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What future for Gaza?

In view of the result presented on February 26, 2025 of the Israeli army’s internal investigation, which acknowledges its full responsibility for the fiasco of October 7, 2023, we can try to do our job as architects. There will be no other channel of communication and proposal than this one

Israel, with the help of the American negotiator, has modified the conditions that could lead to a lasting ceasefire. The only proposal is for an extension of the truce, which means that, in any case, whether today or in a month and a half, Israel intends to resume the war in Gaza. Under these conditions, Hamas is reluctant to let its last hostages go.

Is the USA capable of playing the negotiator while being aligned with Israel? Probably NOT.

Apart from Trump’s proposal, which is a form of ethnic cleansing in disguise, the United States has nothing to propose or negotiate. Can the real estate developer already see himself having the reconstruction work done by countries other than his own, and selling all the rebuilt real estate on his own account? It’s a bit grotesque, but Donald believes in it, and so does Bibi. An unattainable, idiotic dream.

So, what’s the plan? An Arab plan? Maybe, but we’ll have to rework it and turn it into something credible and manageable.

What about security? Can Israel provide security? Israel ensures Gaza’s insecurity, as well as its destruction. It is impossible for Israel to provide security. Israel will destroy any embryonic visible security forces.

Is a temporary trusteeship of Gaza possible? It would be a good solution, but who would risk doing it? and how?

It would be preferable for Gaza’s security to be temporarily assured by an external third party, which cannot be Israel or the United States. But how? An international police force? NO, sending in foreigners who don’t speak the language is never effective. What’s more, we need to rebuild a security system. The best we could do is to have police force trainers in sufficient numbers (1,000 to 2,000) to train, on the spot, new security forces from the local population, whether or not they are from Hamas, but controlled by external agents. Is this possible? It’s never happened internationally, because it’s never been tried. It will be fragile for 6 months, then maybe it will work.

Then we’d have to set up an inspection body made up of: one third international, one third Palestinian and one third Israeli. These inspectors must have access to everything that happens. The aim is to be able to see everything that’s going on, and react in ways other than new bombings. We’d need 100 to start with, rising to 500. What’s the difference between an inspector and an observer? The observer observes and does nothing. The inspector observes and takes steps to rectify what has been observed, relying on the new security forces.

Is this realistic? This could only happen with the cooperation of Arab countries and a few others.

A bottle in the sea that won’t wait for its recipients? Perhaps, but between ethnic cleansing and new bombings, something else must be tried.

Naej DRANER

ND2025-001, March 3, 2025

Naej DRANER is an analyst. He is an architect of a political-security solution who limits himself to the role of architect. His analyses are generally a preparation for the day after and a solution for the short, medium and long term. To build a house, you need an architect, but you also need a contractor. N.D. is not a contractor and can only have an influence if he joins forces with a contractor to design and implement a suitable political-security solution.

Ukraine: Status of the ceasefire of 27 July 2020

To summarize the situation, take a look at this graph. It is the weekly sum of weekly violations and explosions since that date.

In addition, days without any violation since that date can be taken into account:

  • 8 in August
  • 0 in December and January until January 24, 2021

There has been a slight overall improvement in the last 2 weeks. Awareness seems to have started. A TCG meeting was held on January 21. A press release reported discussions but apparently no publishable decisions.

The Luhansk sector has had very few violations in the last few days, but the Donetsk sector reached a record this last weekend. Apparently they are not in phase and do not do the same thing from one sector to the other

When one reads the communiqués of each camp, there is uneasiness and many of the elements accepted in the January 22nd agreement no longer work:

  • the parties had undertaken not to respond to shots received unless ordered to do so by their command at the highest level. This is no longer the case: there is a systematic return,
  • The JCCC had been presented as an arbiter of violations: it seems that it merely relays the information to the MMS, which itself, as usual, does little more than relaying this information with delay in an unidentified form and frequency, except for public reports that are between 24 and 72 hours late on events, depending on the day they are published,

The officially available information is too partial to be sure of what is going on, but it is probably not much. The local actors seem to apply principles that they apparently did not understand, perhaps because they were not explained to them and perhaps also because there is a lack of a kind of coach for all the actors in the field (JCCC and SMM).

If any of you know SMM observers or members of the JCCC, please allow contact to be made so that we can verify some of the information needed to readjust the ceasefire.

Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)

January 26, 2021

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