Peace—or the end of a conflict—is achieved by institutionalizing a new balance, provided that a relevant new balance can be found and successfully established.

In the case of the Persian Gulf, a “Persian Gulf Council” seemed like a logical step. This appears to have failed. Within a few days, the Persian Gulf countries had polarized along their traditional lines of conflict:

• The Revolutionary Guards have drawn the Houthis into a second strait. Of course, they will present this as coincidental, but experts who aren’t too naive know that Shiite militias operate the same way everywhere: a direct military hierarchy of the “Guardians” that always produces the same result—namely, a group that establishes itself as a state within a state and exerts its influence to directly control that group. Whether it’s Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Shiite militias in Iraq, or other militias yet to emerge, the modus operandi is always the same, with an identical outcome. These groups are never integrated into the country. Hezbollah has not helped restore the Lebanese state and will not do so. It has fostered chaos so it can better pose as a savior. Should we negotiate with the Revolutionary Guards? NO—on these issues, we must find a balance within these countries, which are effectively satellites of the Guards, that renders this remote control unnecessary—which is no easy task.
• The Iranian president has confirmed what had been assumed: the Supreme Leader is currently unable to exercise any authority whatsoever. The current rulers are the Revolutionary Guards, who act like a military force and have disregarded the necessary international maritime regulations.
• Saudi Arabia is returning to its usual course of action: military operations in Yemen, rallying the Gulf monarchies around an equivalent of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council), and cooperation with the United States. Admittedly, MBS has called the United States to order to give Oman’s negotiations a chance, but Oman now finds itself quite alone and will struggle to hold its own against Iran when it comes to clearing mines, managing traffic flows, and overseeing the ceasefire.
• We can’t expect much else from Donald other than for him to make himself indispensable and ensure that he is the sole cornerstone of a Gulf settlement. The hope is to avoid this by finding a new balance outside the United States. The glass is half full and therefore half empty. Will the emptiness prevail? Probably. It was hoped for something other than a “Peace Council” like the one in Gaza, which did nothing but serve as a rubber-stamp chamber for Israeli whims. One way or another, the United States risks making itself indispensable and exerting its influence, which could lay the groundwork for renewed stagnation and chaos.
• The clay pot has failed to shatter the iron pot and risks imploding at any moment. It’s no surprise that N.D. was no match for the task, given that he has never been able to clearly explain his plan, which is therefore completely unknown to the Gulf states.

So? Checkmate for the traditional players. A new balance remains to be found, but it won’t be the one envisioned by N.D., whose idea was nothing more than a theoretical exercise that came to nothing. The “Persian Gulf Council” is now a thing of the past.

August 7, 2026

Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)

According to reports, the Strait of Hormuz is expected to reopen. This agreement will establish temporary shipping lanes until mine clearance is completed and the final shipping lanes are negotiated.

But will the agreement be sustainable, or will it fall apart at the first violation, as was the case with the June 17 agreement?

All of this will depend on the accompanying measures and the establishment of a system to monitor and enforce the ceasefire.

Trump and His Upcoming Reactions

Trump is interested in the fact that he’s going to be the center of the world. The rest? He couldn’t care less. He won’t even have the slightest idea of how he’ll torpedo it. True to form, believing himself to be the greatest genius of all time, he’ll eventually see himself as the legitimate arbiter with the right to punish the other side, which is solely responsible for the violations.

Trump’s aides, true to form, won’t speak up until Trump plunges the world into chaos—yet again. There is no filter and no decision-making body between Trump’s sudden idea and its execution by the U.S. military.

The Revolutionary Guards and Their Future Responses

The Revolutionary Guards will try to pass themselves off as the big winners. Having established themselves as the authority over the Strait of Hormuz, at the first sign of trouble they will do what they’ve done before: launch missiles or other weapons at oil tankers. They’ll claim that the ship violated vaguely defined rules and won’t even consider communicating with the vessels or establishing an intervention protocol. That’s exactly how they’ve already shattered the previous agreement. There will indeed be a signed agreement, but they will, as usual, enforce what they believe the agreement should have been—claiming to be the sole legitimate authorities to interpret and amend it, even if their interpretation bears no relation to the agreement itself.

Even if there is nothing in the agreement, we must establish a system to monitor and enforce the ceasefire by presenting it as a traffic control system

SIn the part of Oman closest to the strait and as close to the seashore as possible, you must:

• A requisitioned building or a tent city capable of housing several dozen people
• 3 government officials from each Persian Gulf coastal country, including at least one military officer with sufficient rank to be taken seriously anywhere in their country
• permanent means of communication via radio or telephone
• means of monitoring maritime traffic (primary and secondary radars accessible in real time, even if they are remote)
• about ten patrol boats ready to board the vessel in question

This system must operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and must:

• be organized into teams to ensure continuous operation
• maintain an operations log recording shift changes and all major events
• identify and document any incidents
• contact the country and military officials responsible for incidents

In other words, we shouldn’t wait for Trump to decide on retaliation for a violation, nor should we wait for the Revolutionary Guards to use their weapons as a means of acting as police. We’ll have to anticipate all future violations and take steps to prevent them from happening.

For example, once the agreement has been signed and published, it will need to be communicated to the various military chains of command to ensure that they are aware of it and issue the necessary orders. Firing any type of projectile at a ship will constitute a violation. Militarily neutralizing a radar or other equipment—even if done supposedly as a preventive measure—will constitute a violation. On the other hand, any drone could be shot down without warning if it is located within a country’s sovereign territory (or territorial waters).

In short, we should not rely on Trump, his aides, the Guardians of the Revolution, or Iranian officials to list potential future violations. This must be done proactively by outlining these scenarios and what will need to be done in such cases—specifically regarding the monitoring and maintenance system that must be established and operated, much like a traffic and incident management system extended to cover every conceivable incident.

The decision to implement this rests solely with the Gulf states. That will likely be the problem: they are courageous, but not reckless enough to venture into territory not defined by the official negotiators and the apparent leader of the moment.

August 5, 2026

Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)

A provisional agreement on the waterways is expected to be announced in the coming days. The final agreement will depend on the removal of mines and on whether or not the “Persian Gulf Council” exists.

In the agreement of June 17, 2026—which was never properly implemented—there was a provision regarding mine clearance. Theoretically, Iran was supposed to carry it out, but it’s clear that nothing happened. Iran lacks the necessary capabilities for mine clearance. Perhaps they could defuse identified and visible mines without detonating them, but they lack the maritime capabilities to detect them with certainty and provide any credible assurance that there is no longer a risk from mines.

Furthermore, the majority of the mines were placed in Oman’s territorial waters.

The following outlines the proposed arrangement.

First, the territorial waters and their boundaries must be clearly defined for Oman, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (at least for the portion near the strait). Based on what you believe to be your territorial waters and their geographical boundaries, you should have them validated and signed by your neighboring countries. Implicitly, once Oman has done so, this will be considered established for Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, but it would be better if this were done systematically.

Why emphasize the boundaries of territorial waters? Because they define each country’s absolute sovereignty over those territorial waters, and within its territorial waters. Oman can request the assistance of European mine-clearing teams or those from any other country. Oman has the right to request external mine-clearing ships in its territorial waters. It does not depend on any other country. There should be no negotiations with Iran and the United States on this matter; we should simply inform them and offer to allow Iran to verify certain areas of its territorial waters about which it may have doubts, without any obligation to follow through.

As a reminder, the United States scrapped most of its mine-clearing ships in early 2026 and has only makeshift solutions to offer for conducting such mine-clearing operations. Unless the available information is incorrect, there are reportedly no operational U.S. mine-clearing ships in the Middle East. The only operational capabilities are those of the Europeans, who have already pre-positioned their equipment in the Middle East and are ready to intervene upon request.

It would be desirable to expand the demining area to include a portion (to be defined) of the United Arab Emirates’ territorial waters, as well as a portion of Iran’s territorial waters. This expansion can only take place with the formal consent of both countries. Even if they refuse to expand this area, both countries must formally acknowledge that the demining area has been defined and that they have been informed of the demining teams’ operational area. The purpose of this formal acknowledgment is to prevent either country from taking action against the demining teams that will be carrying out the operation. The request must be forwarded to the relevant European countries that have already made their presence known to Oman.

As for the Persian Gulf countries, a team of 3 to 4 people from each of the countries involved (Iran, Oman, UAE) would be needed to oversee this operation. These individuals must be brought together at a single, permanent location for the duration of the demining operation. They must conduct daily monitoring and submit a detailed weekly report on the operation’s progress.

There are mines that have been spotted and reported to the maritime authorities. We need to take stock of the situation.

To put it diplomatically, we will explain that Iran has done its part and that the other countries, for their own safety and that of all ships, are requesting a thorough inspection of all areas that may contain mines.
It would have been better to have more specific information from the Iranians, but communication is virtually nonexistent—probably because the Iranians want to leave room for doubt about a potential threat. They take pride in posing a threat and are reluctant to share the information they have. We will have to make do with the information they are willing to provide and, in any case, carry out all necessary verifications—with or without their information, which must under no circumstances be allowed to become a stumbling block.

The preparatory phase of the demining operation is expected to take one week, provided it is carried out by the countries directly involved—primarily Oman. The Americans have not been of any assistance so far, due to a lack of credible operational capabilities. They once had excellent capabilities, but decided to stop using them, and those capabilities are no longer operational.

The detailed schedule will then need to be established and monitored by the demining monitoring team.

To avoid interface and internal coordination issues among European countries, it is recommended to designate a single country as the point of entry—for example, France—while asking that country to bring together all the resources needed for this demining operation.

Regardless of the terms of the upcoming U.S.-Iran agreement, this issue must be addressed directly with certain Persian Gulf countries.

Ideally, this would be managed by the “Persian Gulf Council” in close cooperation with Oman, which is the country most directly affected, but the “Council” does not currently exist. And its future existence is uncertain, even though some of its ideas have already been adopted and have helped to temporarily resolve the impasse.

August 4, 2026

Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)

The author who discovered the “Quesako Cycle,” Jean-Baptiste RENARD, was born in 1952. He believes that the research should be continued by others. The research already conducted has been described in the reference book Un phénomène cyclique qui favorise les guerres (A Cyclical Phenomenon That favor Wars), published in french by L’Harmatan. Despite a few typographical errors in some of the tables, the French version remains the reference on the subject.

Definitions

The definition of war adopted here is that of the UCDP, as are the types of conflicts. (See the reference book.)

However, the concept of “disputed incompatibility regarding the government and/or the territory” has not been adopted and will not be adopted. It leads to analyses limited to two causes of war: either territorial or governmental. It is not as simple as that, and this approach did not seem to offer a viable foundation for the future. While the existence of an incompatibility is indisputable, limiting wars to these two cases is not realistic.

Databases on Wars

The “Quesako Cycle ” study used only two referenced databases:

• COW (Correlate Of Wars) (from 1817 to shortly after 2000)
• UCDP (Uppsala Conflict Data Program) (from 1989 to the present)

The author did not use other existing databases—of which there are many—but which did not meet the credibility standards of these two databases. Many existing lists of wars allow one to draw whatever conclusions one wishes from analyses that lack rigor, due to the imprecise nature of the data used. Any additional study conducted using other data sources must be examined with caution and care.

There are two tasks to be carried out:

• Create a COW + UCDP aggregate. This task is fairly straightforward and should take just a few weeks. For his work, J-B Renard used COW, supplemented by his own data. The COW + UCDP aggregate should become the benchmark for all research on the subject. The “Quasako Cycle” will only be recognized once other statistical studies have been conducted using credible databases.
• Start a database on the wars of the last two millennia. This is a titanic undertaking that is extremely time-consuming. The best approach would be to do it gradually, validating individual data points as you go. It will likely take 10 years to build a reliable reference database.

Tools

The first challenge a researcher interested in cyclical phenomena may face is finding a spreadsheet program that allows for date calculations without being constrained by Excel’s limitations. Any date prior to January 1, 1900, cannot be calculated in Excel without writing custom code and managing dates across multiple cells—a somewhat complicated process for a single date.

OpenOffice allows you to work with dates spanning all centuries, just as you would in a spreadsheet program like Excel. There are no date restrictions. You should verify that the date calculations take into account all changes to calendars over the centuries.

This spreadsheet was used for the statistical analysis.

It would be desirable to develop a specialized tool capable of processing the existing data and automatically converting it into a graph. This has not been done yet. A skilled computational mathematician should be able to do this without too much effort. It will likely take a few months of work to produce something that is easily reusable.

This article is still a work in progress. It will be updated in the coming days.

August 4, 2026

Jean-Baptiste RENARD

What caused the failure of the agreement signed on June 17?

Any agreements that might be negotiated and presented will be similar to the one dated June 17, which covers the essentials. There are many reasons for its failure:

• ambiguous agreement
• vague timeline
• lack of a system to monitor and enforce the ceasefire
• chaotic governance in the United States and Iran: both are capable of doing exactly the opposite of what they signed up to, while blaming each other

The two main issues that could jeopardize the implementation of any new agreement are the lack of a system to monitor and enforce the ceasefire and chaotic governance.

Ceasefire Monitoring and Enforcement System

Since June 17, every violation observed by one side has led to systematic military retaliation. The initial violations that triggered the first incident—which in turn set off successive rounds of retaliation—are most often linked to an interpretation of the agreement that bears no relation to the signed agreement, as if the parties were implementing an agreement that has nothing to do with the one they signed.

If there were a ceasefire monitoring and enforcement system, any incident would have to be reported to that system, which would then need to identify the cause and take corrective action as soon as possible—and, if possible, within 24 hours. This would require a robust organizational structure that does not currently exist, starting with an independent official—neither American nor Iranian—who would have liaisons on their team with each of the parties to the conflict, that is, all the countries bordering the Persian Gulf, as well as a reliable, permanent point of contact with both the United States and the Iranian government.

Experience shows that overreactions are always blamed on the other side. Some errors stem from the fact that orders transmitted to the military and all units may be ambiguous… or nonexistent. The most likely scenario for the initial errors is that there will be a complete denial, and it will fall to the ceasefire monitoring and enforcement system to draft and enforce specific orders across the various military chains of command on each side. The command structures on each side will string the ceasefire monitoring and enforcement system along without taking much action, and it will take a great deal of persuasion and authority on the part of the head of the ceasefire monitoring and enforcement system to successfully enforce orders consistent with what has been or will be negotiated.

Chaotic Governance in the United States

Trump is known for saying one thing and doing the opposite the next day. Neither the vice president nor the secretary of state is fulfilling their role as a check on Donald’s unpredictable decisions. Every decision should at least be reviewed by the secretary of state, who should ask a few questions:

• Is this consistent with the agreed-upon agreement?
• Was the ceasefire monitoring and enforcement system notified?
• Did you allow the ceasefire monitoring and enforcement system sufficient time to act? (For initial violations, it may take up to 48 hours to identify the source and implement the necessary corrective and preventive actions.) Even if the source isn’t identified, the monitoring system will determine the necessary actions, which are often the same: ensuring that all military operators know exactly what is and isn’t authorized to prevent a superior from issuing orders on their own—because they disagree, weren’t informed, or failed to follow the proper procedures. If the person in charge of the ceasefire monitoring and enforcement system doesn’t know how to do this, we’ll teach them—including how to give a good scolding.)

We need to move from a system of unfiltered orders to a system of coherent orders. There is nothing else that can be written into an agreement on this subject other than establishing a ceasefire monitoring and enforcement system.

Chaotic Governance in Iran

In principle, Iran should have a political authority and a military authority represented by the Revolutionary Guards.

All we see is the “Revolutionary Guards” in action. The “Supreme Leader” seems absent or nonexistent, limiting himself to repeating what the Revolutionary Guards say.

If the Supreme Leader has no visibility or opportunity to make his voice heard, someone must be found who represents political authority and is capable of reiterating what has been negotiated and agreed upon. The current actors are intoxicated by their military invincibility and are no longer interested in what they are negotiating. They demonstrate that they do not understand the concept of territorial waters or the sovereignty of states associated with those waters. This is often the case with military personnel. If we are to transition from war to a state of peace and build a peaceful future, the military will have to hand over control to political representatives who are currently absent.

From a purely international law perspective, each country is free to act as it sees fit within its territorial waters, unless there were a comprehensive agreement involving all the states bordering the Persian Gulf. Such an agreement is desirable, but the final navigable routes will be determined after all waters in the Strait of Hormuz have been cleared of mines. Claiming that the insecurity deliberately caused by mines laid by the Revolutionary Guards is sufficient to justify a new route—one that would be safe but longer than the previous ones—is unacceptable. Official shipping lanes cannot be determined in haste. The “Persian Gulf Council,” if it is established, should be responsible for this, but it is unlikely that such a decision will be made before two months—the time needed to verify the complete clearance of mines throughout the Strait of Hormuz.

I make no secret of the fact that Iran’s chaotic governance is a major problem for which I see no solution until we have reliable contact with Iran’s political leadership—which should be represented by the Supreme Leader—rather than merely repeating what the Revolutionary Guards say.

The Persian Gulf Council

Today, there is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which gives the impression of being a cooperative body for all the countries of the Persian Gulf. This is not the case. The name is misleading. Iraq and Iran are missing. It is not feasible to include Iraq and Iran in the GCC, given certain GCC agreements that will never apply to them. It would therefore be preferable to create a new body, called the Persian Gulf Council, in which every country bordering the Persian Gulf would be an ex officio member, with each enjoying the same rights.

Pretending that the Persian Gulf Council already exists through the GCC is nonsense. The GCC has always pursued a deliberate policy of exclusion and confrontation toward Iran. This must change, and the countries of the Persian Gulf must learn to speak to one another directly and manage their problems together without intermediaries—whether American, Pakistani, or European.

I can help launch the “Persian Gulf Council,” but it would require motivated leaders to officially raise the issue and stop believing that the decision will come from anywhere other than themselves. I can help spark discussion, but I will not make any decisions: it is their role to make decisions, even if it takes weeks to reach a conclusion.

August 3, 2026

Naej DRANER

Whether it’s in 6 months, 1 year, or 2 years, there will be a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine.

This ceasefire will require between 1,000 and 5,000 personnel to oversee and maintain it. It will be the largest ceasefire line ever established, meaning it will be fragile at first and will begin with hundreds of daily violations.

Between 2014 and 2022, there was never a single day of ceasefire without any violations. There have been days with few violations, but for several years, daily violations numbered in the hundreds, even thousands.

Today, the only existing initiative is that of the “volunteer” countries, but a strategy intended to act as a deterrent will never be enough to ensure a ceasefire. To believe that a credible military force will deter daily violations is wishful thinking and likely also stems from a lack of understanding of the Donbass ceasefire period between 2014 and 2022.

Starting in late August, a series of articles will be published on the subject, ultimately forming a coherent whole.

Starting now, interested countries can identify the necessary resources:

• 2,000 unarmed ceasefire inspectors and observers (which may be increased to 5,000), with the security profile necessary to operate in the field under difficult and dangerous conditions
• 500 personnel for logistical support
• 500 vehicles clearly identifiable as part of this mission, as many of which as possible should be armored,
• Sufficient communication equipment (telephones and radios)
• Infrared binoculars, including at least 100 pairs of artillery observer binoculars capable of identifying a target’s GPS coordinates
• and everything needed to support everyone’s needs

Nothing will happen on this matter between now and August 20

August 2, 2026

Naej DRANER

Monitoring traffic, rescuing ships in distress, penalizing illegal oil dumping, and enforcing international shipping lanes: all of this is necessary.

The idea put forward by Iran for an authority over the Strait of Hormuz is a good one—that is indisputable. The way it has been presented to the other countries of the Persian Gulf, however, is disastrous. It is the presentation of an autocrat and dictator accustomed to having all his subordinates say YES.

For a country to claim that it alone gets to define everything, do everything, and pocket all the financial benefits is naive. Of course all the other countries will say NO. It cannot be any other way.

The rejection of Oman’s proposal for regional management of the Strait of Hormuz shows just how lost Iran is in its dreams of grandeur and regional power. Is this really serious? Being unable to accept cooperation from one or more other countries on such a project is the surest way to bury it.

Without U.S. strikes on Iran, the Revolutionary Guards have reignited hostilities. Is this a provocation aimed at getting the Americans to reignite the war on a large scale? After all, the Revolutionary Guards do love war. They have assumed a dominant position throughout Iran, and the Supreme Leader has stepped back. The Revolutionary Guards have placed a few hardline advisors around the Supreme Leader, and everything is going according to plan: what the Supreme Leader says is filtered and dictated by advocates of perpetual war, such as the Revolutionary Guards. Their resistance has gone to their heads.

When will full-scale war resume? Probably soon: the Revolutionary Guards are taking it upon themselves to reignite it, deliberately.

July 29, 2026

Naej DRANER

P.S.: This was the continuation and conclusion of the “Persian Gulf Council,” an idea that has now sunk body and soul into Iran’s dream of regional power.

Reference Documents

• Full Text of the Iran-U.S. MOU

The text of the Iran-U.S. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), or protocol, signed on June 17, 2026, is very clear:

• Point 1 states in the clearest possible terms the cessation of all military operations and also the cessation of all threats: “… to refrain from any threat or use of force against one another …”
• Point 5: “…The Islamic Republic of Iran will engage in dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administrative framework and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz, in consultation with the other states bordering the Persian Gulf, in accordance with international law and the sovereign rights of the coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz…”
• The text does not specify any mandatory shipping lane for vessels that will freely transit the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran’s unilateral decision to restrict traffic to its own waterways and the armed interventions by the Revolutionary Guards against vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz are not provided for in the MOU and may be considered a unilateral violation of the protocol set forth in Section 1 of the MOU.

This discrepancy between the text officially signed by Iran and its actual implementation rightly raises the question of who is in charge in Iran, given its inability to implement the terms of the signed agreements.

It often happens that a newly signed agreement leads to missteps due to misunderstandings and internal communication problems. It can also be a deliberate act by factions that reject the agreement as signed.

The MOU lacks a mechanism for monitoring and enforcing the ceasefire, whose role is to intervene immediately to identify misunderstandings, document violations, and ensure that they do not recur and do not lead to retaliation.

This repeated violation by Iran has effectively derailed the entire process that was underway.

Negotiating an agreement on the one hand and claiming to enforce rules other than those formalized in the agreement on the other will do nothing but cast doubt on the credibility of Iranian leaders.

Iran’s Deliberate Ambiguity Regarding Its System of Government

What might be considered a weakness in governance is most often exploited by Iran as an opportunity, as if we were required to excuse people who did something other than negotiate—but who nevertheless acted in a way that aligns with Iran’s wishes.

Incertitude sur le guide suprême actuel

The current uncertainty only serves to confirm the lack of leaders capable of commanding the respect of all Iranian factions, starting with the Revolutionary Guards. The latter seem to do as they please and impose their own agenda, even if it runs counter to the agreements that have been signed

Impact on Investments

It is likely that the countries bordering the Persian Gulf—which could invest in Iran to help with reconstruction—will probably not make the planned investments, and this is understandable. The three countries that have the means to invest (namely Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) are precisely the ones targeted first and foremost by the Revolutionary Guards. The result? These countries will first focus on repairing the damage at home and will use their available funds to make up for the lost revenue resulting from the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. If Iran’s official policy is to discourage all countries that could help them, I believe they’ve succeeded. I don’t think the countries bordering the Persian Gulf are bound by point 6 of the MOU. It is the United States that has committed to the funds under Point 6—go talk to them. I don’t feel concerned, and I’m very much afraid that the countries bordering the Persian Gulf won’t feel involved as long as you spend your time destroying them in the name of an Iranian strategy whose author I don’t know. You can’t spend your time destroying things without provoking a collective backlash justified by Iran’s behavior. Iran will reap what it has sown. Believing that it’s enough to threaten them and hold a gun to their heads will only hasten your own downfall.

July 28, 2026

Naej DRANER

Several Persian Gulf countries—including the most important ones—have not acceded to the 1982 convention, making the issue of territorial waters a sensitive one.

In the absence of formal ratification by a state, states apply the 1982 Convention “de facto.”

If there were a body representing all the states bordering the Persian Gulf, the formalization of territorial waters would be a matter of a basic collective agreement.

In the absence of formal accession to the 1982 Convention, customary law prevails, which requires a precise and non-standardized survey.

Generally speaking, the delimitation of territorial waters determines a country’s full sovereignty, whether through the 1982 Convention or through customary law.

Straits, such as the Strait of Hormuz, have rules specific to each strait, but the general rule is that every country retains full sovereignty over its territorial waters. Exercising total control over maritime passages in the territorial waters of neighboring countries without their consent—as Iran desires—is not permitted under any law. One may view this issue however one wishes, but there will be opposition from all other countries. There will never be an agreement to delegate control of maritime traffic to Iran. Militarily, it would be virtually impossible for Iran to enforce such control.

However, there is nothing preventing the countries bordering the Strait of Hormuz from establishing a convention that applies to their territorial waters; at a minimum, this would require the participation of Iran, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates.

As for the United States of America’s claim to control the Strait of Hormuz, it is completely unfounded. Since the U.S. does not use the strait for its own purposes, it would be preferable for the countries bordering the Persian Gulf to take charge. This is no easy task.

July 27, 2026

Naej DRANER

“…

Territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) are two distinct maritime areas defined by international law. Territorial waters extend 12 nautical miles (22 km) and are subject to a state’s full sovereignty, while the EEZ extends up to 200 nautical miles (370 km) for the exclusive exploitation of resources.

Territorial Waters (Territorial Sea)

• Range: Up to 12 nautical miles (approximately 22 km) from the coast.
• Sovereignty: Full and complete sovereignty over the waters, the seabed, and the airspace.
• Rules: Vessels from other countries may pass through, but they must comply with local laws and pose no danger.

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ / Waters of Economic Interest)

• Range: Up to 200 nautical miles (approximately 370 km) from the coast.
• Rights: Exclusive rights to explore for and harvest fish, oil, and gas, or to generate energy (wind, hydro).
• Rules: This is not a territory fully controlled by the state; other countries retain the right to navigate freely and operate aircraft.

…”

The preceding lines were generated by an internet search engine.

Within the framework of the “territorial waters” preparatory committee for the “Persian Gulf Council,” no request was made to delineate EEZs. This could be done at a later date but is not urgent.

The map delineating the territorial waters of the Persian Gulf countries must be presented and countersigned by each representative of a Persian Gulf country present on the committee.

As for what N.D. plans to do with this survey countersigned by the major countries—including, at a minimum, Iran, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia—I’ll leave it to you to guess what sensible use might be made of it.

However, as a prerequisite for moving forward, each country is asked to have available within its own country (not necessarily at the meeting) a specialist in international maritime law. Why? The “Persian Gulf Council” has no international authority to replace the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with another convention that would allow a state to claim rights over another country’s territorial waters. This request is intended to avoid discussing irrational solutions that do not comply with existing international law.

What conclusions do you draw from this? … starting with the Iranian representative? Don’t make me call you ignorant and a fool who invents international law that does not exist. We could imagine a legal framework delegated to the “Persian Gulf Council” by several countries to supervise and control maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. But if that were the case, it would not be a single country acting unilaterally and dictatorially to establish a body to supervise and control the Strait of Hormuz; rather, the “Persian Gulf Council” would define and accept these rules of supervision and control and enforce them. All of this would be carried out in accordance with the democratic rules—yet to be defined—of the Persian Gulf Council.

July 26, 2026

Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)