Until 2025, Israel was a remarkable example of the “Quésako Cycle.” Every war in the Arab-Israeli conflict began during a phase of amplification. This is described in the book “Un phénomène cyclique qui favorise les guerres ?” (A cyclical phenomenon that favors wars?), published by L’Harmattan in french.

Since the trauma of October 7, 2023, Israel has been waging wars on all fronts. Even during periods of calm, the wars continue and start up again. Two wars in one year against Iran, and it is likely that the war in Gaza will resume, under the pretext that Hamas has not completely disarmed.

The same thing happened in the United States after September 11, 2001. They launched wars on all fronts. Afghanistan, then Iraq, under various pretexts. What is the result 25 years after the original trauma? Afghanistan has returned to the Talibans, as if nothing had ever happened. Iraq is in Iran’s sphere of influence. The destruction of Iraq has allowed Iran to rise as a regional power. Was it all for nothing? Practically yes.

So what will be the effect of Israel’s permanent war in 20 years? It’s hard to say, but these wars will not bring Israel peace in the region. These wars will give the illusion of a victorious peace for a time.

Whether after September 11, 2001, or after October 7, 2023, the trauma of these events has led to a headlong rush into permanent war. The “Quésako Cycle” is no longer visible for a while. But in both cases, it is still present, even if it seems less visible.

In the case of the 2003 Iraq War, which seems to contradict the Quésako cycle, since it broke out near a peak of attenuation, it was possible to show the impact of the Quésako Cycle on the Iraq War through the number of war victims (see the section on Materialization in the book “A Cyclical Phenomenon that favors Wars?”). .

In the case of the new Israeli-American-Iranian war, will we see the same indirect phenomenon? Perhaps, but we won’t know for another 10 or 15 years.

March 3, 2026

On Saturday, February 28, Israel and the United States launched a military operation against Iran.

The official objectives are:

• Eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat,
• Destroy the missiles and the capacity to produce them,
• End the current regime.

Most wars do not achieve the objectives for which they are launched. This will also be the case for this new war.

Overthrowing a regime through air strikes alone can, at best, only lead to civil war if the entire security system collapses. In this case, each leader who is eliminated will be replaced. The Iranian regime does not depend solely on a few individuals, but on a system. Even if the system is hated and bloodthirsty, it knows how to renew itself, even if more than 100 leaders were eliminated.

In Libya, the end of Gaddafi’s regime led to civil war. It was not a system but a dictator and a few of his close associates who ran the regime. The end of the Libyan regime created a vacuum, resulting in civil war and instability from which Libya has still not recovered 15 years later.

The nuclear threat will remain as long as enriched uranium remains in Iranian hands. Ballistic capabilities may be reduced but probably not completely destroyed. The Iranian regime will be weakened, that is certain. Regime change is unlikely.

What collateral effects will there be for the United States and Israel? Probably an increase in attacks in 2026 and 2027 and a major oil crisis following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The peacemaker has turned into a warmonger, prolonging and reawakening the dormant war.

How long will this war last? Israel and the United States say as long as it takes. A few days? A few weeks? As long as it takes to destroy everything that can be destroyed. And then what? Since there will be no ground troops, it will end. A civil war? Unlikely. There will always be enough Revolutionary Guards and militiamen to maintain a precarious order. On the other hand, the Iranian population as a whole will suffer from increased economic insecurity.

*** Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version) ***

Naej DRANER

March 1, 2026

Postscript: Some will rightly point out that this new war does not confirm the “Quésako Cycle.” The observation is correct, but when a war begins during a phase of attenuation, it can either end quickly or turn into a long war during which the number of victims multiplies during the subsequent amplification phase. See the war against Iraq in 2003. Initially, this war seemed to challenge the cycle, but it became a pillar of it by highlighting the cycle’s materialization through the number of war victims.
*** Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version) ***

Today, none of the proposals made by Russia, Ukraine, Europe, or the United States present a credible system for maintaining the ceasefire.

The security guarantees sought by Ukraine and the Europeans give the impression that a credible and deterrent military force would be sufficient to ensure a ceasefire once it is announced. This will not be enough and will not lead to a credible and permanent ceasefire.

This is also the problem in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Gaza and in the Israeli-Lebanese conflict in southern Lebanon. Israel believes that targeted military operations are sufficient to ensure a ceasefire. This does not guarantee it, but it does make it decidedly fragile.

All these conflicts are currently being managed by people with no previous experience of ceasefires. They are all rediscovering what a ceasefire could be and, day after day, coming up with solutions, or rather non-solutions.

What contributes to maintaining the ceasefire?

• The initial agreement, if it is clear and accepted by the parties, can contribute to its observance
• A permanent ceasefire system, able to fix any incident in the half-day following any incident.
• A monitoring and inspection system for the warring parties capable of intervening anywhere in each camp.
• Permanent participation of the military forces of each camp in the ceasefire system, under the supervision of the monitoring and inspection system.
• Ongoing analysis of incidents to develop the ceasefire system and enhance its effectiveness.

None of this has been clearly addressed and described in the ongoing negotiations, according to the information available to date.

Naej DRANER

Naej DRANER is an analyst and architect of political and security solutions. He has studied, in particular, the mechanism that was put in place in 2014 and subsequent years in Donbass. This mechanism has never been able to transform into a permanent ceasefire. Taking this past experience into account, it would be possible to make a concrete proposal.

February 18, 2026

*** Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version) ***

In September 2025, a 20-point settlement plan was proposed. It led to a ceasefire on October 10, 2025, and resulted in UN Resolution 2803, which incorporated the 20 points.

Is there a ceasefire that is actually being enforced?

No. The parties involved are divided on what to call this quasi-ceasefire. Is it a frozen conflict? A low-intensity war? Everyone agrees that it is not a real ceasefire and that the Trump plan is not being implemented.

• Several hundred deaths on the Palestinian side since October
• The Rafah crossing, which was supposed to be opened at the start of the ceasefire (point 8), has only been partially open since February 2, 2026. And even then, it is likely that Israel will do everything it can to allow Palestinians to leave but refuse to allow them to enter or return.
• Points 7 and 8 concerning humanitarian aid have not been implemented as they should have been. They have been revised and amended by Israel, without any connection to the Trump plan.
• Israel is doing what it wants and adapting the initial text of the Trump plan to what it really wants to do, without any reaction from Trump or the organization that claims to be implementing the Trump plan.
• There is no known and recognized mechanism for supervising the ceasefire. Israel uses any incident as a pretext to resume bombing. They have a smart AI-based system that turns toilet noises into truth. The result is that the victims of the incidents apparently have no connection to the origin of the incidents.
• No independent observer or journalist is able to provide an objective view of what is happening in Gaza. Lying and censorship are the norm for Israel, reinforced by the indifference of the Trump team.

Trump is a promoter, not a builder. He knows how to manage publicity and press coverage but is incapable of managing a project. The ceasefire in Gaza is self-managing, so there is no real ceasefire.

During the disarmament of Hamas, the Israeli authorities will probably do everything they can to restart the war: this is what the Jewish supremacists in the Israeli government want. They will find the pretexts that suit them.

Naej DRANER

As a reminder, Resolution 2803 was adopted by the Security Council on November 17, 2025.

February 3, 2026

I understood that the “Peace Council” was a body that would deal with Gaza. I read the charter of the “Peace Council” carefully, but it has nothing to do with Gaza.

What is the status of Phase 1 of the Gaza Peace Plan?

Do you remember? Phase 1 said that the Rafah crossing would be opened as soon as the ceasefire began. Three months later, it is still not open. It was promised that humanitarian aid would be distributed to everyone by the various parties involved. That is not what happened. Israel restricted humanitarian aid, multiplied the conditions for distribution to such an extent that little aid actually arrived, and decreed that a tent peg is a dangerous weapon, to the point that Palestinians do not even have waterproof and comfortable tents. And we’ll stop there to simply say that everything that should have been done was secretly changed by Israel without dear Donald realizing that he had been duped with phase 1 of his plan revised and corrected by Israel without Donald’s dear negotiators noticing and pointing out to him that phase 1 had been emptied of its official content: an empty shell that matched Israel’s ambitions and the naivety of Donald and his crack team.

Donald, please, how can we believe that a World Peace Council will control anything, after your inability to simply implement “phase 1 of Gaza”?

Donald, do you have an aide who could explain to you what a treaty is and what it’s for?

I couldn’t believe my ears: Donald wants Greenland for “security reasons.” He’s doing the same thing G. W. Bush did when he claimed it was about weapons of mass destruction, but really just wanted Iraq’s oil. In this case, it’s about pocketing all the mineral resources, after making everyone believe that there is a security problem.

Donald, have you read the current treaty? It allows you to expand the bases if you don’t have enough space for your essential security equipment. Oh yes, you’re right: none of your colleagues have read the treaties or understood them. It’s true that it’s difficult to move forward and understand anything when the official collaborators know no more than Donald.

It is urgent that you recruit, without saying too much, a collaborator who can discreetly explain to you how a treaty works and how it can be used to add essential security equipment.

Recruitment must be discreet so that no one knows Donald is studying.

January 20, 2026

Naej DRANER

The website “L’Horloge de l’inconscient” has authorized an open forum for which the author is solely responsible. Under no circumstances we can be considered responsible for the content of this article.

Translated with DeepL.com (free version)

October 7, 2023 was a similar event for Israel to September 11 for the Americans.

In both cases, there was a military headlong rush that resembled vengeful carnage rather than a real war.

In both cases, the event justified the unjustifiable. This lasted more than 2 years for the Americans, with multiple wars: Afghanistan, Iraq, etc, etc. The rule of law has been violated on a few occasions (Guantanamo, for example).

How long will this last for the Israelis? Impossible to say at the moment. They have lost all critical sense over the past year and seem incapable of taking the slightest step back.

In the name of the ongoing war, the State of Israel has forgotten to set up a commission of inquiry asking the question: “Why did the intelligence and security services fail?”

If Israel’s security services had worked, there would probably have been fewer than 100 deaths, and many of the horrors witnessed that day would not have taken place. Would reactions have been different? Probably, but Israelis are incapable of asking such a question and debating it.

What were the failings of the Israeli security services that led to October 7th?

They are manifold, and a great deal of thought has been and is being given to them outside Israel:

• failure to exploit intelligence that seemed implausible,
• overestimation of its importance and deterrent effect,
• implementation of a technical surveillance system with no relay or human verification,
• no security force on call to intervene within minutes of any incident
• demotivation of reservists for questionable political reasons.

How long will it take for the Israelis to appoint a commission of inquiry and converge on a conclusion already put forward by external players? “The security services and the army were unable to prevent an event that could have been minimized. No sophisticated weapons were used by the attackers. At most, a few weapons that can be found in any security service and a clear desire to turn such an event into a violent and cruel warlike event, without respecting the slightest law relating to wars”.

This does not change the horror and trauma of October 7th, but it could have led the Israelis to act differently.

Will the Israelis ever ask themselves whether 1,400 dead justifies more than 50,000 dead, and whether it also justifies destroying 70% of all the buildings in Gaza, not to mention the hospitals destroyed, the food shortages maintained and so much more?

And if the 1,400 dead had only been 100 dead if the security services had worked, would that have changed?

One day, yes, they’ll ask themselves that question, but it won’t be tomorrow.

For now, the war goes on, with no prospect other than a total victory, which remains hypothetical.

Naej DRANER

ND2024-1001, November 1, 2024

Naej DRANER is an analyst. He is an architect of a political-security solution who limits himself to the role of architect. His analyses are generally a preparation for the day after and a solution for the short, medium and long term. To build a house, you need an architect, but you also need a contractor. N.D. is not a contractor and can only have an influence if he joins forces with a contractor to design and implement a suitable political-security solution.


Does the war begun on October 7, 2023 confirm the “War Cycle”?

The theoretical amplification peak is in May 2024. This new war is triggered 8 months before the theoretical peak. The prediction before this war broke out was that there would be another war, most likely within +/- 1 year of the theoretical peak.

The October 2023 war confirms the “War Cycle” and reinforces the Arab-Israeli conflict as a remarkable case of the “War Cycle”.

What the forecasts didn’t show, however, was that it would be such a massacre, and probably the most terrible war of this conflict, on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides. The horror has only just begun.

We can see that the intensity of the wars during this phase of amplification is much greater for the Ukraine-Russia war and for the war that has just begun. Is this just a coincidence, or does this amplification phase have a particularly high level of intensity? In current studies, we haven’t yet identified any factors that could determine the intensity of this cyclical phenomenon. We do have a few clues that merit further study, but we can’t be sure.

What’s next for this war?

Our knowledge of the “War Cycle” does not allow us to know how future battles will unfold. They may last several weeks.

The consequences of this war will determine the Israeli-Palestinian future, even if it’s unlikely that anything will move in the coming months.

This war is also a “Return” of 50 years from the Yom Kippur War and 75 years from the first Arab-Israeli war.

In the Arab-Israeli conflict, several wars are a return (in the sense of Return Theory) of another war:

• The 2006 Israeli-Lebanese war is a return of the 1982 war (24 years).

• The current war is a return of the 1973 war (50 years)

• The 1973 Yom Kippur War is itself a throwback to the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948, when Israel was created.

The historical origin of the “War Cycle” is the study of “Returns from the Past” between wars. At certain moments, wars are both an application of the “War Cycle” and of the Return Theory).

What do these returns mean? The Israeli-Palestinian problem is likely to reappear in terms little different from those of 1947.

October 10th 2023

Using the graph “Fatalities in state-based conflicts by Region (1989-2022)” published by UCDP (Uppsala Conflict Data Program), it is possible to reinforce the demonstration of the materialization of the “Return War Cycle”

It is explained in the attached text.

The UCDP data gives more credibility to this issue.

In the next update of the “Recurrent War Cycle”, it will be integrated.

Updated October 25, 2023

In this article, the expression “War Cycle” should be understood as the expression “War Cycle of the Return” in reference to the origin of this “War Cycle” from the Return Theory.

Demonstration Hypothesis

If the “War Cycle” favors wars, it would be logical to demonstrate that there are more wars during the amplification phases.

To verify this, the hypothesis was made to count the number of wars per year from a pre-existing list of wars and to calculate the total of wars for mitigation and amplification phases. If the total number of wars during the amplification phases is more important than for the mitigation phases, it could help to demonstrate the reality of an influcence of this War Cycle on the overall wars

After searching on a search engine for an existing database that could provide a list of wars, the list of wars associated with the V4 version of “Correlates of War” was selected. It contains the list of wars from 1816 to 2007. (Although there is a V6 version of the COW database, I did not find a list of wars equivalent to the V4 version, which is why I used the V4)

For each year from 1900 to 2007 were counted the number of wars per year then during the phases of mitigation and amplification. In addition a graph was made to try to show the peaks of amplification. A comparison was made with the theoretical peaks of the amplification phases.

Demonstration Result

From 1900 to 2000 (the later years are not taken into account so that there are as many mitigation phases as amplification phases ), there are 38% more wars during the amplification phases than during the mitigation phases. Of 342 wars on the COW list during this period, 58% are in the amplification phases.

From 1942 to 2000 (with the same number of mitigation and amplification phases), there are 59% more wars during the amplification phases than during the mitigation phases. Of 225 wars on the COW list during this period, 61% are in the amplification phases.

On the other hand, the graph does not objectively show peaks similar to the theoretical peaks of amplification and attenuation. This is probably due to the fact that the number of wars per year is still relatively low, but could also be due to the list of wars used. The result is only significant if we take the total number for all years of the amplification phases and the total number for all years of the mitigation phases.

This finding raises several questions:

• Is the list of wars used objective?
  There is no (or at least I do not know of), to date, a database on wars that is an accepted reference for all actors interested in this subject. It is a colossal task to have such a database that would serve as a reference for all statistics. It would be necessary to have one in order to arrive at an objective statistical demonstration. The list of COW wars used should pose little challenge.
  
• Are 38% and 59% more wars, depending on the periods selected, significant?
  There is a relatively small but real amplification of wars that confirms what has been observed in the contexts described with the “war cycle”.

Limits of the demonstration

Several limitations are known:

• The list of wars used contains only the year of its outbreak, without indicating the precise date. As a consequence, one would have to go back to the list and add the exact date of the beginning of the war, and then check for each war whether or not it is in the mitigation or amplification phase. In the first demonstration presented, the phase of the year is defined if the phase is longer than 6 months in the year.
  ate.

• The list of wars puts all wars on the same level, from the smallest to the biggest. Sometimes, it is only slightly violent demonstrations that are considered as wars. To confirm a phenomenon of amplification and attenuation, it would be necessary to define a weight for each war.
  

From 1900 to 1941, is it significant?

The number of wars during the attenuation phases from 1900 to 1941 is almost the same as during the amplification phases of the same period.

Does this result mean that there is no “War Cycle” demonstrated over the period 1900 to 1941?

When we look at the list of COW wars, we see that:

• There are 8 wars during the mitigation phase from 1934 to 1937
• There are 5 wars during the amplification phase from 1938 to 1941

It is paradoxical to claim that the period preceding the Second World War from 1934 to 1937 was more violent than the period from 1938 to 1941, which includes three years of the Second World War. Why such a result? Because during World War II, the list of COW wars shows almost no wars other than World War II. The successive wars started during the second world war are not visible.

What to conclude? Starting from a simple list of wars, even if it is validated by the actors involved in war studies, is not enough. A monstrous war like the Second World War has less weight in this statistical calculation than the small wars that preceded the Second World War. And yet the 2 world wars help to demonstrate the “War Cycle” by the method of contexts.

Is it enough to refuse to take into account this calculation? YES, and this poses a global problem of method.

Documents to redo the calculation

Click on the link to access the document:

• COW List of wars
• Dates of phases and amplification peaks
• Excel spreadsheet with the calculation

Update August 8, 2022