Strait of Hormuz: An Ambiguous Agreement and Weak Coordination

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Reference Documents

Lack of a ceasefire monitoring system

This is a hallmark of all the 2025 and 2026 ceasefires initiated by the United States. There is no system for monitoring and/or supervising the ceasefire.

In the vast majority of ceasefires, there are violations, and to prevent each violation from escalating into a new war, a ceasefire oversight body is established.

Its role is:

  • Document and track violations,
  • contact each party as soon as possible to prevent the situation from escalating and to clarify the misinterpretation that led to the error
  • understand the cause of the violations and verify whether they were due to a misinterpretation (or inadequacy) of the agreement’s rules or a misapplication (a problem in the internal communication of instructions and orders within the respective hierarchies)

Since there is no oversight system, each side interprets the situation as it sees fit, does not report the information up the chain of command, and decides on its own what military action to take—which was the case on June 26, 27, and 28, 2026

Let’s break down the incident that took place on Thursday, June 25

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) plan calls for the evacuation of a total of 11,000 seafarers aboard 600 ships—who were stranded in the Gulf due to the war in the Middle East—via two separate routes, one near the coast of Iran and the other near the coast of Oman, in coordination with local authorities.

There are therefore two possible routes: one on the Iranian side and one on the Omani side. Each ship has the option of taking either route, and strict procedures have been established by the IMO to contact each ship and facilitate its evacuation.

The IMO had obtained security assurances to ensure that ships would not be targeted, stating that the evacuation process would resume as soon as it had “received further confirmation to that effect.”

A ship that passed through the Omani route was targeted. The U.S. Navy then shot down three other drones that appeared to be attempting to target ships undergoing evacuation.

Who attacked the ship while it was in transit?

Presumably, the Revolutionary Guards opened fire because they believed that any ship should have obtained their authorization beforehand.

Is this an error in the terms of the agreement or in its implementation within the Iranian hierarchy?

Presumably both. Believing that one has exclusive rights—including over the passage of ships through Oman’s territorial waters—is a misinterpretation of the original agreement and is absolutely not what the IMO negotiated. On the other hand, the Revolutionary Guards likely do not have a clear understanding of what falls within their jurisdiction and probably have operational orders that ignore the reality of the opposing party’s territorial waters.

What should be done?

The IMO plans to work with stakeholders to clarify the rules for implementing the evacuation plan.

But that is not enough. We should begin—at a level such as the “Persian Gulf Council” (or another body that considers itself responsible)—by sending the representatives of Iran and Oman a map indicating the boundary of the territorial waters between Iran and Oman, and have each side confirm the current, internationally recognized boundary. This will require as many rounds of back-and-forth as necessary, but we must arrive at a boundary recognized by both parties. It may take time, but it is necessary. We will need this on an ongoing basis, starting with mine clearance.

Why did the United States and Iran each “launch” retaliatory strikes?

Because everyone believes they are acting within their rights, and no clear system for monitoring the ceasefire has been established. If such a system had been properly established, there would be an arbitration process to identify errors or oversteps and correct the interpretation and application of the rules. This situation could continue until the war resumes.

“Poor” coordination—if not nonexistent—as exemplified by mine clearance

Let’s take the example of mine clearance. Originally, the recognized international shipping lanes were located in Omani territorial waters. Iran saw fit to leave a few mines there, just to divert all ships from these international shipping lanes and propose new, safe routes—which, as luck would have it, are in Iranian territorial waters—in order to justify an Iranian right of passage. This is called international extortion, with a few “forgotten” mines (between 0 and 80, depending on the source).

The agreement provides for mine clearance but does not specify who is responsible for what.

If the mines are located in Omani waters, any mine-clearance operations would have to be carried out with the consent of the Omani authorities (hence the importance of clearly defining territorial waters).

Did you know that the United States have no minesweepers in the Middle East? Did you know that three high-performance U.S. minesweepers were sent to the scrapyard in January 2026? In other words, only European ships are operational and ready to respond if called upon. And it’s likely that the Iranians no longer have any minesweepers either. And they’ll act as if they still have the capability to intervene. But Oman can ask whomever it wants to clear its territorial waters of mines. The Iranians will need to be notified, and steps must be taken to ensure they don’t attack these vessels due to a misinterpretation of the mine-clearing mission.

Who is responsible for coordinating mine clearance?

Not the Americans, since they no longer have any operational ships in the Middle East, and it would be better for a neutral country to handle the mine clearance. We could also ask the Iranians to come and clear the identified mines, but there is likely no clearly defined coordination in place. It’s not very complicated to bring together 3 to 5 military personnel from Gulf countries and establish the necessary coordination. According to my information, no one is really addressing this issue—neither the Americans nor the Iranians; a “Persian Gulf Council” could have taken charge of this matter and could still do so to mobilize the European ships ready to intervene. It will take them 2 to 4 weeks to clear the international shipping lane. They are ready to do so, but would like solid guarantees of support, and above all, they need countries bordering the Persian Gulf to be willing to roll up their sleeves and get the ball rolling.

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June 28, 2026

Naej DRANER