Since July 27, 2020, there is finally something that looks like a ceasefire. Certainly there are still some violations, but there have been days without any violations, which has never happened since the beginning of the war in 2014.
Although research on the ceasefire is marginal on this site, it is recommended that you consult the following two documents. These 2 documents were written in 2017, explaining the reasons why the ceasefire did not hold. While there is no evidence that these documents were taken into account by local actors, as if all of this is simply a matter of chance, there is, on the other hand, confirmation that the analysis made in 2017 was accurate.
2 elements suggest that the July 2017 text ND201707003 has reached SMM:
- verification by SMM observers of what had actually been transmitted to the combatants after a ceasefire,
- the modification of SMM reports by allowing a better immediate readability by graph.
These 2 elements can be considered as simple coincidences since the author that I am has never received confirmation of its transmission to SMM.
Between the summer of 2017 and July 2020, did this same text have such an influence that it helped to allow the establishment of a real ceasefire? Not knowing the path followed within the SMM or elsewhere, it is therefore impossible to confirm it. It is therefore an unconfirmed experiment, proving the accuracy of an analysis in 2017 but not proving, for lack of evidence, that it was used to bring about the ceasefire of 2020..
All the author can say is that if the right analysis had reached the right decision-makers in 2017 and had been taken into account, we would have gained 3 years to establish a credible ceasefire. The texts written in 2017 and accessible at the end of this article could have been the basis of an excellent and successful experiment, even if this experiment appears imaginary today.
Being right was not enough to mobilize the actors to make this ceasefire a reality. Time and successive failures have allowed the actors to become more realistic and finally achieve a more credible ceasefire. This is certainly the most likely explanation and the one that will be put forward by all the official actors who will laugh at these coincidences. Is it the truth? No one can say for sure.
We have gone from an average of more than 800 violations per day to a few violations per week: a considerable progress, even if nothing is resolved and the local actors see no common future.
75% of the reasons explained at the time were taken into account. The ceasefire remains fragile as long as there is no shared future, but it is an important step in the right direction, hopefully for the long term.
We will devote several news notes in the days and weeks to come on this subject of the Ukrainian conflict, even if probably none of them will be read and used.
You will find here the two 2017 documents updated with some current comments.
ND201707003 Ukraine Ceasefire – update – 2020-09-23 EN-US
ND201709001 Active Cease-fire control System – update – 2020-09-14 EN-US
Note of 22/10/2020: in 2020, ND202004001 (a version derived from ND201707003) was made for the Ukrainian authorities. There is no indication whether this last text reached the Ukrainian authorities and what they think about it, but it may be the text that was actually used. There were 3 actions identified. Only the action related to the ceasefire led to a result. The others did not succeed and gave no visible result. It is a pity not to know. A coincidence? Maybe
ND202004001-6a Variant from ND201707003 for ukrainian authorities EN-US
September 23, 2020 updated and translated on October 22, 2020
Find out more:
- Ukrainian news: https://www.unian.info/
- DPR news: https://dan-news.info/en
- Daily reports from SMM observers: https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/reports
- Reference texts in english : look at available documents