Iran/United States: There is no active system for monitoring the ceasefire


Reference Documents

I’m sorry to repeat myself, but all of the United States’ attempts at a ceasefire since 2025 have had the same flaw: the lack of a ceasefire monitoring system responsible for addressing every incident and overreach as soon as they occur.

  • This was the case with the October 2025 ceasefire in Gaza. It is not being respected. There have been more than a thousand deaths since the ceasefire began. This is not what you would call a ceasefire, but rather a permanent low-intensity war. The Israelis do whatever they want: they chip away at the territory left to the Palestinians; they kill whoever they want, using their AI system which turns rumors into absolute truth. To top it off, there’s never any verification of what was done or whether the target was justified. Not to mention that none of what was supposed to be done has actually been done. The Palestinians are herded like cattle, given none of what was promised and none of the treatment that would constitute humane treatment.
  • This was the case with the ceasefires in Lebanon. Theoretically, there’s UNIFIL and a few follow-up meetings, but nothing works.
  • In the case of the Iran–U.S. war, there is no known system for monitoring the ceasefire.

The one responsible for blunders and incidents is the other person.

It’s a universal truth in all wars and ceasefires: the other side is to blame. Iran accuses the United States, the United States accuses Iran, and so on and so forth. Each side forgets its own share of the blame and accuses the other. They really enjoy making long speeches on the subject, as if we had to convince ourselves at all costs.

If there had been a system to monitor the ceasefire, what would it have done?

First, it would have been informed about the oil tankers that were attacked and sustained significant damage.

Depending on the capabilities of this monitoring system, it could have inspected each of the oil tankers to assess the damage and gather evidence to confirm the type of munitions used.

As soon as the attacks were known, the monitoring system should have contacted the Iranian military and asked who was responsible for these ceasefire violations. The Iranians have fairly autonomous military hierarchies, and everything depends on the initial orders that were given and the interpretations made on the ground.

The official ceasefire document does not provide for any exceptions authorizing the use of force. If the Iranian side had an objection regarding a particular ship or incident, it should have contacted the monitoring system before doing anything.

It is obvious that the Iranian side will claim that the other side is responsible, cite U.S. bombings, and categorically deny having fired on oil tankers. Furthermore, the Iranian side will make no effort to identify those who actually fired the shots. But the monitoring system must not be intimidated and must, if necessary, send its own inspectors to Iran accompanied by Iranian escorts. It is possible that identifying the perpetrators of these incidents could take more than 24 hours, which is why it is important to communicate from the very start of the incident.

Furthermore, the Americans expected nothing from anyone, and—since there is no ceasefire monitoring system—they took immediate action, believing that their force would so intimidate the Iranians that they would stop. In fact, none of that happened, and the situation escalated significantly.

Every incident between Iran and the United States turns into an escalation, and it cannot be otherwise since there isn’t even a ceasefire monitoring system in place to address every breach of the ceasefire.

The ceasefire monitoring system must be accepted by the belligerents but must not be under their direct control, if it is to have any hope of functioning.

Alongside the monitoring system, a team of negotiators is needed. If the content of the agreement is ambiguous and leaves room for interpretation, it must be renegotiated or amended so that such ambiguities no longer exist.

If necessary, the monitoring system must propose changes to the internal orders issued within the Iranian military hierarchy that led to these ceasefire violations.

However, there is currently no ceasefire monitoring system that is accepted by the parties. One can be proposed and established.

July 9, 2026

Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)