It is important to read first the Methodology for the presentation of the “War Cycle” in order to understand how the results are presented and what they mean
If for all the other contexts, most people with a good general knowledge can confirm the data presented, it is more difficult in the case of Lebanon whose war episodes are not always well known and are sometimes the subject of polemics between the actors themselves.
4 of these data are indisputable (the 1958 crisis, the beginning of the Lebanese war in 1975, the first and second Israeli wars in Lebanon).
2 are not necessarily known in this form and do not necessarily appear to be new wars (the Mountain War and the War of Liberation against Syria, which can be considered as wars within wars or as a new episode of escalation – which is the same for the “War Cycle”: the beginning of a war or an escalation is considered as a significant event).
In any case, the internal or external Lebanese wars follow the “War Cycle” and are a good additional example contributing to the reinforcement of the “War Cycle”.
For the December 2016 update were reviewed the incidents in Lebanon from 2011 to 2016. Many incidents in 2011 and 2012 related to the beginning of the Syrian civil war. Some major clashes in 2013 and 2014, quickly circumscribed and not much in 2015 and 2016.
Was it necessary to indicate one of the clashes under the term tensions? In Lebanon, there are usually so many that it is difficult to distinguish the importance of one confrontation from another. As a result, there are none of them retained and indicated on the graph.
Lebanon remains indirectly involved with its neighbors through its militias.
If the probability of involvement in a new round of war with Israel is not zero, it is relatively low. The most dangerous episode would be a Gaza-Hezbollah alliance with simultaneous bombings. The least we can say is that it would do a lot of damage on both sides without annihilating the countries involved.
In the zone of amplification 2024??? Exercise that is a crystal ball. This conflict with Israel does not give rise to only a few wars (2 wars in 5 amplification peaks since 1982), which does not allow us to draw reliable predictions.
The “War Cycle” has an influence in the Lebanese wars, certainly, but without being able to draw forecasts from it as in Europe or in the Israeli-Arab conflict, because in these 2 other cases, there is at least one per period of amplification.
On the other hand, this Lebanese context remains important to help demonstrate the “War Cycle”. For the moment, all the Lebanese wars have followed this cycle, which is interesting to present, even if we do not know how to transform this observation into predictions in the Lebanese context.
updated on May 3, 2019 (French to English translation on Octobrer 26, 2020)