A provisional agreement on the waterways is expected to be announced in the coming days. The final agreement will depend on the removal of mines and on whether or not the “Persian Gulf Council” exists.

In the agreement of June 17, 2026—which was never properly implemented—there was a provision regarding mine clearance. Theoretically, Iran was supposed to carry it out, but it’s clear that nothing happened. Iran lacks the necessary capabilities for mine clearance. Perhaps they could defuse identified and visible mines without detonating them, but they lack the maritime capabilities to detect them with certainty and provide any credible assurance that there is no longer a risk from mines.

Furthermore, the majority of the mines were placed in Oman’s territorial waters.

The following outlines the proposed arrangement.

First, the territorial waters and their boundaries must be clearly defined for Oman, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (at least for the portion near the strait). Based on what you believe to be your territorial waters and their geographical boundaries, you should have them validated and signed by your neighboring countries. Implicitly, once Oman has done so, this will be considered established for Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, but it would be better if this were done systematically.

Why emphasize the boundaries of territorial waters? Because they define each country’s absolute sovereignty over those territorial waters, and within its territorial waters. Oman can request the assistance of European mine-clearing teams or those from any other country. Oman has the right to request external mine-clearing ships in its territorial waters. It does not depend on any other country. There should be no negotiations with Iran and the United States on this matter; we should simply inform them and offer to allow Iran to verify certain areas of its territorial waters about which it may have doubts, without any obligation to follow through.

As a reminder, the United States scrapped most of its mine-clearing ships in early 2026 and has only makeshift solutions to offer for conducting such mine-clearing operations. Unless the available information is incorrect, there are reportedly no operational U.S. mine-clearing ships in the Middle East. The only operational capabilities are those of the Europeans, who have already pre-positioned their equipment in the Middle East and are ready to intervene upon request.

It would be desirable to expand the demining area to include a portion (to be defined) of the United Arab Emirates’ territorial waters, as well as a portion of Iran’s territorial waters. This expansion can only take place with the formal consent of both countries. Even if they refuse to expand this area, both countries must formally acknowledge that the demining area has been defined and that they have been informed of the demining teams’ operational area. The purpose of this formal acknowledgment is to prevent either country from taking action against the demining teams that will be carrying out the operation. The request must be forwarded to the relevant European countries that have already made their presence known to Oman.

As for the Persian Gulf countries, a team of 3 to 4 people from each of the countries involved (Iran, Oman, UAE) would be needed to oversee this operation. These individuals must be brought together at a single, permanent location for the duration of the demining operation. They must conduct daily monitoring and submit a detailed weekly report on the operation’s progress.

There are mines that have been spotted and reported to the maritime authorities. We need to take stock of the situation.

To put it diplomatically, we will explain that Iran has done its part and that the other countries, for their own safety and that of all ships, are requesting a thorough inspection of all areas that may contain mines.
It would have been better to have more specific information from the Iranians, but communication is virtually nonexistent—probably because the Iranians want to leave room for doubt about a potential threat. They take pride in posing a threat and are reluctant to share the information they have. We will have to make do with the information they are willing to provide and, in any case, carry out all necessary verifications—with or without their information, which must under no circumstances be allowed to become a stumbling block.

The preparatory phase of the demining operation is expected to take one week, provided it is carried out by the countries directly involved—primarily Oman. The Americans have not been of any assistance so far, due to a lack of credible operational capabilities. They once had excellent capabilities, but decided to stop using them, and those capabilities are no longer operational.

The detailed schedule will then need to be established and monitored by the demining monitoring team.

To avoid interface and internal coordination issues among European countries, it is recommended to designate a single country as the point of entry—for example, France—while asking that country to bring together all the resources needed for this demining operation.

Regardless of the terms of the upcoming U.S.-Iran agreement, this issue must be addressed directly with certain Persian Gulf countries.

Ideally, this would be managed by the “Persian Gulf Council” in close cooperation with Oman, which is the country most directly affected, but the “Council” does not currently exist. And its future existence is uncertain, even though some of its ideas have already been adopted and have helped to temporarily resolve the impasse.

August 4, 2026

Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)