The reliability of a ceasefire also depends on the orders issued to the military chains of command and on their decision-making autonomy.
It is therefore necessary to assess the military and political chains of command on each side.
Regarding the Iran-U.S. ceasefire:
- The U.S. military leadership is reliable, but the actions demanded by Trump or the Secretary of Defense are not. Based on a single piece of intelligence, they can decide to launch new strikes—for any reason. If there were a ceasefire monitoring system—one known and recognized by all parties—we could hope that it would temper some of the U.S. authorities’ impulsive decisions. The only risk is that they will not allow the ceasefire monitoring system time to prove itself, since it will take time and a few missteps before it functions properly.
- The Iranian military hierarchy is more complex. The internal Iranian structure that has enabled the system’s resilience is a mix of autonomy and centralized directives. In this case, given the multiple violations already committed by the Iranian side, it is the centralized directives that need to be reviewed. In principle, this process should begin at the highest level of the Iranian state—that is, the Supreme Leader—and then verify that the centralized directives have indeed been transmitted to all relevant Iranian units. In particular, the Revolutionary Guards failed to instruct all units that no armed intervention against oil tankers of any kind was authorized. In short, who is in charge and capable of enforcing what has been signed by the Iranian authorities? In addition to the problems within the Iranian military hierarchy, there is an ongoing conflict between the Iranian political leadership and the Revolutionary Guards. The Revolutionary Guards behave like soldiers for whom the battlefield is infinite. They do not respect countries’ territorial waters—since they probably do not know what they are and consider them irrelevant—and they do not respect them today.
Specifically, the ceasefire monitoring system must be set up on Omani territory, which overlooks the Strait of Hormuz. Three representatives from each country bordering the Persian Gulf must be stationed there on a permanent basis to share the monitoring duties.
For the negotiation phase, we would need to find facilities capable of accommodating each of the eight delegations from the Persian Gulf Council. The simplest solution would be to use the GCC’s facilities. The facilities already exist; we just need to find a few offices. The GCC secretary cannot serve as the secretary of the Persian Gulf Council, but he can facilitate future meetings.
Once the facilities and delegations are in place, it will be necessary to launch some technical negotiations:
- The boundaries of the territorial waters of each country in the Persian Gulf. Until there is an authoritative map accepted by all, we will spend our time dealing with misunderstandings = a first commission to be established
- Are there any standards or treaties that apply to the discharge of wastewater into the Persian Gulf? = a second commission to be established
- Are there any existing organizations that monitor the condition of the waters and wildlife in the Persian Gulf? = a third commission
The first commission on territorial waters must reach a conclusion quickly; its findings will be used by the Ceasefire Monitoring System, particularly with regard to the Strait of Hormuz. There will be overreactions and violations if the Revolutionary Guards continue to act as if all of Oman’s territorial waters belong to Iran. Intervening in Oman’s territorial waters or attacking oil tankers there is both an act of war and, indirectly, a violation of the ceasefire.
The committees will be chaired and led by representatives of the member states. No representative from a country that does not border the Persian Gulf is permitted to serve as a member of the committee.
July 10, 2026
Naej DRANER