Today, none of the proposals made by Russia, Ukraine, Europe, or the United States present a credible system for maintaining the ceasefire.

The security guarantees sought by Ukraine and the Europeans give the impression that a credible and deterrent military force would be sufficient to ensure a ceasefire once it is announced. This will not be enough and will not lead to a credible and permanent ceasefire.

This is also the problem in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Gaza and in the Israeli-Lebanese conflict in southern Lebanon. Israel believes that targeted military operations are sufficient to ensure a ceasefire. This does not guarantee it, but it does make it decidedly fragile.

All these conflicts are currently being managed by people with no previous experience of ceasefires. They are all rediscovering what a ceasefire could be and, day after day, coming up with solutions, or rather non-solutions.

What contributes to maintaining the ceasefire?

• The initial agreement, if it is clear and accepted by the parties, can contribute to its observance
• A permanent ceasefire system, able to fix any incident in the half-day following any incident.
• A monitoring and inspection system for the warring parties capable of intervening anywhere in each camp.
• Permanent participation of the military forces of each camp in the ceasefire system, under the supervision of the monitoring and inspection system.
• Ongoing analysis of incidents to develop the ceasefire system and enhance its effectiveness.

None of this has been clearly addressed and described in the ongoing negotiations, according to the information available to date.

Naej DRANER

Naej DRANER is an analyst and architect of political and security solutions. He has studied, in particular, the mechanism that was put in place in 2014 and subsequent years in Donbass. This mechanism has never been able to transform into a permanent ceasefire. Taking this past experience into account, it would be possible to make a concrete proposal.

February 18, 2026

*** Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version) ***

In September 2025, a 20-point settlement plan was proposed. It led to a ceasefire on October 10, 2025, and resulted in UN Resolution 2803, which incorporated the 20 points.

Is there a ceasefire that is actually being enforced?

No. The parties involved are divided on what to call this quasi-ceasefire. Is it a frozen conflict? A low-intensity war? Everyone agrees that it is not a real ceasefire and that the Trump plan is not being implemented.

• Several hundred deaths on the Palestinian side since October
• The Rafah crossing, which was supposed to be opened at the start of the ceasefire (point 8), has only been partially open since February 2, 2026. And even then, it is likely that Israel will do everything it can to allow Palestinians to leave but refuse to allow them to enter or return.
• Points 7 and 8 concerning humanitarian aid have not been implemented as they should have been. They have been revised and amended by Israel, without any connection to the Trump plan.
• Israel is doing what it wants and adapting the initial text of the Trump plan to what it really wants to do, without any reaction from Trump or the organization that claims to be implementing the Trump plan.
• There is no known and recognized mechanism for supervising the ceasefire. Israel uses any incident as a pretext to resume bombing. They have a smart AI-based system that turns toilet noises into truth. The result is that the victims of the incidents apparently have no connection to the origin of the incidents.
• No independent observer or journalist is able to provide an objective view of what is happening in Gaza. Lying and censorship are the norm for Israel, reinforced by the indifference of the Trump team.

Trump is a promoter, not a builder. He knows how to manage publicity and press coverage but is incapable of managing a project. The ceasefire in Gaza is self-managing, so there is no real ceasefire.

During the disarmament of Hamas, the Israeli authorities will probably do everything they can to restart the war: this is what the Jewish supremacists in the Israeli government want. They will find the pretexts that suit them.

Naej DRANER

As a reminder, Resolution 2803 was adopted by the Security Council on November 17, 2025.

February 3, 2026

I understood that the “Peace Council” was a body that would deal with Gaza. I read the charter of the “Peace Council” carefully, but it has nothing to do with Gaza.

What is the status of Phase 1 of the Gaza Peace Plan?

Do you remember? Phase 1 said that the Rafah crossing would be opened as soon as the ceasefire began. Three months later, it is still not open. It was promised that humanitarian aid would be distributed to everyone by the various parties involved. That is not what happened. Israel restricted humanitarian aid, multiplied the conditions for distribution to such an extent that little aid actually arrived, and decreed that a tent peg is a dangerous weapon, to the point that Palestinians do not even have waterproof and comfortable tents. And we’ll stop there to simply say that everything that should have been done was secretly changed by Israel without dear Donald realizing that he had been duped with phase 1 of his plan revised and corrected by Israel without Donald’s dear negotiators noticing and pointing out to him that phase 1 had been emptied of its official content: an empty shell that matched Israel’s ambitions and the naivety of Donald and his crack team.

Donald, please, how can we believe that a World Peace Council will control anything, after your inability to simply implement “phase 1 of Gaza”?

Donald, do you have an aide who could explain to you what a treaty is and what it’s for?

I couldn’t believe my ears: Donald wants Greenland for “security reasons.” He’s doing the same thing G. W. Bush did when he claimed it was about weapons of mass destruction, but really just wanted Iraq’s oil. In this case, it’s about pocketing all the mineral resources, after making everyone believe that there is a security problem.

Donald, have you read the current treaty? It allows you to expand the bases if you don’t have enough space for your essential security equipment. Oh yes, you’re right: none of your colleagues have read the treaties or understood them. It’s true that it’s difficult to move forward and understand anything when the official collaborators know no more than Donald.

It is urgent that you recruit, without saying too much, a collaborator who can discreetly explain to you how a treaty works and how it can be used to add essential security equipment.

Recruitment must be discreet so that no one knows Donald is studying.

January 20, 2026

Naej DRANER

The website “L’Horloge de l’inconscient” has authorized an open forum for which the author is solely responsible. Under no circumstances we can be considered responsible for the content of this article.

Translated with DeepL.com (free version)

October 7, 2023 was a similar event for Israel to September 11 for the Americans.

In both cases, there was a military headlong rush that resembled vengeful carnage rather than a real war.

In both cases, the event justified the unjustifiable. This lasted more than 2 years for the Americans, with multiple wars: Afghanistan, Iraq, etc, etc. The rule of law has been violated on a few occasions (Guantanamo, for example).

How long will this last for the Israelis? Impossible to say at the moment. They have lost all critical sense over the past year and seem incapable of taking the slightest step back.

In the name of the ongoing war, the State of Israel has forgotten to set up a commission of inquiry asking the question: “Why did the intelligence and security services fail?”

If Israel’s security services had worked, there would probably have been fewer than 100 deaths, and many of the horrors witnessed that day would not have taken place. Would reactions have been different? Probably, but Israelis are incapable of asking such a question and debating it.

What were the failings of the Israeli security services that led to October 7th?

They are manifold, and a great deal of thought has been and is being given to them outside Israel:

• failure to exploit intelligence that seemed implausible,
• overestimation of its importance and deterrent effect,
• implementation of a technical surveillance system with no relay or human verification,
• no security force on call to intervene within minutes of any incident
• demotivation of reservists for questionable political reasons.

How long will it take for the Israelis to appoint a commission of inquiry and converge on a conclusion already put forward by external players? “The security services and the army were unable to prevent an event that could have been minimized. No sophisticated weapons were used by the attackers. At most, a few weapons that can be found in any security service and a clear desire to turn such an event into a violent and cruel warlike event, without respecting the slightest law relating to wars”.

This does not change the horror and trauma of October 7th, but it could have led the Israelis to act differently.

Will the Israelis ever ask themselves whether 1,400 dead justifies more than 50,000 dead, and whether it also justifies destroying 70% of all the buildings in Gaza, not to mention the hospitals destroyed, the food shortages maintained and so much more?

And if the 1,400 dead had only been 100 dead if the security services had worked, would that have changed?

One day, yes, they’ll ask themselves that question, but it won’t be tomorrow.

For now, the war goes on, with no prospect other than a total victory, which remains hypothetical.

Naej DRANER

ND2024-1001, November 1, 2024

Naej DRANER is an analyst. He is an architect of a political-security solution who limits himself to the role of architect. His analyses are generally a preparation for the day after and a solution for the short, medium and long term. To build a house, you need an architect, but you also need a contractor. N.D. is not a contractor and can only have an influence if he joins forces with a contractor to design and implement a suitable political-security solution.


Does the war begun on October 7, 2023 confirm the “War Cycle”?

The theoretical amplification peak is in May 2024. This new war is triggered 8 months before the theoretical peak. The prediction before this war broke out was that there would be another war, most likely within +/- 1 year of the theoretical peak.

The October 2023 war confirms the “War Cycle” and reinforces the Arab-Israeli conflict as a remarkable case of the “War Cycle”.

What the forecasts didn’t show, however, was that it would be such a massacre, and probably the most terrible war of this conflict, on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides. The horror has only just begun.

We can see that the intensity of the wars during this phase of amplification is much greater for the Ukraine-Russia war and for the war that has just begun. Is this just a coincidence, or does this amplification phase have a particularly high level of intensity? In current studies, we haven’t yet identified any factors that could determine the intensity of this cyclical phenomenon. We do have a few clues that merit further study, but we can’t be sure.

What’s next for this war?

Our knowledge of the “War Cycle” does not allow us to know how future battles will unfold. They may last several weeks.

The consequences of this war will determine the Israeli-Palestinian future, even if it’s unlikely that anything will move in the coming months.

This war is also a “Return” of 50 years from the Yom Kippur War and 75 years from the first Arab-Israeli war.

In the Arab-Israeli conflict, several wars are a return (in the sense of Return Theory) of another war:

• The 2006 Israeli-Lebanese war is a return of the 1982 war (24 years).

• The current war is a return of the 1973 war (50 years)

• The 1973 Yom Kippur War is itself a throwback to the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948, when Israel was created.

The historical origin of the “War Cycle” is the study of “Returns from the Past” between wars. At certain moments, wars are both an application of the “War Cycle” and of the Return Theory).

What do these returns mean? The Israeli-Palestinian problem is likely to reappear in terms little different from those of 1947.

October 10th 2023

Using the graph “Fatalities in state-based conflicts by Region (1989-2022)” published by UCDP (Uppsala Conflict Data Program), it is possible to reinforce the demonstration of the materialization of the “Return War Cycle”

It is explained in the attached text.

The UCDP data gives more credibility to this issue.

In the next update of the “Recurrent War Cycle”, it will be integrated.

Updated October 25, 2023

In this article, the expression “War Cycle” should be understood as the expression “War Cycle of the Return” in reference to the origin of this “War Cycle” from the Return Theory.

Demonstration Hypothesis

If the “War Cycle” favors wars, it would be logical to demonstrate that there are more wars during the amplification phases.

To verify this, the hypothesis was made to count the number of wars per year from a pre-existing list of wars and to calculate the total of wars for mitigation and amplification phases. If the total number of wars during the amplification phases is more important than for the mitigation phases, it could help to demonstrate the reality of an influcence of this War Cycle on the overall wars

After searching on a search engine for an existing database that could provide a list of wars, the list of wars associated with the V4 version of “Correlates of War” was selected. It contains the list of wars from 1816 to 2007. (Although there is a V6 version of the COW database, I did not find a list of wars equivalent to the V4 version, which is why I used the V4)

For each year from 1900 to 2007 were counted the number of wars per year then during the phases of mitigation and amplification. In addition a graph was made to try to show the peaks of amplification. A comparison was made with the theoretical peaks of the amplification phases.

Demonstration Result

From 1900 to 2000 (the later years are not taken into account so that there are as many mitigation phases as amplification phases ), there are 38% more wars during the amplification phases than during the mitigation phases. Of 342 wars on the COW list during this period, 58% are in the amplification phases.

From 1942 to 2000 (with the same number of mitigation and amplification phases), there are 59% more wars during the amplification phases than during the mitigation phases. Of 225 wars on the COW list during this period, 61% are in the amplification phases.

On the other hand, the graph does not objectively show peaks similar to the theoretical peaks of amplification and attenuation. This is probably due to the fact that the number of wars per year is still relatively low, but could also be due to the list of wars used. The result is only significant if we take the total number for all years of the amplification phases and the total number for all years of the mitigation phases.

This finding raises several questions:

• Is the list of wars used objective?
  There is no (or at least I do not know of), to date, a database on wars that is an accepted reference for all actors interested in this subject. It is a colossal task to have such a database that would serve as a reference for all statistics. It would be necessary to have one in order to arrive at an objective statistical demonstration. The list of COW wars used should pose little challenge.
  
• Are 38% and 59% more wars, depending on the periods selected, significant?
  There is a relatively small but real amplification of wars that confirms what has been observed in the contexts described with the “war cycle”.

Limits of the demonstration

Several limitations are known:

• The list of wars used contains only the year of its outbreak, without indicating the precise date. As a consequence, one would have to go back to the list and add the exact date of the beginning of the war, and then check for each war whether or not it is in the mitigation or amplification phase. In the first demonstration presented, the phase of the year is defined if the phase is longer than 6 months in the year.
  ate.

• The list of wars puts all wars on the same level, from the smallest to the biggest. Sometimes, it is only slightly violent demonstrations that are considered as wars. To confirm a phenomenon of amplification and attenuation, it would be necessary to define a weight for each war.
  

From 1900 to 1941, is it significant?

The number of wars during the attenuation phases from 1900 to 1941 is almost the same as during the amplification phases of the same period.

Does this result mean that there is no “War Cycle” demonstrated over the period 1900 to 1941?

When we look at the list of COW wars, we see that:

• There are 8 wars during the mitigation phase from 1934 to 1937
• There are 5 wars during the amplification phase from 1938 to 1941

It is paradoxical to claim that the period preceding the Second World War from 1934 to 1937 was more violent than the period from 1938 to 1941, which includes three years of the Second World War. Why such a result? Because during World War II, the list of COW wars shows almost no wars other than World War II. The successive wars started during the second world war are not visible.

What to conclude? Starting from a simple list of wars, even if it is validated by the actors involved in war studies, is not enough. A monstrous war like the Second World War has less weight in this statistical calculation than the small wars that preceded the Second World War. And yet the 2 world wars help to demonstrate the “War Cycle” by the method of contexts.

Is it enough to refuse to take into account this calculation? YES, and this poses a global problem of method.

Documents to redo the calculation

Click on the link to access the document:

• COW List of wars
• Dates of phases and amplification peaks
• Excel spreadsheet with the calculation

Update August 8, 2022

Whether it is tomorrow, next year, in 5 years or in 10 years, there will be a post-war period. It will have to be prepared and built.

The global problem will be the same and can be imagined and anticipated as of now. It is not European practice to think beyond the short and medium term, but we should build on the short, medium and long term.

In the very short term, each belligerent contributes to the escalation and hopes to settle the problem militarily. Russia still hopes to crush Ukraine, starting with the Donbass, and Ukraine is looking for such military assistance that it could at least stabilize the situation in the short or medium term, or even win the war. We might as well say that the post-war period will not begin any time soon, but the post-war period could dynamite a large part of the existing organizations in Europe as well as the traditional economic flows which may not be re-established for a very long time.

The aim here is to identify the various important points of this post-war period:

• Europe-Russia partnership
  In 2022, talking about a Europe-Russia partnership may make people smile or possibly feel indignant. What kind of partnership can we be talking about if the other party does not respect any commitment and any previous treaty? The Budapest agreements, which ensured the independence of Ukraine by Russia, have not been respected. The spirit of the Minsk agreements which recognized the whole territory (except Crimea) including that of the separatists, as part of Ukraine is not respected. What to think of a partner who unilaterally changes the terms of a contract and the currency of payment? Is Russia looking for vassals who bow to its mood? This is how Russia is perceived today. Such a partnership is not realistic today. The vast majority of the Russian population lives in the European part of Russia. Turning to Asia, as Russia is doing now, seems to be a reaction of denial, of spite and of the will to power.
  This point of a partnership will be important.

• European security
  The OSCE came into being because some European countries wanted to avoid a war in Europe with the USSR and the socialist bloc. It must be recognized that the OSCE does not fulfill the main mission for which it was built. In order not to lose face, the OSCE is multiplying side activities, but this does not prevent it from being useless today in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. Even worse, its inability to control a cease-fire and to bring about any solution has probably been a factor favoring the new war of 2022. It will be necessary to rebuild an European security organization as the post-war period of the Second World War rebuilt the UN on the ruins of the League of Nations.

• NATO
  This is another face of European security , as a compensation for the inability to have an European organization that ensures the security of everyone. Has Russia noticed the opposite effect of what it wanted to achieve? Russia wanted to keep countries away from NATO: several countries are rushing to join. Russia has just given NATO a new lease on life with a clear objective: to defend every country against Russia. A moribund alliance resurrected thanks to Russia: bravo Mr Putin!

• A new world order
  The Security Council is not functioning and is unable to play a role in facilitating the resolution of the Russia-Ukraine war. Something will have to be done, if only to reform the functioning of the Security Council. A new world order is not just about replacing one imperialism with another, equally or even more arbitrary one. Of course a new order is needed, but one built on rules common to all and capable of being respected without being changed unilaterally by one or more countries that confuse order with dictatorship.

And of course a Russia-Ukraine settlement. In April 2022, the Russia-Ukraine negotiation is an attempt by Russia to obtain by diplomacy what it intends to obtain by force. It will probably take a while for Russia to appear to be somewhat serious in the negotiations. We will find ourselves in a situation similar to that of the Minsk 1 or 2 agreements that will have to be renegotiated. The territory occupied by the separatists and Russia will be different, but it will be necessary to start from a new reality to rebuild something that could be “the Ksnim agreements”, or how to look for one’s future by looking at it from the past in what seem a reverse order.

It will then be necessary:

• Find a way out or scenarios,
• Establish a cease-fire,
• Establish a system for supervising the cease-fire,
• Enforce the cease-fire,
• Rebuild what has been destroyed,
• and let many years pass before a true reconciliation between the two countries is achieved.

It would be nice if we did not make the same mistakes that were made and if, for once, we could enforce a cease-fire that would hold.

Updated on April 27, 2022

Russia would like Ukraine to opt for neutrality, but allows itself to take Donbass and Luhansk + some other territories. Is this really serious?

If Russia were credible, it would offer neutrality and a guarantee that Ukrainian territory would be respected (possibly outside Crimea at first, as long as there is no agreement on Crimea).

Instead, Russia takes, supposedly in the name of independent republics, a good part of the Ukrainian territory and asks, in addition, for neutrality by not joining NATO or its successor: an European defense

Russia intends to impose both on Ukraine, first, and then on its other neighbors.

Which country will accept to have part of its territory amputated for the benefit of Russia or its allies and at the same time accept to be neutral?

The immediate result is that all countries will rush to NATO.

NATO, which had an almost flat electroencephalogram, has just found a new youth and a real utility: to defend itself against Russia, resurrecting its initial goals to defend itself against the USSR.

So, can we really make a proposal for the Donbass when Russia occupies a whole series of territories around it and allows itself to bomb and destroy elsewhere than in the Donbass?

It seems difficult. We understand that Russia considers massive bombing as a good way to advance negotiations in the hope of surrender. But unfortunately, this leads to a blockage.

Then ? To be resumed when Russia’s intentions are clearer.

To be continued if there is new information

updated on April 11, 2022