For the past few days, tensions between the two countries have been escalating. Each side, determined to prove it is right, is taking unilateral actions that fuel the escalation. This explains why, no matter what agreement might be reached, it would be violated in the days and weeks that follow—for different reasons on each side:

• For the United States, no matter what the incident, the response must be strong. They believe that this will intimidate the Iranians and that they will stop and return to the negotiating table. The opposite is happening. All of these responses are direct orders from Trump, with no filters and likely no decision-making process. Any idea that pops into Trump’s head becomes a new factor in the escalation. None of these escalatory measures correspond to anything negotiated in an agreement, but Trump can’t help thinking that he’s so brilliant that any military order he issues is necessarily justified. He himself undermines the agreements he has signed—and which he does not respect—by claiming to enforce them.
• For Iran, it’s more complicated and a little different. Theoretically, the Iranian political system has three levels: the Supreme Leader, the president, who serves as head of government, and the various administrative agencies responsible for carrying out the government’s orders. In practice, there is a parallel body that commands the Revolutionary Guards. It is not directly commanded by the president but by a member of the Supreme Leader’s inner circle and likely also by the “Supreme National Security Council.” Its secretary is Mohsen Rezaei, who serves as both the Supreme Leader’s representative and the secretary of this security body. The Iranian president, as head of the executive branch, is kept informed but is not necessarily the decision-maker. It is indeed the president who negotiates, but he does not issue orders to the Revolutionary Guards. The first serious incident under the June 17 agreement was the decision to target oil tankers and ships not controlled by Iran. This is not part of the June 17 agreement but rather a separate decision by the Revolutionary Guards. The same thing may happen soon with preemptive strikes. The Iranian president is striving to revive the June 17 Islamabad agreement, but at the same time, a body not affiliated with the head of the executive branch is undermining it.

The two parties are themselves undermining the agreements they signed, while blaming each other for the situation.

Could we break out of this spiral of escalation? Perhaps, but negotiators would at least have to understand this vicious cycle and propose an alternative.

Has Naej DRANER begun negotiations?

No, not at this time. The articles published on this site over the past few months are not a negotiation, but rather a rough draft of ideas that could be used to support a negotiation. The ideas have not been finalized because there is no identified negotiator to work with. An “architect” must be involved early in the negotiation process and work in perfect sync with a team of negotiators. If this is not the case, the negotiation will not even get off the ground.

The June 17 agreement would still be in effect, but in order to begin the supplementary negotiations, the following would be required:

• Identify one or more negotiators with whom N.D. will work as an architect of political and security solutions,
• establish a body to oversee and monitor a ceasefire and implement it as soon as possible,
• encourage both sides to incorporate it into their decision-making process,
• refine the initial agreement by redefining the ceasefire and establishing a timeline,
• propose the necessary implementation notes (only one example was provided; others are needed—this was merely an example).
• Ensure the effectiveness of the entire process through direct, ongoing, and institutionalized link between N.D and the negociator body.

Thinking is not the same as acting. Naej DRANER has a clear idea of what he would attempt if he had the support of one diplomatic mission or another, but he has not taken any action, as he has not identified a reliable and permanent negotiating channel.

September 3, 2026

Naej DRANER (naej.draner@gmail.com)