A war has multiple causes. According to conflict studies, these include:

• immediate causes (what triggers the outbreak of war),
• circumstantial causes (generally events preceding the outbreak of war),
• and structural causes (which are the most significant)

In the case of the Persian Gulf, the causes of a limited war between the countries bordering the Persian Gulf are:

• immediate cause: the decision by the United States and Israel to go to war,
• Circumstantial factors: The war launched by the United States and Israel led Iran to believe that blocking the Strait of Hormuz and destroying its neighbors’ facilities would be to its advantage. The initial war triggered a new war between Iran and the Persian Gulf states.
• Structural causes: Iran and its neighbors in the Persian Gulf rarely communicate with one another and do not belong to any common institution that would allow them to defuse tensions. They communicate only through gunfire, foreign powers, and threats—and never directly (or almost never).

What was the situation like before the war of 2026?

Six of the eight countries bordering the Persian Gulf are members of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. The name might suggest that this is an organization that fosters cooperation among all the countries bordering the Persian Gulf. This is not the case, and given the reality of relations among these six countries, it never will be.

The Gulf Cooperation Council has several objectives:

• partial political integration (there will never be political integration with Iran or Iraq),
• Economic integration (apart from cooperation in the Persian Gulf, it is unlikely that Iraq and Iran will be integrated into it),
• various projects, such as finding alternative shipping routes to the Strait of Hormuz

Iran accounts for roughly half of the Persian Gulf coastline and has no formalized cooperation with its neighbors.

What is the situation like after the war of 2026?

Iran has blocked shipping lanes, launched missiles and drones at various countries, and believes itself to be the master of the Strait of Hormuz. They’re living in a fantasy world, and they’re going to have to come back down to earth.

What is the purpose of the Persian Gulf Council?

It focuses on structural causes. If only the countries bordering the Persian Gulf would communicate regularly with one another, it could pave the way for a better future and help resolve crises. Exchanging threats and bringing in a powerful military ally will only add chaos to chaos.

Iran’s demands should not be taken at face value. Iran sees itself as the master of the Strait of Hormuz. Will Iran dare to propose its demand for exclusive control of the strait to its neighbors? If so, we must respond to Iran: Could you remind us of the demarcation of territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf?

And until the response is credible in light of existing territorial agreements, we’ll have to keep politely repeating the same old refrain, while we wait for a somewhat serious response—with a touch of humor.

Which countries could help facilitate the creation of the Persian Gulf Council?

Iraq, Oman, and Qatar. They must be able to bring the others on board. Once that happens, a framework for negotiations will need to be established with permanent representatives from the eight countries in one of these three countries.

A few drafts have been written (there have been five others besides this one). They are not finalized, which is intentional: it is up to the eight countries to write and define what they wish to do. After that, they must take charge and decide whether or not to create the Persian Gulf Council. This body could be informal or formal, but it would be better if it had an official status, if only to reassure the rest of the world and the insurers.

Having an idea isn’t enough

That is the weakness of an architect and his proposals. After that, we need third countries on board to get the eight countries to go along with it. And then it will be up to those eight countries. For now, they prefer to wait for a magic solution from outside negotiators.

The architect is merely a catalyst to spark a project. There are other solutions besides this project, but it would be good if the Persian Gulf countries would talk to one another and find solutions to their problems. We can help them think things through, but we cannot decide what they do not want to do.

There is a lack of a network of diplomats to try something. According to the statistical data on this website, no Arab country has ever read a single one of these texts. So nothing has happened, and likely nothing will happen, due to a lack of intermediaries and a network. It was an idea—not a stupid one—but without the means to implement it.

Naej DRANER

May 10, 2026

Appendix 5 of Jean-Baptiste Renard’s book A Cyclical Phenomenon that favors Wars, published in french by L’Harmattan, contains war forecasts made in December 2021 regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. The appendix considered a war between 2023 and 2025 to be likely.

Why was a war likely? Because of an understanding of the “Quésako Cycle” and an analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

October 7, 2023, and the war that followed confirmed this analysis.

An Israeli acquaintance commented, “You predicted what the Mossad didn’t.” But this Israeli woman did not understand the “Quésako Cycle” and was quick to conclude that it was impossible to predict this war. She refused to accept reality.

Will Israel ever understand? And will it accept it?

In the wake of the trauma of October 7, 2023, Israel launched a series of wars on all fronts, just as the United States had launched multiple wars after September 11, 2001. Afghanistan, the war on terror, the war in Iraq. What remains in 2026 of all these wars waged by the United States starting in 2001? Afghanistan has been retaken by the Taliban; terrorism is still present everywhere and has even spread to Africa. Iraq is a shadow of its previous state.

What will remain in 20 years of the wars waged by Israel since 2023? Jewish intellectuals point out that all these wars will cause the international community to forget the Holocaust, and that this image of a country that destroys other countries and populations—without having built anything for the future—will slowly take its place. These wars are like an indelible mark on Israel’s behavior: no one will forget.

The key point of the “Quésako Cycle” that Israel needs to understand is in this chart

Will Israel understand and accept this?

The Israeli and Jewish scientific community is significant. Is it capable of engaging with what remains the remarkable case of the “Quésako Cycle”? It is probably too early for Israelis to take a step back. It may take them a few years to understand—or an eternity to deny—the “Quésako Cycle,” which is a disruptive element in the unconscious behavior of Israel and its enemies. They are both bound by the same phenomenon, which remains unknown to them.

Naej DRANER

May 8, 2026

Have you read the book “A Cyclical Phenomenon that favors Wars” by Jean-Baptiste Renard, published by L’Harmattan? ( in french but you can find a translation here)

A book that experts on war and peace should have understood. A cyclical phenomenon whose understanding allows us to predict wars and better understand contemporary conflicts. It is the “Quésako Cycle.” Not some esoteric joke, but rigorous, well-reasoned research presented in an engineer’s style that won’t let up until everyone has understood it.

This book examines various contexts, such as the Russia-Putin context that is of interest to us here, and for which you have the chart below. (If you do not understand the chart, please refer to the book, where everything is explained.)

The author rightly points out that what sets Russia apart is that it has experienced multiple triggers of war at most stages of escalation. The “Quésako Cycle” has a much greater impact on the Russia-Putin duo than in any other known case, including Israel, which remains a notable exception.

Why does the “Quésako Cycle” have such a strong influence on Putin and Russia?

The author believes that a “special study”—we might even add “very special”—would be needed to answer this question.

Fortunately, Russia’s decision-making process has become very streamlined. It consists of one man (Putin) and a few aides and close associates. All other Russian institutions serve merely as a rubber-stamp for the decisions made by Putin and his inner circle. We can therefore imagine that by limiting this “special study” to Putin and his inner circle—and by including the myths and fantasies that drive them—we should be able to find some leads that allow us to move forward and understand how the “Quésako Cycle” can exert such influence.

Putin and Russia are highly sensitive to the “Quésako Cycle.” Understanding why might help advance research on the “Quésako Cycle.”

Will the special study ever see the light of day?

I’m not so sure. The ones who should be interested are the Europeans, but they’re a war behind the times. They’re preparing for the next one just as they experienced the last one. They don’t have the time or the will to step back and take a broader view to understand what they’re experiencing through the Russia-Ukraine conflict. And yet, if they understood why, they could avoid it. Are they aware of this? They haven’t shown the slightest interest and probably haven’t understood a thing. Their leaders and the EU’s top officials should be aware of this, but that’s not the case right now.

For the special study to be carried out, the following would be required:

• motivated researchers
• highly qualified experts on Russia and its institutions
• funding sufficient to cover all necessary supplementary research (a team of 10 to 50 people makes sense)
• a project
• and enough determination to carry it out, without waiting for others to do it and without waiting for the media to cover it (Europeans are very media-sensitive. They consider what everyone is talking about to be of interest, not what no one is talking about. Presumably, they will take an interest in the subject when everyone is talking about it… through the media. And if the media never mentions it, they will likely never be informed)

For now, none of that is happening.

Of course, once launched, the special study must under no circumstances be halted before it is completed. It could take 5, 10, 15, or even 20 years: we need a credible result.

To be continued…

Naej DRANER

May 6, 2026

The Persian Gulf Council is the organization that brings together the countries bordering the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

The purpose of the Persian Gulf Council is:

• Monitor and assess the condition of the waters of the Persian Gulf, particularly with regard to pollution, flora, and fauna.
• If necessary, regulate each country’s discharges into the Persian Gulf and ensure compliance (for example: discharges from desalination plants, which should not be released into the Persian Gulf, as this would gradually turn it into a dead sea, as well as industrial discharges and discharges from wastewater treatment plants).
• Oil Spill Pollution in the Persian Gulf: Should All Coastal Countries Establish and Utilize Common Measures?
• Define and update the rules of navigation in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. This includes the possibility of establishing a right of passage through the Strait of Hormuz.
• Discuss among member countries any issues that may be of direct or indirect collective interest (for example: the possibility of regional denuclearization could be a topic for discussion, even if its implementation might extend beyond the countries bordering the Persian Gulf; the Iran-U.S. conflict could be a topic for discussion).

What the Persian Gulf Council will not do:

• Political integration,
• Economic integration,
• agreements involving only a small group of countries (such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, which does not represent all the countries bordering the Persian Gulf)

What role will the Gulf Cooperation Council play in the Persian Gulf Council?

At first glance, nothing, since they are two different organizations. The Gulf Cooperation Council does not represent all the countries bordering the Persian Gulf. It could represent the six countries if they agreed to a single representation. But given the Gulf Cooperation Council Secretariat’s usual stance toward Iran, a collective statement from the six GCC countries through the voice of its current secretary will likely achieve little. You cannot transform a conflictual relationship that has lasted for several years into a stable one without profound changes within an organization accustomed to a confrontational posture.

Why highlight the Persian Gulf Council now?

Because the United States and Iran claim to be negotiating an agreement on the Strait of Hormuz that will affect all countries bordering the Persian Gulf. That part of the agreement should now be negotiated by the Persian Gulf Council and should be removed from the U.S.-Iran negotiations.

What resources will the Persian Gulf Council have?

Either direct participation by each state, in accordance with rules to be established, or a right of passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

Right of passage through the Strait of Hormuz

Today, Iran claims to be imposing a right of passage from which only Iran would benefit. We must begin technical negotiations starting with internationally recognized shipping lanes:

• Some of these shipping routes are in Omani territorial waters. Although Oman does not want a right of passage, it could claim one or request a share of the right of passage sought by Iran.
• The United Arab Emirates claims three islands, two of which are located in waterways that Iran claims are within its territorial waters. If the United Arab Emirates’ claims are recognized, part of those waterways would therefore lie within the territorial waters of the United Arab Emirates.
• Preliminary conclusion: At the very least, the transit fees collected by Iran should be divided into three equal parts. It would be better to allocate them immediately as part of the Persian Gulf Council’s revenue so that it can fulfill its mission.

These are the arguments of a technical negotiation. If it fails to reach a conclusion, we will explore how we can establish shipping lanes in territorial waters other than those of Iran… and perhaps even how to bypass the Strait of Hormuz for the transit of goods, which would be another way to undermine Iran’s claims to exclusive rights of passage.

Who is interested in the idea of a “Persian Gulf Council”?

In light of recent statements, Saudi Arabia, through MBS, and Iran, through the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, appear to support such a prospect, even if their wording may differ from that of the Persian Gulf Council, as defined here.

Since Naej DRANER cannot know how this proposal could have been considered by these leaders, it’s possible that they naturally considered this possibility: allowing the countries bordering the Persian Gulf to have their say and decide matters that concern them.

Naej DRANER

May 3, 2026

Postscript, May 4, 2026: To date, the Persian Gulf Council project exists solely in the author’s imagination as an alternative means of resolving the issue of the Strait of Hormuz, without addressing the other points. The author is not aware of any intermediaries willing to assist him in implementing this project. Keep a close eye on what happens with the U.S. initiative to escort ships by force. I do not believe it will succeed in normalizing the situation and allowing a return to normal traffic. It is more likely that there will be several serious incidents and perhaps even a resumption of war. Another diplomatic path will be necessary to truly break the deadlock.

“We don’t know how to make peace.” That is the reality of today’s world. Most of the “peaces” we experienced in the 20th century were military victories that we called peace, but very few peace negotiations have succeeded and been truly implemented.

What we know about achieving it is relatively simple: create the right conditions for each of the parties involved to make it happen. And with a little luck, an acceptable solution will eventually emerge.

For example, if all the countries bordering the Persian Gulf began by meeting every day for fifteen minutes, through diplomats in any country, this could lead within a few days or weeks to the normalization of maritime traffic.

Of course, we’ll need to make sure there are no mines. We don’t know if this is real or true. Mine-sweeping vessels exist in various countries, but experts say that the U.S. ships in the Gulf of Oman are not mine-sweepers and that mine-clearing operations have not yet begun. The Americans could do it, but others could as well.

Day after day, we’ll have to make our case. If Iran claims to be setting up a toll in its waters, the neighboring countries across from it can do the same: Oman, the UAE, etc.

The goal of these daily meetings: any topic. Topics agreed upon unanimously are developed after confirmation by the authorities of each country. If no topic garners unanimous support, we look for one every day: 15 minutes to go over them daily.

Everyone wants to reopen maritime traffic. This topic certainly garners unanimous support, but what causes friction is how to achieve it and how to go about it.

We could start with a shipping lane in Iranian waters and another in the remaining territorial waters. The strait is too narrow for either side to claim the usual territorial limits at sea. In that case, we could split the difference by drawing a line down the middle of the strait.

It would be better if maritime traffic were defined in a rational and mutually agreed-upon manner, but if Iran intends to be the sole legal passage, we will create another one, even if it requires construction work to make it possible.

And then, day by day, a draft agreement may emerge that everyone could implement.

What matters is not that there be a miracle negotiator to make it happen, but that, in the end, all the countries bordering the Persian Gulf recognize that this is their project. Of course, outside parties would be needed to keep the process moving forward every day and to review the various proposals, eliminating any that do not enjoy unanimous support.

It’s only a matter of time: they all want the same thing—namely, to facilitate the maritime traffic that concerns them—the only problem is that the proposed solutions don’t have unanimous support at the moment. That could change.

Even if it takes three months to succeed, the proposed approach can work; we just need someone who knows all the countries bordering the Persian Gulf and who follows up with them every day—not even by phone—until it succeeds. Fifteen minutes a day. It could be more than fifteen minutes if interesting solutions emerge. The immediate challenge is to have, for each of these countries, a reliable news channel with a leader capable of committing within the next 15 minutes.

I don’t know how to do that: I have no permanent diplomatic contacts with those countries. Several countries could do it. Be warned: Europeans are more concerned with their internal disagreements than with a potential agreement among the Persian Gulf countries. They’re capable of spending hours just to come up with a press release. That’s not what we’re asking for. We’re simply asking them to take each country’s proposals into account and present them to the others—not to invent a European regulation. They could act as facilitators, but no one has asked them to propose a solution on behalf of others. The architect is supposed to be able to make proposals, and for now the proposal is very simple: regulate maritime traffic to prepare for the opening.

Naej DRANER

April 25, 2026

We need to ensure that this text is conveyed to each of the countries concerned, first through diplomatic channels, and then verify that it has been taken into account by each of their leaders. We must then maintain constant contact for as long as necessary, even if this overlaps with negotiations taking place elsewhere. I don’t have the resources to do that. It would have to be done by volunteer diplomats, regardless of their country

Today, there is no representative body for the countries bordering the Persian Gulf. There is a Gulf Cooperation Council that gives the impression of being such a body, even though it represents only six countries, excluding Iran and Iraq. The GCC aims to establish an economic and political union, which will not be the case for the Persian Gulf Council, should it be established.

If there were a “Persian Gulf Council,” its primary role would be to establish rules for managing maritime traffic and all matters related to the Persian Gulf (pollution, traffic supervision, etc.). Ultimately, such a body is essential, and if it is established, decisions will initially be made by unanimous consent to ensure that they truly reflect the will of the countries bordering the Persian Gulf.

For now, the only negotiations taking place are those between the United States and Iran. Does the “Persian Gulf Council” feel bound by the decisions that the United States and Iran will make, supposedly on its behalf? I don’t think so, but if the “Persian Gulf Council” does not come into being, the decisions implemented in the Persian Gulf will be those of the United States and Iran.

Some Gulf countries have believed—and continue to believe—that U.S. military power is sufficient and will remain sufficient to ensure free passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Take a good look at what is happening: they are currently unable to do so. They can impose a blockade on Iranian ports but will be unable to ensure the safety of any ship passing through the Strait of Hormuz. To achieve this, they would need a military operation on a very, very large scale, which is not on the table for the U.S. at this time.

If the few countries opposed to Iran’s permanent control of the Strait of Hormuz express their opposition only through the United States, you will find yourselves in an unexpected position:

• the Gulf Cooperation Council will, in effect, be replaced by the U.S.-Iran duo
• The toll on the Strait of Hormuz will be collected by Iran (and perhaps the United States) and not by the Persian Gulf Council

Is this your unanimous decision?

Keep in mind that there may be instances of pollution or ships in distress in the Persian Gulf, and that it would be beneficial to have a maritime oversight body representing all the countries of the Persian Gulf. And when that happens, a toll will be necessary to fund it, without any single country claiming to be the sole beneficiary.

Is it your preference to have maritime regulations in the Persian Gulf governed by a U.S.-Iran agreement that will become permanent and be administered solely by the United States and Iran?

Nothing is stopping you from speaking your mind and making decisions.

As far as I’m concerned, there will be no further discussion on this matter unless you have first made a decision

See: Persian Gulf Council (and the few articles that followed)

Naej DRANER

Naej DRANER is a political and security analyst and solutions architect. At a meeting of the Persian Gulf Council, his status as an official advisor to the Persian Gulf Council will be submitted for approval. Only a unanimous decision by the full members will be acceptable.

April 23, 2026

In recent years, a series of leaders have emerged who all share the same defining characteristic: an excessive use of force and the belief that their military superiority alone will be enough to secure peace. For them, peace is nothing more than the expression of their military victory. Netanyahu, Trump, and Putin are just a few of the representatives of this new generation.

When it comes to ceasefires, ignorance seems to reign supreme. They all claim to turn their force into a ceasefire, which is nothing more than a fragile truce, if it comes to pass.

For years, I had the impression that leaders were trying to apply certain principles to achieve a ceasefire. In recent years, that’s no longer even the case. They no longer bother to pretend to apply any principles. They threaten left and right, as if that were the only recognized way to move forward. Are they ignorant? Probably. Are they fools? Probably so, too, but they present themselves as the new geniuses of our time, claiming one day to be the king of peace and behaving the next day like the king of war.

Kissinger said that a leader limits himself to Reader’s Digest-style texts. A few pages, not too complicated, and above all, nothing scholarly.

Do these few pages actually exist, and are they available anywhere? Perhaps, but I don’t see them featuring prominently in our leaders’ general knowledge.

Imagine you have to broker a ceasefire tomorrow—what do you need to know to succeed?

First, you need a basic agreement, which might simply be to allow time for negotiations. Beyond this agreement in principle, you have to implement it.

You must understand that every ceasefire is initially violated, simply because not all combatants have been informed or are pretending not to be. The ceasefire must therefore be announced a few hours in advance (less than 24 hours). This time is needed for the order to be transmitted through the existing combatant chains of command.

Since there will always be incidents, orders must also be given not to respond to the enemy’s incidents or provocations.

To prevent every incident from escalating into a new war, a system for monitoring and enforcing the ceasefire is needed. It can be simple or complex, depending on the situation, but in any case, every incident must be resolved within minutes or an hour if the ceasefire is to hold. Today, most current ceasefires lack a monitoring and control system capable of responding within a few hours. Israel’s great specialty is to respond militarily to every misstep: this is the new Israeli monitoring system, the height of ignorance and sheer stupidity of an army that believes itself invincible, above all others, and thinks that the constant terror it inflicts is sufficient to guarantee a ceasefire. This results in the fragile truces in Gaza and southern Lebanon, the endless cycles of Israel’s “science of the ceasefire.” Each time, they occupy a portion of the enemy’s territory, claiming that this is the solution to ensuring a lasting ceasefire. We have lost count of the number of times the Israeli army has occupied and demolished part of South Lebanon in order to ensure a lasting ceasefire.

It is true that the ceasefire monitoring and control system has never functioned properly under UNIFIL. For it to work, every incident would need to trigger an almost immediate response from the military coordinators on both sides. Military coordination and ceasefire monitoring in South Lebanon takes several days, or even several weeks. The system cannot guarantee to the Israeli army that the combatants responsible for the incident will be identified and neutralized by the monitoring system. “Neutralized” does not mean militarily, but rather through hierarchical coordination.

The same applies to Gaza, only worse: there is no known monitoring system other than the Israeli command system aided by an AI target-identification system. This AI system turns toilet noises into certainties, and since there is no one left to verify whether the impact of the fire made any sense, it has devolved into utter chaos and military arbitrariness.

So will the US-Iran ceasefire hold? As usual, each side will ramp up its threats. Will these threats turn into a new round of war? If so, oil production and traffic in the Persian Gulf will be halted for several months. By constantly threatening, they risk feeling compelled to carry out their threats.

We are piling ignorance upon stupidity.

What about the Ukraine-Russia ceasefire? The Europeans’ current efforts are nothing more than amateurish. None of today’s European leaders has ever implemented a single ceasefire, and they naively believe that a credible military force alone would be enough to enforce one. Well-intentioned but ineffective. They have forgotten the 2014–2022 ceasefire in the Donbas and have forgotten that the ceasefire was never fully respected, nor did they even understand what would have been necessary to make it hold. This has always been a flaw in Ukrainian leadership: they seek the backing of a military force that would sweep away their opponents or keep them at bay, without building a political or diplomatic solution. This has been the case since 2014, and it remains so today. Their allies are not helping them build a future beyond the military.

Naej DRANER

April 21, 2026

To understand this article, you must first have read:

• Synthesis of the Clock of the Unconscious
• The Returns of the Past

As a reminder, the “Quesako Cycle,” which deals with wars, is just one application (among others) of the “Return Theory,” which is described in “The Returns of the Past“.

The “Return Theory” is a fundamental theory that has been used, by identifying returns, to define several concepts such as those of the “Quesako Cycle.”

If you think the “Quesako Cycle” is the only thing that exists, think again. The Clock of the Unconscious encompasses a series of entirely new theories and concepts, of which the “Quesako Cycle” is the only part sufficiently developed to be rationally comprehensible.

The central question of this article is whether the “U.S.-Iran war” represents a “return of the past”—specifically, a return of the 2003 Iraq War—or the emergence of an “Arab Return Cycle” unique to the Arab world.

Definition of a “Return Cycle”:

A “Return Cycle” is a periodic phenomenon that has the same periodicity as the “Quesako Cycle” but uses a different reference point (T0) than the “Quesako Cycle.” Each country (or region) may have its own “Return Cycle.” It helps identify upheavals in the collective unconscious that may impact the country’s history. Such a “Return Cycle” can be a combination of different events.

For example, consider the following events:

• The 2003 Iraq War,
• The Arab Spring of 2011 (including all the upheavals in the Arab states as well as the wars in Syria and Libya)
• The U.S.-Iran War of 2026

All of these events can be seen as part of the escalating phases of a “Return Cycle” that would have its starting point (T0) in the 2003 Gulf War against Iraq

There is one event missing from the 2016–2021 period. There is no specific event that stands out from the others.

The most common “return of the past” is 25 years, + or – 2 years: 2003 + 25 = 2028, meaning the period from 2026 to 2030, during which we may see a recurrence of the war in Iraq.

In other words, if this is indeed a return of the 2003 Iraq War, Donald Trump is more attuned to the Clock of the Unconscious than to his conscious mind (which, as everyone knows, is not really predictable). American people, refer to the unconsciousness of your ” Chaos Star” if you want understanding predictable issues of your guy. That’s all folks.

A simple return from the 2003 Iraq War, or an “Arab Return Cycle” that could shape the future of the Arab world (for example, in 2033–2035)? The question remains open and has not been resolved, since we have not yet found any volunteers to conduct this study.

This topic has not yet been explored, but it will be if there are interested individuals willing to devote the necessary resources to it.

A “Return Cycle XXX” is a new concept that has not yet been described or developed. This article marks the beginning of this topic, with a very short first draft.

For example, there is a “France Return Cycle” featuring various events that have shaped France (in-house)

April 18, 2026

It is generally accepted that the cyclical phenomenon underlying the “Quésako Cycle” is not a perfect sine wave. It is a sine wave that fluctuates and whose period can vary. The average period is 3,095 days, but the actual period could range from 2,200 days to 3,800 days.

If we knew the origin of this cyclical phenomenon, we wouldn’t need to readjust the peaks; observing the cyclical phenomenon that causes this cycle would be enough to determine the variations.

This is an important issue that has not been convincingly resolved.

So far, there has been only one adjustment of -679 days applied in early 2025 to the wars of 2014. This adjustment stems from the observation that several major wars broke out within a short period of time in 2014. It was hypothesized that this meant the peak of amplification had shifted to that time.

Just because one peak is shifted doesn’t mean that the subsequent peaks are shifted in the same way.

While the concept of resetting (to be tested in early 2025) is appealing, it would be preferable not to reset the Quesako cycle by 100% with every change, but rather by a smaller percentage (50 to 75%).

Researchers who take over the “Cycle Quésako” study should be aware that the recalibration method needs to be reviewed.

The best approach would be to identify the cause of this cyclical phenomenon, but there are no credible leads yet. The current suspension of research into the “Quesako Cycle” (due to a lack of adequate resources) is preventing any progress on the matter.

JBR

April 15, 2026

To sum up:

• Less than a week ago, Donald Trump was demanding free passage through the Strait of Hormuz, threatening to destroy everything everywhere if his demands weren’t met. A few days later, that same Donald Trump blocked the Strait of Hormuz. LOGICAL, isn’t it? (I’m a bit slow on the uptake and have a hard time grasping the subtleties of how things unfold.)
• Late last week, Donald Trump was already envisioning the creation of a “joint venture” to manage shipping rights through the Strait of Hormuz. In the past few days, that same Donald Trump has declared that any ship that has paid a transit fee will be prosecuted. LOGICAL, isn’t it? (I’m still just as clueless and haven’t figured out why there’s been a complete about-face: my guess is that Iran made it clear to him that they didn’t need him to collect the money.)

We see this kind of thing practically every day. I call it the “windshield wiper” approach (or the search for the best fan by switching directions repeatedly). One swing in one direction, then suddenly the other way, and then we start all over again.

I have to admit I’m a terrible diplomat: I can’t handle both sides of an issue when I keep changing my goals every day.

Is it worth trying?

I think we need to distinguish between the short term (Trump and his “windshield-wiper diplomacy”) and the long term, which will always be relevant even if not much happens in the coming days.

What will always be useful:

• that the countries bordering the Persian Gulf communicate regularly. That is not the case today: the Gulf Cooperation Council aims for political and economic unification and has often taken an anti-Iran stance. These six countries are navigating the reality of the Gulf crisis by trying to put a little more pressure on Iran. All it would take is for a diplomat from each country bordering the Persian Gulf to meet regularly with all their colleagues somewhere in the world. In the event of a crisis, this could happen daily; otherwise, weekly. What would they discuss? What their countries want—identifying the issues of common interest and setting aside the rest.
• There will be issues related to maritime navigation and pollution in the Persian Gulf. It would be helpful to have joint measures in place to address these issues. Rather than asking each country to contribute, we could establish a transit fee, collected collectively, which would help fund these measures.

As a political and security architect, I see two issues:

• A collective right of way
• the denuclearization of the region. Donald Trump and Israel simply want to recover the enriched uranium and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. As for me, I am seeking the denuclearization of the entire region, starting with the Persian Gulf. This won’t happen in a matter of weeks, but if it succeeds, the enriched uranium will have to be recovered. We’ll get there, but by a different route.

The problem with architects is that they have nothing but ideas, and if no one helps bring them to life, nothing will happen. That’s exactly the case.

How can he claim to be an advisor to a Persian Gulf Council that does not exist (or that is being confused with the council of a few coastal countries that represent only one faction in the conflict)?

It was just an idea that might never come to fruition. People today prefer the “windshield wiper” approach to diplomacy.

Naej DRANER

April 14, 2026