By the end of 2027, we should have a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia. None of the current proposals from any of the belligerents or non-belligerents provide grounds to assert that the ceasefire will hold or that the system put in place to monitor it will be credible.

From 2014 through the fall of 2021, Naej DRANER monitored the ceasefires that were implemented. All observations and comments were consistently sent via email to a European diplomat stationed in Europe. This diplomat (and his country) never responded and will never boast of having received anything, for reasons he will likely never explain to you. He and his country will probably remain in denial. They were even given advance notice of the foreseeable wars in the years to come, after 2021.

There is therefore potentially a witness to this work that was done but never given due credit. This work outlined what needed to be done to achieve a lasting ceasefire, which would likely have prevented the second war that followed.

Knowing the Europeans and their great difficulty in adapting, it is unlikely that they will act differently or more effectively than they did during the Donbass War from 2014 to 2021.

However, they could take their past experience into account. With that in mind, I am providing two texts for your reference:

• A text analyzing an SMM report from that time. Its value lies in reminding us that, according to statistics from that period, in 2019 there were, on average, more than 800 violations per day.
  2020-10-28A Analysis of SMM Report EN-US
  
• A summary of what needs to be done, dating from 2017 and updated several times. No one knows whether it has ever been read or taken into account. It is recommended that it be used as a foundational text for preparing the upcoming ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine.
  ND201707003 Ukraine Ceasefire – update – 2020-09-23 EN-US

Europeans are advised to consult these two texts and contact the diplomat and the country in question, who will be happy to provide further information. (Once you consider that it’s the smallest country in the EU and that the diplomat has served in Paris and Rome, it’s not too complicated.) He might tell you that he never receives his emails, but that’s his problem, not mine. I still have a few archived documents, should bad faith prevail: he’ll tell you an interesting story. We should give him a small chance to explain himself honestly. In any case, the other diplomats have behaved even worse.)

Next, we’ll prepare this ceasefire, taking into account the experience we’ve gained and the study conducted by Naej DRANER from 2014 to the end of 2021—if you’ll allow us—about which we can provide further details at a later time.

September 26, 2026

Naej DRANER

This case is interesting for several reasons:

• UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) was established in 1978. In 48 years, this international peacekeeping force has failed to prevent Israel’s regular invasions, its occupation of Lebanon, or Hezbollah’s construction of tunnels and stockpiling of weapons. While this peacekeeping force is an expression of international goodwill, it also reveals international powerlessness and ineffectiveness.
• Successive agreements have included some form of ceasefire monitoring system, but it has never worked: there is no visible effect on the ground, even if there may have been instances where incidents were mitigated.
• The current agreements between Israel and Lebanon are rejected by Hezbollah. How can we hope for a controlled evolution when one party consistently rejects everything?
• Virtually all Iranian proxies (Hamas, Hezbollah, Yemen) adopt an attitude of defiance, if not outright rupture, toward their countries’ official authorities (Hamas against the Palestinian Authority, Hezbollah against the Lebanese state, the Houthis against the Yemeni government). Some proxies are “advised” directly by the Revolutionary Guards (Houthis, Hezbollah), particularly regarding military operations, which are carried out with Iranian military assistance and, in some cases, under Iranian command. There is no known case in which an Iranian proxy has helped reestablish a central authority or agreed to completely disarm at Iran’s request. The counterexample of Hamas is not significant, since it is militarily imposed. Although Iran claims not to interfere in the affairs of the countries concerned, it—through its Revolutionary Guards—cannot help but pull the strings, often without any acknowledged coordination with Iranian official authorities, even when there is coordination among various actors, as we have seen recently.
• Israel refuses to engage in cooperation but attempts to maintain de facto authority, claiming to be the sole supervisory authority and reserving the right to intervene at any time.
• This is, unfortunately, a typical case where state-of-the-art approaches (peacekeeping forces, pseudo-supervision) are implemented yet have virtually no effect for multiple and complex reasons.

That shouldn’t prevent us from considering other approaches that might work. Southern Lebanon will have to get back on its feet, without Hezbollah and without Israel, but that won’t happen overnight. It will happen, but perhaps in a few years.

Lebanon served as a testing ground for new ideas from the 1970s to the 1990s. It was an interesting experiment, but one that is difficult to move forward without addressing the structural weakness of the Lebanese state, rooted in its sectarian system. If change ever comes, it will have to transcend the sectarian political insularity that has turned this weakness into a source of privilege. Preserving sectarian appearances will not save Lebanon from its own refusal to exist as a state. In Lebanon, one’s community of origin is more important than the state and is the sole entity managing the so-called “state” registries, which are in fact purely communal. A non-political “council of communities” could put an end to this, but it would require a courage that is lacking among the community leaders.

September 23, 2026

Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)

In current ceasefires, the main shortcoming is the lack of a system to monitor and enforce the ceasefire.

Take, for example, the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran signed on June 17, 2026: even the slightest misstep escalated into a conflict that led to the agreement’s non-implementation and mutual accusations that the other side was solely responsible for its breakdown.

Is it naive to believe that there will never be an incident?

The disproportionate reactions of the United States and Iran to the initial missteps that followed the June 17 agreement are perplexing. To be outraged by a misstep reveals a lack of understanding of the issue. It is very rare for a ceasefire to proceed without any incidents, especially during the first few weeks, and every effort must be made to resolve these incidents without resorting to military action. In the case of this agreement, each side felt it had a duty to respond militarily with force, which had the opposite effect of what was intended. Rather than restraining the adversary, this enraged them to the point of prompting further escalations until the ceasefire was nothing more than a memory.

A system for monitoring and maintaining the ceasefire

Regardless of the agreement between the United States and Iran, a system for monitoring and enforcing the ceasefire is necessary. The June 17 agreement did not include any such provision.

What should its role be? To handle, through non-military means, any incidents that may arise. This means having a system that operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. As soon as an incident is reported, its details must be confirmed, and a solution must be found without resorting to the military forces on the ground.

Let’s imagine there are specific navigation rules in the Strait of Hormuz. If a ship fails to comply with them, it will be considered an incident. If one of the parties launches a military operation against that ship, it will be a violation of the ceasefire. What should have been done is for the ceasefire monitoring and enforcement system to contact the vessel by radio; if there was no response, a patrol boat would have been sent to the vessel, asked to board it to remind the crew of the traffic rules, and remained with the vessel’s captain until he complied with the applicable rules.

But the June 17 agreement did not provide for any rules of navigation other than freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. It was in the name of nonexistent rules that missiles were fired at ships that were not complying with rules that had not been defined.

The monitoring system should intervene in any incident and resolve it peacefully. We must therefore define the system for monitoring and enforcing the ceasefire and provide it with the necessary resources. In this case, Iranian and U.S. military units cannot act as the monitoring system. Other actors are therefore needed, but there must be military and political representatives from each side who are permanently present within the system for monitoring and enforcing the ceasefire.

Is a new agreement needed?

Yes and no. Yes, because if the agreement had really been good, the parties to the conflict would have made an effort to implement it. No, because the agreement covered the essentials, and any agreement will contain similar provisions. But what’s missing is a monitoring system, a timeline for implementing the June 17 agreement, and a way to clear up all ambiguities. If they negotiate a new agreement, the problem will be the same: without a monitoring system, they’ll just repeat the same pattern. Mutual distrust is so deep that even the slightest incident triggers a military escalation that brings the agreement to an end.

September 20, 2026

Naej DRANER

Lack of a methodology

Is there a well-established methodology for negotiating a ceasefire and managing incidents that may arise? There should be one, but the years 2025 and 2026 have shown above all that negotiated ceasefires are a complete mess. We live in an era of leaders with rather limited cultural awareness who also claim to know everything, all while doing whatever comes to mind.

The result? No ceasefire holds—nor could any ever hold.

• The ceasefire in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Gaza in October 2025 isn’t really considered a ceasefire. It has transformed an all-out war into a low-intensity conflict. There is no system to monitor the ceasefire, and Israel continues to do as it pleases and carry out bombings under various pretexts. It’s better than before, but the population remains in a worrying state with limited prospects for improvement.
• The June 2026 ceasefire between the United States and Iran did not last long. The June 17, 2026, protocol was torpedoed by Iran when it launched military attacks against several ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. This was the work of Iranian opponents of the signed agreement. Had there been a system in place to monitor the ceasefire negotiated as part of the June 17 protocol, the initial incident involving the violation of the agreement could have been contained. This was not the case. At the first sign of trouble, the United States provoked an escalation—which itself constituted a violation—and effectively buried the agreement. The agreement was therefore so fragile that an unidentified Iranian actor was able to bring it to an end. If there had been a clear methodology or even a modicum of common sense, they would have managed to overcome such incidents. That was not the case. Once again, this war continues, even if it is no longer a full-scale war. The war continues to spread with the Houthi-Saudi Arabia conflict.
• The plan to maintain a ceasefire between Russia and Ukrain with a coalition of volunteers will not amount to much. To claim that simply gathering soldiers and military units on the ground is enough to put an end to all incidents seems naïve. What is needed is to transform this expression of collective goodwill into a system for monitoring the ceasefire. The parties involved do not seem to have learned any lessons from the long period of ceasefire that preceded the Russia-Ukraine war of February 2025.

Write What We Know

Kissinger said that a leader can, at best, only process material at the “Reader’s Digest” level. It has to be simple and short. If it’s too complex and too long, they’ll never read it or understand it.

It’s a bit of an exaggeration, but it sets a goal: to write what we know as simply as possible, in the hope that it will be read and understood.

That, then, is the goal of this series on ceasefires, which will be expanded, article by article, in the coming weeks, in the hope that it will be useful for implementing ceasefires that hold.

September 17, 2026

Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)

Several coordinated events have taken place in Saudi Arabia over the past few days:

• attacks on Saudi Arabian territory, resulting in numerous casualties,
• the gradual takeover of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait,
• an attack on Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline by Iranian militias on Iraqi territory.

These events are certainly coordinated by the Revolutionary Guards.

When we ask ourselves who authorized them to carry out these actions, we arrive at the conclusion that there is a permanent parallel power structure, one that is not subject to day-to-day oversight by the executive branch represented by President Pezeshkian.

The key to a potential return to calm in the Strait of Hormuz lies in this uncontrolled parallel power structure.

It is this power structure that decided to launch military attacks against oil tankers that are not authorized or controlled by Iran.

It is this power structure that initiates most military actions.

Unless this parallel power is brought back under political control, any agreement will be torpedoed in the same way as the June 17 agreement: the Guardians of the Revolution will invent a rule that is not part of any agreement in order to launch a new military action.

Theoretically, next Monday, an agreement will be signed between Iran and Oman in the presence of the Gulf states’ foreign ministers regarding shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz.

This agreement, if implemented, will be contingent on the measures taken in the event of a dispute. A traffic control body for the Strait would be needed to handle ships that do not comply with these new shipping lanes. If this system is not established, the Revolutionary Guards will deem it necessary to militarily neutralize these ships.

If this system were established, there would be several means of intervention:

• radio communication (on mandatory frequencies during the crossing)
• inspection vessels dispatched specifically to the ships

Presumably, this point will be sidestepped in the Oman-Iran agreement, which will likely render it null and void.

What can Saudi Arabia do?

Saudi Arabia is trying to get the United States involved, though the U.S. initially refused.

Saudi Arabia could “put its foot in it” by asking the Supreme Leader, through Pezeshkian, to arbitrate this apparent attempt to drag Iran and Saudi Arabia into all-out war.

Will they do so? It is not in Saudi Arabia’s current practice to launch a strong diplomatic initiative that could be seen as a sign of military weakness.

In any case, we’re going to have to address this reality of parallel powers in Iran

If so many people died in January in Iran during the crackdown on protests, it is also because of this parallel power structure, which is incapable of using non-lethal riot control measures and knows only one way to act: to kill and destroy, whether the targets are Iranian citizens or civilian merchant ships.

The reason the June 17 agreement was derailed was, in the first place, because someone decided to launch a military attack on civilian ships. Iranian officials acted as if this event had never happened, in order to highlight the U.S. military retaliation—which was also a violation of the agreement—but the U.S. retaliation was the consequence of the initial violations initiated by the Revolutionary Guards, without prior oversight by Iran’s political leadership.

Initiating a resolution to this problem would require diplomats to dare to corner the Iranian political leadership, represented by President Pezeshkian and the Supreme Leader. As a complete unknown, it is utterly impossible for me to do so. My thoughts are not conveyed to anyone within the Iranian government.

September 12, 2026

Naej DRANER

Post sriptum:

During the early years of the Islamic Republic, the government was wary of Iran’s military and security structures. That is why the Revolutionary Guards were created—as a parallel power that could be activated by the Supreme Leader without being controlled by the executive branch. The Basij militias follow the same logic. They are responsible for the massacres of January 2026. Even though the Islamic Republic denies the reality of these massacres, they will remain an indelible stain on the mullahs’ incompetence in peacefully managing the upheavals of Iranian civil society. Theoretically, the Supreme Leader has the power to act. The Supreme Leader’s security representative is traditionally the secretary of a kind of Iranian Security Council, which theoretically enables him to act. However, this would require the Supreme Leader to be well-informed and concerned about concrete security issues—such as the suppression of unarmed protesters by militias and military forces equipped to kill rather than to peacefully quell unrest. Nothing in the statements reported by the Iranian media (particularly Iran International, which is the best source I know of for news from Iran) suggests that the Iranian Supreme Leader is aware of this structural dysfunction in Iran.

Postscript, September 13, 2026:

On September 13, The New York Times published an article confirming that it was indeed a deliberate act by factions opposed to the agreement with the U.S. that derailed the June 17 agreement. The same is likely true of the current attacks against Saudi Arabia, whether they come from the Houthis or from Iraq.

For the past few days, tensions between the two countries have been escalating. Each side, determined to prove it is right, is taking unilateral actions that fuel the escalation. This explains why, no matter what agreement might be reached, it would be violated in the days and weeks that follow—for different reasons on each side:

• For the United States, no matter what the incident, the response must be strong. They believe that this will intimidate the Iranians and that they will stop and return to the negotiating table. The opposite is happening. All of these responses are direct orders from Trump, with no filters and likely no decision-making process. Any idea that pops into Trump’s head becomes a new factor in the escalation. None of these escalatory measures correspond to anything negotiated in an agreement, but Trump can’t help thinking that he’s so brilliant that any military order he issues is necessarily justified. He himself undermines the agreements he has signed—and which he does not respect—by claiming to enforce them.
• For Iran, it’s more complicated and a little different. Theoretically, the Iranian political system has three levels: the Supreme Leader, the president, who serves as head of government, and the various administrative agencies responsible for carrying out the government’s orders. In practice, there is a parallel body that commands the Revolutionary Guards. It is not directly commanded by the president but by a member of the Supreme Leader’s inner circle and likely also by the “Supreme National Security Council.” Its secretary is Mohsen Rezaei, who serves as both the Supreme Leader’s representative and the secretary of this security body. The Iranian president, as head of the executive branch, is kept informed but is not necessarily the decision-maker. It is indeed the president who negotiates, but he does not issue orders to the Revolutionary Guards. The first serious incident under the June 17 agreement was the decision to target oil tankers and ships not controlled by Iran. This is not part of the June 17 agreement but rather a separate decision by the Revolutionary Guards. The same thing may happen soon with preemptive strikes. The Iranian president is striving to revive the June 17 Islamabad agreement, but at the same time, a body not affiliated with the head of the executive branch is undermining it.

The two parties are themselves undermining the agreements they signed, while blaming each other for the situation.

Could we break out of this spiral of escalation? Perhaps, but negotiators would at least have to understand this vicious cycle and propose an alternative.

Has Naej DRANER begun negotiations?

No, not at this time. The articles published on this site over the past few months are not a negotiation, but rather a rough draft of ideas that could be used to support a negotiation. The ideas have not been finalized because there is no identified negotiator to work with. An “architect” must be involved early in the negotiation process and work in perfect sync with a team of negotiators. If this is not the case, the negotiation will not even get off the ground.

The June 17 agreement would still be in effect, but in order to begin the supplementary negotiations, the following would be required:

• Identify one or more negotiators with whom N.D. will work as an architect of political and security solutions,
• establish a body to oversee and monitor a ceasefire and implement it as soon as possible,
• encourage both sides to incorporate it into their decision-making process,
• refine the initial agreement by redefining the ceasefire and establishing a timeline,
• propose the necessary implementation notes (only one example was provided; others are needed—this was merely an example).
• Ensure the effectiveness of the entire process through direct, ongoing, and institutionalized link between N.D and the negociator body.

Thinking is not the same as acting. Naej DRANER has a clear idea of what he would attempt if he had the support of one diplomatic mission or another, but he has not taken any action, as he has not identified a reliable and permanent negotiating channel.

September 3, 2026

Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)

Strictly speaking, Yemen is not part of the Persian Gulf Council and should not be a member, unless the Persian Gulf were to be extended to include the Gulf of Oman—which is not planned.

But Yemen serves as a sounding board for the tensions and conflicts between several member states of the Persian Gulf region: Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates (and Oman, whose role appears to have been limited to potential mediation efforts). At least three countries are exacerbating the internal problems that drive local residents and groups to seek one or more external sponsors in an attempt to settle their conflicts through outside support, hoping to gain a decisive military advantage.

The Complexity of Yemen

It will likely be easier to find a solution to the Strait of Hormuz than to find a solution to the conflicts and wars in Yemen.

The country is unstable for several reasons:

• Historically, Yemen has grown accustomed to existing as two distinct countries, and there are historical differences and realities.
• Groups evolve over time, but, exacerbated by poverty and the need to survive, there will always be one or more groups that ask foreign countries for help, which will result in a level of heavy weaponry disproportionate to their needs.
• Internal developments can be rapid, rendering previous attempts at a settlement obsolete. The 2022 settlement, brokered by China, is certainly obsolete for several reasons: the Iran-U.S. conflict is pushing Iran, through the Revolutionary Guards, to open a second front against Saudi Arabia, which seems to have become their bête noire, since it is the only Gulf country to have been barely affected by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Are the Houthis acting independently in their attacks in the Red Sea? They have received all the specialized equipment previously used by Iran in the Strait of Hormuz. A mere coincidence? I don’t think so. It is the hallmark of Iran’s proxies to act indirectly on Iran’s behalf. By pushing the Houthis to engage in constant blackmail over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Revolutionary Guards have failed to realize that they have just shut the door—almost permanently—on any toll collection in the Strait of Hormuz. Everyone has clearly understood that after the Strait of Hormuz, there will be Bab el-Mandeb, and then what??? All of this makes the toll project definitively unacceptable. By trying to be too greedy, there won’t be much left.
• Since 2022, new armed groups and new external actors have emerged, even though they partially withdrew from the scene in late 2025.
• Attempting to resolve the Yemeni problem through just a few parties (such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, as China attempted in 2022) does not seem sufficient.

Searching for and Finding Yemeni Constants

Some advocate for a single state, while others advocate for multiple states. I don’t think that’s where the problem lies. There is certainly a missing level between a single state and local realities. Should we define regions with broad autonomy, or states within a federal or confederal structure? We don’t know at this stage what the right solution is, but we need to foster a process of reflection and discussion at various levels:

• If there is a common Yemeni language, that is already a point in favor of a shared structure, even if it were to be less centralized than a presidential system, which is ill-suited to such a high degree of local diversity.
• What are the overarching activities across the two or three entities that can be managed jointly: electricity, road networks, telecommunications, and the external-facing military?
• Can mineral deposits or petroleum resources remain under joint management, with the profits distributed to the various entities? This approach could prevent certain groups from arming themselves simply to seize control of existing deposits.
• Identifying common Yemeni values should help establish a broadly acceptable foundation.

Start at the lowest administrative level

The lowest level of administration is the governorate, which varies greatly in structure. Does this administrative level function effectively, and what natural groupings could we use to redefine certain regions or entities? A field study would be needed to answer these questions.

Bring together external stakeholders

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran should sit together on a development fund for Yemen. The current use of one or another of these components by external actors does not allow for a peacemaking role in Yemen. Instead, it helps to destabilize the country and prolong an endless conflict.
On the contrary, the humanitarian crisis currently unfolding in various parts of Yemen could be addressed by these external actors if they were united under a single fund. A little less in the way of weapons and a little more in the way of survival aid.

Avoid looking for a quick, magic solution

Yemen has no immediate magic solution. Many have tried, including the Gulf Cooperation Council and various countries such as China. For a time, it was possible to calm the situation.

There is a lack of institutionalized exchanges among all Gulf countries

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has been a source of exclusion and conflict with Iran. If we want Saudi Arabia and Iran to talk to each other, we must wait for diplomatic efforts that seek to bring them together—as China has attempted to do—but they do not belong to any institution through which they would share a common goal.

Today, they are locked in a long-term standoff. GCC member countries will likely invest more than 30 billion euros or dollars to find a way to minimize the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz. Yet these same countries cannot agree to allocate 20 million euros or dollars to try something else—such as a new initiative like a “Persian Gulf Council” . Even if several countries dislike one another, they could at least talk to each other from time to time.

The increase in exchanges between countries—such as what took place among European nations after World War II—has certainly been a key factor in overcoming the war and living in peace among Europeans since the end of the war.

Do you, the countries of the Persian Gulf, have any plans other than snubbing one another and building pipelines to bypass the Strait of Hormuz? You have tens of billions in money—is that the only possible use for it?

Do you, Iran, believe that all you need to do is extort your neighboring countries—through destruction and blackmail—to get them to help you get back on your feet? They will tell you that, given the destruction you have caused and the measures they are taking to avoid your blackmail, they no longer have billions to invest in your future. Coercion and your threats will drive them away. Keep this up, and sooner or later you’ll find yourselves up against a wall that seems to draw you in day by day, intoxicated as you are by what you perceive as your power through your capacity to cause harm. Destroying others will build nothing but will cause everyone to flee from you like the plague.

Yemen could have benefited from your collective understanding, but things are off to a bad start.

August 27, 2026

Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)

Yesterday, Tuesday, August 25, 2026, the U.S. military reported that it had cleared a major shipping lane in the Strait of Hormuz (not the entire Strait of Hormuz).

On the same day, Donald Trump stated that the entire Strait of Hormuz had been cleared (which is inconsistent with the U.S. military’s statement).

What exactly is going on?

It is important to note that:

• The Iranians have not specified exactly how many mines were laid, which would be invaluable information;
• the U.S. military has begun a major shift in demining operations: experienced deminers were decommissioned in early 2026, and the new technology being implemented does not yet appear to be fully proven;
• The Trump administration tends to spin information in a way that makes it impossible to be completely certain.

Consequently, it is recommended that:

• Ask the Iranian side how many mines have been laid and where. The answers will likely be incomplete and unreliable,
• ask CENTCOM what has actually been done and how many mines have been detected and neutralized. This information will certainly be reliable if provided and could give an idea of the status of the mine-clearing efforts.
• In any case, it is necessary to verify a large area that includes Omani territorial waters, part of Iranian territorial waters, and, as a precaution, an adjacent portion of the United Arab Emirates’ territorial waters.
  To do this, the best approach is to call on European mine clearance experts. Double-checking mine detection is a wise precaution, even if it will take several weeks.

We don’t take safety lightly, and even if the U.S. statements are true, another verification is welcome.

August 26, 2026

Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)

The process of analyzing the proposed solution for the Persian Gulf has not been completed. There is a draft proposal—a rough outline—but not all of its elements have been compiled into a single document. One might see some similarities between this draft and current events, but these can be considered mere coincidences. It remains a patchwork effort. Should we move on to a professional version? There isn’t much left to do, other than drafting a comprehensive version and finding a reliable intermediary capable of presenting it to all interested parties.

Is this a legitimate question? Will anyone be interested, and will there be enough resources dedicated to it to have a chance of success?

The United States has relied on economic pressure, which, at best, will take many months—or even years—to have an effect.

So what should be done? It might be better to do nothing if the necessary resources aren’t available. Devoting the necessary time to it (at least part-time) would be possible, but there’s no guarantee that the necessary resources will be provided.

Barring a miracle, the analysis will remain in its current state, consisting of small snippets described in about twenty articles in the “news notes” of this web site..

August 25, 2026

Naej DRANER

The MOU contains ambiguities that need to be clarified or cases of application that need to be specified. The implementation notes will clarify certain practical situations. The implementation notes will be issued by the body responsible for supervising and monitoring the ceasefire. Since this body is in contact with all parties, the implementation notes will be discussed and approved at this level. There must be a list of approved implementation notes. This implementation note must be discussed and then approved by the parties concerned (Oman, Iran, and possibly the UAE and the U.S.).

This is a concrete example of how to avoid certain violations that occurred following the initial implementation of the MOU.

Situation: A vessel is no longer within the temporary navigable channels established prior to the completion of mine clearance. What is the applicable procedure for bringing the vessel back into the navigable channels?

Procedure: Firing upon the vessel or the use of military force against it is considered a violation of the ceasefire.

The first step in the procedure is to make all possible radio calls.

The second step is to send a patrol boat to the vessel and board it. This patrol boat belongs to the country whose territorial waters the vessel is in.

Patrol boats operating simultaneously in the territorial waters of multiple countries (Oman and Iran, for example) could be authorized by the Persian Gulf Council as part of a unified management system for the Strait of Hormuz. If this is the case, they must fly a flag representing the Persian Gulf Council in addition to the flag of the patrol boat’s home country.

In short, the purpose of this implementing note is to prevent any one party from claiming the right to attack a vessel to enforce compliance with the waterways. It is virtually certain that, without such an implementing note, the Iranian side will consider it its role to enforce compliance with the defined temporary waterways by military force, which will result in a violation and likely an associated escalation by

This implementing note is intended to anticipate this situation and incorporate it, as of now, into the authorized practices in the Strait of Hormuz.

There will be other implementing notes on other topics, which should anticipate specific situations that may arise and for which there could be ambiguity in the interpretation of the MOU. We are not going to renegotiate an MOU for every potential problem, but we can propose an implementing note if it concerns a possible situation that could actually arise locally.

August 24, 2026

Naej DRANER (naej.draner)