The Quésako Cycle: Converging Results Calling for Independent Scientific Evaluation

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Summary of Findings and Their Implications

Research on the Quésako Cycle identifies an average periodicity of 3,095 days (approximately 8.47 years), associated with amplification and attenuation phases that may promote or inhibit the onset and escalation of wars. The phenomenon is neither a single cause nor a deterministic mechanism: it would interact with historical, political, territorial, economic, and social causes.

The principal finding concerns the geopolitical contexts studied: more than 80% of the wars recorded in these contexts begin during amplification phases. The claimed predictive value follows directly from this statistical regularity: extending the observed pattern into the future makes it possible to anticipate phases in which wars are expected. As early as 2006, this approach led the author to predict, for each forthcoming amplification phase, at least one war in the Israeli–Arab context and another in the European context.

Two findings illustrate the strength of this relationship: through October 7, 2023, 100% of the wars included in the Israeli–Arab context (more than 1,000 deaths a year) reportedly began during an amplification phase; for wars on European soil, the reported proportion is 89%. These figures, their scope, and possible exceptions call for independent verification.

Three further elements strengthen the case for such an examination: approximately 60% of the selected interstate wars began during amplification phases; a graphical correspondence between the cycle phases and variations in fatalities in independent data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP); and forecasts made before the events, notably in a January 2022 document concerning 2022–2026.

Taken together, these findings warrant an independent, reproducible, and critical scientific evaluation. The aim is not to seek prior acceptance, but to examine whether the results withstand rigorous testing and what implications they may have for understanding and anticipating wars.

1. Periodicity of the Quésako Cycle

The phenomenon distinguishes amplification phases, which favor wars, from attenuation phases, which could theoretically favor their cessation and peace.

The periodicity was investigated using a list of wars, testing values from 3,000 to 3,200 days in five-day increments. For each value, the author calculated the proportion of wars beginning during an amplification phase; the observed maximum led to the selection of 3,095 days, an approximate average value subject to variation.

July 30, 1914, the date selected as the beginning of World War I, serves as a reference point for an amplification peak. Theoretical recalibrations are possible: the recalibration considered on the basis of the 2014 conflicts, tested in 2025, requires confirmation.

The calculation uses interstate wars with more than 5,000 deaths from Correlates of War (COW) V4, supplemented by the author through 2024, covering approximately two centuries.

At 3,095 days, nearly 60% of the selected wars begin during an amplification phase. The COW V4 list (1816–2007) provides a reference external to the author.

Other researchers will need to reexamine the lists, calculations, and selection criteria. In the absence of a universally accepted list spanning two centuries with comparable death tolls, variations in the estimated period are possible.

2. Contexts: From Statistical Observation to Forecasting

A “context” groups conflicts linked to a region, actors, or a recurring geopolitical dynamic. The research examines, in particular, the Israeli–Arab, European, Russian, global, Indian–Pakistani, Sudanese, and Lebanese contexts. It includes wars with more than 1,000 deaths per year, the threshold used by UCDP to distinguish wars from lower-intensity conflicts.

In the contexts studied, more than 80% of recorded wars reportedly begin during amplification phases. This statistical concentration is the very foundation of forecasting: the author extends the historical regularity to future amplification phases. Forecasting is therefore not limited to signaling an abstract risk; it can concern identified contexts and specific periods.

In the Israeli–Arab context, the author reports that 100% of wars began during amplification phases through October 7, 2023. The war that began on that date raises a classification difficulty: are the subsequent confrontations between Israel and Iran, which according to the author occurred during an attenuation phase, extensions of the initial conflict or independent wars? In the latter case, the historical percentage would have to be revised downward. This alternative must be examined explicitly.

For the European context, defined here as wars taking place on European soil, the reported proportion is 89%. Since 2006, these two regularities have provided the basis for anticipating at least one war in each of these contexts during every forthcoming amplification phase. Verification will need to establish the dates of the forecasts, the wars included, the definitions of the contexts, and any counterexamples.

Not all contexts are necessarily suitable for statistical analysis. Their definitions, the number of wars included, and the criteria used to select them will need to be specified to allow independent evaluation of the findings. Other contexts may also be studied.

3. Materialization by the Number of Victims

The research also examines the relationship between the phases of the Quésako Cycle and changes in the number of victims, primarily fatalities. It is called Materialization of the Quésako Cycle. The hypothesis of materialization was first formulated using data relating to Iraq, including data published by WikiLeaks and compared with Iraq Body Count data; it was not developed from the UCDP charts.

The UCDP series, produced independently of this research, were examined subsequently. Their graphical alignment with the cycle phases is presented as important confirmation of the earlier hypothesis. The independence of the data strengthens the significance of the finding, but the correspondence must be assessed quantitatively.

UCDP data covers slightly more than fifty years. Extending the comparison over approximately two centuries is difficult because of the variable quality of historical sources. Combining UCDP and COW series could be explored, subject to the reliability and comparability of the fatality figures.

4. A Non-Deterministic Modeling

The modeling distinguishes phenomenon A, a periodic phenomenon that would amplify or attenuate existing tensions, from phenomenon B: the actual outbreak of war, which depends on circumstances, decisions, and the crossing of a threshold for war. Their interaction seeks to explain why some tensions lead to war while others do not.

This modeling makes it possible to address apparently contradictory situations and identify configurations that can be used for forecasting. It will need to be tested against competing explanations.

5. Forecasts Made Before the Events

Over the long term, the model identifies forthcoming amplification phases. Context analysis goes further by identifying geopolitical areas in which outbreaks of war are expected. The author states that this forecasting method has been used since 2006.

A document dated January 2022, preceding Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, discussed risks of war in Europe and in the Israeli–Arab context for 2022–2026. Subsequent events make these forecasts particularly worthy of examination. Their exact wording, dates, specificity, and the full set of forecasts, including those that did not materialize, will need to be verified.

6. Why Independent Evaluation Is Necessary

An external assessment should reproduce the periodicity calculations and the proportions by context; verify definitions, thresholds, war lists, and recalibrations; examine the treatment of prolonged or overlapping conflicts; test the correspondences against COW, UCDP, and other sources; and compare the results with models that do not incorporate a cycle.

It should also study dated forecasts and their outcomes. This approach does not consist of artificially separating the statistical observation from its predictive extension, but rather of testing the strength of the connection between them, particularly using new periods and new data.

The evaluation may confirm, qualify, or refute the conclusions. Its independence is all the more necessary because the potential implications extend beyond forecasting wars alone.

Conclusion

The Quésako Cycle brings together a historical periodicity, high statistical concentrations in certain contexts, a hypothesis of manifestation in war fatalities, and forecasts made before certain events. The central point is the direct transition from statistical observation to anticipation: more than 80% of wars in the contexts studied, with reported proportions of 100% through October 7, 2023 in the Israeli–Arab context and 89% in Europe, reportedly begin during amplification phases.

It is precisely the significance of these findings, and the questions they raise, that make independent scientific examination necessary. If confirmed, they could not only contribute to anticipating wars, but also open up a broader field of research and lead to a reexamination of certain concepts concerning collective and historical dynamics.

Reference and contact:

- in French : « Un phénomène cyclique qui favorise les guerres ?» 2025 – L'Harmattan
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