Category Archives: News notes

Who visits the “Clock of the Unconscious” website?

Attached are the sessions from the last 30 days.

In early 2026, it was China that regularly accessed the site, viewing all the pages from the past. A thorough analysis—though I can’t figure out what they got out of it.

In recent weeks, Singapore has been the leader in terms of access.

Over the past week or two, Europeans have been accessing the site in a disciplined but unenthusiastic manner. One country (likely Germany or Spain) shared some information with colleagues, including a few links. One or two people from each of these European countries accessed it—no more. Europeans are a bit peculiar. On their part, this isn’t an enthusiastic embrace of new ideas, but rather a polite gesture among well-mannered people who react very slowly and rather superficially. They will be surprised to find that others have already gotten a head start on the subject. They access it because someone sent them something, but their engagement and reflection are measured. It will likely take them weeks or months before they make any decision on the matter. … only to be surprised that they have already fallen considerably behind others

The contact form is never used: no one ever asks any questions.

There are between 5 and 30 visits per day, no more.

When you look at the articles from April 6 and 7 on the Persian Gulf Council, it seems odd. It appears to have hit the mark, but in practice, none of the Arab countries directly involved accessed it. It may have had an effect elsewhere and indirectly. Since there were only 5 or 6 visits on those days, the user who accessed it remains unidentified, but no country that should be directly concerned has done so. It’s a multi-cushion billiards game: it’s not the one who accesses it who does anything with it. And the one who does something with it will make sure to remain unknown.

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April 8, 2026

Persian Gulf Council – continued

Will the Persian Gulf Council ever see the light of day? Probably NOT; it is merely an illustrative description of what should have been done to avoid the chaos of the coming months. The management of the Strait of Hormuz should be neither that of Trump—the president of chaos who will cause the greatest chaos the world has seen since World War II—nor that of Iran, which is trying to carve out a role for itself that its neighbors will never accept.

The current Gulf Cooperation Council represents the coastal states, excluding Iraq and Iran. Expanding it to include these two countries could amount to creating a true Persian Gulf Council, but this should probably be avoided:

  • The Gulf Cooperation Council has historically tended to oppose the two absent countries: changing organizations would allow us to start a completely new project,
  • If Iran continues to insist on maintaining sole control over the Strait of Hormuz, other countries will have no choice but to undertake major projects that render passage through the Strait of Hormuz unnecessary. In such a case, a joint organization comprising these countries (excluding Iran) is needed to lead and carry out this work.

Some Persian Gulf countries are trying to obtain some sort of authorization from the UN to use force to control the Strait of Hormuz—authorization they will be quick to delegate to other countries or that the “president of chaos” will claim for himself. It will be virtually impossible to control the Strait of Hormuz militarily without controlling a large part of Iran’s territory. And even in that case, it will be easy for Iran to disrupt navigation in the Persian Gulf, whether directly from the shore or via drones.

Are the countries bordering the Persian Gulf willing to send a strong message to all those who claim to control the Persian Gulf or the Strait of Hormuz without them?

A toll on the Strait of Hormuz? That would make sense for the Persian Gulf Council, given the need to establish round-the-clock monitoring of maritime traffic. Any toll collected by a coastal country would have to be remitted to the Persian Gulf Council.

The “President of Chaos” has promised hell for Iran. It will be hell for all the countries of the Persian Gulf and a step backward for everyone, with, as a bonus, the greatest chaos the world has ever known—a feat the “President of Chaos” considers magnificent. In any case, Israel—whose specialty is torpedoing any diplomatic initiative that gets in the way—has taken the lead: by single-handedly bombing the largest petrochemical complex, it has ensured that there is no turning back. This is not the first time, nor will it be the last, that Israel has forced Trump’s hand, leaving him no choice but to follow along and provoke the greatest chaos the world has ever known. It was not he who carried out these threats, but his ally, to ensure they came to pass.

Naej DRANER

April 7, 2026

Persian Gulf Council

Article 1: All countries bordering the Persian Gulf are ex officio members of the Persian Gulf Council.

Article 2: The presidency of the Persian Gulf Council rotates among all ex officio members. The presidency shall be held successively in alphabetical order of the members, for a term of 6 months or 1 year (as decided at the first meeting of the Persian Gulf Council). Meetings and their venues are proposed and managed by the current presidency.

Article 3: The purpose of the Persian Gulf Council is to manage all issues arising in the Persian Gulf: maritime traffic, pollution, the Strait of Hormuz (and any potential toll), security, and navigation control.

Article 4: No member may unilaterally make a decision that falls within the purview of the Persian Gulf Council without that decision being reviewed at meetings of the Persian Gulf Council.

Article 5: The resources allocated to the Persian Gulf Council shall be determined by its members.

These articles will be supplemented, if necessary, at future meetings.

There are no other publications besides the one on this website. We encourage all readers of this article to share it so that it reaches the members of the Persian Gulf Council.

Le 6 Avril 2026

Naej DRANER

Naej DRANER is a political and security analyst and solutions architect. At a meeting of the Persian Gulf Council, his status as an official advisor to the Persian Gulf Council will be put forward for approval. Only a unanimous decision by the full members will be acceptable.

Postscript: The Persian Gulf Council should not be confused with the Gulf Cooperation Council, which is limited to six countries bordering the Persian Gulf and whose scope extends beyond the Persian Gulf alone.

OSCE: Replace It or Reform It?

The OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) was established on January 1, 1995, as a successor to the CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe), which was created following the 1975 Helsinki Accords. The OSCE is the largest regional security organization. Its goal is to ensure the security and peace of its member states, which span all of Europe as well as Central Asia.
It is not a legal entity, but rather a forum for states that has become a permanent institution. Its role is to prevent conflicts and help resolve them.

Can we say that such an organization is fulfilling its role when it plays no part in the war tearing the European continent apart—namely, the Russia-Ukraine war?

Rooted in considerations from a bygone era, at a time when the EU was still in its infancy, the OSCE is in need of fundamental reform.

Effective immediately, the OSCE could be tasked with preparing to monitor and maintain the Russia-Ukraine ceasefire.

It is likely that the current front line—or some variation of it—will serve as the ceasefire line.

The OSCE gained experience from 2014 to 2022 through the SMM (Special Monitoring Mission). The resources allocated to it would need to be increased three- or fourfold. A system that is less passive than the one previously implemented must also be put in place.

If this mission is launched, it would open the door to reforming and restructuring the OSCE in a positive way. At least half of the OSCE’s activities and structures are set to be phased out. This would be easier if a ceasefire mission were to mobilize hundreds of people.

To date, there is no agreement on the future system for monitoring and enforcing the ceasefire in Ukraine. The coalition of “volunteers” led by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom has been unable to propose a system for monitoring and enforcing the ceasefire that is acceptable to and accepted by Russia.

This is an opportunity for the OSCE if the Chairmanship or the Troika are able to make their mark (The Troika consists of the current OSCE Chairmanship—Switzerland—along with the previous Chairmanship—Finland—and the next Chairmanship—to be determined).

There is a need for a security organization covering Europe and the former Central Asian republics of the USSR.

The OSCE’s priority should be:

  • identify and prevent future conflicts,
  • have an internal dispute resolution body
  • be able to monitor and maintain a ceasefire

If the OSCE is unable to do so in the coming months and years, it will have to disappear and be reborn in a different form.

Naej DRANER

March 24, 2026

Preparing for the Post-War of the Russia-Ukraine War

These postwar preparations should begin as soon as possible, even if a ceasefire were not to be reached until much later:

  • Replace or reform the OSCE,
  • Keep the Russia-Ukraine negotiations going,
  • Define and prepare a mechanism to maintain the ceasefire,
  • Rethinking the Russia-Europe balance in a different way.

These various points will be covered in separate articles in the coming days and weeks.

Naej DRANER

March 23, 2026

Nuclear Deterrence in the 22nd Century

Imagine yourself in the 22nd century, on January 1, 2100.

  • If there were a nuclear war in the 21st century, who would dare to argue that nuclear deterrence ensures peace and will never lead to a nuclear war,
  • If there hasn’t been a nuclear war, we might question the wisdom of maintaining indefinitely a system that is never used, costs a fortune, and poses a real risk.

In the 21st century, we no longer think about deterrence in those terms; we are content with a short-term view and the reassuring feeling of being protected by nuclear deterrence.

No 21st-century solution is satisfactory. A country like Ukraine, which agreed to give up all its nuclear weapons in exchange for a Russian promise of non-intervention, can only bitterly regret this reality. The Russia-Ukraine war likely would never have taken place if Ukraine had retained its nuclear arsenal.

The balance of nuclear terror is becoming less and less effective. Some countries boast of having missiles superior to those of others, giving the impression that they could unleash hell on earth.

A solution must be found to this reality. Nuclear proliferation will continue. If Israel settles for a short-term view, hoping to remain the only country in the region with nuclear weapons, this is no longer the case with Pakistan.

The United States is the only country to have used nuclear weapons and to have destroyed a country twice on the pretext that it might acquire nuclear weapons. The first time, it was a lie intended to divert public attention from the true objectives. The second time, it was another lie based on a reality that did not match the statements made by the countries that went to war.

A war against Iran will not solve the nuclear problem that exists today and will continue to exist in the future.

Ideally, we would be able to deploy a “nuclear bomb neutralizer,” but at present that remains the stuff of imagination and science fiction, with virtually no credibility.

Naej DRANER

March 20, 2026

Any complete destruction of an existing security system leads to civil war

There are several key points to keep in mind when seeking to reform the security system of a state or a quasi-state entity:

  • A system for maintaining security and public order is essential, regardless of its form,
  • The complete destruction of the existing security system leads to a civil war,
  • An army is often unable to ensure long-term, reliable law and order.

When attempting to replace one security system with another, it is not enough simply to dismantle the old one; one must be able to define and implement the new system—or transform the old security system into a new one.

The classic mistake is to rely solely on military force while claiming that this is the new security system: it is not integrated, and more often than not, it is ineffective.

Currently, there are two cases directly related to this issue:

  • Hamas in the Gaza Strip,
  • the aim of destroying the Islamic Republic and establishing a new regime. The most likely scenario is that if the Islamic Republic is completely destroyed, a civil war will break out and could last for years.

Hamas in Gaza

The current proposal in the Trump plan calls for the complete eradication of Hamas and Gaza’s security services and their replacement with an international Arab military force. This will likely never work.

The goal should be to establish new law enforcement agencies rather than eliminate all the old ones, which would amount to the same thing since the missions, personnel, hierarchies, and organizational structure would be completely overhauled.

To do this, you would need to:

  • set up one or more tent camps to train thousands of future security personnel, along with all the necessary logistics and equipment
  • Open recruitment offices that will recruit all potential candidates on-site: no staff will be hired at any level other than the lowest rank. Anyone deemed unsuitable for service in the security forces must be offered a long-term job and provided with ongoing support. Recruitment will never be conducted on a group basis; only individuals will be hired, without any rank.
  • to have instructors who are capable of performing operational duties (i.e., commanding patrols or units while also serving as instructors)
  • Develop a training program for the next three weeks, starting with a week of physical tests, followed by eliminations for those who do not pass
  • work with future local authorities (or the Palestinian Authority) to establish a minimum set of laws or regulations to be enforced

This operation to train new security forces must not be under the control of any army (Israeli or otherwise). However, a group of inspectors must be established, composed of one-third Israelis, one-third Palestinians, and one-third international inspectors (Arab or otherwise). This inspection group has access to everything, everywhere, based on the intelligence known to the inspectors. Today, if there is a problem, the Israeli army bombs and kills what it perceives to be the problem. Tomorrow, it will be the inspection group that is tasked with addressing the problem and must resolve it immediately (within a few hours) with the assistance of the new security forces.

Iran

The priority should not be the dismantling of the current security forces, but their gradual transformation.

For example, there are no unarmed riot police capable of deploying anywhere. The mullahs’ regime is demonstrating its incompetence by sending armed Revolutionary Guards to confront the crowds, as if they were going to fight a foreign army that does not exist. This incompetence has resulted in thousands (perhaps even tens of thousands) of deaths, as the authorities are unable to restore order without a bloodbath.

Since there are no plans for foreign troops to conduct ground operations, it is unrealistic to claim that new security forces can be trained there.

Replacing the Revolutionary Guards with properly trained and equipped riot police is an important step. If this proves impossible, there is a risk of a protracted civil war or a harsh and ruthless dictatorship, even under an officially weakened regime.

Naej DRANER
Naej DRANER is a political and security analyst and solutions architect.

Updated on March 21, 2026

Israel: When War Becomes a Permanent State

The trauma of September 11, 2001, and that of October 7, 2023, had the same effect: the victims (the United States in 2001 and Israel in 2023) embarked on a state of perpetual war.

The United States went to war in Afghanistan against the Taliban and terrorists, and then against Iraq, which was accused of developing weapons of mass destruction that existed only in the American imagination but did not prevent the war, which turned out to be a disaster. The 2003 war against Iraq was a military victory but a political and diplomatic disaster.

Israel has launched a war against Hamas, then against Hezbollah, and finally against Iran. The war has been ongoing since 2023.

When war becomes a permanent state, as it did in the years following 2001 and as it is now, the “Quésako Cycle” seems to have ceased to exist. The wars in Afghanistan in 2001, in Iraq in 2003, and against Iran in 2025 and then in 2026 have no direct connection to the “Quésako Cycle” and may even seem to contradict it.

In the study on the “materialization of the Quésako cycle,” it was possible to demonstrate that the “Quésako cycle” did indeed influence the war in Iraq, if one considers the number of war-related deaths, which suggests a manifestation of the “Quésako cycle” (see the Iraq Body Count website or the book “A Cyclical Phenomenon That Promotes Wars?” (Editions l’Harmattan).

Will the war that is breaking out in Iran have the same effect, escalating into a civil war that lasts for years? It is too early to say.

Throughout history, there has been another period when wars were permanent, to the point that the Quésako Cycle was not apparent: the Napoleonic Wars. When war becomes a permanent state, as is now the case for Israel, successive wars seem to contradict the “Quésako Cycle.” This cycle is then less visible, but it becomes apparent again after these episodes of war.

Did the United States come out on top after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq? No, it lost on both counts: the Taliban have returned to power, undoing more than 20 years of military occupation by the United States and its allies. Iraq’s political system is as unstable as its Lebanese model.

Will Israel come out on top? It will buy itself some time, but it will still be faced with the same problems it has failed to resolve. It is only a matter of time before another military victory turns into a political and diplomatic disaster.

The nations of the world will not forget that Israel destroyed Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Iranian state. These memories will be stronger than anything else. They might forget the Holocaust and realize that the victim of the past has become the oppressor, believing itself to be the savior of its future.

March 16, 2026

Israel’s permanent war

Until 2025, Israel was a remarkable example of the “Quésako Cycle.” Every war in the Arab-Israeli conflict began during a phase of amplification. This is described in the book “Un phénomène cyclique qui favorise les guerres ?” (A cyclical phenomenon that favors wars?), published by L’Harmattan in french.

Since the trauma of October 7, 2023, Israel has been waging wars on all fronts. Even during periods of calm, the wars continue and start up again. Two wars in one year against Iran, and it is likely that the war in Gaza will resume, under the pretext that Hamas has not completely disarmed.

The same thing happened in the United States after September 11, 2001. They launched wars on all fronts. Afghanistan, then Iraq, under various pretexts. What is the result 25 years after the original trauma? Afghanistan has returned to the Talibans, as if nothing had ever happened. Iraq is in Iran’s sphere of influence. The destruction of Iraq has allowed Iran to rise as a regional power. Was it all for nothing? Practically yes.

So what will be the effect of Israel’s permanent war in 20 years? It’s hard to say, but these wars will not bring Israel peace in the region. These wars will give the illusion of a victorious peace for a time.

Whether after September 11, 2001, or after October 7, 2023, the trauma of these events has led to a headlong rush into permanent war. The “Quésako Cycle” is no longer visible for a while. But in both cases, it is still present, even if it seems less visible.

In the case of the 2003 Iraq War, which seems to contradict the Quésako cycle, since it broke out near a peak of attenuation, it was possible to show the impact of the Quésako Cycle on the Iraq War through the number of war victims (see the section on Materialization in the book “A Cyclical Phenomenon that favors Wars?”). .

In the case of the new Israeli-American-Iranian war, will we see the same indirect phenomenon? Perhaps, but we won’t know for another 10 or 15 years.

March 3, 2026