To understand this article, you must first have read:

• Synthesis of the Clock of the Unconscious
• The Returns of the Past

As a reminder, the “Quesako Cycle,” which deals with wars, is just one application (among others) of the “Return Theory,” which is described in “The Returns of the Past“.

The “Return Theory” is a fundamental theory that has been used, by identifying returns, to define several concepts such as those of the “Quesako Cycle.”

If you think the “Quesako Cycle” is the only thing that exists, think again. The Clock of the Unconscious encompasses a series of entirely new theories and concepts, of which the “Quesako Cycle” is the only part sufficiently developed to be rationally comprehensible.

The central question of this article is whether the “U.S.-Iran war” represents a “return of the past”—specifically, a return of the 2003 Iraq War—or the emergence of an “Arab Return Cycle” unique to the Arab world.

Definition of a “Return Cycle”:

A “Return Cycle” is a periodic phenomenon that has the same periodicity as the “Quesako Cycle” but uses a different reference point (T0) than the “Quesako Cycle.” Each country (or region) may have its own “Return Cycle.” It helps identify upheavals in the collective unconscious that may impact the country’s history. Such a “Return Cycle” can be a combination of different events.

For example, consider the following events:

• The 2003 Iraq War,
• The Arab Spring of 2011 (including all the upheavals in the Arab states as well as the wars in Syria and Libya)
• The U.S.-Iran War of 2026

All of these events can be seen as part of the escalating phases of a “Return Cycle” that would have its starting point (T0) in the 2003 Gulf War against Iraq

There is one event missing from the 2016–2021 period. There is no specific event that stands out from the others.

The most common “return of the past” is 25 years, + or – 2 years: 2003 + 25 = 2028, meaning the period from 2026 to 2030, during which we may see a recurrence of the war in Iraq.

In other words, if this is indeed a return of the 2003 Iraq War, Donald Trump is more attuned to the Clock of the Unconscious than to his conscious mind (which, as everyone knows, is not really predictable). American people, refer to the unconsciousness of your ” Chaos Star” if you want understanding predictable issues of your guy. That’s all folks.

A simple return from the 2003 Iraq War, or an “Arab Return Cycle” that could shape the future of the Arab world (for example, in 2033–2035)? The question remains open and has not been resolved, since we have not yet found any volunteers to conduct this study.

This topic has not yet been explored, but it will be if there are interested individuals willing to devote the necessary resources to it.

A “Return Cycle XXX” is a new concept that has not yet been described or developed. This article marks the beginning of this topic, with a very short first draft.

For example, there is a “France Return Cycle” featuring various events that have shaped France (in-house)

April 18, 2026

It is generally accepted that the cyclical phenomenon underlying the “Quésako Cycle” is not a perfect sine wave. It is a sine wave that fluctuates and whose period can vary. The average period is 3,095 days, but the actual period could range from 2,200 days to 3,800 days.

If we knew the origin of this cyclical phenomenon, we wouldn’t need to readjust the peaks; observing the cyclical phenomenon that causes this cycle would be enough to determine the variations.

This is an important issue that has not been convincingly resolved.

So far, there has been only one adjustment of -679 days applied in early 2025 to the wars of 2014. This adjustment stems from the observation that several major wars broke out within a short period of time in 2014. It was hypothesized that this meant the peak of amplification had shifted to that time.

Just because one peak is shifted doesn’t mean that the subsequent peaks are shifted in the same way.

While the concept of resetting (to be tested in early 2025) is appealing, it would be preferable not to reset the Quesako cycle by 100% with every change, but rather by a smaller percentage (50 to 75%).

Researchers who take over the “Cycle Quésako” study should be aware that the recalibration method needs to be reviewed.

The best approach would be to identify the cause of this cyclical phenomenon, but there are no credible leads yet. The current suspension of research into the “Quesako Cycle” (due to a lack of adequate resources) is preventing any progress on the matter.

JBR

April 15, 2026

To sum up:

• Less than a week ago, Donald Trump was demanding free passage through the Strait of Hormuz, threatening to destroy everything everywhere if his demands weren’t met. A few days later, that same Donald Trump blocked the Strait of Hormuz. LOGICAL, isn’t it? (I’m a bit slow on the uptake and have a hard time grasping the subtleties of how things unfold.)
• Late last week, Donald Trump was already envisioning the creation of a “joint venture” to manage shipping rights through the Strait of Hormuz. In the past few days, that same Donald Trump has declared that any ship that has paid a transit fee will be prosecuted. LOGICAL, isn’t it? (I’m still just as clueless and haven’t figured out why there’s been a complete about-face: my guess is that Iran made it clear to him that they didn’t need him to collect the money.)

We see this kind of thing practically every day. I call it the “windshield wiper” approach (or the search for the best fan by switching directions repeatedly). One swing in one direction, then suddenly the other way, and then we start all over again.

I have to admit I’m a terrible diplomat: I can’t handle both sides of an issue when I keep changing my goals every day.

Is it worth trying?

I think we need to distinguish between the short term (Trump and his “windshield-wiper diplomacy”) and the long term, which will always be relevant even if not much happens in the coming days.

What will always be useful:

• that the countries bordering the Persian Gulf communicate regularly. That is not the case today: the Gulf Cooperation Council aims for political and economic unification and has often taken an anti-Iran stance. These six countries are navigating the reality of the Gulf crisis by trying to put a little more pressure on Iran. All it would take is for a diplomat from each country bordering the Persian Gulf to meet regularly with all their colleagues somewhere in the world. In the event of a crisis, this could happen daily; otherwise, weekly. What would they discuss? What their countries want—identifying the issues of common interest and setting aside the rest.
• There will be issues related to maritime navigation and pollution in the Persian Gulf. It would be helpful to have joint measures in place to address these issues. Rather than asking each country to contribute, we could establish a transit fee, collected collectively, which would help fund these measures.

As a political and security architect, I see two issues:

• A collective right of way
• the denuclearization of the region. Donald Trump and Israel simply want to recover the enriched uranium and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. As for me, I am seeking the denuclearization of the entire region, starting with the Persian Gulf. This won’t happen in a matter of weeks, but if it succeeds, the enriched uranium will have to be recovered. We’ll get there, but by a different route.

The problem with architects is that they have nothing but ideas, and if no one helps bring them to life, nothing will happen. That’s exactly the case.

How can he claim to be an advisor to a Persian Gulf Council that does not exist (or that is being confused with the council of a few coastal countries that represent only one faction in the conflict)?

It was just an idea that might never come to fruition. People today prefer the “windshield wiper” approach to diplomacy.

Naej DRANER

April 14, 2026

Definition of the Persian Gulf Council : article Persian Gulf Council

Since Tuesday, April 7, 2026, there has been a fragile two-week ceasefire between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other. Negotiations are set to begin in the coming days. The agreement underlying the ceasefire is unclear. Various versions are circulating; Trump’s obsession with secrecy, fueled by what he perceives as his omnipotence, leads him to say little or to say one thing and its opposite, reflecting his difficulty in managing the unmanageable nature of his successive and contradictory decisions.

The negotiations will take place in Islamabad between the United States and an Iranian delegation. No Persian Gulf country other than Iran will be represented there. While Saudi Arabia may have an indirect and uncertain influence, it will not be a decision-maker. The other countries will be absent, both directly and indirectly.

The mindset of the Gulf Cooperation Council—which calls itself the Persian Gulf Council despite the absence of Iraq and Iran—is all about power dynamics. Naively, the GCC believes that a military solution (effectively led by the U.S.) will resolve everything and has been waiting for a UN resolution to give the green light to the use of force, which would be a mistake and lead to further escalation. The obsession of some members with demanding reparations—while completely ignoring the damage suffered by Iran and the use of American bases—will poison the debate. They lack a long-term vision and will miss this opportunity, leaving the United States to negotiate a toll without them. The beneficiaries of this toll will likely be Iran and the Trump family and their friends. The United States has become a banana republic where public and private interests are blithely conflated without anyone batting an eye.

If the Persian Gulf countries are unable to establish a Persian Gulf Council in the coming days that includes all the coastal states, they will suffer for decades to come the consequences of an agreement reached without them—one in which their great American ally will insist on being the sole decision-maker, acting in the shadowy and secretive manner typical of it. It will be a makeshift, ad-hoc agreement.

Is there anything else they can do?

If they agreed to establish a Persian Gulf Council, they could put the past behind them and set aside the GCC for a while. All countries bordering the Persian Gulf must be represented in it.

Next, you need to list the topics to be discussed one by one:

1 – The Strait of Hormuz toll: this is necessary to regulate traffic and fund local monitoring agencies. These agencies must be those of the Persian Gulf Council, not those of a foreign country that will be concerned solely with the royalties it receives. It will take six months to a year to define and begin implementing these new rules.

2 – The Persian Gulf Council could call for regional denuclearization. A similar agreement exists in South America. The Gulf Cooperation Council could raise the issue before having it taken up by the Arab League and expanded to include all countries, whether declared nuclear powers or not. It would take two to three years just to get the ball rolling on this issue. The advantage is that the issue would be addressed globally rather than unilaterally by a victor imposing terms on a vanquished party to secure military superiority and exclusive possession of nuclear weapons. Are the Gulf states prepared to ban all nuclear weapons in Iran while accepting that Israel possesses nuclear weapons and that this possession is recognized?

3 – Reparations. Is it possible to demand reparations from those who attack any of the Persian Gulf states? But can we reasonably blame Iran without highlighting the deliberate aggression of Israel and the United States, which occurred without any military provocation from Iran? Putting this issue on the agenda right now would mean burying the Persian Gulf Council once and for all, as it would display the same bias as the GCC, which claims to represent the Persian Gulf countries while excluding two key players. It is certainly possible to reach an agreement for the future, even if it is likely that it will not apply to what has just transpired.

Don’t forget: in two weeks, it will be too late—you’ll be stuck with a deal struck behind your back by your favorite broker, who will have found a way to line his own pockets with your former enemy, all while telling you it’s for your own good (which I personally doubt).

April 10, 2026

Naej DRANER

Naej DRANER is a political and security analyst and solutions architect. At a meeting of the Persian Gulf Council, his status as an official advisor to the Persian Gulf Council will be submitted for approval. Only a unanimous decision by the full members will be acceptable.
Rest assured: N.D. will never become the official advisor, since the Persian Gulf Council will never come into existence and the only official council will be the United States & friends & foes.
This was merely a speculative idea of which no Persian Gulf country was aware.

Attached are the sessions from the last 30 days.

In early 2026, it was China that regularly accessed the site, viewing all the pages from the past. A thorough analysis—though I can’t figure out what they got out of it.

In recent weeks, Singapore has been the leader in terms of access.

Over the past week or two, Europeans have been accessing the site in a disciplined but unenthusiastic manner. One country (likely Germany or Spain) shared some information with colleagues, including a few links. One or two people from each of these European countries accessed it—no more. Europeans are a bit peculiar. On their part, this isn’t an enthusiastic embrace of new ideas, but rather a polite gesture among well-mannered people who react very slowly and rather superficially. They will be surprised to find that others have already gotten a head start on the subject. They access it because someone sent them something, but their engagement and reflection are measured. It will likely take them weeks or months before they make any decision on the matter. … only to be surprised that they have already fallen considerably behind others

The contact form is never used: no one ever asks any questions.

There are between 5 and 30 visits per day, no more.

When you look at the articles from April 6 and 7 on the Persian Gulf Council, it seems odd. It appears to have hit the mark, but in practice, none of the Arab countries directly involved accessed it. It may have had an effect elsewhere and indirectly. Since there were only 5 or 6 visits on those days, the user who accessed it remains unidentified, but no country that should be directly concerned has done so. It’s a multi-cushion billiards game: it’s not the one who accesses it who does anything with it. And the one who does something with it will make sure to remain unknown.

April 8, 2026

Will the Persian Gulf Council ever see the light of day? Probably NOT; it is merely an illustrative description of what should have been done to avoid the chaos of the coming months. The management of the Strait of Hormuz should be neither that of Trump—the president of chaos who will cause the greatest chaos the world has seen since World War II—nor that of Iran, which is trying to carve out a role for itself that its neighbors will never accept.

The current Gulf Cooperation Council represents the coastal states, excluding Iraq and Iran. Expanding it to include these two countries could amount to creating a true Persian Gulf Council, but this should probably be avoided:

• The Gulf Cooperation Council has historically tended to oppose the two absent countries: changing organizations would allow us to start a completely new project,
• If Iran continues to insist on maintaining sole control over the Strait of Hormuz, other countries will have no choice but to undertake major projects that render passage through the Strait of Hormuz unnecessary. In such a case, a joint organization comprising these countries (excluding Iran) is needed to lead and carry out this work.

Some Persian Gulf countries are trying to obtain some sort of authorization from the UN to use force to control the Strait of Hormuz—authorization they will be quick to delegate to other countries or that the “president of chaos” will claim for himself. It will be virtually impossible to control the Strait of Hormuz militarily without controlling a large part of Iran’s territory. And even in that case, it will be easy for Iran to disrupt navigation in the Persian Gulf, whether directly from the shore or via drones.

Are the countries bordering the Persian Gulf willing to send a strong message to all those who claim to control the Persian Gulf or the Strait of Hormuz without them?

A toll on the Strait of Hormuz? That would make sense for the Persian Gulf Council, given the need to establish round-the-clock monitoring of maritime traffic. Any toll collected by a coastal country would have to be remitted to the Persian Gulf Council.

The “President of Chaos” has promised hell for Iran. It will be hell for all the countries of the Persian Gulf and a step backward for everyone, with, as a bonus, the greatest chaos the world has ever known—a feat the “President of Chaos” considers magnificent. In any case, Israel—whose specialty is torpedoing any diplomatic initiative that gets in the way—has taken the lead: by single-handedly bombing the largest petrochemical complex, it has ensured that there is no turning back. This is not the first time, nor will it be the last, that Israel has forced Trump’s hand, leaving him no choice but to follow along and provoke the greatest chaos the world has ever known. It was not he who carried out these threats, but his ally, to ensure they came to pass.

Naej DRANER

April 7, 2026

Article 1: All countries bordering the Persian Gulf are ex officio members of the Persian Gulf Council.

Article 2: The presidency of the Persian Gulf Council rotates among all ex officio members. The presidency shall be held successively in alphabetical order of the members, for a term of 6 months or 1 year (as decided at the first meeting of the Persian Gulf Council). Meetings and their venues are proposed and managed by the current presidency.

Article 3: The purpose of the Persian Gulf Council is to manage all issues arising in the Persian Gulf: maritime traffic, pollution, the Strait of Hormuz (and any potential toll), security, and navigation control.

Article 4: No member may unilaterally make a decision that falls within the purview of the Persian Gulf Council without that decision being reviewed at meetings of the Persian Gulf Council.

Article 5: The resources allocated to the Persian Gulf Council shall be determined by its members.

These articles will be supplemented, if necessary, at future meetings.

There are no other publications besides the one on this website. We encourage all readers of this article to share it so that it reaches the members of the Persian Gulf Council.

Le 6 Avril 2026

Naej DRANER

Naej DRANER is a political and security analyst and solutions architect. At a meeting of the Persian Gulf Council, his status as an official advisor to the Persian Gulf Council will be put forward for approval. Only a unanimous decision by the full members will be acceptable.

Postscript: The Persian Gulf Council should not be confused with the Gulf Cooperation Council, which is limited to six countries bordering the Persian Gulf and whose scope extends beyond the Persian Gulf alone.

The OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) was established on January 1, 1995, as a successor to the CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe), which was created following the 1975 Helsinki Accords. The OSCE is the largest regional security organization. Its goal is to ensure the security and peace of its member states, which span all of Europe as well as Central Asia.
It is not a legal entity, but rather a forum for states that has become a permanent institution. Its role is to prevent conflicts and help resolve them.

Can we say that such an organization is fulfilling its role when it plays no part in the war tearing the European continent apart—namely, the Russia-Ukraine war?

Rooted in considerations from a bygone era, at a time when the EU was still in its infancy, the OSCE is in need of fundamental reform.

Effective immediately, the OSCE could be tasked with preparing to monitor and maintain the Russia-Ukraine ceasefire.

It is likely that the current front line—or some variation of it—will serve as the ceasefire line.

The OSCE gained experience from 2014 to 2022 through the SMM (Special Monitoring Mission). The resources allocated to it would need to be increased three- or fourfold. A system that is less passive than the one previously implemented must also be put in place.

If this mission is launched, it would open the door to reforming and restructuring the OSCE in a positive way. At least half of the OSCE’s activities and structures are set to be phased out. This would be easier if a ceasefire mission were to mobilize hundreds of people.

To date, there is no agreement on the future system for monitoring and enforcing the ceasefire in Ukraine. The coalition of “volunteers” led by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom has been unable to propose a system for monitoring and enforcing the ceasefire that is acceptable to and accepted by Russia.

This is an opportunity for the OSCE if the Chairmanship or the Troika are able to make their mark (The Troika consists of the current OSCE Chairmanship—Switzerland—along with the previous Chairmanship—Finland—and the next Chairmanship—to be determined).

There is a need for a security organization covering Europe and the former Central Asian republics of the USSR.

The OSCE’s priority should be:

• identify and prevent future conflicts,
• have an internal dispute resolution body
• be able to monitor and maintain a ceasefire

If the OSCE is unable to do so in the coming months and years, it will have to disappear and be reborn in a different form.

Naej DRANER

March 24, 2026

These postwar preparations should begin as soon as possible, even if a ceasefire were not to be reached until much later:

• Replace or reform the OSCE,
• Keep the Russia-Ukraine negotiations going,
• Define and prepare a mechanism to maintain the ceasefire,
• Rethinking the Russia-Europe balance in a different way.

These various points will be covered in separate articles in the coming days and weeks.

Naej DRANER

March 23, 2026

Imagine yourself in the 22nd century, on January 1, 2100.

• If there were a nuclear war in the 21st century, who would dare to argue that nuclear deterrence ensures peace and will never lead to a nuclear war,
• If there hasn’t been a nuclear war, we might question the wisdom of maintaining indefinitely a system that is never used, costs a fortune, and poses a real risk.

In the 21st century, we no longer think about deterrence in those terms; we are content with a short-term view and the reassuring feeling of being protected by nuclear deterrence.

No 21st-century solution is satisfactory. A country like Ukraine, which agreed to give up all its nuclear weapons in exchange for a Russian promise of non-intervention, can only bitterly regret this reality. The Russia-Ukraine war likely would never have taken place if Ukraine had retained its nuclear arsenal.

The balance of nuclear terror is becoming less and less effective. Some countries boast of having missiles superior to those of others, giving the impression that they could unleash hell on earth.

A solution must be found to this reality. Nuclear proliferation will continue. If Israel settles for a short-term view, hoping to remain the only country in the region with nuclear weapons, this is no longer the case with Pakistan.

The United States is the only country to have used nuclear weapons and to have destroyed a country twice on the pretext that it might acquire nuclear weapons. The first time, it was a lie intended to divert public attention from the true objectives. The second time, it was another lie based on a reality that did not match the statements made by the countries that went to war.

A war against Iran will not solve the nuclear problem that exists today and will continue to exist in the future.

Ideally, we would be able to deploy a “nuclear bomb neutralizer,” but at present that remains the stuff of imagination and science fiction, with virtually no credibility.

Naej DRANER

March 20, 2026