Reference Documents
The agreement implemented by Tehran is not the one that was officially published
According to point 1 of the MOU, any use of force or threats was supposed to be prohibited.
Point 5 did indeed provide for discussions with Oman and the Gulf states, but we cannot act as if these agreements already exist. Tehran gives the impression that it is implementing agreements that exist only in the minds of the Revolutionary Guards but have never been formalized or recognized by the other parties.
Negotiations with the Gulf countries in the form of a Persian Gulf Council?
In any case, this will be necessary, and in any case, it was already planned under item 5.
Points in the MOU to be revised by the PGC (Persian Gulf Council)
We should focus only on the points concerning the Persian Gulf countries and leave the others to negotiations between Iran and the United States, which are beyond our control.
These points are:
- Point 1, which concerns the ceasefire and any use of force or threats,
- Point 2, which concerns the territorial integrity of each country,
- Point 5, which remains essential but for which a monitoring mechanism must be established
(It seems likely that Iran has done nothing to clear the mines, but we must first precisely demarcate each country’s territorial waters before asking European countries to carry out mine clearance in Omani territorial waters.)
In these various points, the United States must be replaced with the countries bordering the Persian Gulf. We must only consider issues that the Gulf countries can negotiate and that are relevant to the Persian Gulf region—not issues over which they have no control or that depend exclusively on the United States.
Replace item 6 with a financial contribution toward the reconstruction of Iran
It is important that there be a significant financial incentive, the form of which must be specified. This incentive should likely be linked to the state of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. The countries capable of offering such an incentive (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) cannot do so if they are being strangled by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. This incentive must exceed all revenue Iran could generate from tolls. This matter will not be a decision of the Persian Gulf Council but a proposal from several states that is recognized and accepted by the Persian Gulf Council.
This financial incentive should be viewed as an investment intended to aid reconstruction, not as a grant. An investment can serve as a lasting bond between countries. A country that invests can control the scope of its investment. For example, it is not possible for Iran to use investment funds to develop missiles and new weapons, whereas donated money would allow Iran to do whatever it wants with it, starting with strengthening its military capabilities.
Add a ceasefire monitoring system limited to the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz
This is essential to prevent further escalation. This system will necessarily be coordinated with the United States.
Only those who don’t try anything end up going nowhere
There needs to be a permanent framework for negotiations with representatives from the countries concerned, regardless of the location chosen.
July 12, 2026 (last updated at 11:55 a.m.)
Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)
Naej DRANER is a solutions architect. This article is an example of what N.D. would propose to the countries bordering the Persian Gulf if he had ties with any of them (which is not the case at the moment). It is intended as a direct advisory exercise for the countries concerned. Since N.D. has no contacts and no official standing, this is a shot in the dark that will likely never become a reality (though it could).