According to reports, the Strait of Hormuz is expected to reopen. This agreement will establish temporary shipping lanes until mine clearance is completed and the final shipping lanes are negotiated.
But will the agreement be sustainable, or will it fall apart at the first violation, as was the case with the June 17 agreement?
All of this will depend on the accompanying measures and the establishment of a system to monitor and enforce the ceasefire.
Trump and His Upcoming Reactions
Trump is interested in the fact that he’s going to be the center of the world. The rest? He couldn’t care less. He won’t even have the slightest idea of how he’ll torpedo it. True to form, believing himself to be the greatest genius of all time, he’ll eventually see himself as the legitimate arbiter with the right to punish the other side, which is solely responsible for the violations.
Trump’s aides, true to form, won’t speak up until Trump plunges the world into chaos—yet again. There is no filter and no decision-making body between Trump’s sudden idea and its execution by the U.S. military.
The Revolutionary Guards and Their Future Responses
The Revolutionary Guards will try to pass themselves off as the big winners. Having established themselves as the authority over the Strait of Hormuz, at the first sign of trouble they will do what they’ve done before: launch missiles or other weapons at oil tankers. They’ll claim that the ship violated vaguely defined rules and won’t even consider communicating with the vessels or establishing an intervention protocol. That’s exactly how they’ve already shattered the previous agreement. There will indeed be a signed agreement, but they will, as usual, enforce what they believe the agreement should have been—claiming to be the sole legitimate authorities to interpret and amend it, even if their interpretation bears no relation to the agreement itself.
Even if there is nothing in the agreement, we must establish a system to monitor and enforce the ceasefire by presenting it as a traffic control system
SIn the part of Oman closest to the strait and as close to the seashore as possible, you must:
- A requisitioned building or a tent city capable of housing several dozen people
- 3 government officials from each Persian Gulf coastal country, including at least one military officer with sufficient rank to be taken seriously anywhere in their country
- permanent means of communication via radio or telephone
- means of monitoring maritime traffic (primary and secondary radars accessible in real time, even if they are remote)
- about ten patrol boats ready to board the vessel in question
This system must operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and must:
- be organized into teams to ensure continuous operation
- maintain an operations log recording shift changes and all major events
- identify and document any incidents
- contact the country and military officials responsible for incidents
In other words, we shouldn’t wait for Trump to decide on retaliation for a violation, nor should we wait for the Revolutionary Guards to use their weapons as a means of acting as police. We’ll have to anticipate all future violations and take steps to prevent them from happening.
For example, once the agreement has been signed and published, it will need to be communicated to the various military chains of command to ensure that they are aware of it and issue the necessary orders. Firing any type of projectile at a ship will constitute a violation. Militarily neutralizing a radar or other equipment—even if done supposedly as a preventive measure—will constitute a violation. On the other hand, any drone could be shot down without warning if it is located within a country’s sovereign territory (or territorial waters).
In short, we should not rely on Trump, his aides, the Guardians of the Revolution, or Iranian officials to list potential future violations. This must be done proactively by outlining these scenarios and what will need to be done in such cases—specifically regarding the monitoring and maintenance system that must be established and operated, much like a traffic and incident management system extended to cover every conceivable incident.
The decision to implement this rests solely with the Gulf states. That will likely be the problem: they are courageous, but not reckless enough to venture into territory not defined by the official negotiators and the apparent leader of the moment.
August 5, 2026
Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)