What caused the failure of the agreement signed on June 17?

Any agreements that might be negotiated and presented will be similar to the one dated June 17, which covers the essentials. There are many reasons for its failure:

• ambiguous agreement
• vague timeline
• lack of a system to monitor and enforce the ceasefire
• chaotic governance in the United States and Iran: both are capable of doing exactly the opposite of what they signed up to, while blaming each other

The two main issues that could jeopardize the implementation of any new agreement are the lack of a system to monitor and enforce the ceasefire and chaotic governance.

Ceasefire Monitoring and Enforcement System

Since June 17, every violation observed by one side has led to systematic military retaliation. The initial violations that triggered the first incident—which in turn set off successive rounds of retaliation—are most often linked to an interpretation of the agreement that bears no relation to the signed agreement, as if the parties were implementing an agreement that has nothing to do with the one they signed.

If there were a ceasefire monitoring and enforcement system, any incident would have to be reported to that system, which would then need to identify the cause and take corrective action as soon as possible—and, if possible, within 24 hours. This would require a robust organizational structure that does not currently exist, starting with an independent official—neither American nor Iranian—who would have liaisons on their team with each of the parties to the conflict, that is, all the countries bordering the Persian Gulf, as well as a reliable, permanent point of contact with both the United States and the Iranian government.

Experience shows that overreactions are always blamed on the other side. Some errors stem from the fact that orders transmitted to the military and all units may be ambiguous… or nonexistent. The most likely scenario for the initial errors is that there will be a complete denial, and it will fall to the ceasefire monitoring and enforcement system to draft and enforce specific orders across the various military chains of command on each side. The command structures on each side will string the ceasefire monitoring and enforcement system along without taking much action, and it will take a great deal of persuasion and authority on the part of the head of the ceasefire monitoring and enforcement system to successfully enforce orders consistent with what has been or will be negotiated.

Chaotic Governance in the United States

Trump is known for saying one thing and doing the opposite the next day. Neither the vice president nor the secretary of state is fulfilling their role as a check on Donald’s unpredictable decisions. Every decision should at least be reviewed by the secretary of state, who should ask a few questions:

• Is this consistent with the agreed-upon agreement?
• Was the ceasefire monitoring and enforcement system notified?
• Did you allow the ceasefire monitoring and enforcement system sufficient time to act? (For initial violations, it may take up to 48 hours to identify the source and implement the necessary corrective and preventive actions.) Even if the source isn’t identified, the monitoring system will determine the necessary actions, which are often the same: ensuring that all military operators know exactly what is and isn’t authorized to prevent a superior from issuing orders on their own—because they disagree, weren’t informed, or failed to follow the proper procedures. If the person in charge of the ceasefire monitoring and enforcement system doesn’t know how to do this, we’ll teach them—including how to give a good scolding.)

We need to move from a system of unfiltered orders to a system of coherent orders. There is nothing else that can be written into an agreement on this subject other than establishing a ceasefire monitoring and enforcement system.

Chaotic Governance in Iran

In principle, Iran should have a political authority and a military authority represented by the Revolutionary Guards.

All we see is the “Revolutionary Guards” in action. The “Supreme Leader” seems absent or nonexistent, limiting himself to repeating what the Revolutionary Guards say.

If the Supreme Leader has no visibility or opportunity to make his voice heard, someone must be found who represents political authority and is capable of reiterating what has been negotiated and agreed upon. The current actors are intoxicated by their military invincibility and are no longer interested in what they are negotiating. They demonstrate that they do not understand the concept of territorial waters or the sovereignty of states associated with those waters. This is often the case with military personnel. If we are to transition from war to a state of peace and build a peaceful future, the military will have to hand over control to political representatives who are currently absent.

From a purely international law perspective, each country is free to act as it sees fit within its territorial waters, unless there were a comprehensive agreement involving all the states bordering the Persian Gulf. Such an agreement is desirable, but the final navigable routes will be determined after all waters in the Strait of Hormuz have been cleared of mines. Claiming that the insecurity deliberately caused by mines laid by the Revolutionary Guards is sufficient to justify a new route—one that would be safe but longer than the previous ones—is unacceptable. Official shipping lanes cannot be determined in haste. The “Persian Gulf Council,” if it is established, should be responsible for this, but it is unlikely that such a decision will be made before two months—the time needed to verify the complete clearance of mines throughout the Strait of Hormuz.

I make no secret of the fact that Iran’s chaotic governance is a major problem for which I see no solution until we have reliable contact with Iran’s political leadership—which should be represented by the Supreme Leader—rather than merely repeating what the Revolutionary Guards say.

The Persian Gulf Council

Today, there is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which gives the impression of being a cooperative body for all the countries of the Persian Gulf. This is not the case. The name is misleading. Iraq and Iran are missing. It is not feasible to include Iraq and Iran in the GCC, given certain GCC agreements that will never apply to them. It would therefore be preferable to create a new body, called the Persian Gulf Council, in which every country bordering the Persian Gulf would be an ex officio member, with each enjoying the same rights.

Pretending that the Persian Gulf Council already exists through the GCC is nonsense. The GCC has always pursued a deliberate policy of exclusion and confrontation toward Iran. This must change, and the countries of the Persian Gulf must learn to speak to one another directly and manage their problems together without intermediaries—whether American, Pakistani, or European.

I can help launch the “Persian Gulf Council,” but it would require motivated leaders to officially raise the issue and stop believing that the decision will come from anywhere other than themselves. I can help spark discussion, but I will not make any decisions: it is their role to make decisions, even if it takes weeks to reach a conclusion.

August 3, 2026

Naej DRANER