There are several key points to keep in mind when seeking to reform the security system of a state or a quasi-state entity:

• A system for maintaining security and public order is essential, regardless of its form,
• The complete destruction of the existing security system leads to a civil war,
• An army is often unable to ensure long-term, reliable law and order.

When attempting to replace one security system with another, it is not enough simply to dismantle the old one; one must be able to define and implement the new system—or transform the old security system into a new one.

The classic mistake is to rely solely on military force while claiming that this is the new security system: it is not integrated, and more often than not, it is ineffective.

Currently, there are two cases directly related to this issue:

• Hamas in the Gaza Strip,
• the aim of destroying the Islamic Republic and establishing a new regime. The most likely scenario is that if the Islamic Republic is completely destroyed, a civil war will break out and could last for years.

Hamas in Gaza

The current proposal in the Trump plan calls for the complete eradication of Hamas and Gaza’s security services and their replacement with an international Arab military force. This will likely never work.

The goal should be to establish new law enforcement agencies rather than eliminate all the old ones, which would amount to the same thing since the missions, personnel, hierarchies, and organizational structure would be completely overhauled.

To do this, you would need to:

• set up one or more tent camps to train thousands of future security personnel, along with all the necessary logistics and equipment
• Open recruitment offices that will recruit all potential candidates on-site: no staff will be hired at any level other than the lowest rank. Anyone deemed unsuitable for service in the security forces must be offered a long-term job and provided with ongoing support. Recruitment will never be conducted on a group basis; only individuals will be hired, without any rank.
• to have instructors who are capable of performing operational duties (i.e., commanding patrols or units while also serving as instructors)
• Develop a training program for the next three weeks, starting with a week of physical tests, followed by eliminations for those who do not pass
• work with future local authorities (or the Palestinian Authority) to establish a minimum set of laws or regulations to be enforced

This operation to train new security forces must not be under the control of any army (Israeli or otherwise). However, a group of inspectors must be established, composed of one-third Israelis, one-third Palestinians, and one-third international inspectors (Arab or otherwise). This inspection group has access to everything, everywhere, based on the intelligence known to the inspectors. Today, if there is a problem, the Israeli army bombs and kills what it perceives to be the problem. Tomorrow, it will be the inspection group that is tasked with addressing the problem and must resolve it immediately (within a few hours) with the assistance of the new security forces.

Iran

The priority should not be the dismantling of the current security forces, but their gradual transformation.

For example, there are no unarmed riot police capable of deploying anywhere. The mullahs’ regime is demonstrating its incompetence by sending armed Revolutionary Guards to confront the crowds, as if they were going to fight a foreign army that does not exist. This incompetence has resulted in thousands (perhaps even tens of thousands) of deaths, as the authorities are unable to restore order without a bloodbath.

Since there are no plans for foreign troops to conduct ground operations, it is unrealistic to claim that new security forces can be trained there.

Replacing the Revolutionary Guards with properly trained and equipped riot police is an important step. If this proves impossible, there is a risk of a protracted civil war or a harsh and ruthless dictatorship, even under an officially weakened regime.

Naej DRANER
Naej DRANER is a political and security analyst and solutions architect.

Updated on March 21, 2026

The trauma of September 11, 2001, and that of October 7, 2023, had the same effect: the victims (the United States in 2001 and Israel in 2023) embarked on a state of perpetual war.

The United States went to war in Afghanistan against the Taliban and terrorists, and then against Iraq, which was accused of developing weapons of mass destruction that existed only in the American imagination but did not prevent the war, which turned out to be a disaster. The 2003 war against Iraq was a military victory but a political and diplomatic disaster.

Israel has launched a war against Hamas, then against Hezbollah, and finally against Iran. The war has been ongoing since 2023.

When war becomes a permanent state, as it did in the years following 2001 and as it is now, the “Quésako Cycle” seems to have ceased to exist. The wars in Afghanistan in 2001, in Iraq in 2003, and against Iran in 2025 and then in 2026 have no direct connection to the “Quésako Cycle” and may even seem to contradict it.

In the study on the “materialization of the Quésako cycle,” it was possible to demonstrate that the “Quésako cycle” did indeed influence the war in Iraq, if one considers the number of war-related deaths, which suggests a manifestation of the “Quésako cycle” (see the Iraq Body Count website or the book “A Cyclical Phenomenon That Promotes Wars?” (Editions l’Harmattan).

Will the war that is breaking out in Iran have the same effect, escalating into a civil war that lasts for years? It is too early to say.

Throughout history, there has been another period when wars were permanent, to the point that the Quésako Cycle was not apparent: the Napoleonic Wars. When war becomes a permanent state, as is now the case for Israel, successive wars seem to contradict the “Quésako Cycle.” This cycle is then less visible, but it becomes apparent again after these episodes of war.

The nations of the world will not forget that Israel destroyed Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Iranian state. These memories will be stronger than anything else. They might forget the Holocaust and realize that the victim of the past has become the oppressor, believing itself to be the savior of its future.

March 16, 2026

Well done, Donald! You were looking for a Nobel Prize, and now you’ve just won it.

The earth unanimously awards you the Nobel War Prize.

Congratulations again

Naej DRANER

March 3, 2026

Until 2025, Israel was a remarkable example of the “Quésako Cycle.” Every war in the Arab-Israeli conflict began during a phase of amplification. This is described in the book “Un phénomène cyclique qui favorise les guerres ?” (A cyclical phenomenon that favors wars?), published by L’Harmattan in french.

Since the trauma of October 7, 2023, Israel has been waging wars on all fronts. Even during periods of calm, the wars continue and start up again. Two wars in one year against Iran, and it is likely that the war in Gaza will resume, under the pretext that Hamas has not completely disarmed.

The same thing happened in the United States after September 11, 2001. They launched wars on all fronts. Afghanistan, then Iraq, under various pretexts. What is the result 25 years after the original trauma? Afghanistan has returned to the Talibans, as if nothing had ever happened. Iraq is in Iran’s sphere of influence. The destruction of Iraq has allowed Iran to rise as a regional power. Was it all for nothing? Practically yes.

So what will be the effect of Israel’s permanent war in 20 years? It’s hard to say, but these wars will not bring Israel peace in the region. These wars will give the illusion of a victorious peace for a time.

Whether after September 11, 2001, or after October 7, 2023, the trauma of these events has led to a headlong rush into permanent war. The “Quésako Cycle” is no longer visible for a while. But in both cases, it is still present, even if it seems less visible.

In the case of the 2003 Iraq War, which seems to contradict the Quésako cycle, since it broke out near a peak of attenuation, it was possible to show the impact of the Quésako Cycle on the Iraq War through the number of war victims (see the section on Materialization in the book “A Cyclical Phenomenon that favors Wars?”). .

In the case of the new Israeli-American-Iranian war, will we see the same indirect phenomenon? Perhaps, but we won’t know for another 10 or 15 years.

March 3, 2026

On Saturday, February 28, Israel and the United States launched a military operation against Iran.

The official objectives are:

• Eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat,
• Destroy the missiles and the capacity to produce them,
• End the current regime.

Most wars do not achieve the objectives for which they are launched. This will also be the case for this new war.

Overthrowing a regime through air strikes alone can, at best, only lead to civil war if the entire security system collapses. In this case, each leader who is eliminated will be replaced. The Iranian regime does not depend solely on a few individuals, but on a system. Even if the system is hated and bloodthirsty, it knows how to renew itself, even if more than 100 leaders were eliminated.

In Libya, the end of Gaddafi’s regime led to civil war. It was not a system but a dictator and a few of his close associates who ran the regime. The end of the Libyan regime created a vacuum, resulting in civil war and instability from which Libya has still not recovered 15 years later.

The nuclear threat will remain as long as enriched uranium remains in Iranian hands. Ballistic capabilities may be reduced but probably not completely destroyed. The Iranian regime will be weakened, that is certain. Regime change is unlikely.

What collateral effects will there be for the United States and Israel? Probably an increase in attacks in 2026 and 2027 and a major oil crisis following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The peacemaker has turned into a warmonger, prolonging and reawakening the dormant war.

How long will this war last? Israel and the United States say as long as it takes. A few days? A few weeks? As long as it takes to destroy everything that can be destroyed. And then what? Since there will be no ground troops, it will end. A civil war? Unlikely. There will always be enough Revolutionary Guards and militiamen to maintain a precarious order. On the other hand, the Iranian population as a whole will suffer from increased economic insecurity.

*** Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version) ***

Naej DRANER

March 1, 2026

Postscript: Some will rightly point out that this new war does not confirm the “Quésako Cycle.” The observation is correct, but when a war begins during a phase of attenuation, it can either end quickly or turn into a long war during which the number of victims multiplies during the subsequent amplification phase. See the war against Iraq in 2003. Initially, this war seemed to challenge the cycle, but it became a pillar of it by highlighting the cycle’s materialization through the number of war victims.
*** Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version) ***

Today, none of the proposals made by Russia, Ukraine, Europe, or the United States present a credible system for maintaining the ceasefire.

The security guarantees sought by Ukraine and the Europeans give the impression that a credible and deterrent military force would be sufficient to ensure a ceasefire once it is announced. This will not be enough and will not lead to a credible and permanent ceasefire.

This is also the problem in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Gaza and in the Israeli-Lebanese conflict in southern Lebanon. Israel believes that targeted military operations are sufficient to ensure a ceasefire. This does not guarantee it, but it does make it decidedly fragile.

All these conflicts are currently being managed by people with no previous experience of ceasefires. They are all rediscovering what a ceasefire could be and, day after day, coming up with solutions, or rather non-solutions.

What contributes to maintaining the ceasefire?

• The initial agreement, if it is clear and accepted by the parties, can contribute to its observance
• A permanent ceasefire system, able to fix any incident in the half-day following any incident.
• A monitoring and inspection system for the warring parties capable of intervening anywhere in each camp.
• Permanent participation of the military forces of each camp in the ceasefire system, under the supervision of the monitoring and inspection system.
• Ongoing analysis of incidents to develop the ceasefire system and enhance its effectiveness.

None of this has been clearly addressed and described in the ongoing negotiations, according to the information available to date.

Naej DRANER

Naej DRANER is an analyst and architect of political and security solutions. He has studied, in particular, the mechanism that was put in place in 2014 and subsequent years in Donbass. This mechanism has never been able to transform into a permanent ceasefire. Taking this past experience into account, it would be possible to make a concrete proposal.

February 18, 2026

*** Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version) ***

In September 2025, a 20-point settlement plan was proposed. It led to a ceasefire on October 10, 2025, and resulted in UN Resolution 2803, which incorporated the 20 points.

Is there a ceasefire that is actually being enforced?

No. The parties involved are divided on what to call this quasi-ceasefire. Is it a frozen conflict? A low-intensity war? Everyone agrees that it is not a real ceasefire and that the Trump plan is not being implemented.

• Several hundred deaths on the Palestinian side since October
• The Rafah crossing, which was supposed to be opened at the start of the ceasefire (point 8), has only been partially open since February 2, 2026. And even then, it is likely that Israel will do everything it can to allow Palestinians to leave but refuse to allow them to enter or return.
• Points 7 and 8 concerning humanitarian aid have not been implemented as they should have been. They have been revised and amended by Israel, without any connection to the Trump plan.
• Israel is doing what it wants and adapting the initial text of the Trump plan to what it really wants to do, without any reaction from Trump or the organization that claims to be implementing the Trump plan.
• There is no known and recognized mechanism for supervising the ceasefire. Israel uses any incident as a pretext to resume bombing. They have a smart AI-based system that turns toilet noises into truth. The result is that the victims of the incidents apparently have no connection to the origin of the incidents.
• No independent observer or journalist is able to provide an objective view of what is happening in Gaza. Lying and censorship are the norm for Israel, reinforced by the indifference of the Trump team.

Trump is a promoter, not a builder. He knows how to manage publicity and press coverage but is incapable of managing a project. The ceasefire in Gaza is self-managing, so there is no real ceasefire.

During the disarmament of Hamas, the Israeli authorities will probably do everything they can to restart the war: this is what the Jewish supremacists in the Israeli government want. They will find the pretexts that suit them.

Naej DRANER

As a reminder, Resolution 2803 was adopted by the Security Council on November 17, 2025.

February 3, 2026

I understood that the “Peace Council” was a body that would deal with Gaza. I read the charter of the “Peace Council” carefully, but it has nothing to do with Gaza.

What is the status of Phase 1 of the Gaza Peace Plan?

Do you remember? Phase 1 said that the Rafah crossing would be opened as soon as the ceasefire began. Three months later, it is still not open. It was promised that humanitarian aid would be distributed to everyone by the various parties involved. That is not what happened. Israel restricted humanitarian aid, multiplied the conditions for distribution to such an extent that little aid actually arrived, and decreed that a tent peg is a dangerous weapon, to the point that Palestinians do not even have waterproof and comfortable tents. And we’ll stop there to simply say that everything that should have been done was secretly changed by Israel without dear Donald realizing that he had been duped with phase 1 of his plan revised and corrected by Israel without Donald’s dear negotiators noticing and pointing out to him that phase 1 had been emptied of its official content: an empty shell that matched Israel’s ambitions and the naivety of Donald and his crack team.

Donald, please, how can we believe that a World Peace Council will control anything, after your inability to simply implement “phase 1 of Gaza”?

Donald, do you have an aide who could explain to you what a treaty is and what it’s for?

I couldn’t believe my ears: Donald wants Greenland for “security reasons.” He’s doing the same thing G. W. Bush did when he claimed it was about weapons of mass destruction, but really just wanted Iraq’s oil. In this case, it’s about pocketing all the mineral resources, after making everyone believe that there is a security problem.

Donald, have you read the current treaty? It allows you to expand the bases if you don’t have enough space for your essential security equipment. Oh yes, you’re right: none of your colleagues have read the treaties or understood them. It’s true that it’s difficult to move forward and understand anything when the official collaborators know no more than Donald.

It is urgent that you recruit, without saying too much, a collaborator who can discreetly explain to you how a treaty works and how it can be used to add essential security equipment.

Recruitment must be discreet so that no one knows Donald is studying.

January 20, 2026

Naej DRANER

The website “L’Horloge de l’inconscient” has authorized an open forum for which the author is solely responsible. Under no circumstances we can be considered responsible for the content of this article.

Translated with DeepL.com (free version)

October 7, 2023 was a similar event for Israel to September 11 for the Americans.

In both cases, there was a military headlong rush that resembled vengeful carnage rather than a real war.

In both cases, the event justified the unjustifiable. This lasted more than 2 years for the Americans, with multiple wars: Afghanistan, Iraq, etc, etc. The rule of law has been violated on a few occasions (Guantanamo, for example).

How long will this last for the Israelis? Impossible to say at the moment. They have lost all critical sense over the past year and seem incapable of taking the slightest step back.

In the name of the ongoing war, the State of Israel has forgotten to set up a commission of inquiry asking the question: “Why did the intelligence and security services fail?”

If Israel’s security services had worked, there would probably have been fewer than 100 deaths, and many of the horrors witnessed that day would not have taken place. Would reactions have been different? Probably, but Israelis are incapable of asking such a question and debating it.

What were the failings of the Israeli security services that led to October 7th?

They are manifold, and a great deal of thought has been and is being given to them outside Israel:

• failure to exploit intelligence that seemed implausible,
• overestimation of its importance and deterrent effect,
• implementation of a technical surveillance system with no relay or human verification,
• no security force on call to intervene within minutes of any incident
• demotivation of reservists for questionable political reasons.

How long will it take for the Israelis to appoint a commission of inquiry and converge on a conclusion already put forward by external players? “The security services and the army were unable to prevent an event that could have been minimized. No sophisticated weapons were used by the attackers. At most, a few weapons that can be found in any security service and a clear desire to turn such an event into a violent and cruel warlike event, without respecting the slightest law relating to wars”.

This does not change the horror and trauma of October 7th, but it could have led the Israelis to act differently.

Will the Israelis ever ask themselves whether 1,400 dead justifies more than 50,000 dead, and whether it also justifies destroying 70% of all the buildings in Gaza, not to mention the hospitals destroyed, the food shortages maintained and so much more?

And if the 1,400 dead had only been 100 dead if the security services had worked, would that have changed?

One day, yes, they’ll ask themselves that question, but it won’t be tomorrow.

For now, the war goes on, with no prospect other than a total victory, which remains hypothetical.

Naej DRANER

ND2024-1001, November 1, 2024

Naej DRANER is an analyst. He is an architect of a political-security solution who limits himself to the role of architect. His analyses are generally a preparation for the day after and a solution for the short, medium and long term. To build a house, you need an architect, but you also need a contractor. N.D. is not a contractor and can only have an influence if he joins forces with a contractor to design and implement a suitable political-security solution.