Reference Documents
The text of the Iran-U.S. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), or protocol, signed on June 17, 2026, is very clear:
- Point 1 states in the clearest possible terms the cessation of all military operations and also the cessation of all threats: “… to refrain from any threat or use of force against one another …”
- Point 5: “…The Islamic Republic of Iran will engage in dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administrative framework and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz, in consultation with the other states bordering the Persian Gulf, in accordance with international law and the sovereign rights of the coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz…”
- The text does not specify any mandatory shipping lane for vessels that will freely transit the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran’s unilateral decision to restrict traffic to its own waterways and the armed interventions by the Revolutionary Guards against vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz are not provided for in the MOU and may be considered a unilateral violation of the protocol set forth in Section 1 of the MOU.
This discrepancy between the text officially signed by Iran and its actual implementation rightly raises the question of who is in charge in Iran, given its inability to implement the terms of the signed agreements.
It often happens that a newly signed agreement leads to missteps due to misunderstandings and internal communication problems. It can also be a deliberate act by factions that reject the agreement as signed.
The MOU lacks a mechanism for monitoring and enforcing the ceasefire, whose role is to intervene immediately to identify misunderstandings, document violations, and ensure that they do not recur and do not lead to retaliation.
This repeated violation by Iran has effectively derailed the entire process that was underway.
Negotiating an agreement on the one hand and claiming to enforce rules other than those formalized in the agreement on the other will do nothing but cast doubt on the credibility of Iranian leaders.
Iran’s Deliberate Ambiguity Regarding Its System of Government
What might be considered a weakness in governance is most often exploited by Iran as an opportunity, as if we were required to excuse people who did something other than negotiate—but who nevertheless acted in a way that aligns with Iran’s wishes.
Incertitude sur le guide suprême actuel
The current uncertainty only serves to confirm the lack of leaders capable of commanding the respect of all Iranian factions, starting with the Revolutionary Guards. The latter seem to do as they please and impose their own agenda, even if it runs counter to the agreements that have been signed
Impact on Investments
It is likely that the countries bordering the Persian Gulf—which could invest in Iran to help with reconstruction—will probably not make the planned investments, and this is understandable. The three countries that have the means to invest (namely Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) are precisely the ones targeted first and foremost by the Revolutionary Guards. The result? These countries will first focus on repairing the damage at home and will use their available funds to make up for the lost revenue resulting from the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. If Iran’s official policy is to discourage all countries that could help them, I believe they’ve succeeded. I don’t think the countries bordering the Persian Gulf are bound by point 6 of the MOU. It is the United States that has committed to the funds under Point 6—go talk to them. I don’t feel concerned, and I’m very much afraid that the countries bordering the Persian Gulf won’t feel involved as long as you spend your time destroying them in the name of an Iranian strategy whose author I don’t know. You can’t spend your time destroying things without provoking a collective backlash justified by Iran’s behavior. Iran will reap what it has sown. Believing that it’s enough to threaten them and hold a gun to their heads will only hasten your own downfall.
July 28, 2026
Naej DRANER