Reference Documents
Item 5 of the MOU
Point 5: Upon the signing of this MOU, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days, only from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa. The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start, and considering the need for removing the tactical and military obstacles and de-mining by the Islamic Republic of Iran will be instated within 30 days. The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialog with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz, in discussion with other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz.e point 5 du MOU dit:
In other words, this detail was not part of the direct negotiations with the U.S. but is part of negotiations with the states bordering the Persian Gulf, which corresponds to the definition of the “Persian Gulf Council.”
The “Persian Gulf Council” has a maximum of 60 days to define the new rules concerning the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.
For traffic to resume normally, clear rules will be necessary in any case, and an announcement by the “Persian Gulf Council” would be welcome.
Is there a cause-and-effect relationship between the texts written about the “Persian Gulf Council” and the MOU? Probably, but the intermediary has not been identified. Presumably, it is an Asian country that intervened indirectly.
Item 6 of the MOU
The Americans could not resist promising financial aid, even though they state loud and clear that they will not be the ones to pay for it. Since the Persian Gulf Council is not a forum for economic and political integration, it is not affected by this American promise. At most, the Persian Gulf Council could allocate a sum (no more than one-tenth of the amount specified in point 6 of the MOU) to encourage Iran to honor its commitments. For example, these funds could be contingent on Iran not blockading the Strait of Hormuz. Whenever the Strait of Hormuz is unilaterally closed by a country, there will be a sanction or a substantial reduction in the funds promised as part of the “Persian Gulf Council’s” goodwill cooperation. We’re not going to spend our time closing and reopening the Strait of Hormuz at the drop of a hat and rewarding the closures of the strait that the Persian Gulf countries need for their economic activities.
It is recommended that the Persian Gulf Council choose its official advisors carefully. Naej DRANER has never proposed anything equivalent to point 6, but as soon as the Persian Gulf Council is officially established, one or two U.S. advisors will show up demanding to take the reins… and they will propose something equivalent to point 6—which Naej DRANER will never propose to the “Persian Gulf Council.”
General Comments on the MOU
- The timing is unclear and impractical. The terms “immediately” and “within 30 days” are used interchangeably to mean the same thing. This is unclear and, frankly, ambiguous.
- The key players in the Lebanese war—namely Israel and Hezbollah—do not appear to have been involved and do not feel concerned.
- There is no system for monitoring the ceasefire. As a result, as soon as an incident occurs, the opposing side responds militarily, causing the situation to escalate.
- Lots of good intentions, few constraints. If the United States reneges on its commitments to the other parties—whose consent it didn’t even seek—the agreement could become a stillborn effort.
- This does nothing to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, unless a deal equivalent to the 2015 agreement is renegotiated, which would take at least six months to a year.
The “Persian Gulf Council” must exist
It won’t solve all the problems, but it can alleviate some of them and send a clear message to everyone who uses the Strait of Hormuz:
- It is implicitly understood in the MOU, even though it is not explicitly stated.
- A temporary chairman must be selected; this position cannot be held by Oman or Qatar, as they cannot act as both judge and party in the dispute involving the United States and Iran.
- A secretary must be appointed.
- All work to be carried out within the two months must be initiated .
N.D. has a golden rule: when people indirectly use his advice without ever acknowledging it, he plays dead and “forgets” to mention an important condition that he had forgotten “completely unintentionally” to explain earlier. Of course, N.D. will be very very sorry if, without his advices, the project does not exit any longer.
June 21, 2026
Naej DRANER