Following an interview with Badr Al-Boussaïdi published in the form of an article and quotes (in Le Monde on June 29), what Oman is currently proposing is equivalent to the “Persian Gulf Council.”

Badr Al-Boussaïdi raises the possibility of a treaty of non-interference and non-aggression among all stakeholders in the Persian Gulf. It is this point that we address here.

What promotes coexistence is the increase in exchanges and contacts between countries

Today, this is how we explain the gradual pacification of Europe and the period of international coexistence in the aftermath of World War II.

A non-aggression treaty is passive and generally does not yield results in the medium and long term

A treaty does not lead to any interaction or exchange beyond the signing of the treaty. When a threat becomes imminent, simply pointing out the treaty’s existence is not enough.

An institution—a forum for ongoing exchanges (political, cultural, economic, and financial) among all member countries—is a dynamic system that continues to have an impact under all circumstances.

Even in turbulent times, there is a constant flow of communication that helps us stay in touch

Conclusion: Don’t pursue the path of a treaty; instead, consider an institution or organization capable of exerting influence.

Furthermore, if you ever plan to offer and sell services, you will need an organization whose international legal status is recognized and as uncontroversial as possible. A “de facto” company without international legal status will be exploited to find a loophole that holds the various countries responsible for these services financially liable. Do not form an informal, unofficial group that refuses to formalize its existence.

June 29, 2026

Naej DRANER

If any reader knows Badr Al-Boussaïdi, Oman’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, please forward this text to him. The French text is considered the original. The U.S. English version is a translation by the author using DeepL, with the most glaring errors corrected manually; it is not certified.

Reference Documents

• Full Text of the Iran-U.S. MOU
• Persian Gulf Council Project summary
• Persian Gulf Council and Iran-US MOU

Lack of a ceasefire monitoring system

This is a hallmark of all the 2025 and 2026 ceasefires initiated by the United States. There is no system for monitoring and/or supervising the ceasefire.

In the vast majority of ceasefires, there are violations, and to prevent each violation from escalating into a new war, a ceasefire oversight body is established.

Its role is:

• Document and track violations,
• contact each party as soon as possible to prevent the situation from escalating and to clarify the misinterpretation that led to the error
• understand the cause of the violations and verify whether they were due to a misinterpretation (or inadequacy) of the agreement’s rules or a misapplication (a problem in the internal communication of instructions and orders within the respective hierarchies)

Since there is no oversight system, each side interprets the situation as it sees fit, does not report the information up the chain of command, and decides on its own what military action to take—which was the case on June 26, 27, and 28, 2026

Let’s break down the incident that took place on Thursday, June 25

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) plan calls for the evacuation of a total of 11,000 seafarers aboard 600 ships—who were stranded in the Gulf due to the war in the Middle East—via two separate routes, one near the coast of Iran and the other near the coast of Oman, in coordination with local authorities.

There are therefore two possible routes: one on the Iranian side and one on the Omani side. Each ship has the option of taking either route, and strict procedures have been established by the IMO to contact each ship and facilitate its evacuation.

The IMO had obtained security assurances to ensure that ships would not be targeted, stating that the evacuation process would resume as soon as it had “received further confirmation to that effect.”

A ship that passed through the Omani route was targeted. The U.S. Navy then shot down three other drones that appeared to be attempting to target ships undergoing evacuation.

Who attacked the ship while it was in transit?

Presumably, the Revolutionary Guards opened fire because they believed that any ship should have obtained their authorization beforehand.

Is this an error in the terms of the agreement or in its implementation within the Iranian hierarchy?

Presumably both. Believing that one has exclusive rights—including over the passage of ships through Oman’s territorial waters—is a misinterpretation of the original agreement and is absolutely not what the IMO negotiated. On the other hand, the Revolutionary Guards likely do not have a clear understanding of what falls within their jurisdiction and probably have operational orders that ignore the reality of the opposing party’s territorial waters.

What should be done?

The IMO plans to work with stakeholders to clarify the rules for implementing the evacuation plan.

But that is not enough. We should begin—at a level such as the “Persian Gulf Council” (or another body that considers itself responsible)—by sending the representatives of Iran and Oman a map indicating the boundary of the territorial waters between Iran and Oman, and have each side confirm the current, internationally recognized boundary. This will require as many rounds of back-and-forth as necessary, but we must arrive at a boundary recognized by both parties. It may take time, but it is necessary. We will need this on an ongoing basis, starting with mine clearance.

Why did the United States and Iran each “launch” retaliatory strikes?

Because everyone believes they are acting within their rights, and no clear system for monitoring the ceasefire has been established. If such a system had been properly established, there would be an arbitration process to identify errors or oversteps and correct the interpretation and application of the rules. This situation could continue until the war resumes.

“Poor” coordination—if not nonexistent—as exemplified by mine clearance

Let’s take the example of mine clearance. Originally, the recognized international shipping lanes were located in Omani territorial waters. Iran saw fit to leave a few mines there, just to divert all ships from these international shipping lanes and propose new, safe routes—which, as luck would have it, are in Iranian territorial waters—in order to justify an Iranian right of passage. This is called international extortion, with a few “forgotten” mines (between 0 and 80, depending on the source).

The agreement provides for mine clearance but does not specify who is responsible for what.

If the mines are located in Omani waters, any mine-clearance operations would have to be carried out with the consent of the Omani authorities (hence the importance of clearly defining territorial waters).

Did you know that the United States have no minesweepers in the Middle East? Did you know that three high-performance U.S. minesweepers were sent to the scrapyard in January 2026? In other words, only European ships are operational and ready to respond if called upon. And it’s likely that the Iranians no longer have any minesweepers either. And they’ll act as if they still have the capability to intervene. But Oman can ask whomever it wants to clear its territorial waters of mines. The Iranians will need to be notified, and steps must be taken to ensure they don’t attack these vessels due to a misinterpretation of the mine-clearing mission.

Who is responsible for coordinating mine clearance?

Not the Americans, since they no longer have any operational ships in the Middle East, and it would be better for a neutral country to handle the mine clearance. We could also ask the Iranians to come and clear the identified mines, but there is likely no clearly defined coordination in place. It’s not very complicated to bring together 3 to 5 military personnel from Gulf countries and establish the necessary coordination. According to my information, no one is really addressing this issue—neither the Americans nor the Iranians; a “Persian Gulf Council” could have taken charge of this matter and could still do so to mobilize the European ships ready to intervene. It will take them 2 to 4 weeks to clear the international shipping lane. They are ready to do so, but would like solid guarantees of support, and above all, they need countries bordering the Persian Gulf to be willing to roll up their sleeves and get the ball rolling.

….

June 28, 2026

Naej DRANER

The weakness of Naej DRANER’s role stems from the lack of a reliable intermediary and feedback mechanism.

The security-policy solution architect defines the solution, presents it to stakeholders, and refines it as necessary.

In the case of the “Persian Gulf Council,” there was a feeling that some ideas were partially adopted, without it being possible to determine who was actually informed and at what level. There was no reliable feedback to gauge reactions and refine the proposals. It appears that one or two countries were informed of the project, but not all of them.

It happens—unfortunately quite often—that the intermediary ends up seeing himself as the architect and takes advantage of his position as an intermediary to modify the proposals on his own and appear as the sole actor. When this happens, N.D. can no longer do anything, neither as an architect nor as an advisor. In short, he is bypassed and no longer has any control over the project.

In other words, N.D.’s role can only be properly fulfilled in close collaboration with the president of the Persian Gulf Council and its secretary. If they never come into being, nothing will ever happen.

Consulting services are never submitted in advance to any government other than those involved with the target organization. For example, this would be a matter between me and the Persian Gulf Council (if the latter had been established), including the cost of the consulting services (I would need to go on-site and assess the situation quickly, but I have no budget to do so).

Ideally, there would be an association of diplomats capable of relaying and reporting back on ideas and reactions.

This has not prevented advice from being strictly and correctly implemented in the past, but that is not the case here.

June 25, 2026

Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)

The Strait of Hormuz crisis is unlikely to happen again. Saudi Arabia is set to expand its pipelines, which will allow it to bypass the Strait of Hormuz; the United Arab Emirates is set to double its pipeline capacity; and Iraq has planned an alternative solution. Qatar, Oman, and a few other countries will remain dependent on the Strait of Hormuz, but if another crisis were to occur—provided the planned projects are completed by then—less than half of the traffic would be affected.

Customers who were dependent on the Strait of Hormuz will take steps to reduce their dependence.

There could be a temporary, significant increase in maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, but this is expected to be temporary for the next two years.

Will the Persian Gulf Council ever see the light of day? Probably not; the major countries that depend on the Strait of Hormuz are taking a different approach. They prefer the security of a pipeline to the vagaries of a single country’s whims within an organization it claims to control.

It made sense and will continue to make sense for their collective future, but the mood is far from cheerful. They’re under indirect attack from Iran, which resorts to threats and blackmail, and are being held hostage by their great American ally, which has committed—on their behalf—to making them cough up a few hundred billion.

Are we implicated by the American promises of funding? I’m not. If wealth is the art of making others pay for what they promise, it’s easy to see why they’re so rich.

In its culture, Iran of past generations had a genuine tradition of collective water management. The Islamic Republic of Iran has squandered this reality by making inappropriate decisions over the years. Some even say that certain major Iranian cities might have to relocate as a result of incompetent water management in a country that had historically managed its water resources effectively.

Only time will tell.

June 24, 2026

Naej DRANER

Reference Documents

• Full Text of the Iran-U.S. MOU
• Persian Gulf Council Project summary
• Persian Gulf Council and Iran-US MOU

Short- and medium-term needs that could justify a “Persian Gulf Council”

The Iran-U.S. agreement explicitly calls for a return to normalcy within 30 days. However, after 60 days, the applicable rules will be determined by Iran, Oman, and the countries bordering the Persian Gulf.

The Persian Gulf countries could get involved if they feel the need to.

The short- and medium-term need is :

• to assure all parties involved of the security of the Strait of Hormuz,
• to regulate traffic if everyone were to try to access it all at once.

If a Persian Gulf council were established with clear traffic rules accepted by all coastal countries, this could help restore normal traffic.

Until the mine clearance is complete, there is a risk that should theoretically be eliminated in 30 days, but for which we have no visibility.

Estimate traffic demand once conditions have returned to normal, after 30, 60, and 90 days.

Each country bordering the Persian Gulf is able to estimate its theoretical demand for 30, 60, and 90 days.

The first step would be to collect these estimates and assess whether there is a need to regulate future traffic.

If there is a risk of exceeding the maximum traffic capacity, a reservation and time-slot system will need to be implemented. It may be free or fee-based, but preparations for such a reservation and traffic control system are necessary.

Within the next 30 days, it is unlikely that traffic will reach full capacity. Everyone is wary of the constant contradictory announcements. The strait is open, then closed, then open, then closed, and so on…

After 30 days? We could make an estimate. If there is no risk of exceeding normal traffic levels, it might be possible to take no action.

The Persian Gulf Council could now be established to influence the definition of future navigation rules. The issue could involve both regulating traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and internal regulation within the Persian Gulf, if everyone wants to make up for lost time and waiting ships need to be docked in the Persian Gulf.

These countries could survive without a “Persian Gulf Council,” but it would be better if they could demonstrate that they are jointly defining and shaping the future of the Persian Gulf.

This decision rests with the countries bordering the Persian Gulf. To date, Naej DRANER is nothing more than an idea-monger, with no official role related to the Persian Gulf.

June 22, 2026

Naej DRANER

P.S.: Recently, there have been several visits to this site from Iran. We do not know whether these were made by private individuals or by Iranian government officials.

Reference Documents

• Full Text of the Iran-U.S. MOU
• Persian Gulf Council Project summary

Item 5 of the MOU

In other words, this detail was not part of the direct negotiations with the U.S. but is part of negotiations with the states bordering the Persian Gulf, which corresponds to the definition of the “Persian Gulf Council.”

The “Persian Gulf Council” has a maximum of 60 days to define the new rules concerning the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

For traffic to resume normally, clear rules will be necessary in any case, and an announcement by the “Persian Gulf Council” would be welcome.

Is there a cause-and-effect relationship between the texts written about the “Persian Gulf Council” and the MOU? Probably, but the intermediary has not been identified. Presumably, it is an Asian country that intervened indirectly.

Item 6 of the MOU

The Americans could not resist promising financial aid, even though they state loud and clear that they will not be the ones to pay for it. Since the Persian Gulf Council is not a forum for economic and political integration, it is not affected by this American promise. At most, the Persian Gulf Council could allocate a sum (no more than one-tenth of the amount specified in point 6 of the MOU) to encourage Iran to honor its commitments. For example, these funds could be contingent on Iran not blockading the Strait of Hormuz. Whenever the Strait of Hormuz is unilaterally closed by a country, there will be a sanction or a substantial reduction in the funds promised as part of the “Persian Gulf Council’s” goodwill cooperation. We’re not going to spend our time closing and reopening the Strait of Hormuz at the drop of a hat and rewarding the closures of the strait that the Persian Gulf countries need for their economic activities.

It is recommended that the Persian Gulf Council choose its official advisors carefully. Naej DRANER has never proposed anything equivalent to point 6, but as soon as the Persian Gulf Council is officially established, one or two U.S. advisors will show up demanding to take the reins… and they will propose something equivalent to point 6—which Naej DRANER will never propose to the “Persian Gulf Council.”

General Comments on the MOU

• The timing is unclear and impractical. The terms “immediately” and “within 30 days” are used interchangeably to mean the same thing. This is unclear and, frankly, ambiguous.
• The key players in the Lebanese war—namely Israel and Hezbollah—do not appear to have been involved and do not feel concerned.
• There is no system for monitoring the ceasefire. As a result, as soon as an incident occurs, the opposing side responds militarily, causing the situation to escalate.
• Lots of good intentions, few constraints. If the United States reneges on its commitments to the other parties—whose consent it didn’t even seek—the agreement could become a stillborn effort.
• This does nothing to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, unless a deal equivalent to the 2015 agreement is renegotiated, which would take at least six months to a year.

The “Persian Gulf Council” must exist

It won’t solve all the problems, but it can alleviate some of them and send a clear message to everyone who uses the Strait of Hormuz:

• It is implicitly understood in the MOU, even though it is not explicitly stated.
• A temporary chairman must be selected; this position cannot be held by Oman or Qatar, as they cannot act as both judge and party in the dispute involving the United States and Iran.
• A secretary must be appointed.
• All work to be carried out within the two months must be initiated .

N.D. has a golden rule: when people indirectly use his advice without ever acknowledging it, he plays dead and “forgets” to mention an important condition that he had forgotten “completely unintentionally” to explain earlier. Of course, N.D. will be very very sorry if, without his advices, the project does not exit any longer.

June 21, 2026

Naej DRANER

What kills an idea is not discussion, but indifference and the lack of debate.

The “Quesako Cycle” is likely the most significant discovery regarding wars that we need to understand and promote. However, the “Quésako Cycle” can only be fully understood through a whole series of new concepts and research:

• the statistics on wars cited in the “Correlates of War” (COW) studies, that is, a wide range of information related to wars,
• The concept of “context,” as presented in the book “A Cyclical Phenomenon that favors War,”
• the concept of the threshold for the outbreak of war, presented in the same book,
• the rules used for war predictions, presented in the same book

So far, a few people have listened politely but have never spoken up, one way or the other.

The concepts presented here are opposite to Western thinking. Indeed, the West has always been content to claim that it resolves wars by winning them. For most contemporary leaders, peace means winning the war. And to save face, everyone strives to prove that they will ultimately be militarily vindicated.

Whether it is Russia, Ukraine, Europe, the United States, China, Israel, Hamas, Hezbollah, or Iran, they all believe that the coming peace is their victory—which they see as the source of peace—when in fact it is merely a means of preparing for the next war.

A debate would require everyone to express their opinions and do so rationally. A debate requires listening to all arguments, including those that are uncomfortable.

It is time to return to the basics: “Let a hundred flowers bloom again, and let everyone speak on such a subject.”

A debate will lead everyone to refine their arguments and find a suitable and convincing line of reasoning. The “Quésako Cycle” will only survive if such a debate takes place. For now, there have only been a few polite comments limited to a select few circles; these comments aren’t even being shared openly. No one has objectively presented all of this research in a convincing manner.

It is much more a Chinese than a Western mindset to dare to acknowledge the importance of such a cycle; yet the Chinese would still need to dare to speak openly among themselves, rather than in conventional, non-contradictory discourse.

Two major wars (Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah-Iran) continue without anyone daring to present the “Quésako Cycle” as the most likely cause of these two wars. Are we burying our heads in the sand, or are we refusing to engage in debate?

June 10, 2026

Traffic statistics for the website “Horlogedelinconscient.fr” show:

• most visitors access the site directly via a direct link (likely one of the links I shared and that others have reposted),
• There are two countries from which visitors access the site most frequently: China and Singapore. In China, traffic comes from a city in the northwest, but not from major cities like Beijing or Shanghai.
• To date, there is no indication as to whether the interest in these two countries is “natural” or linked to authorities or universities in those countries.
• The few visits from European countries are limited. This seems to stem more from curiosity than from sustained interest.

As the author, I still haven’t updated the English translation of the French presentation for the Quésako Cycle (Présentation Cycle Quesako 2026-03-30 – FR), since I’m not sure who might be interested and who isn’t. I plan to do it, but without any direct feedback, I’m not very motivated.

Currently, research on the “Quésako Cycle” is not at a standstill; rather, it is:

• on hold, due to a lack of official interest,
• unknown to the key players who should be aware of it (the UN, leaders of major countries such as the United States, Russia, Europe, NATO, China, Israel, Arab countries, etc.)
• no debate has taken place on the subject
• no official submissions have been made to scientific journals (I am responsible for this, due to the lack of any response from those who have access to them)

However, in order to move forward, I would need the support of others. You don’t have to be a great scientist to cooperate and help, but you do need the intellectual courage to see through the necessary official debate.

Currently, the reference materials are:

• The book “Un phénomène cyclique qui favorise les guerres” published in French by Éditions l’Harmatan,
• The American English translation “A cyclical phenomenon that favors war?“ is slightly more up-to-date but has not yet been published,
• The French PowerPoint presentation “Présentation Cycle Quesako 2026-03-30 – FR“, designed to be shown in diaporama mode. Translation is in progress. Mainly graphs and pictures need some time. The text is easily translatable.

The question arises:

• whether priority should be given to the research work on the “Cycle Quésako”
• or whether, on the contrary, priority should be given to Naej DRANER’s work on conflict resolution

The two are complementary.

It seems to me that the priority should be to highlight the war predictions made in December 2021 and clearly explain why those predictions were possible and why current leaders and diplomats are avoiding the subject. The two main ongoing wars—Ukraine-Russia and Israel-Palestinians-Iran-Lebanon—are concrete examples demonstrating the relevance and reality of the “Quésako Cycle.” It is not normal that the parties involved in these wars are unaware of it.

I am urgently seeking outspoken individuals from any country who can speak out on this issue and spark an international debate.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

Jean-Baptiste RENARD (author and researcher) and Naej DRANER (international troublemaker)

June 4, 2026

Currently, the Ukraine-Russia front line is relatively stable. For many months, Russia was very slowly chipping away at Ukrainian territory. That trend has stopped and is now reversing. We must be cautious about the statements coming out of Russia. The Russian military leadership has been making numerous claims of success that do not correspond to reality. Russia is not in a difficult situation, but its official claims—such as regarding the entirety of the Donbas—do not align with a reality that Russia can militarily achieve in the short to medium term. The primary source for the state of the front is the “Institute for the Study of War,” which appears to be the only reliable source I am aware of.

The most likely scenario is that a ceasefire will eventually be declared along the front line, serving as a military pause while discussions and negotiations continue. Whether the ceasefire line lies slightly more on the Russian or Ukrainian side will not change the arrangements that need to be made for the upcoming ceasefire. It would take 3 to 6 months to properly prepare the ceasefire arrangements. This will likely be done in a rush, since no known plan is realistic, whether on the Russian, Ukrainian, American, or European side.

The latest truce during Orthodox Easter offers a preview of what the ceasefire will be like if no preparations are made.

European leaders seem to have no idea what the ceasefire from 2014 to 2022 was like. It was never fully respected, with daily violations numbering in the hundreds or thousands. Nor do these same leaders seem to have a clear idea of what needs to be done. To believe that a few willing countries would be enough to impress and deter Russia stems from either ignorance of the subject or disinformation.

A study was conducted during the 2014–2022 ceasefire. This study helps us understand what needs to be done. Should we resume it? Or should we wait for a few leaders to devise a system that will never work? It’s a shame that we have to wait for a failure to occur before we can explain what would have prevented it. Whether it’s about war, ceasefires, or the peace to come, Europeans have not, so far, shown the kind of open-mindedness that indicates they’re trying to get a handle on these issues. Am I misinformed about their actual knowledge of these matters? Perhaps, but the failure to take an interest in the “Quésako Cycle” is quite revealing of their overall mindset.

Later in 2026, if interest is expressed, everything necessary for preparing a ceasefire will be outlined. For now, it seems as though it won’t even be read.

Naej DRANER

May 21, 2026