The Iran-U.S. war could provide an opportunity to examine several textbook cases. The one discussed here is escalation.

Since July 7, the situation has been escalating. It continues day after day. Both sides justify their military actions by claiming they are trying to bring the other side back to the negotiating table.

When Iran says that military actions will continue as long as the United States does, this is a case of a deadlock. This will continue because each side is waiting for the other to stop. If each side makes its own cessation contingent on the other’s prior cessation, there is no alternative but escalation.

Each side in the conflict sees only the events that give them cause for outrage and justify escalation

That is the nature of all wars:

• Each belligerent sees only part of the reality;
• each belligerent believes that its decisive military action will lead to de-escalation. The opposite is what happens.
• Each belligerent highlights the other’s violations, while carefully ignoring its own.

All the warring parties have violated the memorandum of understanding signed on June 17

Virtually all 14 points have been violated by both sides.

Let’s start with point 1: it is supposed to prohibit any military action. Firing on a ship is a violation; bombing a military target is a violation; bombing U.S. bases is a violation; and so on.

What could the negotiators who negotiated the memorandum of understanding signed on June 17 do?

• Pretend to negotiate a new agreement? There’s no point—everything that was expected is already in the agreement. We could clarify certain points by drafting implementation notes, which are simply responses to questions raised about the content of the memorandum of understanding
• A new ceasefire would need to be secured to take effect 24 hours later (so that the order can be relayed to the various military chains of command before implementation). If it were an immediate ceasefire, it would be violated and called into question right away,
• propose a system for monitoring and enforcing the ceasefire. It must be permanent and known and accepted by both sides,
• identify the points in the memorandum of understanding that need to be renegotiated or clarified, and plan to begin these discussions 48 or 72 hours after the ceasefire takes effect
• There is one point concerning the status of the Strait of Hormuz to be negotiated with Oman and the countries bordering the Persian Gulf. It should be implemented as soon as possible. The framework of a Persian Gulf Council would be appropriate; otherwise, another must be found.

Is there a genuine desire to end the war and begin de-escalation?

This issue raises questions. Each belligerent justifies its own violations by pointing to the other side’s violations, using them as a pretext for not having to follow the protocol:

• First violation: Iran decided that it alone has the right to define maritime routes and issued threats, followed by attacks on ships. This violation is indisputable.
• Second violation: The United States, lacking a monitoring system that serves as an arbiter and corrects the opposing party’s behavior, intends to punish Iran militarily for the first violation. This constitutes a new violation.
• Third violation: Iran, in response to the second violation, considers that it must also punish the United States and launches military attacks against U.S. bases and U.S. allies.
• Subsequently, a whole series of violations are responses to the previous violations and gradually render nearly all points of the memorandum of understanding null and void..

Will there be a military victor?

Unlikely. The United States will not be able to prevent military actions against its ships without occupying a large part of Iran. Iran will not be able to secure any agreement from the countries bordering the Persian Gulf to regulate and control the Strait of Hormuz on its own.

Militarily, each belligerent has significant capacity to cause harm, but neither is capable of gaining military control over the situation as it hopes.

Ultimately, both sides will lose, and it seems unlikely that either belligerent will succeed in completely destroying its adversary.

Each belligerent’s hope of defeating its adversary militarily drives the conflict toward escalation rather than de-escalation.

So, are we at an impasse?

In a way. The current escalation is fueling hopes for military solutions that do not seem realistic.

July 24, 2026

Naej DRANER

Naej DRANER is merely an observer of a situation in which he takes no action. Reflecting and making suggestions is not the same as taking action. Having ideas—good or bad—is pointless when one has no way of acting on them.