Several Persian Gulf countries—including the most important ones—have not acceded to the 1982 convention, making the issue of territorial waters a sensitive one.

In the absence of formal ratification by a state, states apply the 1982 Convention “de facto.”

If there were a body representing all the states bordering the Persian Gulf, the formalization of territorial waters would be a matter of a basic collective agreement.

In the absence of formal accession to the 1982 Convention, customary law prevails, which requires a precise and non-standardized survey.

Generally speaking, the delimitation of territorial waters determines a country’s full sovereignty, whether through the 1982 Convention or through customary law.

Straits, such as the Strait of Hormuz, have rules specific to each strait, but the general rule is that every country retains full sovereignty over its territorial waters. Exercising total control over maritime passages in the territorial waters of neighboring countries without their consent—as Iran desires—is not permitted under any law. One may view this issue however one wishes, but there will be opposition from all other countries. There will never be an agreement to delegate control of maritime traffic to Iran. Militarily, it would be virtually impossible for Iran to enforce such control.

However, there is nothing preventing the countries bordering the Strait of Hormuz from establishing a convention that applies to their territorial waters; at a minimum, this would require the participation of Iran, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates.

As for the United States of America’s claim to control the Strait of Hormuz, it is completely unfounded. Since the U.S. does not use the strait for its own purposes, it would be preferable for the countries bordering the Persian Gulf to take charge. This is no easy task.

July 27, 2026

Naej DRANER

“…

Territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) are two distinct maritime areas defined by international law. Territorial waters extend 12 nautical miles (22 km) and are subject to a state’s full sovereignty, while the EEZ extends up to 200 nautical miles (370 km) for the exclusive exploitation of resources.

Territorial Waters (Territorial Sea)

• Range: Up to 12 nautical miles (approximately 22 km) from the coast.
• Sovereignty: Full and complete sovereignty over the waters, the seabed, and the airspace.
• Rules: Vessels from other countries may pass through, but they must comply with local laws and pose no danger.

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ / Waters of Economic Interest)

• Range: Up to 200 nautical miles (approximately 370 km) from the coast.
• Rights: Exclusive rights to explore for and harvest fish, oil, and gas, or to generate energy (wind, hydro).
• Rules: This is not a territory fully controlled by the state; other countries retain the right to navigate freely and operate aircraft.

…”

The preceding lines were generated by an internet search engine.

Within the framework of the “territorial waters” preparatory committee for the “Persian Gulf Council,” no request was made to delineate EEZs. This could be done at a later date but is not urgent.

The map delineating the territorial waters of the Persian Gulf countries must be presented and countersigned by each representative of a Persian Gulf country present on the committee.

As for what N.D. plans to do with this survey countersigned by the major countries—including, at a minimum, Iran, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia—I’ll leave it to you to guess what sensible use might be made of it.

However, as a prerequisite for moving forward, each country is asked to have available within its own country (not necessarily at the meeting) a specialist in international maritime law. Why? The “Persian Gulf Council” has no international authority to replace the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with another convention that would allow a state to claim rights over another country’s territorial waters. This request is intended to avoid discussing irrational solutions that do not comply with existing international law.

What conclusions do you draw from this? … starting with the Iranian representative? Don’t make me call you ignorant and a fool who invents international law that does not exist. We could imagine a legal framework delegated to the “Persian Gulf Council” by several countries to supervise and control maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. But if that were the case, it would not be a single country acting unilaterally and dictatorially to establish a body to supervise and control the Strait of Hormuz; rather, the “Persian Gulf Council” would define and accept these rules of supervision and control and enforce them. All of this would be carried out in accordance with the democratic rules—yet to be defined—of the Persian Gulf Council.

July 26, 2026

Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) establishes the rules governing territorial waters and the rights associated with them.

As part of the preparations for the “Persian Gulf Council,” a territorial waters commission has been established to review the current territorial waters in accordance with the United Nations Convention.

The sole purpose of this commission is to map the boundaries of existing territorial waters and ensure that all parties are referring to the same areas and the same boundaries.

Territorial waters extend up to a maximum of 12 miles, and if the distance between the two opposing countries is less than 24 miles, the median line applies.

Each state has rights attached to its territorial waters:

• A state’s sovereignty extends to its territorial waters.
• Under certain circumstances, a sovereign state may prohibit certain civilian and military vessels from passing through its territorial waters.
• The right of passage for other states through a strait is not automatic. There may be disputes and potential future changes to the 1982 Convention.

In any country, the military tends to view its sphere of influence as extending beyond territorial waters. This has no legal basis, and the belief that one is capable of exercising military control over what occurs in a neighbor’s territorial waters has no legal basis. It amounts to mere pretension.

Iran, like any country bordering the Persian Gulf, is a member of the preparatory commission, and its representative is expected to know at the very least the extent of its own territorial waters. We are not referring to the rights that its military might believe it has, in disregard of international law. Believing oneself to be militarily superior has no basis in international law and does not alter territorial waters or the rights associated with them. If a state’s representative on the commission were to present anything other than the reality recognized by the 1982 Convention, they would need to be corrected until they provide the correct information.

There may be disputes and potential disagreements: all of them must be noted, bearing in mind that the commission merely records the reality as it stands today, including any disputes and challenges. The commission will rule on the basis of the 1982 Convention should any proposals prove to be overly far-fetched.

Why is surveying territorial waters important?

Essentially, this is based on the fact that international rights are defined in relation to territorial waters.

One could imagine that the “Persian Gulf Council” might have a right of control over various territorial waters, such as those of Iran and Oman, but such a right would first have to be established through an agreement with the respective states. Each country may, within its own territorial waters, grant a right to the “Persian Gulf Council.” A state’s claim to assert rights in territorial waters other than its own is not a matter of law but of sheer confusion.

It is therefore particularly important that the territorial waters of each state be clearly delineated and recognized by all.

The Territorial Waters Commission will take no decision other than to survey the existing situation and have it validated by each State. A state of war may give rise to somewhat strange, even far-fetched, demands, but these do not fall within the scope of law.

The rights of each State over its territorial waters will automatically derive from this survey. If a “Persian Gulf Council” were ever established, it could be granted limited rights over territorial waters, but this would require a convention, treaty, or founding charter. However, there is a difference between a state’s claim to assert rights in its neighbor’s territorial waters and agreeing to a limited transfer of such rights to an international body created by states.

If asked how we will move forward on the issue of the Strait of Hormuz, I would reply that we must begin with a precise and mutually agreed-upon survey by the territorial waters commission. A number of rights will automatically follow from this.

If the preparatory commission is never established, nothing will ever happen.

July 25, 2026

Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)

The Iran-U.S. war could provide an opportunity to examine several textbook cases. The one discussed here is escalation.

Since July 7, the situation has been escalating. It continues day after day. Both sides justify their military actions by claiming they are trying to bring the other side back to the negotiating table.

When Iran says that military actions will continue as long as the United States does, this is a case of a deadlock. This will continue because each side is waiting for the other to stop. If each side makes its own cessation contingent on the other’s prior cessation, there is no alternative but escalation.

Each side in the conflict sees only the events that give them cause for outrage and justify escalation

That is the nature of all wars:

• Each belligerent sees only part of the reality;
• each belligerent believes that its decisive military action will lead to de-escalation. The opposite is what happens.
• Each belligerent highlights the other’s violations, while carefully ignoring its own.

All the warring parties have violated the memorandum of understanding signed on June 17

Virtually all 14 points have been violated by both sides.

Let’s start with point 1: it is supposed to prohibit any military action. Firing on a ship is a violation; bombing a military target is a violation; bombing U.S. bases is a violation; and so on.

What could the negotiators who negotiated the memorandum of understanding signed on June 17 do?

• Pretend to negotiate a new agreement? There’s no point—everything that was expected is already in the agreement. We could clarify certain points by drafting implementation notes, which are simply responses to questions raised about the content of the memorandum of understanding
• A new ceasefire would need to be secured to take effect 24 hours later (so that the order can be relayed to the various military chains of command before implementation). If it were an immediate ceasefire, it would be violated and called into question right away,
• propose a system for monitoring and enforcing the ceasefire. It must be permanent and known and accepted by both sides,
• identify the points in the memorandum of understanding that need to be renegotiated or clarified, and plan to begin these discussions 48 or 72 hours after the ceasefire takes effect
• There is one point concerning the status of the Strait of Hormuz to be negotiated with Oman and the countries bordering the Persian Gulf. It should be implemented as soon as possible. The framework of a Persian Gulf Council would be appropriate; otherwise, another must be found.

Is there a genuine desire to end the war and begin de-escalation?

This issue raises questions. Each belligerent justifies its own violations by pointing to the other side’s violations, using them as a pretext for not having to follow the protocol:

• First violation: Iran decided that it alone has the right to define maritime routes and issued threats, followed by attacks on ships. This violation is indisputable.
• Second violation: The United States, lacking a monitoring system that serves as an arbiter and corrects the opposing party’s behavior, intends to punish Iran militarily for the first violation. This constitutes a new violation.
• Third violation: Iran, in response to the second violation, considers that it must also punish the United States and launches military attacks against U.S. bases and U.S. allies.
• Subsequently, a whole series of violations are responses to the previous violations and gradually render nearly all points of the memorandum of understanding null and void..

Will there be a military victor?

Unlikely. The United States will not be able to prevent military actions against its ships without occupying a large part of Iran. Iran will not be able to secure any agreement from the countries bordering the Persian Gulf to regulate and control the Strait of Hormuz on its own.

Militarily, each belligerent has significant capacity to cause harm, but neither is capable of gaining military control over the situation as it hopes.

Ultimately, both sides will lose, and it seems unlikely that either belligerent will succeed in completely destroying its adversary.

Each belligerent’s hope of defeating its adversary militarily drives the conflict toward escalation rather than de-escalation.

So, are we at an impasse?

In a way. The current escalation is fueling hopes for military solutions that do not seem realistic.

July 24, 2026

Naej DRANER

Naej DRANER is merely an observer of a situation in which he takes no action. Reflecting and making suggestions is not the same as taking action. Having ideas—good or bad—is pointless when one has no way of acting on them.

There’s nothing else important to write about for now. As for the “Architect” section, the main work is done. When you build a house, you need an architect and a contractor. The architect has done his job; now we need to find a contractor.

What Kind of Entrepreneur Are You?

Not be American or Iranian—if possible, completely, completely unfamiliar with the Persian Gulf:

• This could be an international organization, a state, a group of states, or simply a group of diplomats acting together outside the framework of their respective states to advance the issue.
• Accept the architect’s initial work, and if you wish to modify it (changes can always be made), do so in direct consultation with the architect to avoid putting him in an awkward position regarding the proposed project.
• Acknowledge the source of the ideas that will be implemented,
• contact Oman, if possible from a country other than France (for reasons of protocol with regard to French authorities, diplomats stationed in Paris are unable to act in a flexible and transparent manner). Oman must have access to all documents.
• Naej DRANER does not and will not represent France or the EU. There may be opportunities for coordination, but not in the role of a mere advisor whose texts are taken and modified without even consulting him,
• In the case of Oman, either the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia must be involved to provide a framework for the United States,
• The June 17 memorandum of understanding should not be renegotiated, but rather it should be considered that it has not yet been implemented, and that there may be a few amendments to be negotiated.
• We need to draft implementing guidelines (clarifying the text of June 17),
• Among the countries bordering the Persian Gulf, at least 4 of the 8 must agree to participate, including Iran,
• We need to launch the three planned preparatory committees as soon as possible,
• It will take some nerve to get the whole thing back on track.
• The entrepreneur must be a manager: every issue must be monitored and followed up on.
• The entrepreneur must accept that the final decision-maker will be the “Persian Gulf Council” and that he, along with the architect, is merely a behind-the-scenes player—someone who gets things done but is practically invisible.

All we have to do is… we need to…

July 20, 2026

Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)

Architect N.D. will make himself available as much as necessary. He rarely travels but is always available remotely. The architect and contractor must work as one when they collaborate. Issues of EGO and PROTOCOL are not on the agenda, but one must know how to adapt and help others adapt without being psychologically rigid and without believing that one can change everything all by oneself in a corner (N.D., in such a case, says nothing more and lets things run their course until they collapse, without a second thought).

If we were to use an image to describe what needs to be done to maintain the ceasefire, the best analogy would be that of a fire and firefighters.

It is clear that, in the case of a fire, the time and resources deployed between the start of the fire and its spread will determine the ability to prevent the fire from spreading.

If 24 hours pass between the start of a fire and the deployment of firefighting resources, the fire is sure to be out of control by then.

Ceasefire enforcement systems almost never intervene within 24 hours of an incident.

Among the factors that render ceasefire enforcement ineffective are:

• the absence of any system for monitoring and enforcing the ceasefire, as in the case of the June 17, 2026, protocol between Iran and the United States,
• the system’s lack of responsiveness (it may be defined in theory but lack any dedicated resources),
• the security culture among leaders and the military. This culture is often weak, and aside from asserting that striking hard will force the other side to back down, few stakeholders dare to admit that a military response marks the beginning of escalation rather than de-escalation,
• Ceasefire monitoring systems are often passive: a few observers are deployed, but there are no plans to take any action based on their observations—or at least not within the following hours,
• to influence events, close coordination is required both at the political and diplomatic levels and with the combat command structures. Often, the negotiating team is recognized but is never immediately available, and there is no coordination with the military command structures,
• the resources allocated to a system for monitoring and enforcing the ceasefire are too limited or inadequate.

There are many examples of inadequate ceasefire monitoring and enforcement systems:

• The SMM (OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine from 2014 to 2022) was a completely passive monitoring system, with a tracking and negotiation mechanism that could only be activated by the current OSCE Chairmanship. Response times were measured in weeks and months. There was an attempt to integrate military chains of command, but this turned into a competing rather than a complementary body.
• The ceasefire between Hamas and Israel in October 2025 lacks a permanently operational monitoring and enforcement system. According to Israel, “maintenance” means bombing and maintaining constant tension. The result: thousands of dead and wounded after the ceasefire date,
• The ceasefire in southern Lebanon. Theoretically, UNIFIL plays a passive observation role. UNIFIL does not react in real time and is not linked to any diplomatic coordination. It is incapable of exerting any influence whatsoever on the combatant leaderships,
• The June 17 ceasefire between the United States and Iran. There is no system for monitoring, enforcing, or restoring the ceasefire. There is no permanent monitoring system, nor any diplomatic or military coordination that can be activated in response to each incident. Furthermore, each side is convinced of its military superiority and believes that all it takes is to strike a little harder to make it stop. The result: a new war

In short, regarding the analogy between a ceasefire and a fire, the parties involved believe that to put out the fire, one must fan the flames (escalation) and naively wait for the other side to stop first.

The result:

• The United States has not demonstrated its ability to ensure the free flow of shipping. It has not succeeded in doing so, and I do not believe it will succeed.
• Iran has failed to understand that the more time passes, the less important the Strait of Hormuz will become. The United Arab Emirates has decided to do everything in its power to ensure that there is no longer any maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia will step up its efforts to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. The same goes for Iraq. In two years, traffic through the Strait of Hormuz will have been cut at least in half and will no longer have any international significance. Iran will be left with an empty shell and a goose that lays golden eggs—killed by the Revolutionary Guards. They’re puffing themselves up today, but they’ll be the losers in the long run.

Often, the goals of war are never achieved. It is likely that neither the United States nor Iran will achieve their objectives, and both will be losers in the long run. All of this is because there is no system in place to monitor and enforce the ceasefire. The slightest incident triggers an escalation leading to a new war.

Restoring the ceasefire? That’s the hardest part and would require committed actors, either at the international level or in the Persian Gulf region. According to my information, neither side has the necessary motivation beyond letting the new war fester while hoping for a magical military lull. That’s their prerogative!

July 18, 2026

Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)

This is what has been missing in all the ceasefires since 2025 and in the preparations for a Ukraine-Russia ceasefire.

A militarily credible force does not guarantee a ceasefire

Those who have implemented ceasefires since 2025 and those preparing a ceasefire in the Ukraine-Russia conflict believe that it is the military credibility of their forces that guarantees the ceasefire.

They believe this, and they are wrong. A military force fuels escalation. This is what is currently happening in the Iran-U.S. conflict.

The only known exception is a form of intervention so powerful that it crushes everything in its path. In the case of Lebanon, a Syrian deterrent force intervened in 1976 and was formalized a few years later. It helped restore calm, while simultaneously laying the groundwork for future wars. The Syrians deliberately disarmed most of the militias, except for Hezbollah, which created a problem that remains unresolved in 2026.

A chronological account of what happened and what a monitoring system should have done

Step 1 – The Revolutionary Guards violated the ceasefire signed on June 17 by attacking oil tankers and container ships.
If there had been a system for monitoring, maintaining, and restoring the ceasefire, it would have been agreed that the monitoring system must identify the source and secure an immediate and lasting halt to such violations from the Iranians.
The Americans, knowing that such a system exists, could have waited and allowed the monitoring system to carry out its role in maintaining and restoring the ceasefire. It is normal, in this kind of incident, to need time to identify and neutralize the sources. The Americans could have facilitated the work of the monitoring system by providing the data they had collected on the origin and route taken by the drones or ships that intervened to cause this violation.

But since there is no established monitoring system, the U.S. president decided, unilaterally and without consulting the other side, to take decisive action through airstrikes. He believes his military strength is credible and that the airstrikes he ordered will force the Iranians to stop.

When there is a system for monitoring, maintaining, and restoring, one must be willing to wait without provoking an escalation.

The Americans were the ones who caused the initial escalation.

Step 2—In retaliation for ceasefire violations targeting oil tankers and for the violation of freedom of movement, the U.S. launched airstrikes against Iran, thereby also violating the memorandum of understanding signed on June 17, 2026.
If there had been a system for monitoring, maintaining, and restoring the ceasefire, it would have been agreed that the monitoring system must identify the source and secure from the Americans an immediate and lasting halt to such violations.
LThe Iranians, knowing that such a system exists, could have waited and monitored the monitoring system as it worked to maintain and restore the ceasefire. It is normal, in cases of such incidents, to need time to identify and neutralize the sources. In the case of the bombings, it would have been easy to obtain all the information regarding the origin and targets of those bombings. The Iranians could have facilitated the work of the monitoring system by providing the data they had collected on the bombings observed on their territory.
But since there is no established system for supervision, some Iranians (likely the Revolutionary Guards, without consulting the political leadership) decided unilaterally—without verifying anything with the other side—to launch retaliatory strikes against various U.S. bases. They believe their military strength is credible and that the missiles and drones they have launched will force the Gulf states (and Jordan) to stop the bombings.They have launched a new escalation that overshadows all previous ones, and no one has waited for a ceasefire mechanism to do anything, since there isn’t one. A mechanism that doesn’t exist cannot do something that the warring parties unanimously refuse to do.

Step 3 — Each side blames the other and successively calls into question all the points of agreement in the protocol signed on June 17

• a halt to all traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, ordered by Iran,
• a return to the naval blockade of Iranian ships
• etc.

The gradual escalation has once again turned into a war.

Monitoring, Maintaining, and Restoring

Monitoring involves documenting incidents and taking the necessary steps to prevent a return to a state of war.

Maintaining involves taking the necessary preventive and corrective actions to uphold the ceasefire.

Restoring involves taking the necessary steps to restore the ceasefire. In this case, the warring parties must be persuaded to stop justifying their military actions based on the actions of the other side.

Should we renegotiate a new agreement?

It won’t do any good, since the chaotic governing bodies aren’t quite sure what they want. Furthermore, the signed protocol contains just about everything that will need to be included in a new agreement. What’s missing is the monitoring system for the ceasefire. However, we need to draft a series of implementing guidelines that will clarify points that could lead to misunderstandings.

Create a monitoring system and define implementation notes

Setting up a monitoring system requires establishing a system that operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, with designated contact numbers and at least three people on duty at all times. (In another article, it was proposed to install the monitoring system in the part of Oman closest to the Strait of Hormuz. If no building is available, a tent village must be set up with all necessary housing and equipment.)

The implementation notes are supplementary notes to the signed protocol.

Examples :

• Is an attack on a cargo ship or an oil tanker a violation of the ceasefire?
• Is a bombing a violation of the ceasefire?
• Are missiles and drones targeting U.S. bases or the oil monarchies considered violations?
• Does the protocol specify that there is a single shipping route defined solely by Iran?
• You may add other questions, and the common, accepted answers should be noted and will be used later by the monitoring system
• …. etc.

Who will negotiate these implementing notes? It could be Pakistan, Oman, or Qatar… These negotiations must be conducted nonstop as soon as possible.

If necessary, the monitoring system will define and negociate any other implementing note.

If necessary, we’ll add more.

But we will need to establish and implement a system for monitoring, maintaining, and restoring the ceasefire as soon as possible. It is the missing keystonee for any ceasefire.

July 16, 2026 updated on July 17, 2026

Naej DRANER

Architect and coach for any system designed to monitor, maintain, and restore a ceasefire

Reference Documents

• Full Text of the Iran-U.S. MOU

Both governance are chaotic. This reality must be taken into account in future negotiations.

The current Iran-U.S. negotiations cover too many issues. At least one of them will stall the rest. The recommendation is to remove some of the issues from the Iran-U.S. negotiations and transfer them to the countries bordering the Persian Gulf.

Not all countries bordering the Persian Gulf will likely want to join the Persian Gulf Council immediately, but they must have a place at the table, and all eight are ex officio members—with the hope that at least three or four of them will take the initiative to launch it.

Chaotic governance can be brought under control with the right interlocutors, and there are several such figures in the Persian Gulf countries. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates know how to make their voices heard by the United States, but we would need to have a negotiation plan other than the one involving Pakistan to secure a pause from the United States, which does not seem to have internalized the cycle of “ship incident—bombings—retaliation against U.S. allies in the Gulf,” and so it begins all over again…

Governance in Iran

Iran denies that the Revolutionary Guards have committed abuses against ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz. The memorandum of understanding (MOU) that was negotiated and made public does not provide for any circumstances under which Iran would be authorized to use threats or force. Point 1 of the MOU is particularly clear.

If there were a ceasefire monitoring committee, the evidence of these interventions by the Revolutionary Guards would be sufficiently documented to be indisputable. But Iran denies this reality and highlights U.S. reactions in the form of airstrikes. Prior to the airstrikes, there were these incidents provoked by the Revolutionary Guards. These incidents cannot be justified under the signed protocol and demonstrate a problem with Iranian governance. There are those who negotiate, and then others who act differently. Censorship in Iran and the need to appear victorious have driven the Iranian regime to make many claims that bear only a distant resemblance to reality and to what was negotiated.

Reimposing a navigation ban is contrary to the agreed-upon protocol. Claiming that Iran has the right to control the Strait of Hormuz is not in line with the protocol. Iran could justify having control within its territorial waters, just as the Sultanate of Oman can justify control of the Strait of Hormuz within its territorial waters, but this was not stated in those terms in the protocol.

This section must be developed among the countries bordering the Persian Gulf and implemented as soon as possible.

To prepare this section, it is proposed that a preparatory commission be established to have each Persian Gulf coastal state validate the boundaries of its territorial waters. This commission is an essential preparatory step for the Persian Gulf Council. It is likely that the claims submitted by each state will be incompatible and inconsistent. A coherent framework recognized by all parties must be achieved by applying standard rules. Regarding the Strait of Hormuz, this boundary must lie midway between the coasts of the countries on either side of the strait. This therefore directly concerns Iran, Oman, and the UAE. The other countries should have territorial sea boundaries consistent with existing international rules. Some might say this is obvious, but such obvious points must be verified on maps and validated by each country bordering the Persian Gulf.

Why are these boundaries important?

• For each country’s control of the Strait of Hormuz within its territorial waters,
• To carry out mine clearance of the former international shipping lanes that were deliberately mined in order to establish new, safe routes—which, coincidentally, are located solely within Iranian territorial waters, according to Iran.

When should this commission’s work have begun? A few weeks ago, and without any results, everything will just go around in circles, since we have no information about any mine-clearing work en cours qui aurait du être terminé pour le 17 Juillet et n’a probablement même pas commencé.

Governance in the United States

It’s just as complicated. There’s a secretary of state who seems to be absent from the decision-making process regarding this war. The pattern is simple: there are incidents involving ships, we bomb them, which provokes retaliation, and thus further retaliation in the form of bombings. The intelligence of U.S. leaders has failed to allow them to recognize that there are internal inconsistencies within Iran; rather than bombing again, they should have—and should—focused on this point and on the issue of internal governance in Iran.

Rather than engaging in such reflection on Iranian governance and ways to address it, the United States’ magic solution is: let’s bomb them until they give in. If they haven’t “given in” before, there’s little chance they will now. And here we go again—another war that Israel will join with glee: that’s exactly what they wanted.

July 13, 2026

Naej DRANER

Postscript 5:00 p.m.:

The right response from the United States and the Gulf states would be to highlight Iran’s inconsistencies—which stem from internal power struggles—and to exploit these internal contradictions by constantly drawing attention to the excesses of the Revolutionary Guards. To do this, we must respond tit for tat.etc.
– The Iranians claim they are not behind the incidents: Iran does not control its troops.
– We did not order these incidents: you do not control what your troops do.
– This is in accordance with the signed protocol: you cannot read the texts you have signed.

Instead, the bombings in Iran are distracting attention from the root cause of the incidents triggered by unruly Revolutionary Guards. These incidents provided an opportunity to argue that Iran’s government is imploding and that the Revolutionary Guards are no longer under control. This is a low blow on the part of U.S. leaders… and those of the Gulf states, who are highlighting attacks on their own soil that can be attributed to U.S. airstrikes. The root cause is the Iranian Supreme Leader’s inability to enforce agreements signed by his country. It is the Revolutionary Guards who are applying an imaginery agreement that was never signed. Are Iranian leaders still in control? Personally, I doubt it, and we should keep that doubt alive. It’s time for the Iranian Supreme Leader to show who is ruling the country. Can he read again the MOU signed by his country ?

Reference Documents

• Full Text of the Iran-U.S. MOU
• Persian Gulf Council Project summary

The agreement implemented by Tehran is not the one that was officially published

According to point 1 of the MOU, any use of force or threats was supposed to be prohibited.

Point 5 did indeed provide for discussions with Oman and the Gulf states, but we cannot act as if these agreements already exist. Tehran gives the impression that it is implementing agreements that exist only in the minds of the Revolutionary Guards but have never been formalized or recognized by the other parties.

Negotiations with the Gulf countries in the form of a Persian Gulf Council?

In any case, this will be necessary, and in any case, it was already planned under item 5.

Points in the MOU to be revised by the PGC (Persian Gulf Council)

We should focus only on the points concerning the Persian Gulf countries and leave the others to negotiations between Iran and the United States, which are beyond our control.

These points are:

• Point 1, which concerns the ceasefire and any use of force or threats,
• Point 2, which concerns the territorial integrity of each country,
• Point 5, which remains essential but for which a monitoring mechanism must be established
  (It seems likely that Iran has done nothing to clear the mines, but we must first precisely demarcate each country’s territorial waters before asking European countries to carry out mine clearance in Omani territorial waters.)

In these various points, the United States must be replaced with the countries bordering the Persian Gulf. We must only consider issues that the Gulf countries can negotiate and that are relevant to the Persian Gulf region—not issues over which they have no control or that depend exclusively on the United States.

Replace item 6 with a financial contribution toward the reconstruction of Iran

It is important that there be a significant financial incentive, the form of which must be specified. This incentive should likely be linked to the state of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. The countries capable of offering such an incentive (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) cannot do so if they are being strangled by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. This incentive must exceed all revenue Iran could generate from tolls. This matter will not be a decision of the Persian Gulf Council but a proposal from several states that is recognized and accepted by the Persian Gulf Council.
This financial incentive should be viewed as an investment intended to aid reconstruction, not as a grant. An investment can serve as a lasting bond between countries. A country that invests can control the scope of its investment. For example, it is not possible for Iran to use investment funds to develop missiles and new weapons, whereas donated money would allow Iran to do whatever it wants with it, starting with strengthening its military capabilities.

Add a ceasefire monitoring system limited to the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz

This is essential to prevent further escalation. This system will necessarily be coordinated with the United States.

Only those who don’t try anything end up going nowhere

There needs to be a permanent framework for negotiations with representatives from the countries concerned, regardless of the location chosen.

July 12, 2026 (last updated at 11:55 a.m.)

Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)

Naej DRANER is a solutions architect. This article is an example of what N.D. would propose to the countries bordering the Persian Gulf if he had ties with any of them (which is not the case at the moment). It is intended as a direct advisory exercise for the countries concerned. Since N.D. has no contacts and no official standing, this is a shot in the dark that will likely never become a reality (though it could).

The reliability of a ceasefire also depends on the orders issued to the military chains of command and on their decision-making autonomy.

It is therefore necessary to assess the military and political chains of command on each side.

Regarding the Iran-U.S. ceasefire:

• The U.S. military leadership is reliable, but the actions demanded by Trump or the Secretary of Defense are not. Based on a single piece of intelligence, they can decide to launch new strikes—for any reason. If there were a ceasefire monitoring system—one known and recognized by all parties—we could hope that it would temper some of the U.S. authorities’ impulsive decisions. The only risk is that they will not allow the ceasefire monitoring system time to prove itself, since it will take time and a few missteps before it functions properly.
• The Iranian military hierarchy is more complex. The internal Iranian structure that has enabled the system’s resilience is a mix of autonomy and centralized directives. In this case, given the multiple violations already committed by the Iranian side, it is the centralized directives that need to be reviewed. In principle, this process should begin at the highest level of the Iranian state—that is, the Supreme Leader—and then verify that the centralized directives have indeed been transmitted to all relevant Iranian units. In particular, the Revolutionary Guards failed to instruct all units that no armed intervention against oil tankers of any kind was authorized. In short, who is in charge and capable of enforcing what has been signed by the Iranian authorities? In addition to the problems within the Iranian military hierarchy, there is an ongoing conflict between the Iranian political leadership and the Revolutionary Guards. The Revolutionary Guards behave like soldiers for whom the battlefield is infinite. They do not respect countries’ territorial waters—since they probably do not know what they are and consider them irrelevant—and they do not respect them today.

Specifically, the ceasefire monitoring system must be set up on Omani territory, which overlooks the Strait of Hormuz. Three representatives from each country bordering the Persian Gulf must be stationed there on a permanent basis to share the monitoring duties.

For the negotiation phase, we would need to find facilities capable of accommodating each of the eight delegations from the Persian Gulf Council. The simplest solution would be to use the GCC’s facilities. The facilities already exist; we just need to find a few offices. The GCC secretary cannot serve as the secretary of the Persian Gulf Council, but he can facilitate future meetings.

Once the facilities and delegations are in place, it will be necessary to launch some technical negotiations:

• The boundaries of the territorial waters of each country in the Persian Gulf. Until there is an authoritative map accepted by all, we will spend our time dealing with misunderstandings = a first commission to be established
• Are there any standards or treaties that apply to the discharge of wastewater into the Persian Gulf? = a second commission to be established
• Are there any existing organizations that monitor the condition of the waters and wildlife in the Persian Gulf? = a third commission

The first commission on territorial waters must reach a conclusion quickly; its findings will be used by the Ceasefire Monitoring System, particularly with regard to the Strait of Hormuz. There will be overreactions and violations if the Revolutionary Guards continue to act as if all of Oman’s territorial waters belong to Iran. Intervening in Oman’s territorial waters or attacking oil tankers there is both an act of war and, indirectly, a violation of the ceasefire.

The committees will be chaired and led by representatives of the member states. No representative from a country that does not border the Persian Gulf is permitted to serve as a member of the committee.

July 10, 2026

Naej DRANER