All posts by admin-jbr

The Hamas war and the “War Cycle”

Does the war begun on October 7, 2023 confirm the “War Cycle”?

The theoretical amplification peak is in May 2024. This new war is triggered 8 months before the theoretical peak. The prediction before this war broke out was that there would be another war, most likely within +/- 1 year of the theoretical peak.

The October 2023 war confirms the “War Cycle” and reinforces the Arab-Israeli conflict as a remarkable case of the “War Cycle”.

What the forecasts didn’t show, however, was that it would be such a massacre, and probably the most terrible war of this conflict, on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides. The horror has only just begun.

We can see that the intensity of the wars during this phase of amplification is much greater for the Ukraine-Russia war and for the war that has just begun. Is this just a coincidence, or does this amplification phase have a particularly high level of intensity? In current studies, we haven’t yet identified any factors that could determine the intensity of this cyclical phenomenon. We do have a few clues that merit further study, but we can’t be sure.

What’s next for this war?

Our knowledge of the “War Cycle” does not allow us to know how future battles will unfold. They may last several weeks.

The consequences of this war will determine the Israeli-Palestinian future, even if it’s unlikely that anything will move in the coming months.

This war is also a “Return” of 50 years from the Yom Kippur War and 75 years from the first Arab-Israeli war.

In the Arab-Israeli conflict, several wars are a return (in the sense of Return Theory) of another war:

  • The 2006 Israeli-Lebanese war is a return of the 1982 war (24 years).
  • The current war is a return of the 1973 war (50 years)
  • The 1973 Yom Kippur War is itself a throwback to the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948, when Israel was created.

The historical origin of the “War Cycle” is the study of “Returns from the Past” between wars. At certain moments, wars are both an application of the “War Cycle” and of the Return Theory).

What do these returns mean? The Israeli-Palestinian problem is likely to reappear in terms little different from those of 1947.

October 10th 2023

Confirmation of the materialization of the “Recurrent (or Return)War Cycle” by UCDP data & graph

Using the graph “Fatalities in state-based conflicts by Region (1989-2022)” published by UCDP (Uppsala Conflict Data Program), it is possible to reinforce the demonstration of the materialization of the “Return War Cycle”

It is explained in the attached text.

The UCDP data gives more credibility to this issue.

In the next update of the “Recurrent War Cycle”, it will be integrated.

Updated October 25, 2023

Does the War Cycle cause more wars during the amplification phases?

In this article, the expression “War Cycle” should be understood as the expression “War Cycle of the Return” in reference to the origin of this “War Cycle” from the Return Theory.

Demonstration Hypothesis

If the “War Cycle” favors wars, it would be logical to demonstrate that there are more wars during the amplification phases.

To verify this, the hypothesis was made to count the number of wars per year from a pre-existing list of wars and to calculate the total of wars for mitigation and amplification phases. If the total number of wars during the amplification phases is more important than for the mitigation phases, it could help to demonstrate the reality of an influcence of this War Cycle on the overall wars

After searching on a search engine for an existing database that could provide a list of wars, the list of wars associated with the V4 version of “Correlates of War” was selected. It contains the list of wars from 1816 to 2007. (Although there is a V6 version of the COW database, I did not find a list of wars equivalent to the V4 version, which is why I used the V4)

For each year from 1900 to 2007 were counted the number of wars per year then during the phases of mitigation and amplification. In addition a graph was made to try to show the peaks of amplification. A comparison was made with the theoretical peaks of the amplification phases.

Demonstration Result

From 1900 to 2000 (the later years are not taken into account so that there are as many mitigation phases as amplification phases ), there are 38% more wars during the amplification phases than during the mitigation phases. Of 342 wars on the COW list during this period, 58% are in the amplification phases.

From 1942 to 2000 (with the same number of mitigation and amplification phases), there are 59% more wars during the amplification phases than during the mitigation phases. Of 225 wars on the COW list during this period, 61% are in the amplification phases.

On the other hand, the graph does not objectively show peaks similar to the theoretical peaks of amplification and attenuation. This is probably due to the fact that the number of wars per year is still relatively low, but could also be due to the list of wars used. The result is only significant if we take the total number for all years of the amplification phases and the total number for all years of the mitigation phases.

This finding raises several questions:

  • Is the list of wars used objective?
    There is no (or at least I do not know of), to date, a database on wars that is an accepted reference for all actors interested in this subject. It is a colossal task to have such a database that would serve as a reference for all statistics. It would be necessary to have one in order to arrive at an objective statistical demonstration. The list of COW wars used should pose little challenge.
  • Are 38% and 59% more wars, depending on the periods selected, significant?
    There is a relatively small but real amplification of wars that confirms what has been observed in the contexts described with the “war cycle”.

Limits of the demonstration

Several limitations are known:

  • The list of wars used contains only the year of its outbreak, without indicating the precise date. As a consequence, one would have to go back to the list and add the exact date of the beginning of the war, and then check for each war whether or not it is in the mitigation or amplification phase. In the first demonstration presented, the phase of the year is defined if the phase is longer than 6 months in the year.
  • The list of wars puts all wars on the same level, from the smallest to the biggest. Sometimes, it is only slightly violent demonstrations that are considered as wars. To confirm a phenomenon of amplification and attenuation, it would be necessary to define a weight for each war.

From 1900 to 1941, is it significant?

The number of wars during the attenuation phases from 1900 to 1941 is almost the same as during the amplification phases of the same period.

Does this result mean that there is no “War Cycle” demonstrated over the period 1900 to 1941?

When we look at the list of COW wars, we see that:

  • There are 8 wars during the mitigation phase from 1934 to 1937
  • There are 5 wars during the amplification phase from 1938 to 1941

It is paradoxical to claim that the period preceding the Second World War from 1934 to 1937 was more violent than the period from 1938 to 1941, which includes three years of the Second World War. Why such a result? Because during World War II, the list of COW wars shows almost no wars other than World War II. The successive wars started during the second world war are not visible.

What to conclude? Starting from a simple list of wars, even if it is validated by the actors involved in war studies, is not enough. A monstrous war like the Second World War has less weight in this statistical calculation than the small wars that preceded the Second World War. And yet the 2 world wars help to demonstrate the “War Cycle” by the method of contexts.

Is it enough to refuse to take into account this calculation? YES, and this poses a global problem of method.

Documents to redo the calculation

Click on the link to access the document:

Update August 8, 2022

Russia-Ukraine: preparing and building the post-war

Whether it is tomorrow, next year, in 5 years or in 10 years, there will be a post-war period. It will have to be prepared and built.

The global problem will be the same and can be imagined and anticipated as of now. It is not European practice to think beyond the short and medium term, but we should build on the short, medium and long term.

In the very short term, each belligerent contributes to the escalation and hopes to settle the problem militarily. Russia still hopes to crush Ukraine, starting with the Donbass, and Ukraine is looking for such military assistance that it could at least stabilize the situation in the short or medium term, or even win the war. We might as well say that the post-war period will not begin any time soon, but the post-war period could dynamite a large part of the existing organizations in Europe as well as the traditional economic flows which may not be re-established for a very long time.

The aim here is to identify the various important points of this post-war period:

  • Europe-Russia partnership
    In 2022, talking about a Europe-Russia partnership may make people smile or possibly feel indignant. What kind of partnership can we be talking about if the other party does not respect any commitment and any previous treaty? The Budapest agreements, which ensured the independence of Ukraine by Russia, have not been respected. The spirit of the Minsk agreements which recognized the whole territory (except Crimea) including that of the separatists, as part of Ukraine is not respected. What to think of a partner who unilaterally changes the terms of a contract and the currency of payment? Is Russia looking for vassals who bow to its mood? This is how Russia is perceived today. Such a partnership is not realistic today. The vast majority of the Russian population lives in the European part of Russia. Turning to Asia, as Russia is doing now, seems to be a reaction of denial, of spite and of the will to power.
    This point of a partnership will be important.
  • European security
    The OSCE came into being because some European countries wanted to avoid a war in Europe with the USSR and the socialist bloc. It must be recognized that the OSCE does not fulfill the main mission for which it was built. In order not to lose face, the OSCE is multiplying side activities, but this does not prevent it from being useless today in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. Even worse, its inability to control a cease-fire and to bring about any solution has probably been a factor favoring the new war of 2022. It will be necessary to rebuild an European security organization as the post-war period of the Second World War rebuilt the UN on the ruins of the League of Nations.
  • NATO
    This is another face of European security , as a compensation for the inability to have an European organization that ensures the security of everyone. Has Russia noticed the opposite effect of what it wanted to achieve? Russia wanted to keep countries away from NATO: several countries are rushing to join. Russia has just given NATO a new lease on life with a clear objective: to defend every country against Russia. A moribund alliance resurrected thanks to Russia: bravo Mr Putin!
  • A new world order
    The Security Council is not functioning and is unable to play a role in facilitating the resolution of the Russia-Ukraine war. Something will have to be done, if only to reform the functioning of the Security Council. A new world order is not just about replacing one imperialism with another, equally or even more arbitrary one. Of course a new order is needed, but one built on rules common to all and capable of being respected without being changed unilaterally by one or more countries that confuse order with dictatorship.

And of course a Russia-Ukraine settlement. In April 2022, the Russia-Ukraine negotiation is an attempt by Russia to obtain by diplomacy what it intends to obtain by force. It will probably take a while for Russia to appear to be somewhat serious in the negotiations. We will find ourselves in a situation similar to that of the Minsk 1 or 2 agreements that will have to be renegotiated. The territory occupied by the separatists and Russia will be different, but it will be necessary to start from a new reality to rebuild something that could be “the Ksnim agreements”, or how to look for one’s future by looking at it from the past in what seem a reverse order.

It will then be necessary:

  • Find a way out or scenarios,
  • Establish a cease-fire,
  • Establish a system for supervising the cease-fire,
  • Enforce the cease-fire,
  • Rebuild what has been destroyed,
  • and let many years pass before a true reconciliation between the two countries is achieved.

It would be nice if we did not make the same mistakes that were made and if, for once, we could enforce a cease-fire that would hold.

Updated on April 27, 2022

Ukraine-Russia: Neutrality and Donbass

Russia would like Ukraine to opt for neutrality, but allows itself to take Donbass and Luhansk + some other territories. Is this really serious?

If Russia were credible, it would offer neutrality and a guarantee that Ukrainian territory would be respected (possibly outside Crimea at first, as long as there is no agreement on Crimea).

Instead, Russia takes, supposedly in the name of independent republics, a good part of the Ukrainian territory and asks, in addition, for neutrality by not joining NATO or its successor: an European defense

Russia intends to impose both on Ukraine, first, and then on its other neighbors.

Which country will accept to have part of its territory amputated for the benefit of Russia or its allies and at the same time accept to be neutral?

The immediate result is that all countries will rush to NATO.

NATO, which had an almost flat electroencephalogram, has just found a new youth and a real utility: to defend itself against Russia, resurrecting its initial goals to defend itself against the USSR.

So, can we really make a proposal for the Donbass when Russia occupies a whole series of territories around it and allows itself to bomb and destroy elsewhere than in the Donbass?

It seems difficult. We understand that Russia considers massive bombing as a good way to advance negotiations in the hope of surrender. But unfortunately, this leads to a blockage.

Then ? To be resumed when Russia’s intentions are clearer.

To be continued if there is new information

updated on April 11, 2022

Ukraine-Russia: What agreement? Crimea

The idea is to successively test different ideas and adapt them if there is feedback.

So let’s start with Crimea.

Crimea’s belonging to Ukraine is a curiosity of history: a gift made by Khrushchev to Ukraine of the Crimean peninsula which is largely Russian, starting with Sevastopol. What is given is given. Its resumption by Russia is not justifiable: a stunt. The referendum held in 2 weeks makes no sense. On the other hand, to propose a referendum under international control makes sense, but it is necessary to determine 2 things

  • The conditions under which this referendum can take place (population concerned, absence of censorship, authorization of the ukrainian language , control of the referendum, etc. )
  • The question of the referendum

On this last point, there are many possibilities that can be transformed into questions:

  • Autonomous Republic attached to Ukraine or Russia
  • Independent Republic
  • Autonomous Republic associated with Russia and Ukraine
    This may seem strange, but there are real and funny situations: a state can exist and have a form of two-headed power on which it depends: for example, the state of Andorra depends on both the French Republic (the president in title) and a bishop. Such an association of two states may seem strange but is possible. Decisions can only be applied with the agreement of the two associated sponsors, but the day-to-day management is always done by a local authority proposed by the sponsors and validated of local representatives. So Crimea could be simultaneously attached to Ukraine and Russia

On the other hand, a referendum would only make sense if a free press allows everyone to express themselves and if the opponents have the right to exist and to express themselves.

This would require at least 6 months to a year of preparation.

What does Kiev think? The question has not yet been asked. Kiev’s only chance would be to achieve an attractive internal status for minorities. That is to say? Think about it …

There can be a clause saying that Kiev can ask for this referendum whenever it wants, with a one-year deadline for its realization.

The next point will be on the Donbass if there is a beginning of agreement on the point “Crimea”, ie:

  • body in charge of the supervision of the referendum: OSCE or UN,
  • retained questions (later we can remove some with the agreement of the 2, but not add any.

If Ukraine and Russia are not aware, nothing more will happen.

to be continued, if someone finds some interest in the subject

Updated on April 11, 2022

Russia-Ukraine War: Facts, “War Cycle” and past Return


February 22, 2022 Russian troops enter the Donbass occupied by the separatists

On 23 February the war was extended to the whole of Ukraine with the clear objective of taking total control of Ukraine. One could speak of a desire for organized dismemberment. Crimea remains in Russia, Donbass and Luhansk are extended and given to the “self-proclaimed republics” and what remains will be occupied militarily with all the ingredients of a military control, including dismissal, even execution or imprisonment of everything that does not correspond to what the Russians want.

The fighting is ongoing. If there is serious resistance from the Ukrainian army, it is difficult to imagine that the struggle between the pot of clay and the pot of iron will end in the victory of the pot of clay.

Everyone is in shock. I had to force myself to try to make a coherent objective assessment of this research to write these few lines.

War Cycle

The January 23 text “Does a cyclical phenomenon favor War and Peace ?” contained the forecast analysis of wars in the period 2022-2026 for Europe which was updated on December 30, 2021 and has changed little in the last 2 or 3 years.

Overall, it said that there would be a war that would involve:

  • a country of the former socialist bloc
  • with a direct or indirect Russian component

The analysis ended with an analogy to the 2008 Georgia and 2014 Ukrainian wars, indicating that it would likely be on a larger scale

See: european context This analysis has not been updated with respect to the situation created since February 22, just to make it possible to consult the forecast.

We are theoretically a little more than a month away from the beginning of the amplification phase, but as the phases are approximate, the forecasts were presented for the period 2022-2026

The prediction of the “War Cycle” is therefore accurate, even if an initiative of such magnitude was not imagined and described in the forecast.

Once again, this confirms the “War Cycle”, even if it is sad to say that it is true..

Past Return

In relation with the “Return Theory”, what does this war remind us of?

  • Return of 2014 = first return according to the “Return Theory”, generally not very important compared to that of 25 years and which in this case is multiplied by an unmeasurable factor
  • Return of the USSR and its usual management of the wills of emancipation, except that we have never had such an outburst of violence and destruction (it is a continuation of the reverse Return of the disintegration of the USSR started in 2014)
  • Return of the carving up of Poland in 1939 by a joint action of Nazi Germany and the Soviets?

Whether in terms of the number of deaths, refugees, destruction, troops involved or consequences, there is no known event strictly comparable to the attack of a small or medium-sized country by a large one. We will have to wait for some time to be able to make an objective assessment, but the European demons of war are back on a scale that no one would have dared to imagine just two weeks ago.

What can we conclude?

It is not glorious to try to show an intellectual victory for having described the probable outline of a war that confirms the “War Cycle”

It is frightening to note with incredulity the “fake news” used to justify this war:

  • genocide by Ukrainians
  • Ukrainian Nazi regime
  • democratically elected power called puppet

Have they gone mad, unable to distinguish the truth from the “fake news” invented from scratch, most often by their own services or sympathizers? The truth does not matter in Russia, what matters is that the appearance presented is believed, even if it is false or too partisan to be credible.

A bit like the war against Iraq in 2003, which successively invented “nuclear weapons” and terrorist groups.

Is it the war that pushes one to say anything and invent these state lies? It seems so, as if the justification given was only a rattle for fools like us who believe everything they are told.

February 27, 2022

Europe-Russia : 2022 Crisis

What does the Clock of the Unconscious tell us?

2 elements are necessary to get an idea of what can happen:

Since 2014, both have been involved and provide additional information:

  • The war in Ukraine started in 2014 is in line with the “War Cycle“, in the European context and this information does not seem to be known yet by the main actors involved in this crisis. It would be better if they knew it, but it is difficult for me to do more than make information available, even if hardly anyone reads it so far.
  • The “Return” of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the USSR began in 2014. It is a return of a negative type. That is, it is the opposite of the original event that gives the impression of reappearance. Russia is surfing on this impression of the return of the USSR that had never been digested. This return continues in 2022 and other returns are added to it, like the first return in 2014 of the war in Ukraine

What does the “War Cycle” tell us?

See the synthesis (accessible through the link on the word “synthesis”), recently updated as well as the European context. If he says that there will be a war, whose context will be linked to Russia and the former socialist countries, he does not say when and not necessarily in Ukraine.

What do the “Returns from the Past” tell us?

To have events punctuated simultaneously by the “War Cycle” and the “Return Theory” is rather rare, but it is the case since 2014. As a reminder, the “Return Theory” indicates that a past event, having marked the collective unconscious, can be relived at a multiple of 3085 days (8 years 5 months and a half). The most frequent occurrence is 3 times (25 years) or 6 times (50 years).

There may be occurrences of once (8 years and some to + or -6 months) but they are not very marked. There is no example of the same war restarted on a very large scale after a first return, which means that a new war Ukraine Russia on a large scale does not correspond to what is predicted by the “Return Theory”. On the other hand, the current first return may be an opportunity to relive the event of 2014. When we talk about the Ukraine-Russia war, are we talking about the 2014 one or a new one? In relative time, we are a few weeks away from the outbreak of the 2014 war. Contemporaries may be confusing the future with the past of 8 years ago. This is a possible and known effect of return phenomena.

Paradoxically, this feverish episode could provide official recognition of Russia’s direct involvement since 2014. And if Russia really does invade Ukraine, all of Russia’s political and diplomatic rhetoric since 2014 shatters. This is not in line with Putin’s and Russia’s behavior in recent years: doing and denying what is done to try to smear the opponent as much as one can and claim that he alone is responsible.

The “Return of 25 years” started in 2014 continues, but it is not known for how long. To sum it up, “Russia thinks it is the USSR but will never become the USSR again” The similarity will stop at the thirst for power without being able to compare the means of the former USSR and the current Russia. Certainly, Russia has good military assets such as hypersonic missiles, but the adventurism of some private mercenaries does not make a powerful army respected on the whole planet.


Conflicting signals are brought by 2 applications of the Clock of the Unconscious. A new all-out war between Russia and Ukraine is not the most likely. According to the actors themselves as Ukraine, the situation has not evolved on the ground and does not confirm an imminent war. Panic or exaggerated psycho-drama or confusion with the unconscious of the first return, as if we thought we were in 2014? One of these explanations is the most likely, even if nothing can be definitively excluded. A fabricated event is one of those hypotheses of a crude attempt to legitimize an action, but I still consider it unlikely. If this kind of creation of events is widely used in Russia to eliminate opponents, it is unlikely that the rest of the world is fooled by it

So it’s a wait-and-see situation, despite the loud sounds of a boot that sound more like a scare tactic than imminent action.

February 3, 2022

2022: a good and rich year to come

As a reminder, this is a website for the communication of the research on the Clock of the Unconscious of Naej DRANER. The communications are not systematic and regular. Only when there is something to say about one of the subjects in progress.

The information made available is partial. It will be completed as and when interest is shown by those who become aware of it. Most of the information is available, but some subjects are not yet available.

Let’s not tell ourselves a story. We don’t know if there is at least one person who has understood the whole thing accurately. The reactions are absent and oscillate between indifference and probably snickering. Is this a reason not to communicate anything? The philosophy of this site is simple: we make information available to those who want to try to understand and find an added value.

The dogs bark and the caravan passes: this is a good summary of the current situation.

Why is 2022 going to be a good and rich year?

  • First of all, it is necessary to make an assessment of the period 2010-2022: the most fruitful period since these researches were started. It will be necessary to explain why and the elements of this fruitfulness.
  • The period to come: 2022 to 2026 is already underway. The discussions begun between NATO and Russia are part of it and it is now necessary to explain the context so that those who are interested understand it and can act accordingly
  • We must try to find a form of expression that is understandable and that avoids the intellectual flight of those who read it by reacting to a subject other than the one presented. They reassure themselves by reacting or feigning indifference, but their reactions simply indicate that they have not understood and are missing the point. It is possible that the author is expressing himself or herself poorly, so an effort must be made. The author may be alone on his subject, which is a pity. It would be easier if there were reactions, but you can’t force someone to react to a subject they don’t understand.
  • Several new questions (due to the evolution of ideas) have not yet been expressed.

For all these reasons, there will be a lot to come during this year 2022. The author and the site are not dead: they will simply come out of a break.

The “Contexts” part of the “Cycle of Wars” has already been updated in December 2021

This is a very small part of the topics to be updated and explained in 2022, but it is an essential part for those who want to anticipate the future.

January 13, 2022


Donbass: what is the status of the ceasefire on June 2, 2021

If someone asks about the status of the ceasefire in the Donbass in Ukraine, it is possible to give details from different sources: Ukrainian army, separatist armed forces and SMM (Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine).

As a reminder the war started in April 2014. A first ceasefire was declared in September 2014. There have been many other ceasefires that have never been followed by a complete ceasefire without any violations for several days. The ceasefire has always been fictitious, in the form of more or less strong lulls. The best ceasefire is that of July 27, 2020. It gave rise, for a few weeks, to a very low level of violations. This is no longer the case in 2021, and the level of violations is similar to that which preceded the ceasefire of 27 July 2020, although it is a little lower, but with very strong variations and can reach more than 1,000 violations in one day.

In recent weeks, there was no longer a cease-fire or even a serious lull.

If we take here the day of June 2, 2021, it is that there are three reports available but globally inconsistent.

The Ukrainian news agency “Unian” representing the Ukrainian army and the DAN news agency representing the separatist DPR forces both report that there were no cease-fire violations. For once, which is rare, each side agrees that the other respected the ceasefire throughout the day on June 2 (See the articles available at the end of this article)

The SMM published on 3 June 2021 in the evening the report 127/2021 on the day of 2 June 2021. The SMM report mentions 360 violations and 33 explosions (cumulative Donetsk and Luhansk sectors)

How to explain such a gap between 0 violations for combatant representatives and 360 violations for SMM observers?

To the question whether the SMM report is credible and its figures accurate, the answer is YES. There is no doubt that there were this number of violations and 33 explosions, which is a moderately high level in Donbass. However, the SMM day starts at 7:30 pm the day before and ends at 7:30 pm. Some violations and explosions presented by the SMM as belonging to the day of June 2 took place on June 1. Thus, 61 violations and 11 explosions should be removed. But some others should also be added. Even if we take only the violations and explosions of June 2, the numbers are still significant. Why is the SMM not able to provide data on a full day and only on the day? I honestly don’t know, but it gives the impression that the SMM considers everyone to be adapting to the SMM and not the other way around. On all subjects, the SMM is often out of step and has difficulty adapting to reality and to others: they have no problem that their reports are sometimes published 72 hours after the incidents, as if their reports were useless and nobody ever uses them to debrief or to know if the situation is calm or not. But, on the reality of the SMM information, it is not debatable and it is unfortunately the only reliable source of information, even if it is regrettable that this information is only available when those who give it have time (not to disturb on Sundays and holidays and to wait until the end of the day for the data of the day before to be processed)

So why did both the Ukrainian army and the separatists claim that there were no violations?

We are reduced to hypotheses:

  • There may be an agreement in the works that is unknown at this time
  • The term violation means different things to different people. For the SMM, the slightest shot, whether a light or heavy weapon, is considered a violation
  • The fighting forces in the Donbass have no more rigor in reporting than in action. If there is no immediate threat, the incident is minor, it will not be considered an enemy attack or a violation

Unfortunately, it has been like this for a little less than 7 years: the actors of the Ukrainian conflict in Donbass do not speak the same language and the words do not have the same meaning

Conclusion: the cease-fire is not yet effective, but each of the adversaries seems to recognize that there is no immediate danger and progress on the ground that the SMM figures have difficulty in confirming.

Perhaps a hope for a new and lasting lull,even though it is not true that there was no violation on that day. On June 6, a new communiqué of the Ukrainian army states that there was no violation on June 5, 2021, but the SMM report will not be published for more than a day. If the SMM published all these data in the morning like all components on the spot, we could compare. But since the data of the Ukrainian army are not reliable and on Sunday the DAN agency does not publish anything, we can not conclude anything today. The day after tomorrow, perhaps.
Note added on June 7, 2021 : there was almost no violation on June 5, 2021, according to the SMM report published today. Ukrainian army was right.

Information sources:

Ukrainian army: article from UNIAN

DPR new : article from DAN agency

SMM : report from OSCE site

Article written and published on June 6, 2021