War Cycle in the Arab-Israeli context

It is important to read first the Methodology for the presentation of the “War Cycle” in order to understand how the results are presented and what they mean

The War Cycle applied to the israeli-arab conflict

Israeli-Arab Conflict Deviation

Data used

The wars that have been recorded are those that are generally cited

Among the points that may vary slightly from one author to another :

  • The first Intifada is broadly described as peaceful and is generally not described as a war: it has been indicated under a tension-type event
  • Operation Pillar of Defense is sometimes described as a war: it has been indicated under a tension-type event

The calculation of the variances was done without and with these two events. There is not much difference and even with these two events, there is a cyclical phenomenon that influences this conflict.

Some may also highlight incidents of varying degrees of importance, describing them as wars (e.g., 1978 – Operation Litani, 1996 – Operation Reasons for Anger, attacks, etc.). According to our information, this characterization of these war events is marginal, even for Israelis.

The list of selected events has been carefully crafted in the hope that readers will recognize it as an objective list. If this list were challenged, we could always adapt it, but in view of all the information available at the international level, it will require more than an isolated assertion by a contradictor who refuses this data and tries to distort what is presented to change it. It will then be asked to propose a clear method for drawing up such a list.

In any case, the Arab-Israeli conflict remains the remarkable case of the “Cycle of Wars”.

Possible additional studies

It would be possible to make a more general statistical study by including all incidents, military operations and attacks. Such a study could shed light on identifying periods when tensions are expected, without the outbreak of war, but such a study will not change the reality observed with respect to war outbreaks, which is the main focus of this study, in order to be able to use these findings in anticipation of war outbreaks.

Forecasts 2019 to 2022

Theoretically this is the period when there can be a peace initiative, even a partial one.

Note of 18/10/2020: the peace initiative with UAE and Bahrain confirms this forecast. End of the note

There is an American attempt to have the fait accompli based on the Israeli military victories in the Golan Heights, Jerusalem and soon the West Bank accepted at the international level. Support for this initiative is very limited.

The return of 50 years of the 6-day war that was supposed to happen in 2017 or 2018 was not very visible. Apart from the attempt by Hamas to demonstrate regularly on the border with Israel, there has been no generalization to the West Bank that could have been interpreted as such a return. Rather, the 50-year Return was a reaffirmation of the Israeli military victory.

The recurring tensions with Gaza could lead to a new conflict even in the period when the wars are easing: when tensions are too high and almost permanent, as is the case in the first half of 2019, a slippage into war remains possible.

Forecasts 2022-2025 on the peak of 2024

If this conflict is resolved, there will be no more wars. The 75-year milestone is important. It could be the moment when Israel could find itself shaken in its foundations that Israel today thinks are eternal.

It would be a great illusion to believe that the absence of a solution could not call into question the very existence of Israel even 75 years after its creation.

Israel-xxx Regional Military Alliance ?

If today the only Israeli military alliance is with the US, the possible regional integration should provoke a military alliance with Israel. A regional war like the one in Syria and Iraq could have provoked such an alliance. This is not the case at the moment, but it could be the case if there is finally a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Settlement ProspectsThere are 2 main obstacles to any evolution:

Il y  2 principaux freins à toute évolution:

  • The two territorial restitutions that took place in South Lebanon and Gaza did not ease relations with Lebanon and Gaza. The assertion that Israel would obtain peace in return for the restitution of territories was defeated in both cases. This does not encourage Israel to return these territories, on the contrary.
  • Israel still lives as if the State of Israel had not yet been definitively created, at least as it would like it to be recognized. Israel has accepted every opportunity that has presented itself, but never its content. Neither the 1947 partition plan for Palestine nor the Oslo Accords have been accepted in substance. According to Israel, peace means first of all consecrating its military victory.

In 2010, in anticipation and to avoid the round of wars in the 2014-2017 period, a manuscript “Will Jerusalem know a lasting Peace?” was written. It was updated in 2014 and has not been used.

Most likely, the 2-state regulation will be abandoned and lead to an Apartheid-style stalemate in South Africa. Such a situation will eventually lead to the opposite of what Israel wants (see footnote of May 6, 2019).

The apparent victory for Israel of the non-recognition of a Palestinian state could lead to the dilution of the State of Israel into a larger whole that will no longer be a Jewish state without being a Palestinian state either: a kind of Israeli-Palestinian state that seems unlikely today, with a Palestinian state limited to the Gaza Strip?

updated on April 29, 2019 (French->English Translation on Octobre 19,2020)

PS: (note of May 6, 2019). From the moment that Israel would get the Israeli-Palestinian settlement to lead to a single state, without a Palestinian state, it is a trap that will slowly close, even if its consequences may not be visible for several years, or even decades. Israel will seek to minimize the “Israeli Arabs” and Palestinians who might have rights in the State of Israel, to leave rights only to Jews in the State of Israel. For this, they will seek to propose a status for the Palestinian population that is a “kind of autonomy” without any rights over the State of Israel. This is exactly what led to Bantustan in South Africa: to try to give them a kind of “homeland” that will be a way of giving them rights without giving them any. The illusion of “parking” them in an autonomy without a state and without rights will only last for a while. In any case, Israel’s current demand to integrate most of the settlements in the West Bank leads, right now and naturally, to such a deadlock: the Palestinian state proposed by the Israelis is not viable and therefore leads to the dilution of the Palestinians in a state that is not theirs, which will eventually lead to the dilution of the Jews in another group that cannot be exclusively Jewish without entering into state racism.

Worse, the Israelis, not wanting to reintegrate Gaza, will create a second illusion: that Gaza will never be a state. It is obvious that one day it will be a state with all its rights. It will be a double punishment: a “Bantustan” that will be a fiction for a few years and a hard “Palestinian” state that will eventually have complete sovereignty.