Peace—or the end of a conflict—is achieved by institutionalizing a new balance, provided that a relevant new balance can be found and successfully established.

In the case of the Persian Gulf, a “Persian Gulf Council” seemed like a logical step. This appears to have failed. Within a few days, the Persian Gulf countries had polarized along their traditional lines of conflict:

• The Revolutionary Guards have drawn the Houthis into a second strait. Of course, they will present this as coincidental, but experts who aren’t too naive know that Shiite militias operate the same way everywhere: a direct military hierarchy of the “Guardians” that always produces the same result—namely, a group that establishes itself as a state within a state and exerts its influence to directly control that group. Whether it’s Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Shiite militias in Iraq, or other militias yet to emerge, the modus operandi is always the same, with an identical outcome. These groups are never integrated into the country. Hezbollah has not helped restore the Lebanese state and will not do so. It has fostered chaos so it can better pose as a savior. Should we negotiate with the Revolutionary Guards? NO—on these issues, we must find a balance within these countries, which are effectively satellites of the Guards, that renders this remote control unnecessary—which is no easy task.
• The Iranian president has confirmed what had been assumed: the Supreme Leader is currently unable to exercise any authority whatsoever. The current rulers are the Revolutionary Guards, who act like a military force and have disregarded the necessary international maritime regulations.
• Saudi Arabia is returning to its usual course of action: military operations in Yemen, rallying the Gulf monarchies around an equivalent of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council), and cooperation with the United States. Admittedly, MBS has called the United States to order to give Oman’s negotiations a chance, but Oman now finds itself quite alone and will struggle to hold its own against Iran when it comes to clearing mines, managing traffic flows, and overseeing the ceasefire.
• We can’t expect much else from Donald other than for him to make himself indispensable and ensure that he is the sole cornerstone of a Gulf settlement. The hope is to avoid this by finding a new balance outside the United States. The glass is half full and therefore half empty. Will the emptiness prevail? Probably. It was hoped for something other than a “Peace Council” like the one in Gaza, which did nothing but serve as a rubber-stamp chamber for Israeli whims. One way or another, the United States risks making itself indispensable and exerting its influence, which could lay the groundwork for renewed stagnation and chaos.
• The clay pot has failed to shatter the iron pot and risks imploding at any moment. It’s no surprise that N.D. was no match for the task, given that he has never been able to clearly explain his plan, which is therefore completely unknown to the Gulf states.

So? Checkmate for the traditional players. A new balance remains to be found, but it won’t be the one envisioned by N.D., whose idea was nothing more than a theoretical exercise that came to nothing. The “Persian Gulf Council” is now a thing of the past.

August 7, 2026

Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)