Persian Gulf Council: Yemen


Strictly speaking, Yemen is not part of the Persian Gulf Council and should not be a member, unless the Persian Gulf were to be extended to include the Gulf of Oman—which is not planned.

But Yemen serves as a sounding board for the tensions and conflicts between several member states of the Persian Gulf region: Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates (and Oman, whose role appears to have been limited to potential mediation efforts). At least three countries are exacerbating the internal problems that drive local residents and groups to seek one or more external sponsors in an attempt to settle their conflicts through outside support, hoping to gain a decisive military advantage.

The Complexity of Yemen

It will likely be easier to find a solution to the Strait of Hormuz than to find a solution to the conflicts and wars in Yemen.

The country is unstable for several reasons:

  • Historically, Yemen has grown accustomed to existing as two distinct countries, and there are historical differences and realities.
  • Groups evolve over time, but, exacerbated by poverty and the need to survive, there will always be one or more groups that ask foreign countries for help, which will result in a level of heavy weaponry disproportionate to their needs.
  • Internal developments can be rapid, rendering previous attempts at a settlement obsolete. The 2022 settlement, brokered by China, is certainly obsolete for several reasons: the Iran-U.S. conflict is pushing Iran, through the Revolutionary Guards, to open a second front against Saudi Arabia, which seems to have become their bête noire, since it is the only Gulf country to have been barely affected by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Are the Houthis acting independently in their attacks in the Red Sea? They have received all the specialized equipment previously used by Iran in the Strait of Hormuz. A mere coincidence? I don’t think so. It is the hallmark of Iran’s proxies to act indirectly on Iran’s behalf. By pushing the Houthis to engage in constant blackmail over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Revolutionary Guards have failed to realize that they have just shut the door—almost permanently—on any toll collection in the Strait of Hormuz. Everyone has clearly understood that after the Strait of Hormuz, there will be Bab el-Mandeb, and then what??? All of this makes the toll project definitively unacceptable. By trying to be too greedy, there won’t be much left.
  • Since 2022, new armed groups and new external actors have emerged, even though they partially withdrew from the scene in late 2025.
  • Attempting to resolve the Yemeni problem through just a few parties (such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, as China attempted in 2022) does not seem sufficient.

Searching for and Finding Yemeni Constants

Some advocate for a single state, while others advocate for multiple states. I don’t think that’s where the problem lies. There is certainly a missing level between a single state and local realities. Should we define regions with broad autonomy, or states within a federal or confederal structure? We don’t know at this stage what the right solution is, but we need to foster a process of reflection and discussion at various levels:

  • If there is a common Yemeni language, that is already a point in favor of a shared structure, even if it were to be less centralized than a presidential system, which is ill-suited to such a high degree of local diversity.
  • What are the overarching activities across the two or three entities that can be managed jointly: electricity, road networks, telecommunications, and the external-facing military?
  • Can mineral deposits or petroleum resources remain under joint management, with the profits distributed to the various entities? This approach could prevent certain groups from arming themselves simply to seize control of existing deposits.
  • Identifying common Yemeni values should help establish a broadly acceptable foundation.

Start at the lowest administrative level

The lowest level of administration is the governorate, which varies greatly in structure. Does this administrative level function effectively, and what natural groupings could we use to redefine certain regions or entities? A field study would be needed to answer these questions.

Bring together external stakeholders

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran should sit together on a development fund for Yemen. The current use of one or another of these components by external actors does not allow for a peacemaking role in Yemen. Instead, it helps to destabilize the country and prolong an endless conflict.
On the contrary, the humanitarian crisis currently unfolding in various parts of Yemen could be addressed by these external actors if they were united under a single fund. A little less in the way of weapons and a little more in the way of survival aid.

Avoid looking for a quick, magic solution

Yemen has no immediate magic solution. Many have tried, including the Gulf Cooperation Council and various countries such as China. For a time, it was possible to calm the situation.

There is a lack of institutionalized exchanges among all Gulf countries

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has been a source of exclusion and conflict with Iran. If we want Saudi Arabia and Iran to talk to each other, we must wait for diplomatic efforts that seek to bring them together—as China has attempted to do—but they do not belong to any institution through which they would share a common goal.

Today, they are locked in a long-term standoff. GCC member countries will likely invest more than 30 billion euros or dollars to find a way to minimize the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz. Yet these same countries cannot agree to allocate 20 million euros or dollars to try something else—such as a new initiative like a “Persian Gulf Council” . Even if several countries dislike one another, they could at least talk to each other from time to time.

The increase in exchanges between countries—such as what took place among European nations after World War II—has certainly been a key factor in overcoming the war and living in peace among Europeans since the end of the war.

Do you, the countries of the Persian Gulf, have any plans other than snubbing one another and building pipelines to bypass the Strait of Hormuz? You have tens of billions in money—is that the only possible use for it?

Do you, Iran, believe that all you need to do is extort your neighboring countries—through destruction and blackmail—to get them to help you get back on your feet? They will tell you that, given the destruction you have caused and the measures they are taking to avoid your blackmail, they no longer have billions to invest in your future. Coercion and your threats will drive them away. Keep this up, and sooner or later you’ll find yourselves up against a wall that seems to draw you in day by day, intoxicated as you are by what you perceive as your power through your capacity to cause harm. Destroying others will build nothing but will cause everyone to flee from you like the plague.

Yemen could have benefited from your collective understanding, but things are off to a bad start.

August 27, 2026

Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)