Currently, the Ukraine-Russia front line is relatively stable. For many months, Russia was very slowly chipping away at Ukrainian territory. That trend has stopped and is now reversing. We must be cautious about the statements coming out of Russia. The Russian military leadership has been making numerous claims of success that do not correspond to reality. Russia is not in a difficult situation, but its official claims—such as regarding the entirety of the Donbas—do not align with a reality that Russia can militarily achieve in the short to medium term. The primary source for the state of the front is the “Institute for the Study of War,” which appears to be the only reliable source I am aware of.

The most likely scenario is that a ceasefire will eventually be declared along the front line, serving as a military pause while discussions and negotiations continue. Whether the ceasefire line lies slightly more on the Russian or Ukrainian side will not change the arrangements that need to be made for the upcoming ceasefire. It would take 3 to 6 months to properly prepare the ceasefire arrangements. This will likely be done in a rush, since no known plan is realistic, whether on the Russian, Ukrainian, American, or European side.

The latest truce during Orthodox Easter offers a preview of what the ceasefire will be like if no preparations are made.

European leaders seem to have no idea what the ceasefire from 2014 to 2022 was like. It was never fully respected, with daily violations numbering in the hundreds or thousands. Nor do these same leaders seem to have a clear idea of what needs to be done. To believe that a few willing countries would be enough to impress and deter Russia stems from either ignorance of the subject or disinformation.

A study was conducted during the 2014–2022 ceasefire. This study helps us understand what needs to be done. Should we resume it? Or should we wait for a few leaders to devise a system that will never work? It’s a shame that we have to wait for a failure to occur before we can explain what would have prevented it. Whether it’s about war, ceasefires, or the peace to come, Europeans have not, so far, shown the kind of open-mindedness that indicates they’re trying to get a handle on these issues. Am I misinformed about their actual knowledge of these matters? Perhaps, but the failure to take an interest in the “Quésako Cycle” is quite revealing of their overall mindset.

Later in 2026, if interest is expressed, everything necessary for preparing a ceasefire will be outlined. For now, it seems as though it won’t even be read.

Naej DRANER

May 21, 2026

The Persian Gulf Council is an intergovernmental body that could be established if the members of the Persian Gulf Council decided to create and operate it.

The ex officio members of the Persian Gulf Council are the countries bordering the Persian Gulf.

The scope of the Persian Gulf Council covers the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

Pursuant to agreements among the members, this Council is concerned with:

• Navigation in the Persian Gulf within the area defined by the Council,
• Environment and pollution in the Persian Gulf
• and other related topics, such as water and environmental monitoring, if the Council so decides

A few articles have been written on this topic. They are merely drafts to be expanded upon by members, depending on their interest and agreement. Leaving them as drafts is intentional. Countries will need to get involved for the Council to be established. They will propose, decide on, and implement their agreements in a more concrete form than these drafts, which were intended solely to spark discussion on the subject.

A recap of previous articles:

• Persian Gulf Council
• Persian Gulf Council – continued 1
• Persian Gulf Council – continued 2
• Persian Gulf Council – Continued 3
• What is the choice of the countries bordering the Persian Gulf ?
• Persian Gulf Council – Continued 4
• Persian Gulf: Analysis

Procedure to Follow

• Agreement by each coastal country to participate in the Persian Gulf Council,
• If all countries agree, appointment of a temporary chair country and appointment of a Council secretary (who will document projects and agreements and assist in their implementation). The secretary is a civil servant nominated by one of the countries

First topic: Defining navigation in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz

The first step should be to clarify the boundaries of each country’s territorial waters, including in the Strait of Hormuz, which belongs to several coastal states and not just one.

The result of this first step will be a map showing the boundaries of the agreed-upon territorial waters. If there are any disputes, they should be noted, and the points agreed upon by all parties should serve as the basis for further work. For now, international shipping lanes are not included; they will be added at a later date.

The second step involves establishing a maritime traffic monitoring agency. This agency could utilize data from existing primary radars (which track ships even without transponders), as well as standardized information for international navigation based on active transponders. We can also envision units under the authority of the Persian Gulf Council that would have the power to inspect ships and ensure they adhere to designated shipping lanes. In this second step, oversight would not be carried out by a single country but by the Persian Gulf Council.

In this second step, we must identify the areas that will fall under the oversight of the monitoring body. For example, the entire Strait of Hormuz should be subject to this monitoring. We will also need to determine the means of intervention (small Iranian vessels could serve this purpose if they represented the Gulf Cooperation Council rather than a single country).

The third step is to decide whether or not to impose a toll. The toll could cover the operating costs of the Persian Gulf Council

Whether each country contributes directly or charges fees to ships traveling to the Persian Gulf is a decision made by the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The fourth step is to define the waterways. There may be several, but to regulate traffic, this must be clearly established at the international level.

If the Persian Gulf Council can perform these four steps and reach an agreement, the rest should follow.

The short-term challenge is to understand that the Persian Gulf Council is focused on a return to normal operations, not on a wartime footing. During a war, generals act as if they control everything, disregarding international rules and even the territorial waters of others; hence the need to begin by clarifying the boundaries of each country’s territorial waters and ensuring they are accepted by all.

To function, the Persian Gulf Council may need to define surveillance zones within which it will exercise oversight and control. However, this will not involve the oversight and control of a single country claiming authority over all others, even if the principle of oversight and control will be similar to that which a single country might exercise.

If the Persian Gulf Council reaches this stage, it will be necessary to clearly define the resources made available by the countries (e.g., existing radar systems) and the necessary coordination mechanisms (the ability to utilize data from various radar systems).

Relationship to other negotiations

Iran and the United States have a range of issues to discuss. The Persian Gulf Council is limited to the Persian Gulf and will not make any decisions on other matters. On other matters, it will be possible to exchange views. Conversely, Iran and the US are expected not to define, in place of the Persian Gulf Council, what falls under the jurisdiction of the Persian Gulf littoral states.

It is not impossible that the Persian Gulf Council will not be established immediately, but it will be necessary sooner or later. It is a concept that makes sense for the future.

Naej DRANER

May 19, 2026

It has been nearly 80 years since 1949, when the Kuomintang-controlled government of the Republic of China established itself in Taiwan. The more time passes, the more pronounced the differences with the People’s Republic of China will become.

Can there be permanent coexistence within a single country? That would be desirable.

Seen from the outside, China has launched impressive military programs, as if its military strength alone were enough to resolve the Taiwan issue. Attempts to address the Taiwan question from a peaceful and political perspective seem slim.

The management of Hong Kong and its governance by the People’s Republic of China do not bode well for the coexistence of the Taiwanese system within the People’s Republic of China.

“One Country, Two Systems” was the slogan of those who wanted to believe that Hong Kong would retain its unique characteristics for at least 50 years. The current reality is “One Country, One System.” Admittedly, certain aspects of Hong Kong’s distinctiveness have been preserved, but no democratic freedom of expression has survived. The sentencing of Jimmy Lai, a former local media mogul, in February 2026 is the most striking illustration of this.

What are the possible avenues for envisioning Taiwan’s coexistence within the People’s Republic of China?

• The evolution of China’s single-party Communist system toward a multiparty system could be one path forward, but it is unlikely in the short term, given that the Communist Party is a key pillar of the Chinese state,
• The possibility of open and public discussions among Chinese leaders could signal a shift toward a diversity of opinions, but this does not fit with the usual image of the Chinese government.

In the short term, releasing Jimmy Lai and allowing him to rebuild a free press—even if limited—could be a way to buy time and appear credible in the willingness to accept changes that accommodate certain aspects of Taiwan.

Imagine you are a negotiator and want to make a proposal to the people of Taiwan to convince them that they will be treated well within the People’s Republic of China. How credible would you be, given the success of the “One Country, Two Systems” slogan? Probably none.

Is there a possible solution? Probably, but not the way things are being handled today. Chinese leaders may let a negotiator try something, without giving him any means to succeed, just to ease their conscience before moving on to military action.

Would Mao Zedong have agreed to launch a military operation without first attempting genuine negotiations, even if it meant shaking the People’s Republic of China to its very core? There is no simple answer to this question.

It will be difficult to convince Taiwan to give up its dream of independence, and some concessions will have to be made in order to arrive at credible proposals for the future.

Jimmy Lai’s release would be a real test and a first step. But he must not be deported from Hong Kong. He must remain there, free to engage in whatever activities he chooses.

It will be difficult for the current Chinese and Taiwanese leaders, but we should try and find a way to take action. It will take time and a great deal of effort to explore every possible angle of this issue, including options that seem unthinkable today.

We have five years to take action. After that, we enter the realm of future risks. (See the “Quesako Cycle” for more information.)

Naej DRANER

May 18, 2016

This question may seem trivial to those who have not grasped the “Return Theory” and its significance. It is fundamental for those interested in the Clock of the Unconscious.

A “return of the past” is an event that is similar to or the opposite of a past event. The event is almost never exactly the same, but it is similar. In what ways is the Iran-U.S. war similar to the 2003 war against Iraq? The official objective of eliminating a nuclear threat is the same in both cases. Even if it was a fantasy, a fabrication—not to say a lie—in 2003, this war is officially justified by the United States for the same reasons: to prevent a country from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

The “Return Theory” states that there is a probability that an event that has left a mark on the collective unconscious will recur after a period of 3,095 days, give or take two years.

Why 3,095 days? That is the period of the “Quésako Cycle.” Since this cycle is an application of the “Return Theory” it was deemed appropriate to use the same value. Would it take extensive historical research to demonstrate this using simple “past returns”?

This phenomenon of “return” is well-known and significant. For example, the 2014 conflict in Ukraine is seen as a return to the collapse of the Soviet bloc that began in 1989. What makes the 2014 return unique is that it continues into 2026, in a reversed form, as if Russia were reliving its past in reverse in an attempt to erase it.

The 25-year cycle (or multiples thereof) (roughly 3 times 3,095 days) seems the most likely. In the case of the 2003 War Recurrence, the theoretical recurrence would be at the end of 2028, whereas we are currently in 2026. The usual margin of plus or minus two years has been exceeded, since it has been two years and ten months. One might wonder whether the reality of the shift observed for the “Quésako Cycle” is also applicable to the phenomenon of return. If that were the case, we could consider that the current war is indeed a “Return” of the past event. In other words, the U.S. president’s unconscious motivation is likely that there was a similar war a little over 25 years ago, which is enough to fuel this war.

Is Trump more influenced by his subconscious than by his conscious mind? Probably. What will be the consequence? He will have no qualms about considering the total destruction of Iran. But since he opposed the war in Iraq, one might assume he would oppose a war similar to that of 2003. Unfortunately, a rational understanding of Trump’s plans and behavior is far from straightforward.

Will the United States collectively relive a war like that? That’s pretty much what’s happening.

This instance of a “return” to the 2003 war has not been fully confirmed. If we were to consider it a “return,” we would need to revisit the “Return Theory.” But as far as I’m concerned, it’s obvious that Trump is more attuned to his collective unconscious than to his conscious mind.

A suivre

Le 11 mai 2026

A war has multiple causes. According to conflict studies, these include:

• immediate causes (what triggers the outbreak of war),
• circumstantial causes (generally events preceding the outbreak of war),
• and structural causes (which are the most significant)

In the case of the Persian Gulf, the causes of a limited war between the countries bordering the Persian Gulf are:

• immediate cause: the decision by the United States and Israel to go to war,
• Circumstantial factors: The war launched by the United States and Israel led Iran to believe that blocking the Strait of Hormuz and destroying its neighbors’ facilities would be to its advantage. The initial war triggered a new war between Iran and the Persian Gulf states.
• Structural causes: Iran and its neighbors in the Persian Gulf rarely communicate with one another and do not belong to any common institution that would allow them to defuse tensions. They communicate only through gunfire, foreign powers, and threats—and never directly (or almost never).

What was the situation like before the war of 2026?

Six of the eight countries bordering the Persian Gulf are members of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. The name might suggest that this is an organization that fosters cooperation among all the countries bordering the Persian Gulf. This is not the case, and given the reality of relations among these six countries, it never will be.

The Gulf Cooperation Council has several objectives:

• partial political integration (there will never be political integration with Iran or Iraq),
• Economic integration (apart from cooperation in the Persian Gulf, it is unlikely that Iraq and Iran will be integrated into it),
• various projects, such as finding alternative shipping routes to the Strait of Hormuz

Iran accounts for roughly half of the Persian Gulf coastline and has no formalized cooperation with its neighbors.

What is the situation like after the war of 2026?

Iran has blocked shipping lanes, launched missiles and drones at various countries, and believes itself to be the master of the Strait of Hormuz. They’re living in a fantasy world, and they’re going to have to come back down to earth.

What is the purpose of the Persian Gulf Council?

It focuses on structural causes. If only the countries bordering the Persian Gulf would communicate regularly with one another, it could pave the way for a better future and help resolve crises. Exchanging threats and bringing in a powerful military ally will only add chaos to chaos.

Iran’s demands should not be taken at face value. Iran sees itself as the master of the Strait of Hormuz. Will Iran dare to propose its demand for exclusive control of the strait to its neighbors? If so, we must respond to Iran: Could you remind us of the demarcation of territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf?

And until the response is credible in light of existing territorial agreements, we’ll have to keep politely repeating the same old refrain, while we wait for a somewhat serious response—with a touch of humor.

Which countries could help facilitate the creation of the Persian Gulf Council?

Iraq, Oman, and Qatar. They must be able to bring the others on board. Once that happens, a framework for negotiations will need to be established with permanent representatives from the eight countries in one of these three countries.

A few drafts have been written (there have been five others besides this one). They are not finalized, which is intentional: it is up to the eight countries to write and define what they wish to do. After that, they must take charge and decide whether or not to create the Persian Gulf Council. This body could be informal or formal, but it would be better if it had an official status, if only to reassure the rest of the world and the insurers.

Having an idea isn’t enough

That is the weakness of an architect and his proposals. After that, we need third countries on board to get the eight countries to go along with it. And then it will be up to those eight countries. For now, they prefer to wait for a magic solution from outside negotiators.

The architect is merely a catalyst to spark a project. There are other solutions besides this project, but it would be good if the Persian Gulf countries would talk to one another and find solutions to their problems. We can help them think things through, but we cannot decide what they do not want to do.

There is a lack of a network of diplomats to try something. According to the statistical data on this website, no Arab country has ever read a single one of these texts. So nothing has happened, and likely nothing will happen, due to a lack of intermediaries and a network. It was an idea—not a stupid one—but without the means to implement it.

Naej DRANER

May 10, 2026

Appendix 5 of Jean-Baptiste Renard’s book A Cyclical Phenomenon that favors Wars, published in french by L’Harmattan, contains war forecasts made in December 2021 regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. The appendix considered a war between 2023 and 2025 to be likely.

Why was a war likely? Because of an understanding of the “Quésako Cycle” and an analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

October 7, 2023, and the war that followed confirmed this analysis.

An Israeli acquaintance commented, “You predicted what the Mossad didn’t.” But this Israeli woman did not understand the “Quésako Cycle” and was quick to conclude that it was impossible to predict this war. She refused to accept reality.

Will Israel ever understand? And will it accept it?

In the wake of the trauma of October 7, 2023, Israel launched a series of wars on all fronts, just as the United States had launched multiple wars after September 11, 2001. Afghanistan, the war on terror, the war in Iraq. What remains in 2026 of all these wars waged by the United States starting in 2001? Afghanistan has been retaken by the Taliban; terrorism is still present everywhere and has even spread to Africa. Iraq is a shadow of its previous state.

What will remain in 20 years of the wars waged by Israel since 2023? Jewish intellectuals point out that all these wars will cause the international community to forget the Holocaust, and that this image of a country that destroys other countries and populations—without having built anything for the future—will slowly take its place. These wars are like an indelible mark on Israel’s behavior: no one will forget.

The key point of the “Quésako Cycle” that Israel needs to understand is in this chart

Will Israel understand and accept this?

The Israeli and Jewish scientific community is significant. Is it capable of engaging with what remains the remarkable case of the “Quésako Cycle”? It is probably too early for Israelis to take a step back. It may take them a few years to understand—or an eternity to deny—the “Quésako Cycle,” which is a disruptive element in the unconscious behavior of Israel and its enemies. They are both bound by the same phenomenon, which remains unknown to them.

Naej DRANER

May 8, 2026

Have you read the book “A Cyclical Phenomenon that favors Wars” by Jean-Baptiste Renard, published by L’Harmattan? ( in french but you can find a translation here)

A book that experts on war and peace should have understood. A cyclical phenomenon whose understanding allows us to predict wars and better understand contemporary conflicts. It is the “Quésako Cycle.” Not some esoteric joke, but rigorous, well-reasoned research presented in an engineer’s style that won’t let up until everyone has understood it.

This book examines various contexts, such as the Russia-Putin context that is of interest to us here, and for which you have the chart below. (If you do not understand the chart, please refer to the book, where everything is explained.)

The author rightly points out that what sets Russia apart is that it has experienced multiple triggers of war at most stages of escalation. The “Quésako Cycle” has a much greater impact on the Russia-Putin duo than in any other known case, including Israel, which remains a notable exception.

Why does the “Quésako Cycle” have such a strong influence on Putin and Russia?

The author believes that a “special study”—we might even add “very special”—would be needed to answer this question.

Fortunately, Russia’s decision-making process has become very streamlined. It consists of one man (Putin) and a few aides and close associates. All other Russian institutions serve merely as a rubber-stamp for the decisions made by Putin and his inner circle. We can therefore imagine that by limiting this “special study” to Putin and his inner circle—and by including the myths and fantasies that drive them—we should be able to find some leads that allow us to move forward and understand how the “Quésako Cycle” can exert such influence.

Putin and Russia are highly sensitive to the “Quésako Cycle.” Understanding why might help advance research on the “Quésako Cycle.”

Will the special study ever see the light of day?

I’m not so sure. The ones who should be interested are the Europeans, but they’re a war behind the times. They’re preparing for the next one just as they experienced the last one. They don’t have the time or the will to step back and take a broader view to understand what they’re experiencing through the Russia-Ukraine conflict. And yet, if they understood why, they could avoid it. Are they aware of this? They haven’t shown the slightest interest and probably haven’t understood a thing. Their leaders and the EU’s top officials should be aware of this, but that’s not the case right now.

For the special study to be carried out, the following would be required:

• motivated researchers
• highly qualified experts on Russia and its institutions
• funding sufficient to cover all necessary supplementary research (a team of 10 to 50 people makes sense)
• a project
• and enough determination to carry it out, without waiting for others to do it and without waiting for the media to cover it (Europeans are very media-sensitive. They consider what everyone is talking about to be of interest, not what no one is talking about. Presumably, they will take an interest in the subject when everyone is talking about it… through the media. And if the media never mentions it, they will likely never be informed)

For now, none of that is happening.

Of course, once launched, the special study must under no circumstances be halted before it is completed. It could take 5, 10, 15, or even 20 years: we need a credible result.

To be continued…

Naej DRANER

May 6, 2026

The Persian Gulf Council is the organization that brings together the countries bordering the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

The purpose of the Persian Gulf Council is:

• Monitor and assess the condition of the waters of the Persian Gulf, particularly with regard to pollution, flora, and fauna.
• If necessary, regulate each country’s discharges into the Persian Gulf and ensure compliance (for example: discharges from desalination plants, which should not be released into the Persian Gulf, as this would gradually turn it into a dead sea, as well as industrial discharges and discharges from wastewater treatment plants).
• Oil Spill Pollution in the Persian Gulf: Should All Coastal Countries Establish and Utilize Common Measures?
• Define and update the rules of navigation in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. This includes the possibility of establishing a right of passage through the Strait of Hormuz.
• Discuss among member countries any issues that may be of direct or indirect collective interest (for example: the possibility of regional denuclearization could be a topic for discussion, even if its implementation might extend beyond the countries bordering the Persian Gulf; the Iran-U.S. conflict could be a topic for discussion).

What the Persian Gulf Council will not do:

• Political integration,
• Economic integration,
• agreements involving only a small group of countries (such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, which does not represent all the countries bordering the Persian Gulf)

What role will the Gulf Cooperation Council play in the Persian Gulf Council?

At first glance, nothing, since they are two different organizations. The Gulf Cooperation Council does not represent all the countries bordering the Persian Gulf. It could represent the six countries if they agreed to a single representation. But given the Gulf Cooperation Council Secretariat’s usual stance toward Iran, a collective statement from the six GCC countries through the voice of its current secretary will likely achieve little. You cannot transform a conflictual relationship that has lasted for several years into a stable one without profound changes within an organization accustomed to a confrontational posture.

Why highlight the Persian Gulf Council now?

Because the United States and Iran claim to be negotiating an agreement on the Strait of Hormuz that will affect all countries bordering the Persian Gulf. That part of the agreement should now be negotiated by the Persian Gulf Council and should be removed from the U.S.-Iran negotiations.

What resources will the Persian Gulf Council have?

Either direct participation by each state, in accordance with rules to be established, or a right of passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

Right of passage through the Strait of Hormuz

Today, Iran claims to be imposing a right of passage from which only Iran would benefit. We must begin technical negotiations starting with internationally recognized shipping lanes:

• Some of these shipping routes are in Omani territorial waters. Although Oman does not want a right of passage, it could claim one or request a share of the right of passage sought by Iran.
• The United Arab Emirates claims three islands, two of which are located in waterways that Iran claims are within its territorial waters. If the United Arab Emirates’ claims are recognized, part of those waterways would therefore lie within the territorial waters of the United Arab Emirates.
• Preliminary conclusion: At the very least, the transit fees collected by Iran should be divided into three equal parts. It would be better to allocate them immediately as part of the Persian Gulf Council’s revenue so that it can fulfill its mission.

These are the arguments of a technical negotiation. If it fails to reach a conclusion, we will explore how we can establish shipping lanes in territorial waters other than those of Iran… and perhaps even how to bypass the Strait of Hormuz for the transit of goods, which would be another way to undermine Iran’s claims to exclusive rights of passage.

Who is interested in the idea of a “Persian Gulf Council”?

In light of recent statements, Saudi Arabia, through MBS, and Iran, through the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, appear to support such a prospect, even if their wording may differ from that of the Persian Gulf Council, as defined here.

Since Naej DRANER cannot know how this proposal could have been considered by these leaders, it’s possible that they naturally considered this possibility: allowing the countries bordering the Persian Gulf to have their say and decide matters that concern them.

Naej DRANER

May 3, 2026

Postscript, May 4, 2026: To date, the Persian Gulf Council project exists solely in the author’s imagination as an alternative means of resolving the issue of the Strait of Hormuz, without addressing the other points. The author is not aware of any intermediaries willing to assist him in implementing this project. Keep a close eye on what happens with the U.S. initiative to escort ships by force. I do not believe it will succeed in normalizing the situation and allowing a return to normal traffic. It is more likely that there will be several serious incidents and perhaps even a resumption of war. Another diplomatic path will be necessary to truly break the deadlock.

“We don’t know how to make peace.” That is the reality of today’s world. Most of the “peaces” we experienced in the 20th century were military victories that we called peace, but very few peace negotiations have succeeded and been truly implemented.

What we know about achieving it is relatively simple: create the right conditions for each of the parties involved to make it happen. And with a little luck, an acceptable solution will eventually emerge.

For example, if all the countries bordering the Persian Gulf began by meeting every day for fifteen minutes, through diplomats in any country, this could lead within a few days or weeks to the normalization of maritime traffic.

Of course, we’ll need to make sure there are no mines. We don’t know if this is real or true. Mine-sweeping vessels exist in various countries, but experts say that the U.S. ships in the Gulf of Oman are not mine-sweepers and that mine-clearing operations have not yet begun. The Americans could do it, but others could as well.

Day after day, we’ll have to make our case. If Iran claims to be setting up a toll in its waters, the neighboring countries across from it can do the same: Oman, the UAE, etc.

The goal of these daily meetings: any topic. Topics agreed upon unanimously are developed after confirmation by the authorities of each country. If no topic garners unanimous support, we look for one every day: 15 minutes to go over them daily.

Everyone wants to reopen maritime traffic. This topic certainly garners unanimous support, but what causes friction is how to achieve it and how to go about it.

We could start with a shipping lane in Iranian waters and another in the remaining territorial waters. The strait is too narrow for either side to claim the usual territorial limits at sea. In that case, we could split the difference by drawing a line down the middle of the strait.

It would be better if maritime traffic were defined in a rational and mutually agreed-upon manner, but if Iran intends to be the sole legal passage, we will create another one, even if it requires construction work to make it possible.

And then, day by day, a draft agreement may emerge that everyone could implement.

What matters is not that there be a miracle negotiator to make it happen, but that, in the end, all the countries bordering the Persian Gulf recognize that this is their project. Of course, outside parties would be needed to keep the process moving forward every day and to review the various proposals, eliminating any that do not enjoy unanimous support.

It’s only a matter of time: they all want the same thing—namely, to facilitate the maritime traffic that concerns them—the only problem is that the proposed solutions don’t have unanimous support at the moment. That could change.

Even if it takes three months to succeed, the proposed approach can work; we just need someone who knows all the countries bordering the Persian Gulf and who follows up with them every day—not even by phone—until it succeeds. Fifteen minutes a day. It could be more than fifteen minutes if interesting solutions emerge. The immediate challenge is to have, for each of these countries, a reliable news channel with a leader capable of committing within the next 15 minutes.

I don’t know how to do that: I have no permanent diplomatic contacts with those countries. Several countries could do it. Be warned: Europeans are more concerned with their internal disagreements than with a potential agreement among the Persian Gulf countries. They’re capable of spending hours just to come up with a press release. That’s not what we’re asking for. We’re simply asking them to take each country’s proposals into account and present them to the others—not to invent a European regulation. They could act as facilitators, but no one has asked them to propose a solution on behalf of others. The architect is supposed to be able to make proposals, and for now the proposal is very simple: regulate maritime traffic to prepare for the opening.

Naej DRANER

April 25, 2026

We need to ensure that this text is conveyed to each of the countries concerned, first through diplomatic channels, and then verify that it has been taken into account by each of their leaders. We must then maintain constant contact for as long as necessary, even if this overlaps with negotiations taking place elsewhere. I don’t have the resources to do that. It would have to be done by volunteer diplomats, regardless of their country

Today, there is no representative body for the countries bordering the Persian Gulf. There is a Gulf Cooperation Council that gives the impression of being such a body, even though it represents only six countries, excluding Iran and Iraq. The GCC aims to establish an economic and political union, which will not be the case for the Persian Gulf Council, should it be established.

If there were a “Persian Gulf Council,” its primary role would be to establish rules for managing maritime traffic and all matters related to the Persian Gulf (pollution, traffic supervision, etc.). Ultimately, such a body is essential, and if it is established, decisions will initially be made by unanimous consent to ensure that they truly reflect the will of the countries bordering the Persian Gulf.

For now, the only negotiations taking place are those between the United States and Iran. Does the “Persian Gulf Council” feel bound by the decisions that the United States and Iran will make, supposedly on its behalf? I don’t think so, but if the “Persian Gulf Council” does not come into being, the decisions implemented in the Persian Gulf will be those of the United States and Iran.

Some Gulf countries have believed—and continue to believe—that U.S. military power is sufficient and will remain sufficient to ensure free passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Take a good look at what is happening: they are currently unable to do so. They can impose a blockade on Iranian ports but will be unable to ensure the safety of any ship passing through the Strait of Hormuz. To achieve this, they would need a military operation on a very, very large scale, which is not on the table for the U.S. at this time.

If the few countries opposed to Iran’s permanent control of the Strait of Hormuz express their opposition only through the United States, you will find yourselves in an unexpected position:

• the Gulf Cooperation Council will, in effect, be replaced by the U.S.-Iran duo
• The toll on the Strait of Hormuz will be collected by Iran (and perhaps the United States) and not by the Persian Gulf Council

Is this your unanimous decision?

Keep in mind that there may be instances of pollution or ships in distress in the Persian Gulf, and that it would be beneficial to have a maritime oversight body representing all the countries of the Persian Gulf. And when that happens, a toll will be necessary to fund it, without any single country claiming to be the sole beneficiary.

Is it your preference to have maritime regulations in the Persian Gulf governed by a U.S.-Iran agreement that will become permanent and be administered solely by the United States and Iran?

Nothing is stopping you from speaking your mind and making decisions.

As far as I’m concerned, there will be no further discussion on this matter unless you have first made a decision

See: Persian Gulf Council (and the few articles that followed)

Naej DRANER

Naej DRANER is a political and security analyst and solutions architect. At a meeting of the Persian Gulf Council, his status as an official advisor to the Persian Gulf Council will be submitted for approval. Only a unanimous decision by the full members will be acceptable.

April 23, 2026