How important is this cause compared to others? It's hard to say today. In view of all the CONTEXT, it must represent between 20 and 40% of all cumulative causes. Remember that there is never a single cause of war, but a series of causes that lead to war. The "Quesako Cycle" will never be THE cause but will be one cause among others. Some will minimize it, others will magnify it.

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Measuring the relative importance of the causes is a (titanic) task that remains to be done.

It's a cause of war during the amplification phase. But it is not a cause of peace.

Conclusion Modeling

This explanation is consistent with the seemingly contradictory results. We can speak of modeling the effect of the "Quesako Cycle".

This model does not explain the origin of the "Quesako Cycle", but it does provide a simple explanation that makes it easier to understand the phenomenon.

Modeling logically leads us to consider the "Quesako Cycle" as one of the causes of war, in its amplification phase.

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Forecasts

Once a cycle has been identified, it is possible to forecast war risks based on knowledge of the identified "Cycle". Making forecasts that are confirmed is part of an indirect demonstration of the "Quesako cycle". As indicated by the referenced authors (*see **Reference authors** , page 7*), Quincy Wright would have considered that confirmed forecasts, based on an "identified cyclical phenomenon", can be considered as a confirmation of the "cyclical phenomenon". It's also the beginning of proof towards demonstrating the existence of the "Quesako Cycle" in relation to wars.

War risk forecasts

More than 20 years' experience in forecasting this periodic phenomenon

For over 20 years, the risks of war have been known for Europe and the Arab-Israeli conflict in the next phase of amplification. War risks have turned into war every time, because no one has believed in and considered war risks to ensure that potential wars don't happen.

Does believing in forecasts mean we accept "determinism"? NO, but it simply indicates a predictive trend that can be disproved, if we take action to prevent this war from taking place.

Up until now, no one has taken any preventive diplomatic action to avoid the wars taking place. The forecasts were not considered either before or after the wars, as if we weren't capable of learning from them.

Given over 20 years' experience of the "Quesako Cycle" and its effects, it's possible to repeat a similar analysis for the next amplification phase, from 2029 to 2033. Hopefully, things can change to minimize the risk of war in the future.

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Forecasts are not made to come true, but to prevent them by acting before they happen. But there is no action to match the stakes. The fatalist is not the one who makes accurate forecasts, but the one who refuses to act in the face of what is predictable.

For the risks of future war to be taken seriously, the "Quesako cycle" will first have to be known and recognized.

The logic and rules of war risk forecasting

What have we learned that we can use for forecasting?

1. First, the **CONTEXTS** (*see page26 and following*): it provides invaluable information. If we have a war at every amplification phase (at least since 1990), there's a good chance of a new one. Today, it's "**war risk forecasting**". With less than three years to go before the start of the amplification phase, we'll turn it into a "**war forecast**".

2. Based on **MODELING** (*see page88 and following*), we can define a few rules for forecasting the risk of war.

- Rule A1: According to **CAS 1** Modeling, the contexts show that in recurring conflicts, there is a probability of war during the amplification phase. Since the duration of an amplification phase is a little more than 4 years, we can say that there is a high probability of war during the year preceding and the year following the amplification peak, and a slightly lower probability during the other years of the amplification phase.

- Rule A2: According to **CAS 3** of Modeling, when a war has begun before the amplification phase, there may be an escalation (or a new war within the war).

- Rule A3: If a new conflict emerges during the amplification phase, it can turn into a new war, even if it doesn't correspond to an already-identified recurring conflict.

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Forecasts for the period 2022-2026 - made before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022

"... There will probably be new wars in the existing recurrent conflicts (see charts):

- A new round of the Israeli-Arab war (as per rule A1) or an Israeli-Iranian variant (*see Appendix 5: Analysis of the Israeli-Arab context in late 2021*, page 127)
- A new European war (according to rule A1) (*see Appendix 6: European context at the end of 2021*, page 129)
 - An episode of tension between India and Pakistan (as per rule A1) or between India and China
 - Rule A2 could apply to the war in Ethiopia, which began during the mitigation phase and could degenerate regionally if not resolved before 2023.

As well as other new wars:

- One or more wars other than the previous ones (as per rule A3)
- Chinese nationalism could cause a few sparks to fly, but not necessarily a new war. A possible USA-China showdown?

And the possible extension of existing wars

- Ukraine, Yemen are candidates for further escalation... "

Relevance of the forecast made before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war.

- There was a war in Europe as an extension of the existing war in Ukraine.
- There was a Hamas-Israel war on October 7, 2023.
- In April 2025, an episode of Indo-Pakistani tension that could degenerate into war.
- There were also a few sparks of Chinese nationalism.

Overall, the forecast made sense and was confirmed in its broad outlines.

Don't forget that there are two levels in forecasting:

- *The overall level, corresponding to the box above;*
- *A detailed geopolitical analysis is provided in the following two appendices:*

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- *Appendix 5: Analysis of the Israeli-Arab context in late 2021 , page 127*
- *Appendix 6: European context at the end of 2021 , page 129*

Only the detailed level of the two appendices can help you understand how detailed forecasts can be made. This detailed level can only be precisely defined 1 to 3 years before the start of the amplification phase.

Forecasts for 2025-2029

This period is known as the attenuation phase.

In Europe, it's a good time for a war to end, whether through victory or a negotiated peace.

In the Arab-Israeli conflict, this is the period when there may be a diplomatic breakthrough, even if this breakthrough will not prevent a new war during the next phase of amplification, unless the settlement is fair and agreed by all parties. The most likely time for a new agreement will be between 2026 and 2028. 2025 will probably be a year of aborted projects.

War risk forecasts for the period 2029-2033

- **Europe:** According to Rule A1 - There is a risk of a new war on European soil. All wars in Europe since 1990 have been with a country of the former socialist perimeter (USSR or Yugoslavia), and since 2008, with a direct or indirect Russian component. If the end of the Ukraine-Russia war were to end with a Ukrainian capitulation or with an agreement concretizing Russian military advances, then the new war would be another Russian attempt to extend its perimeter. Another risk would be the disintegration of Europe. The way to avoid this future war would be to find a more balanced Europe-Russia relationship and get away from this desire to vassalize our adversary. We can live in peace without being vassals (in either sense). Today's Russia believes only in the possibility of imposing a balance of power, and will only accept an agreement if, temporarily, Russia makes this balance of power a reality. The risk of war will be greatest + or - one year from the amplification peak, i.e. in the period 2030 to 2032.

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- **Arab-Israeli conflict:** Rule A1 - The risk is always there, unless there is a credible settlement. The Abrahamic Accords will not protect Israel from another war. The impasse of any negotiated solution leading to a settlement of this conflict will probably provoke a new war, unless there is a fair settlement accepted by all parties. The risk of war will be greatest + or - one year from the amplification peak, i.e. in the period 2030 to 2032.

- **China-USA:** Following Rule A1 - China is building a military empire that can and will rival any other power. China's shady nationalism will cause sparks and perhaps more in the two phases of amplification to come. There has been no definite CONTEXT for China, but this coming conflict could eclipse all others. The United States cannot stand the idea of another country being superior to it. The example of the Hong Kong takeover is a repulse for any political or diplomatic solution in Taiwan. China must open negotiations with Taiwan as soon as possible. This will take several years.

- **Africa:** It's difficult to predict which wars will take place in Africa. UCDP data on the number of deaths due to war show that Africans are heavily involved in war mortality, even if it is difficult to identify wars in advance. *We'll have to take stock in 2028 to be more precise and assess the real risks of war.*

- **Other wars:** There will probably be one or other wars linked to this 2029-2033 amplification phase. *We'll have to take stock in 2028 to be more precise and assess the real risks of war.*

Conclusion Forecasts

Over the years, forecasts have been made and confirmed.

War risk forecasts for the next amplification period from 2029 to 2033 are shown. It's a rational construction that applies a few rules derived from the whole study of the "Quesako Cycle" and wars. The forecasts will only be taken seriously when the "Quesako Cycle" and its effect on wars are recognized.

While the "Quesako cycle" indicates the most likely period for the outbreak of new wars, the geopolitical analysis that can be made allows us to be more precise.

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Conclusions and outlook

This study on the "Quesako Cycle" and wars partially demonstrates the existence of a cycle and its effects:

- **Calculation and recalibration:** The calculation shows that in the 3,095-day cycle (8 years 5 months and 20 days), 60% of wars break out during the amplification phases, based on a list of wars with more than 5,000 deaths, taken from the COW V4 list, supplemented by wars from 2008 to 2024. 60% is a credible starting point, and shows that we are not in a fatalistic, deterministic process.

- **Contexts linked to contemporary wars:** The contexts presented need to be carefully looked at and analyzed to see that the "Quesako Cycle" is indeed linked to wars. Can we consider these contexts as a partial demonstration of the effect of the "Quesako Cycle"? At the very least, there are coincidences between the "Quesako Cycle" and wars in the contexts presented. Over 80% coincidence in 7 contexts: is this just another coincidence or a certainty?

- **Materialization of the cycle,** introducing a relationship between this cycle and the number of victims of wars. This part is probably one of the most difficult to consider as a confirmation of the "Quesako Cycle". It amounts to asserting that the "Quesako Cycle" probably has such an influence on human beings that it would explain, in part, the variations in the number of war deaths. This point is based on solid data outside the author's control but will require time and new data to be accepted. The problem lies not so much with the data presented as with the very principle of a link between a periodic phenomenon and the number of war deaths. What seems important is that the principle of MATERIALIZATION imagined on reading the WikiLeaks data has been confirmed by the UCDP data.

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- **Modeling** the cycle in relation to the outbreak of war. Even if we don't yet know where this cycle comes from or how it works, the modeling presented here enables us to transform apparent inconsistencies into a model of understanding. This model is indispensable for those wishing to identify future war risks.

Modeling cannot be considered as a demonstration of the "Quesako Cycle", but it can be an aid to understanding the effect of the "Quesako Cycle".

- **War risk forecasts.** Can the forecasts made be considered as partial demonstration? YES.

To summarize, 4 elements are presented as partial demonstrations: CALCULATION, CONTEXT, MATERIALIZATION, FORECASTS.

Is the glass half full or half empty? For some, it's half full. For others, it's half empty. That conclusions differ today is normal. It's a difficult subject that nobody expected. The only "rational" discussion is a difficult one. Any war provokes both a reaction of flight on the part of those who don't want war, and a refusal to see anything other than one's own opinions. If the presentation is based on facts and logic linked to these facts, it's not enough to convince certain players.

This book approaches warfare from a "polemologically neutral" angle, i.e. without taking sides in the conflict and refusing to debate the justification for war. The "Quesako cycle" demonstration does not claim to justify the arguments of one side or the other but aims to present the phenomenon in the same way for both sides. Both sides are victims of this phenomenon, which they will remain unaware of until their mutual victimhood is recognized.

This non-partisan stance does not rule out identifying those parties who may be more sensitive to this phenomenon, to the point of starting a war as an aggressor or reacting disproportionately.

Are these elements sufficient proof? YES and NO.

NO, because it's not a single individual who determines what's true or not in science. Demonstrations presented by one author must be confirmed by others through a process of review and debate. Even if the partial demonstrations appear to be right, others than the author will have to give their opinion.

NO, because nothing in our current science allows us to imagine how such an influence is possible. Just because we haven't yet explained

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such a phenomenon influencing humans doesn't mean it doesn't exist. We're just seeing, and trying to share it with all those who want to understand rationally in a world based on the search for truth.

YES, because it's a complete tour of the subject, from different angles. It would be difficult to reject everything out of hand, even if it is difficult to accept everything.

The first step is to share, discuss, and deepen what has been done. A few presentations over the years have shown that the subject of a cyclical phenomenon influencing wars is a highly inflammable one. Reason sometimes has less hold than feelings, given what the term "War" connotes.

Forcing a conclusion, after having presented all the elements, will not advance the subject. We must dare to let all opinions be expressed, in the hope that reason will eventually prevail. We are faced with a periodic phenomenon that can have a lasting impact on what we think we know about war and peace. We must be willing to communicate on the subject and present the few foundations we have discovered, even if they are only partial.

Here are some of the questions you're bound to be asked:

- **What is the origin of this cyclical phenomenon?** *Only a global, interdisciplinary debate will enable us to make progress on this issue. There are many hypotheses in all fields, but none has been studied and shared enough to come up with a credible answer.*

- **Is the intensity of wars linked to this phenomenon?** *The wars of the 2022-2025 period were comparable in horror to the worst wars, whether in Ukraine or Gaza. Does this have anything to do with the "Quesako Cycle"? Likely, we'll have to wait for an explanation of the origin of the phenomenon before we can answer that question.*

- **Can war and peace players agree on the "Quesako cycle"?** *First, they'd have to know about it and do something about it.*

- **Why does the "Quesako Cycle" have so much influence on wars and so little on peace?** *When war breaks out, there is a compelling need that immediately expresses itself in war. When a protagonist thinks about peace, it's not out of enthusiasm, but rather out of necessity, and it takes a long time. Even if there is a trend towards de-escalation or peace, it doesn't have much immediate impact. Action on war is possible. Measuring peace is difficult: there are too few peace events to draw measurable conclusions.*

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- **Does the "Quesako Cycle" also encourage violence at certain times?** *Probably, but we need to be able to carry out statistical studies over very long periods. Do we have enough reliable data? Can data from one era be compared with data from another?*

- **How can this phenomenon affect our understanding of wars? Are we fighting these wars because there is such a cycle? Are we the playthings of a phenomenon that is now unconscious?** *It's too early to say. It's not even certain that this study will ever be sufficiently well known for there to be a meaningful adversarial debate.*

- **Will it have any influence to recognize such a cycle?** *It certainly will. It may even distort the reality of war. The protagonists might even try to start wars at the most unlikely moments, to make it clear that they are not the unwitting playthings. Assuming that the "Quesako Cycle" is recognized worldwide, leaders may become aware of their behavior due to this reality and may change their strategy and justification for war. This is just one hypothesis to be tested in current conflicts. Public opinion could also have an indirect influence if it could point the finger at those who indulge in unabashed influence or refusal of the "Quesako Cycle".*

- **Does it make any difference to a country's military defense?** *NO, IT DOESN'T. It's a new and partial cause for which we know no antidote. The defensive aspect of an army should be increased. We find ourselves in a situation where adversaries can "lose their heads". Whatever their idea, you must hold on without giving the attack any chance of succeeding. This may have consequences for basic military strategies and equipment: given that anyone can fall prey to the "Quesako cycle" and start a war, the defense system must be strengthened to enable an effective defensive system: whether by sea, air, or land, no foreign army should be able to cross the defense lines. Even if this is an ambitious goal, it must be clearly defined.*

- **How can we avoid or put an end to a war for which we know there is a "Quesako" effect?** *See the MODELING section. It is possible to play on causes other than the "Quesako Cycle". In 2010, applying the principles of the MODELING part and to avoid the 2014-2017 round of wars, a manuscript entitled "Will Jerusalem Know Lasting Peace?" was written by Naej Draner, who is the pseudonym used for all experimental politics. It has been updated several times. The latest version dates from 2020, but no version of*

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this text has been used in any attempt to find a settlement to this conflict. This manuscript was the only attempt to apply the principles defined in the "Quesako" study to try and find a settlement. Attempts to find a method of neutralizing the effect of the "Quesako Cycle" have failed. Israelis and Palestinians should consider that they are both victims of the "Quesako Cycle" and try to unite to overcome its devastating effects. Further research may be needed to find and implement an effective method of resolving the conflicts and wars exacerbated by the effects of the "Quesako Cycle".

These are the perspectives that will emerge should this book provoke astonishment and debate to the point where the "Quesako Cycle" moves from an idea, which may initially seem surprising, of one author to a discussed and recognized reality.

There is a lot to be done and written on the subject. This book has limited itself to what is factual and solid, pointing out only a few additional avenues that seem interesting, but also ignoring what adds nothing to the subject. The important thing today is to make available the elements for all those concerned by wars. Public opinion could push leaders to consider and integrate the "Quesako Cycle". We need to open a debate, without knowing when it will lead to a shared conclusion.

Of course, there will be misinformation and intoxication. We are not in the world of outrageous verbal one-upmanship, as some leaders are so fond of, but in the world of thinking driven by solid common sense, whatever the disruption caused by a cycle that nobody expected and that some will be quick to try to demolish definitively on the basis of arguments that will probably have nothing to do with what has been written here. Bad faith and lies have become commonplace on the part of many leaders. This book does not intend to play into the hands of these leaders but is part of a patient search for the truth about a phenomenon that can concern us all. Everything will be done to ensure that a genuine debate takes place, without being intimidated by the game of loudmouths who think that the strength of their lie is enough to make it the truth.

Let's just trust in everyone's ability to think and react, even if it does seem a little cacophonous for a while.

March 25, 2025

Following the Israel-Iran War, the Israeli-Arab context has been updated

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Appendix 1: List of major wars from 1900 to 2024

This list was drawn up in 2001 and completed in 2024.

Trigger date	Description	Comment
10/02/1904	Russo-Japanese war	
30/07/1914	World War I	
13/09/1931	Japanese aggression in Manchuria	This war marked the beginning of the various Japanese wars in Asia.
01/09/1939	World War II	Invasion of Poland
21/10/1947	First Indo-Pakistani war	
15/05/1948	Proclamation of the State of Israel and First Arab-Israeli War	
25/06/1950	Korean War	
29/10/1956	Suez crisis	
04/08/1964	Vietnam War, first American raids on communists in South Vietnam	
30/05/1967	Biafra War	
05/06/1967	Six-Day War between Israel and its neighbors	
06/09/1973	Yom Kippur War	
13/04/1975	Lebanese war	
24/12/1979	USSR intervention in Afghanistan	

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Trigger date	Description	Comment
23/09/1980	Iraq-Iran war	
02/04/1982	Falklands War (between the UK and Argentina)	
06/06/1982	Israeli war in Lebanon	
02/08/1990	Iraq invades Kuwait	
01/07/1991	The disintegration and wars of Yugoslavia	It's not one, but a whole series of successive wars that began somewhere in 1991.
01/08/1998	Second Congo War	
24/03/1999	The war in Kosovo	
01/05/1999	Chechen War	
28/09/2000	Israeli-Palestinian conflict	
07/10/2001	second war Afghanistan	completed in 2024
20/03/2003	second Gulf war	completed in 2024
12/06/2006	Second Israeli-Lebanese war	completed in 2024
07/08/2008	Georgian War	completed in 2024
27/12/2008	Operation Cast Lead	completed in 2024
15/03/2011	Civil war in Syria	completed in 2024
14/11/2012	Operation Pillar of Defense	completed in 2024
05/06/2014	Islamic State war	completed in 2024
08/07/2014	Operation Protective Edge	completed in 2024
06/04/2014	Donbass war	completed in 2024
27/09/2020	Nagorno-Karabakh war	completed in 2024
04/11/2020	Ethiopia-Tigray war	completed in 2024
24/02/2022	Russia-Ukraine war	completed in 2024
07/10/2023	Israel-Hamas war	completed in 2024

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Appendix 2: List of COW V4 wars completed from 2007 to 2024

War Outbreak date	Description	How to
26/04/1828	First Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829	
25/04/1846	Mexican-American War of 1846-1847	
24/03/1848	Austro-Sardinian War of 1848-1849	
10/04/1848	First Schleswig-Holstein War of 1848-1849	
23/10/1853	Crimean War of 1853-1856	
29/04/1859	War of Italian unification of 1859	
22/10/1859	First Spanish-Moroccan War of 1859-1860	
16/04/1862	Franco-Mexican War of 1862-1864	
01/02/1864	Second Schleswig-Holstein War of 1848-1849	
12/11/1864	Lopez War of 1864-1870	
15/06/1866	Seven Weeks War of 1866	
19/07/1870	Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871	

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War Outbreak date	Description	How to
24/04/1877	Second Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878	
14/02/1879	War of the Pacific of 1879-1880	
11/07/1882	Conquest of Egypt of 1882	
15/06/1884	Sino-French War of 1884-1885	
25/07/1894	First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895	
10/02/1904	Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905	
07/07/1909	Second Spanish-Moroccan War of 1909-1910	
29/09/1911	Italian-Turkish War of 1911-1912	
17/10/1912	First Balkan War of 1912-1913	
30/06/1913	Second Balkan War of 1913	
30/07/1914	World War I of 1914-1918	
22/11/1918	Estonian War of Liberation of 1918-1920	
02/12/1918	Latvian War of Liberation of 1918-1920	
14/02/1919	Russo-Polish War of 1919-1920	
16/04/1919	Hungarian Adversaries War of 1919	
01/11/1919	Franco-Turkish War of 1919-1921	
19/12/1931	Second Sino-Japanese War of 1931-1933	
15/06/1932	Chaco War of 1932-1935	
03/10/1935	Conquest of Ethiopia of 1935-1936	
07/07/1937	Third Sino-Japanese War	
11/05/1939	Nomonhan War of 1939	

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War Outbreak date	Description	How to
01/09/1939	World War II	
30/11/1939	Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940	
01/12/1940	Franco-Thai War of 1940-1941	
26/10/1947	First Kashmir War of 1947-1948	
15/05/1948	Arab-Israeli War of 1948-1949	
24/06/1950	Korean War of 1950-1953	
29/10/1956	Sinai War of 1956	< 5 000 deaths but important war for Arab-Israeli conflict context
07/02/1965	Vietnam War Phase 2 of 1965-1975	
05/08/1965	Second Kashmir War of 1965	
05/06/1967	Six Days War of 1967	
13/01/1968	Second Laotian War Phase 2 of 1968-1973	
06/03/1969	War of Attrition of 1969-1970	
23/03/1970	War of the communist coalition of 1970-1971	
03/12/1971	Pakistan-Bengal War of 1971	
06/10/1973	Yom Kippur War of 1973	
20/07/1974	Turco-Cypriot War of 1973	< 5 000 deaths but important war for Europe context
23/10/1975	War over Angola of 1975-1976	< 5 000 deaths but important war for Africa
23/07/1977	Second Ogaden War Phase 2 of 1977-1978	
24/09/1977	Vietnamese-Cambodian Border War of 1977-1978	
28/10/1978	Uganda-Tanzanian War of 1978-1979	
17/02/1979	Sino-Vietnamese Punitive War of 1979	

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War Outbreak date	Description	How to
22/09/1980	Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988	
25/03/1982	Falklands War of 1982	< 5 000 deaths but important war for Europe context - removed from calculation
21/04/1982	War over Lebanon of 1982 (Israel)	< 5 000 deaths but important war for Arab-Israeli conflict context - removed from calculation
15/11/1986	War over the Aouzou Strip of 1986-1987	Chad/Libya
02/08/1990	Gulf War of 1989	
07/04/1992	War of Bosnian Independence of 1992	
06/02/1993	Azeri-Armenian War of 1993-1998	
06/05/1998	Badme Border War of 1998/2000	Ethiopia/Eritrea
24/03/1999	War for Kosovo of 1999	
07/10/2001	Invasion of Afghanistan of 2001	
19/03/2003	Invasion of Iraq of 2003	
12/06/2006	Second Israeli-Lebanese War	not in COW V4 list, added for calculation
07/08/2008	Russo-Georgian War	not in COW V4 list, added for calculation
27/12/2008	Cast Lead	not in COW V4 list, added for calculation
15/03/2011	Syrian civil War	not in COW V4 list, added for calculation
14/11/2012	2012 Gaza War	not in COW V4 list, added for calculation
05/06/2014	War against the Islamic State	not in COW V4 list, added for calculation
08/07/2014	Operation Protective Edge	not in COW V4 list, added for calculation
06/04/2014	Donbas War	not in COW V4 list, added for calculation
27/09/2020	Nagorno-Karabakh War	not in COW V4 list, added for calculation

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War Outbreak date	Description	How to
04/11/2020	Tigray War	not in COW V4 list, added for calculation
24/02/2022	Russia-Ukraine War	not in COW V4 list, added for calculation
07/10/2023	Israel-Hamas War	not in COW V4 list, added for calculation

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Appendix 3: Table of Cycles from Edward R. Dewey's "Systematic Period Reconnaissance"

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Table 1

Systematic Period Reconnaissance
Index of International Battles,
1700-1913 (Logs of Data Plus One)

Cycle Hint	Fraction of 214 years	Period in Years	Amplitude	Date of Crest	Slope
1	1.7	125.882	.242	2057.02	.008
2	2.6	82.308	.084	2038.79	.004
3	4.0	53.500	.304	1967.17	.023
4	5.6	38.214	.105	1977.99	.011
5	6.7	31.940	.050	1966.87	.006
6	9.0	23.778	.139	1971.54	.023
7	11.0	19.455	.103	1972.62	.021
8	12.3	17.398	.181	1967.02	.042
9	13.8	15.507	.057	1967.80	.015
10	15.1	14.172	.032	1973.65	.009
11	16.2	13.210	.091	1971.20	.028
12	17.6	12.159	.073	1976.12	.024
13	19.1	11.204	.110	1971.29	.040
14	20.9	10.239	.066	1974.54	.026
15	22.4	9.554	.070	1971.85	.030
16	24.4	8.771	.073	1972.73	.033
17	24.9	8.594	.066	1968.81	.031
18	25.5	8.392	.067	1972.95	.032
19	26.1	8.199	.066	1969.83	.032
20	26.5	8.076	.061	1967.86	.030
21	27.9	7.670	.052	1969.85	.027
22	29.3	7.304	.030	1972.25	.017
23	30.6	6.994	.048	1968.49	.028
24	32.8	6.524	.059	1971.02	.036
25	34.3	6.239	.024	1965.02	.015
26	35.7	5.994	.059	1967.51	.040
27	37.3	5.737	.033	1969.65	.023
28	37.6	5.692	.032	1968.62	.022
29	38.2	5.602	.027	1966.70	.019
30	39.3	5.445	.025	1968.21	.018
31	39.8	5.377	.028	1966.50	.021
32	41.9	5.107	.033	1966.24	.026

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Appendix 4: Review of UCDP data

UCDP background

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) is a project for collecting data on organized violence, including war. There is no known global equivalent. The graphs available start in 1989, which means that in 2024, there will be 35 years' worth of data. The project had been initiated a few years earlier, but the first usable data on the UCDP graphs are from 1989.

Some graphs date back to 1946, but these are not the ones that would be useful for a demonstration of the "Quesako cycle".

The quality of the data and the work carried out by UCDP make it a reference base for many researchers.

The UCDP definitions are specific to them. You need to be familiar with them to appreciate what the available graphs indicate. We recommend that you refer to the definitions available on the UCDP project. Only a few essential definitions are listed here.

UCDP and the "Quesako Cycle"

Compared with the "Quesako Cycle", the UCDP data cover 5 successive phases of amplification, starting with the peak in 1990.

An extension of the UCDP project to the years prior to the UCDP project is desirable. It will not be possible to have the same quality of data as that collected, but if it were possible to have reliable estimates of the number of deaths per year over the period 1900-1989, this would be a plus. Experience with the 2003 Iraq war showed that initial estimates of the number of war casualties were very approximate, not to say erroneous. We must therefore be cautious about extending the UCDP project to earlier periods.

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In the amplification period, with the peak in 2007, there is a discrepancy between UCDP and the "Quesako cycle" materialization studies. The strength of the UCDP project lies in its categorization of conflicts, which can also become a weakness when we are unable to allocate war victims to the categories defined by UCDP using databases other than those of UCDP. For methodological reasons, some data may not be considered at all. This is the case for some of the Iraq data from 2003 to 2010. It is to be hoped that one day there will be a review capable of reincorporating the corresponding data. This won't change much in terms of demonstrating the materialization of the "Quesako Cycle", which seems to be a foregone conclusion, even if the 2007 amplification phase is not confirmed by UCDP data.

If, one day, the "Quesako Cycle" gives rise to research on a different scale from what has been done, it will be necessary to add one or two people to the research team who specialize in UCDP data.

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UCDP definitions

A few UCDP definitions are necessary to fully understand the graphics.

State-based armed conflict

A state-based armed conflict is a contested^{XXXIII} incompatibility involving a government and/or territory, where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.

Comment: "State-based armed conflict" is also called "armed conflict", as opposed to "non-state conflict", in which none of the warring parties is a government.

Armed conflict

(relates to state-based)

A state-based armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.

Comment: "Armed conflict" is also referred to as "state-based conflict", as opposed to "non-state conflict", in which none of the warring parties is a government.

War

(relates to state-based)

A state-based conflict or dyad which reaches at least 1000 battle-related deaths in a specific calendar year.

Non-state conflict

(relates to non-state)

The use of armed force between two organised armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year.

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One-sided violence

(relates to one-sided)

The deliberate use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year.

Comment: Extrajudicial executions on government premises are excluded.

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
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UCDP 2024 chart review

In the following, the UCDP graphs^{XXXIV} are commented on in relation to the "Quesako cycle".

Fatalities by type of violence



The information retained from this graph is :

- State-based conflicts predominate;
- One-sided violence (which includes genocide) can be extremely violent (as in the Rwandan genocide). This classification, which excludes one-sided violence from state-based conflicts, acts as an (involuntary) filter for the materialization of the "Quesako Cycle".
- Non-state conflicts are **very limited in terms of the number of fatalities**. Hasty comparisons between state and non-state conflicts should therefore be avoided. The


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disproportion of scale between the victims of each of these 2 types calls for caution in interpreting comparisons between state and non-state conflicts, which may be meaningless because the data for one type of conflict is too limited.

Fatalities in state-based conflicts by region




This graph is used as part of the "Quesako Cycle" to confirm the "Quesako Cycle" materialization hypothesis (see the MATERIALIZATION of the "Quesako Cycle" page 73)

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State-based conflicts by region



The information retained from this graph is :


- No significant correlation between the number of conflicts and the "Quesako cycle";
- The gradual increase in the number of conflicts over time could be used as an indicator of pre-existing tension. This indicator could be useful in explaining the violence of wars in the 2022-2026 period. We started from an extremely high level of tension in 2021. *At this stage, this is just a hypothesis.*

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State-based conflicts by type of conflict



The information retained from this graph is:


- Inter-state conflicts are fewer in number compared to intra-state conflicts.
- It's important to keep in mind the importance of each of these types of conflicts.

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Number of state conflicts by intensity level



This graph is important to show that there are relatively few wars (over 1,000 deaths in a year) compared with the overall number of conflicts (over 25 deaths in a year).


This graph does not allow for a direct correlation between the number of wars in progress and the phases of amplification or attenuation. This graph cannot be used to reach a conclusion on the existence or otherwise of a "Quesako Cycle".

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Fatalities in non-state conflicts by region



The information retained from this graph is:

- There is no unquestionable relationship between the number of deaths in non-state conflicts and the "Quesako Cycle";
- This could mean that the concept of the state probably has an amplifying role in violence.
- Bearing in mind that the number of deaths in non-state conflicts is very low compared to those in state conflicts, we can't draw any definite conclusions.

Other charts

The other graphics were not used in the "Quesako cycle".

Appendix 5: Analysis of the Israeli-Arab context in late 2021

The following text is an extract from the January 23, 2022 version. The text was updated on December 19, 2021.

....

2022-2026 forecasts around the 2024 peak

While the Abraham Accords and the normalization of relations with several Arab states may give the impression that the Arab-Israeli conflict is over, this does not rule out the possibility of upheavals, particularly on the Palestinian side. The Arab-Israeli conflict is not over, nor has it found a point of equilibrium that would make it immune to the "Cycle...".

The Arab-Israeli conflict has often produced agreements in the attenuation phase that have been challenged in the subsequent amplification phase. What will remain of the Abraham Accords, and are they stronger than the Palestinian conflict? There will be something left of these agreements, but it's an illusion to believe that nothing will happen in the next period of amplification.

Will there be a war during this period 2022-2026? Yes, with about a 90% chance. But which one and when? The candidate wars are Iran (indirectly by proxy), the Palestinians, and Syria, as well as any combination of the three. And when? Most likely in the period 2023-2025, + or - a year from the expected peak, but it may happen (as in 2014) that it is frankly delayed.

Could this war be avoided? Perhaps, if we gave ourselves the means to launch something a little serious, starting in mid-2022 at the latest and lasting as long as necessary to start building something and give a future perspective to Palestinian populations who no longer have any. You can't build anything by ignoring reality and pretending to be invincible.

Israeli-xxx regional military alliance??

If Israel's only military alliance today is with the USA, possible regional integration should provoke a military alliance with Israel. A regional war like the one in Syria and Iraq could have provoked such an alliance. This is not the case now, but it could be if there is finally a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Prospects for settlement

There are 2 main obstacles to any evolution:

- The two territorial restitutions that took place in South Lebanon and Gaza have not calmed relations with Lebanon and Gaza. The claim that Israel would obtain peace in return for the return of territory has been undermined in both cases. On the contrary, this does not encourage Israel to return these territories.
- Israel still lives as if the State of Israel had not yet been definitively created, at least as it would like it to be recognized. Israel has accepted every opportunity that has presented itself, but never its content. Neither the 1947 Palestine Partition Plan nor the Oslo Accords were accepted in reality. For Israel, peace means first and foremost enshrining its military victory.

In 2010, in anticipation of and to avoid the 2014-2017 round of wars, a manuscript entitled "Will Jerusalem know lasting Peace?" was written. It has been updated several times. The latest version dates from 2020, but no version of this text has been used to try to find a solution to this conflict.

Most likely, the 2-state solution will be abandoned, leading to an Apartheid-style stalemate like in South Africa. Such a situation would ultimately lead to the opposite of what Israel wants.

The apparent victory for Israel of the non-recognition of a Palestinian state could lead to the dilution of the State of Israel into a larger whole that would no longer be a Jewish state without being a Palestinian state either: a kind of Israeli-Palestinian state that seems unlikely today, although consistent with current developments.

Analysis updated on December 19, 2021

Note: Although published in 2025, this analysis was finalized in December 2021 before the first of the wars expected over the period 2022-2026, in order to make some clarifications in the war forecast for the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Appendix 6: European context at the end of 2021

The following text is an extract from the January 23, 2022 version. The text was updated on December 30, 2021.

....

2022-2026 forecasts based on the 2024 peak^{XXXV}

It is probable (80-90%) that there will be a war during this period. The most likely period is 2023-2025.

This war will be:

- or an escalation of an ongoing or dormant conflict (Ukraine, Georgia... or potential conflict already identified within the OSCE).
- or a new conflict that would be amplified during this period (as was the case for the Ukrainian conflict, which did not pre-exist before 2013 but gives the impression of having been amplified by this phenomenon in 2014).

Most likely:

- It will be in a country of the former socialist bloc (in the broad sense, USSR and Yugoslavia and other socialist countries).
- There will be an indirect or direct Russian component.

Could we avoid this war?

Yes, if there was the will to launch an initiative and undertake everything possible to bring the initiative to fruition.

The short-term difficulty is that the Europe-Russia relationship is one of mistrust and liar's poker. Who really believes that Russia did not intervene indirectly in the Donbass region of Ukraine? Russian officials want us to believe it, but the others don't, even if they don't shout it too loudly. Russia's military presence and armaments are such that there is little chance of the Ukrainian conflict evolving. It is deliberately blocked by a massive military presence, whatever the pretext. Admittedly, there is a Ukrainian problem, but an exacerbated one. For its part, Ukraine is finding it hard to present a way out of the crisis that will give its Russian-speaking population a comprehensible future.

Analysis to initiate reflection or action

What's new since 1990 is that all of Europe's internal wars are taking place in the former "Eastern bloc" area, representing the former Soviet and socialist bloc, and including Yugoslavia and other socialist bloc countries such as Romania and Albania.

That is how we arrived at:

- The wars of the disintegration of Yugoslavia.
- The Georgian War.
- The Chechen wars.
- 1999 - the war in Kosovo (involving the countries that emerged from the disintegration of Yugoslavia).
 - 2008 - again, war in Georgia (Russian component).
 - 2014 - war in Ukraine (Russian component).

Since 2008, all European wars have followed the same pattern regarding Russia: either a Russian-speaking population or a local community relies on Russia to fuel the war and lead to de facto secession, if not outright encouraged and desired by Russia (Crimea).

From a geopolitical point of view, Russia's retreat to the East following the collapse of the blocs and the disintegration of the USSR poses a problem. Russia and Europe have not found a point of balance that reassures everyone. Russia is worried about NATO's advance eastwards, including potentially towards Ukraine, and Europe is worried about Russia waking up.

The emerging new NATO line is too close to vital Russian centers (St. Petersburg and Moscow) not to arouse (historically justified) fears. Russia's regional interventions are too frequent not to arouse (historically justified) fears in several of Russia's neighboring countries. These fears, on both sides, fuel mutual tensions.

Will there still be a Russian-backed separatist problem in Europe?

The answer is definitely YES, as long as fears on both sides are not allayed, which would require a new regional geopolitical balance involving European countries, Russia and probably also NATO and the OSCE. It is difficult to envisage any major developments in the short term in the context of chaotic European governance.

The conflict in Georgia hasn't moved an inch in 7 years. It could be the same in Ukraine, whatever the protestations of good faith.

What's more, the current conflicts are not being resolved, showing that the means officially used in Europe by OSCE are not working. They merely mitigate the effects, but do not resolve anything. If there were an effective method of maintaining a ceasefire, we could hope to anticipate and limit the impact of local "separatism" on Europe. This is not the case, and existing European bodies will neither prevent nor end any war, at least in their existing 2021 state.

Without geopolitical evolution, we can already imagine tensions and wars around 2024, of the same type as those we experienced in 2008 and 2014, probably on a much larger scale.

Analysis updated on December 30, 2021

Note: Although published in 2025, this analysis was finalized in December 2021 before the first of the wars expected over the period 2022-2026, in order to provide some clarification in the forecast of war in Europe.

Thanks

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- WikiLeaks for bringing an idea to life;
- Iraqbodycount team;
- UCDP team;
- all the researchers who were approached but never replied or deigned to discuss it - we mustn't hold this against them. They may understand one day, and have indirectly enabled us to challenge ourselves to find a publishable form;
- And many others that were the occasion of multiple discussions;
- Not forgetting the american proofreader: Susanna

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Endnotes

^I In the past, the cycle was called "Return Cycle", then "War Cycle", then "Return War Cycle" and finally "Quesako cycle". Why not "War Cycle"? Because this name gives the impression that the problem raised has already been solved and that the link with wars has already been proven, which is not the case in the first place. What's more, this study of the effect of the "Quesako Cycle" on wars is only a small part of a much larger body of research in which the "Quesako Cycle" plays an important role in events other than wars. It is therefore important not to link the name of this cycle to the name of War, as if it were specific to wars, but to keep the name neutral.

^{II} WikiLeaks is an organization that publishes classified documents. On the 2003 Iraq war, WikiLeaks published all the internal US army reports showing casualties, making it possible to know exactly how many people were killed in the war in the years following the arrival of US soldiers.

^{III} Iraqbodycount refers to the "Iraqbodycount.org" website, where records of violent deaths in Iraq from 2003 to 2020 are presented. It was mainly British opponents who decided to count all the victims of this war. This information is published on the "Iraqbodycount.org" website.

^{IV} UCDP = Uppsala Conflict Data Program is a research program that has been collecting data on existing wars since the 1980s. UCDP publishes this data annually, making it available to the scientific community. UCDP is a reference for data on contemporary wars.

^V Polemology is the study of war (sociology of war). It was founded by Gaston Bouthoul (1896-1980) in the aftermath of the Second World War. In French, it is a distinct discipline from irenology.

^{VI} Quincy Wright, *A Study of war*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.

^{VII} *Traité de polémologie* by Gaston Bouthoul. Bibliothèque scientifique de Payot, March 1991.

^{VIII} Edward R. Dewey, "Systematic Reconnaissance of Cycles in War", published in *Cycles* magazine in January 1967.

^{IX} <https://correlatesofwar.org/>

^X <https://www.uu.se/en/department/peace-and-conflict-research/research/ucdp/>

^{XI} COW (The Correlates of WAR) - V4 - 1816-2007 wars Citation as requested: Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). *Resort to War: 1816-2007*. Washington DC: CQ Press. Available at <https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/cow-war/>

^{XII} This is a complementary study that should be carried out one day.

^{XIII} Edward R. Dewey, "Systematic Reconnaissance of Cycles in War", published in *Cycles* magazine in January 1967.

^{XIV} Further study to be carried out.

^{XV} Further study of the solar cycle.

^{XVI} Further studies to be carried out on the Calculation section.

^{XVII} Wikipedia - "Arab-Israeli War":

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerre_isra%C3%A9lo-arabe

^{XVIII} Wikipedia - "List of Russia's wars":

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_des_guerres_de_la_Russie

^{XIX} Wikipedia - "Indo-Pakistani war": https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerre_indo-pakistanaise

^{XX} Wikipedia - "First Indo-Pakistani War": https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premi%C3%A8re_guerre_indo-pakistanaise

^{XXI} Wikipedia - "Second Indo-Pakistani War": https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deuxi%C3%A8me_guerre_indo-pakistanaise

^{XXII} Wikipedia - "Third Indo-Pakistani War": https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Troisi%C3%A8me_guerre_indo-pakistanaise

^{XXIII} Wikipedia - "Kargil conflict": https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conflit_de_Kargil

^{XXIV} Wikipedia - "Indo-Pakistani confrontation of 2001-2002": https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confrontation_indo-pakistanaise_de_2001-2002

^{XXV} Wikipedia - "2019 Indo-Pakistani confrontation": https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confrontation_indo-pakistanaise_de_2019

^{XXVI} https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crise_indo-pakistanaise_de_2025

^{XXVII} Wikipedia - "Sudanese civil war": https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerre_civile_soudanaise

^{XXVIII} Wikipedia - "Lebanon War": https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerre_du_Liban

^{XXIX} Larousse - "Lebanon War": https://www.larousse.fr/encyclopedie/divers/guerre_du_Liban/185813

^{XXX} Wikipedia - "Conflict in Lebanon (2011-2017)" WIKIPEDIA - "CONFLICT IN LEBANON (2011-2017)" [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conflit_au_Liban_\(2011-2017\)](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conflit_au_Liban_(2011-2017))

^{XXXI} At the time, the Institute of Polemology was housed in the Musée de la Guerre in Paris.

^{XXXII} While the various causes of war (structural, conjunctural, immediate) are taken from polemology, the notion of a "threshold for war" is the author's own. There may be other authors who would have described the equivalent of a threshold, but they have not yet been identified. If they are ever identified, they will be referenced.

^{XXXIII} The notion of incompatibility used by UCDP has not been taken up. Limiting incompatibility to a government or a territory is not exhaustive. The notion of incompatibility seems more in the how or the explanation than in the what. The definition should be in the what, not the how.

^{XXXIV} Davies, Shawn, Garoun Engström, Therese Pettersson & Magnus Öberg (2024). "Organized violence 1989-2023, and the prevalence of organized crime groups". *Journal of Peace Research* 61(4).

^{XXXV} In 2021 and 2022, the "Quesako Cycle", then called the "War Cycle", had not yet been reset. The amplification peak was scheduled for 2024. It has been shifted to 2022 with this current update.